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Abstract  
 
 
 
 
 
This research considers the emergence in history of a discourse about shamans. Beginning 
with the prevalent claim that shamans have existed in all human societies throughout history, 
the initial question is: how did a kind of ritual specialist first reported in Siberia in the 
seventeenth century become the eponymous category of a universalisable religiosity? My 
project is anchored by the argument that the simultaneity of epistemological practice that 
tends to produce universal structures with an ontological practice that tends to deconstruct 
universals into embodied contingencies, together illustrate the double-hinge on which pivots 
modern subjectivity. According to Foucault’s reading of Kant, this double-hinged 
subjectivity is instantiated in a practical limit attitude that in turn establishes a self-
perpetuating dialectic, a perpetual motion dynamo animating and innervating modern 
history. This thesis argues that the simultaneously particularising and universalising 
tendencies of statements about shamans are part and parcel of modernity’s practical limit 
attitude, and can be seen in the proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse 
since the eighteenth century. Chapter Two considers this problem from a genealogical 
perspective, with reference to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russia. Subsequent 
chapters consider shamanism’s imbrications with other discursive fields. With reference to 
the indigenist movement for human rights (Chapter Three), environmentalist critiques of 
anthropocentrism (Chapter Four), and neoliberal governmentality in self-conduct as much as 
the conduct of states (Chapter Five), structural transformations in these respective fields 
have variously sustained and stimulated new proliferations, intensifications and circulations 
of shamanism, and have contributed to the reported revival of shamanic religiosity since the 
1990s. This argument takes seriously Arjun Apparudai’s recommendation to pay attention to 
the ‘mundane discourses’ of global cultural flows, and is conceived as a contribution towards 
both the sociology of religion and critical-theoretical approaches to studying religion. 
Regarding the former, this research demonstrates shamanism is a highly adaptive and 
productive discourse for a diverse assemblage of actors with interests in tapping 
shamanism’s significatory potential. Regarding the latter, shamanism is demonstrated to be a 
highly productive subject for reflexive studies of contemporary religiosity, including 
strategies for circumscribing interests, authorising representations, and legitimating 
practices.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The Problem 
During the three centuries since the earliest reports about someone called a ‘shaman’ were 
authored by European travellers to Siberia’s southern steppes, shamans have been identified 
in cultures and locations increasingly removed in space and time from North Asia. Varieties 
of globally distributed local religiosities have been assimilated into a globalised shamanic 
idiom, prompting proposals that ‘shamanism’ is a ‘new world religion’ (for example Cox 
2003; cf. Cox 2010:105-8,112). At the same time, the notion that shamanic practices are 
better conceived as techniques and therefore available to anyone rather than a calling 
confined only to the called has prompted their even wider embrace. In its temporal 
dimension, shamans have been identified in the early histories of Judeo-Christianity (for 
example Charing 2011, Craffert 2008, Keeney 2006, and Money 2001), in ancient Greece 
(discussed in Chapter Two), and even implicated with the very beginning of human 
cognitive evolution some 40,000 to 60,000 years ago (for example Winkelman 2002a). 
Today, shamans are widely imputed to exist in all places and at all times throughout human 
history. The point of departure for this research is to ask how did a kind of ritual specialist 
first reported in Siberia in the seventeenth century become an eponymous category of a 
universal religiosity? The many interrelated answers to this question have in common that 
figurations of shamans are useful and represent value for an assortment of advocates and 
proponents of shamanic religiosities as much as for their detractors.  
This observation, although hardly novel, is nevertheless important to state at the 
outset, because it helps account for the significant and wide-ranging transformations in 
shamanism discourse in recent decades. This suggestion adumbrates a second range of 
questions: For whom has shamanism become important, and why? What does this discourse 
do? What are its effects, implications, and consequences? How have these interventions and 
applications contributed to elaborating shamanism in the twenty-first century? Here the 
problem shifts orientation from shamanism’s historical conditions of possibility towards 
considering how this discourse is effective in the contemporary world. Since the 1970s, 
several constellations of interests and values have given a new prominence to shamanic 
religiosities, stimulated new proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse, and 
variously deepened and extended shamanism’s entanglements in domains of knowledge and 
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practice in which it was previously less prominent. I consider these developments with 
reference to three practical domains. First, since the 1970s a transnational indigenous 
peoples movement has articulated a sophisticated critique of the universal right of all peoples 
to self-determination in relation to their lands, territories, and resources, and has challenged 
human rights jurisprudence to find durable solutions without compromising the sovereignty 
of states or the nation-state system of international law. Solutions emerging from recent 
court judgments place great store in the ‘intertemporal dimension’ of indigenous 
‘cosmovisions’, utilise an established transnational discourse on shamanism to argue and 
articulate their key provisions, and in doing so have consolidated shamanism discourse in 
new practical domains by adding legal precedent and citation to shamanism’s discursive 
regularities.  
Second, during the 1980s concern about degradation of the earth biosphere prompted 
distinctions between sustainable and unsustainable forms of human development. 
Conservationists turned to indigenous peoples believing they could derive models from 
indigenous examples of sustainable use of natural resources, while indigenists in turn saw 
growing anxiety about destruction of natural environments as another vehicle for drawing 
attention to indigenous peoples’ grievances. However, by promoting the notion that 
indigenous peoples are inherently disposed towards living in harmony with nature, the 
indigenist-environmentalist alliance revised the primitivist trope of the noble savage with the 
notion of the ‘ecological Indian’ who is more of nature than in it (Nadasdy 2005:292). 
Ecocentric disposition became a measure of ontological difference and indigenous ontology 
became the embodiment of a critique of anthropocentric mastery of natural environments. 
Again, shamanism supplied both discursive language with which to articulate ecocentric 
disposition as ontological difference and the critique this difference implied with respect to 
the unsustainability of anthropocentrism.  
Finally, the emergence in recent decades of a specifically neoliberal homo economicus 
has transformed some shamans into spiritual entrepreneurs whose investments in their 
embodied human capital—in their skills and experience, social and spiritual networks, and 
related qualities of their corporeal being—renders their shamanic practice as a form of 
economic self-conduct. However, as the correlate of a neoliberal art of government, 
neoliberal subjects, including shamans, are also increasingly targeted by sovereign power, 
even as the principle of economy in self-conduct increasingly undermines the juridical form 
of the sovereign’s authority and reduces the domain in which sovereign power can be 
exercised effectively. Amid transformations of culture into commodity, knowledge into 
property, tradition into patent, identity into asset, and shamanic practice into human capital, 
shamanic religiosities are increasingly drawn into the ambit of things arranged by 
governments as much as by professional shamans to optimise desirable ends.  
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The problem I want to draw out of these discussions is how these domains of 
knowledge and practice—I term them indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism with 
qualifications given in respective chapters—contribute to relaying and extending shamanism 
as a discursive formation by adjusting and consolidating the principles of its unity, its 
mechanisms of assimilation and exclusion, its strategies for accumulating and deploying 
authority, and the range of its effects.  
In the background of this study is a concern with time, which is to say the 
temporalisation of a relation between past, present, and future; but also our time, which is to 
say a relation between a structure of time represented in shamanism discourse and a 
subjectivity for whom this temporal relation is important. This problem adumbrates the third 
area of inquiry with which this study is concerned. Europeans authored reports about 
shamans for European audiences beginning at the height of the European Enlightenment; the 
story of shamans’ emigration from Siberia to populate the world and human history is a 
European story that closely shadows the moods and predilections of European modernity. Of 
course, this is not to say people who are today known as shamans did not exist before 
European observers testified to the fact.  But the discourse about this kind of person and its 
elaboration and extension to other places and times is inseparable from conditions of 
possibility brought about by modernity. There may have been shamans before the eighteenth 
century, but without modernity there is no shamanism. Following Michel Foucault, this 
research understands modernity as the structure of a relation between the time of the present 
and past, one that produces a form of subjectivity marked by a tendency to exalt the present 
by seeking its limits. As I explain below, this modern subjectivity is double-hinged, with one 
arm establishing a form of relationship with knowledge of the world, and another 
establishing a form of relationship with the knowing self. This double-hinged subjectivity is 
instantiated in a practical limit attitude in epistemological and ontological dimensions that in 
turn establishes a self-perpetuating dialectic that animates and innervates modern history. 
The simultaneously particularising and universalising tendencies of statements about 
shamans are part and parcel of modernity’s practical limit attitude and account for the 
proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse since the eighteenth century 
generally.  
In summary, the thesis of this study is as follows: The emergence of modern 
subjectivity inaugurated, among many consequences, a discourse oriented by ideas and 
practices attached to a particular kind of person, a shaman. Over the following centuries, this 
discourse was elaborated in considerable detail via the perpetual motion of the modern limit 
attitude that oscillates between epistemological labour figured in a tendency towards 
universalism and ontological labour, oriented toward contingency. This elaboration was part 
of a globalising European modernity such that by the twenty-first century, its constituting 
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terms, categories, and ideas were authoritatively available, if not already applied, to virtually 
all times and places in human history, and supplied discursive language to a diverse array of 
concerns and interests. These concerns have in turn facilitated proliferations and 
intensifications of shamanism discourse in new practical domains and at increasing scales of 
complexity and transnational distribution. I argue that these can best be seen in shamanism’s 
imbrications with indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism.  
To be clear then, this is not an ethnographic study; I am not interested in particular 
shamans in particular places except insofar as such examples illustrate how they function as 
discursive formations. When I refer to spiritual or shamanic traditions, I prefer the 
sociological emphasis of ‘shamanic religiosity’, by which I mean practices and beliefs 
related to a person who, while in an altered state of consciousness, engages with spirits with 
the intention of influencing events and fortunes impacting others, whether individuals or 
collective groups. This definition is deliberately broad and is intended more as a positive 
rubric than a normative definition. This rubric is adapted from common definitions of the 
classic Siberian shaman, which generally emphasise three elements: a shaman is someone 
who 1) enters a trace-state in which they 2) journey into a spirit world 3) on behalf of or in 
service to a community (for example, Eliade 1964; Hoppál 2004; Hultkrantz 1973; Siikala 
2004). This definition tends to narrow what counts as shamanic, and I have toned down the 
emphasis on shamans’ journey out of their body in recognition that ‘shaman’ and ‘shamanic’ 
increasingly designates spirit mediums and possession states too. I also de-emphasise 
shamans’ communal role to include New Age or neo-shamanic adaptations which tend to be 
more individualistic (although not necessarily so). Possession states are often also not 
communal, particularly as spirit mediums’ practices, like neo-shamans’, become increasingly 
entrepreneurial. Lastly, I prefer the sociological emphasis on situated social practices over 
shamans’ experience emphasised by phenomenologists like Eliade and Hultkrantz.   
As for shamanism, I use this term to designate a discourse. My approach to 
shamanism draws on Foucauldian archaeology and pays attention to the regularities, unities, 
modalities, and strategies that link statements about shamans into a knowledge structure. 
However, I supplement this approach with attention to the accidents and contingencies that 
have shaped the emergence in history of a discourse about shamans. Thus, a genealogical 
account of shamanism precedes the more archaeological method developed in discussions of 
indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism. Furthermore, I take seriously Arjun 
Appadurai’s recommendation that the study of discursive forms ought to broaden what 
counts as discourse.1 Sources for this research include: scholarly sources, including many 
                                                       
1 Appadurai recommends Edward Said’s extension of Foucault’s theory of discourse be taken still further. Said 
(1979) added a humanist slant to Foucault’s structuralist one, and despite considerable criticism (Clifford 
1988a; Young 2004), studying literature as a form of discourse enabled new methods of criticism, notably in 
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published a century or more ago that I treat as primary source material, as well as popular 
books and magazines written for general audiences; reports and legal instruments produced 
by transnational organisations, particularly agencies of the United Nations (hereafter UN), 
but also activist and professional organisations of various kinds; legal documents, including 
court judgments, national legislation, and international conventions and declarations; 
documents published by or on behalf of national governments, including policy directives, 
statements by statutory agencies, and submissions to regulatory authorities; as well as a 
variety of digital sources, including promotional material published by shamanic 
practitioners and practitioner organisations on personal websites and via social media. All 
these sources are cited in the bibliography.  
I am aware that this emphasis on discursive practice risks eclipsing attention to 
embodied practice, which tends to be more implicit than explicit in Foucault’s earlier 
writings on archaeological method. Foucault’s later writings, particularly on biopower and 
technologies of the self, more explicitly foreground embodied practice, but tend to place 
greater emphasis on the relationship between self and body than on the social effects of 
embodied practice. For this reason, I supplement the broadly Foucauldian method of this 
study with Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practices situated between field and habitus. 
Embodied practices have variably relied on, drawn upon and otherwise invoked shamanism 
across a variety of domains, or fields. Sometimes shamanic religiosity has been among the 
organising elements constituting and organising a field, other times it has been more 
marginal, but always the discursive structures underpinning it are adjusted to practical 
interests. This is illustrated particularly well by the indigenist-environmentalist alliance 
discussed in Chapter Four, although many similar examples are identified throughout this 
dissertation. That said, the discussion in Chapter Five is anchored in Foucault’s critique of 
neoliberal subjectivity and governmentality to show how neoliberal governmentality, both in 
relation to self-conduct and government-conduct, has generated new forms of shamanism 
discourse and practice that we can reasonably expect will continue and intensify in the 
twenty-first century. Since these theoretical questions and methodological considerations are 
related specifically to Chapter Five, I expand on them on detail there. The theoretical and 
methodological approach of this dissertation as a whole is discussed at length below. Before 
turning our attention there, however, the following summary sketch of the terrain on which 
this study is situated indicates the appropriateness and usefulness of the theoretical and 
methodological choices underpinning it by briefly introducing some of the ways in which 
shamanism, indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism are imbricated, both 
                                                                                                                                                           
postcolonial and feminist contexts. While praising Said’s adaptations of Foucauldian analysis, Appadurai 
cautions against divorcing studies of literary discourses from ‘mundane discourses of bureaucracies, armies, 
private corporations, and nonstate social organizations’, and recommends these discursive forms be submitted 
to Foucauldian analysis too (Appadurai 1996:159). 
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practically and discursively. Following this sketch survey, I consider methodological issues, 
first with regards modernity’s double-hinged subjectivity, and thereafter with regards 
Foucauldian geneaology and Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Finally I situate this study with 
reference to recent scholarship before concluding this introductory chapter with an overview 
of the structure and outline of the thesis.  
 
The Terrain 
Credo Mutwa is well-known to a generation of South Africans as a folklorist, traditional 
healer and shaman. Beginning in the 1950s Mutwa promoted himself as an authority on 
African folklore and tradition and during the 1960s published several collections of southern 
African folklore (1969, 1966, 1964). Although Mutwa’s elaborate and evocative accounts of 
southern African culture and religion bore virtually no resemblance to recorded ethnographic 
data, either then or since (Chidester 2004:72; Rose 1965:471), his renditions of African 
primitivity and unassimilable difference from white settler culture gained him favour with 
the apartheid regime, and permission to build a ‘cultural village’ in Soweto, the sprawling 
township south-west of Johannesburg reserved for black South Africans by segregation laws. 
The village depicted rural ‘tribal’ scenes corresponding to the different ethnic profiles at the 
centre of the apartheid policy of separate development. It was torched during the 1976 
Soweto Student Uprising. Despite re-establishing his village in the 1980s as an artists’ retreat 
and tourist attraction conveniently close to the gambling and tourist resort of Sun City in the 
Boputhatswana Bantustan, by the 1990s Mutwa was widely regarded as an eccentric whose 
rambled musings on ‘things African’ were derisively dismissed by black South Africans and 
increasingly ignored by whites.  
During the 1990s, however, Mutwa’s fortunes changed. In 1997 he addressed a 
meeting of the World Health Organisation in Kampala, Uganda, on traditional healers and 
‘Indigenous Knowledge Systems’ (Chidester 2004:76-7), and in 1999 addressed the Living 
Lakes conference in California, where he received the Global Nature Fund’s Best 
Conservation Practice Award (GNF 2012). His books were brought back into print and he 
supplemented them with new titles (Mutwa 2003, 1999, 1996). He received visits from 
international authors and luminaries of the global New Age circuit, including the Joseph 
Campbell Foundation’s Stephen Larson, family therapist, cybernetician, and ‘all-American 
shaman’ Bradford Keeney, and British conspiracy theorist David Icke. The gist of Icke’s six-
hour interview with ‘Zulu shaman Credo Mutwa’ is that Mutwa confirms Icke’s claim that 
planet earth is controlled by a cabal of extraterrestrial, shape-shifting reptiles, with the juicy 
addition that these reptiles have been known to Africans for millennia as the Chitauri and are 
supposedly mentioned frequently in African folklore (Icke and Mutwa 2004). Less 
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outlandish but similarly celebratory is the volume of Mutwa’s ‘dreams, prophecies and 
mysteries’ titled Zulu Shaman and edited by Larson (Mutwa 2003), while Keeney was so 
enamoured with Mutwa that he included in his Profiles of Healing series a book-length 
feature on Mutwa, ‘the most famous African traditional healer of the 20th century’ (Keeney 
2001; RRF 2010b; cf. Kottler et al, 2004:3-16). Published by the Ringing Rocks Foundation 
(hereafter RRF), an organisation founded in 1995 ‘to explore, document, and preserve 
indigenous cultures and their healing practices’, RRF bestowed on Mutwa the honorific 
‘Distinguished Artist and Teacher of African Traditional Culture’ and awarded him a 
lifetime stipend that would ‘allow this treasure to live out his days free to create as he 
chooses’ (RRF quoted in Chidester 2004:77). 
Mutwa is neither unique nor an anomaly. A small but popular publishing industry 
translates local southern African religiosity into a globalising shamanic idiom, and spiritual, 
self-help and pop-psychology shelves of popular bookstores feature several collaborations 
between proponents of Euro-American ‘New Age spirituality’ and African ‘shamans’ 
(discussed in Chapter Five). Not only in Africa. The Foundation for Shamanic Studies 
(hereafter FSS) is a quasi-scholarly not-for-profit organisation based in Mill Valley, north of 
San Francisco. Founded in 1979 by Michael Harner, a retired anthropologist whose interest 
in shamanic religiosities was catalysed by his fieldwork among Jivaro and Conibo 
communities in the Ecuadorian and Peruvian Amazon respectively during the 1950s and 
early 1960s, Harner’s interest in shamanic religiosities culminated in his theory of ‘core 
shamanism’, Harner’s distillation of shamanism’s essential elements. Core shamanism is the 
organising principle of the FSS’s dedication ‘to the preservation, study and teaching of 
shamanic knowledge for the welfare of the Planet and its inhabitants’ (FSS 2012). Towards 
this end, during the 1990s the FSS led several ‘expeditions’ to the Republic of Tuva to assist 
Tuvans recover their shamanic heritage after decades of Soviet domination (Brunton 1994; 
Uccusic 2000). Like the RRF with Credo Mutwa, the FSS awarded ‘founding father of 
Tuvan shamanism’ Mongush Barakhovich Kenin-Lopsan the honorific ‘Living Treasure of 
Shamanism’ along with a lifelong stipend. Similar outreach and recovery projects based on 
core shamanism have been pursued in other parts of the world, most recently among a 
Baniwa community in the northwest Amazon basin (see Chapter Four). Over the years, FSS 
has grown into an international operation, with ‘faculty members’ and affiliate organisations 
spread across North America and Europe, and several in Australia, East Asia, and South 
America.  
The labours of the FSS and RRF are complimented and supported by professional 
shamans such as the several hundred registered members of the Society for Shamanic 
Practitioners. Largely based in North America, these professional shamanic practitioners are 
determined to establish shamanic practice as a credible profession and viable career option. 
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They host regular conferences, publish industry journals (as opposed to scholarly ones), and 
extensively utilise online resources, like the professional networking website Linked-In, 
where membership of the Shamanism group passed 1000 in February 2013. These and 
similar efforts have contributed significantly towards establishing the transnational template 
of shamans-as-healers/counselors/therapists tapped by Credo Mutwa, FSS, RRF, among 
many similar examples. Consider RRF’s ten-volume Profiles of Healing series:  described as 
an ‘encyclopedia of the world’s healing practices’, the ten volumes aim to ‘evoke the 
experience of being with traditional healers, shamans and medicine people as they teach their 
cultural ways’, and credits series author Bradford Keeney with undertaking ‘the broadest and 
most intense field studies of global shamanism in history’ (RRF 2010a, 2010c). Although 
Keeney is not featured in the series, he is the subject of American Shaman: An Odyssey of 
Global Healing Traditions (Kottler et al. 2004), which was awarded Best Spiritual Book of 
2004 by Spirituality and Health magazine in the category ‘shamanism’, according to 
Keeney’s website (Mojo Doctors 2012). 
But such apparently New Age circuits are not isolated from the societies in which they 
are embedded and which they connect, even if their discourses tend to represent them as 
autonomous from the conditions of their own possibility. For example, ‘indigenous 
knowledge’, such as promoted internationally by Credo Mutwa and celebrated by both 
popular and specialist literature, has been an important plank in successive post-apartheid 
governments’ strategies to modernise South Africa’s economy in accord with former 
president Thabo Mbeki’s version of a developmental state. A cornerstone of Mbeki’s vision 
of an African Renaissance (Odora Hoppers 2002), this strategic prioritising of ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ has also transformed local traditional healers into ‘African traditional health 
practitioners’, targeted them with an ensemble of legislative, policy and regulatory 
interventions, and brought them into the ambit of things disposed by government towards 
desired ends. The South Africa example is hardly unique. In Brazil during the 1990s 
alliances between local indigenous tribes and international environmental advocacy groups 
shifted the locus of tribes’ indigenous identity from historical dispossession of valuable land 
to contemporary possession of valuable local knowledge about environmental resources, 
plant and animal species, and biodiversity conservation. This reworking of indigenous 
peoples’ public image from ‘combative warriors’ to ‘stewards of the forest’ generated new 
representations of shamans as privileged keepers and protectors of valuable indigenous 
knowledge, and elevated shamans to new prominence in Brazilian public life (Conklin 
2002). As political power flowed from tribal chiefs to shamans, new alliances emerged 
between central government and indigenous groups, now represented by shamans, to resist 
international biopiracy by foreign corporations and regulate bioprospecting in the national 
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interest.2 These developments not only reversed indigenous tribes’ exclusion from Brazilian 
national imaginaries, they also anchored these imaginaries in indigenous knowledge. As 
Beth Conklin (2002:156-7) has argued, these transformations have distilled an increasingly 
generic image of shamanic religiosity that, firstly, singles out medicinal plant use as the core 
of shamanic practice and expertise, and secondly, separates shamans from images of 
conflict, killing, and death (see Chapter Four).  
This rendering of a generic shaman therefore is not a faddish enthusiasm for certain 
circuits of New Age discourse. It is a consequence of a convergence of interests that have 
restructured practical fields, implicated categories of people increasingly identified as 
shamans, and inflected shamanism discourse with symbolic capital cached in notions of 
indigenous knowledge and identity, sustainable development, and spiritual as much as 
physical health. For example, pharmaceutical companies have been prominent among 
corporate interests currying favour with local indigenous healers. Pharmaceutical companies 
have long appreciated that indigenous healers offered valuable research leads, but were 
restrained from pursuing these leads by a combination of logistical difficulties inherent in 
collaborating with often remote and relatively inaccessible indigenous communities, as well 
as difficulties inherent in scientifically isolating medicinal properties of plants identified 
from folk traditions. During the 1980s, however, indigenist activism and the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance increased visibility of and access to indigenous communities, and 
advances in genetic science improved efficiencies in scientific research. The combination of 
these factors meant that collaborating with shamans and other kinds of traditional healers 
became both viable and desirable. At least one transnational corporation, Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals, made data collection from indigenous communities and traditional healers 
a cornerstone of their research and development strategy as it sought a foothold in the 
lucrative and highly competitive phytomedicines market (Clapp and Crook 2002). However, 
as that market has grown—in 2006 its worth was estimated at nearly $43 billion globally 
(Okigbo and Mmeka 2006:88)—public sector interests have become increasingly prominent 
too. So great have been concerns in India, particularly following several high-profile cases of 
biopiracy, that India’s government established the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, a 
government-funded project to ‘safeguard the sovereignty of [India’s] traditional knowledge’ 
(TKDL 2012). The archive conforms to international patent classification specifications, and 
agreements with Japan, the European Union, United Kingdom, United States, and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation grant confidential access to these respective patent offices 
to prevent intellectual property theft.  
                                                       
2 Bioprospecting refers to ‘the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical 
resources’; biopiracy refers to ‘the appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and 
indigenous communities by individuals or institutions seeking exclusive monopoly control (usually patents or 
plant breeders’ rights) over these resources and knowledge’ (see Robinson 2010:11-18; cf. Reid et al. 1993).  
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While governments of developing countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa are 
increasingly alert to the threats to their economies posed by biopirates,3 they are also 
increasingly alert to the benefits and opportunities of bioprospecting. For example, the South 
African government is working hard to position South Africa as an important player in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The ‘supportive policy environment’ the government has gradually 
devised identifies ‘indigenous knowledge’ as a critical element in ‘the “farmer-to-pharma” 
value chain’ (alongside ‘biotechnology…infrastructure’ and ‘biodiversity heritage 
exploitation’) (DST 2008:10), and is coordinated with legislative reforms, institutional 
bodies, regulatory authorities, state agencies, private sector interests, and traditional healers’ 
organisations and associations. Sovereign power is increasingly entangled with the 
discursive regularities and embodied practices authorising generic representations of 
shamanic religiosities as modes of health practice and sources of practical knowledge.  
This then is the terrain on which this study is situated and the intersections with which 
it is concerned. I argue that imbrications between practical domains I refer to as indigenism, 
environmentalism, and neoliberalism have facilitated proliferations and intensifications of 
shamanism discourse at increasing scales of complexity and transnational distribution. More 
than this, discursive and embodied practices imbricating these domains are extending 
shamanism into domains in which previously it has been less prominent. International 
human rights law, sustainable economic development, intellectual property, and neoliberal 
governmentality are a few of the examples I consider.  
With the exception of Chapter Two, this analysis almost entirely draws on data from Africa, 
the Americas and Europe. There are historical reasons for this selection. Transnational 
indigenism coalesced in the Americas where a succession of meetings and conferences 
attended by indigenous delegates from across the region during the 1970s sustained the 
nascent movement until an indigenous agenda was formally institutionalised at the UN in 
1982. Similarly, the Amazon Basin was the crucible in which the indigenist-environmentalist 
alliance was forged in the late 1980s, and Europe and North America the regions where 
ecocentrism as indigenous ontological difference appealed the most. My focus on 
transatlantic exchanges between North American and African shamanic practitioners reflects 
how African shamanic religiosities increasingly appeal to North American audiences in 
much the same way that South American shamanic religiosities appealed a generation ago, 
although today these audiences are arguably more usefully construed as markets. As the 
correlate of neoliberal entrepreneurialism, neoliberal governmentality is also an important 
problem for this research. I illustrate this problematic with reference to post-apartheid South 
Africa where the government’s implementation of a raft of policies, legislation and 
                                                       
3 See McGown and Burrows (2006) for forty case studies from Africa. 
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regulatory authorities designed to bring ‘African traditional healers’ into the ambit of things 
coordinated towards desired ends is an instructive example of the implications for 
shamanism of neoliberal statecraft. The implications of these historical developments have 
been felt around the world and my analysis touches on impacts in other regions too, 
including Australia and Asia. However, restrictions on length coupled with the necessities of 
a focused discussion have precluded considerations of further examples. 
 
Modernity’s Double-hinge 
The tendency to think of modernity as an epoch with a definite beginning and trajectory of 
development is as important to the concept ‘modernity’ as it is problematic. It is important 
because the sense of a rupture between ‘the present’ and an era preceding it has given the 
present a quality of urgency, with a sense of purpose and mission. This tendency has been 
instrumental in supplying a temporal vision with a teleological connection imposed between 
past, present and future projecting a more or less consistent line of progress and 
development. It is problematic because the notion of a sudden rupture is empirically false 
and a teleology of progress is easily contested. However, more problematic than the veracity 
of the claim is the claim’s effect. If modernity can be distinguished from other periods of 
human history, it is not simply because, as Habermas (1990) suggests, ‘moderns’ wish to 
express a consciousness of their present as the culmination of a transition in time. This is 
hardly novel, as usages of ‘modern’ since the fifth century attest (Benavides 1998:187; 
Habermas 1981:3). Rather, it is because this consciousness inheres in a contradiction, one 
that introduces ambivalence into moderns’ relation with the present time of modernity such 
that the present appears activated and becomes animated in a mode easily given to 
personification of temporality, as if time itself were conscious with purpose and obligation.  
Capturing and arresting this problem for long enough to illustrate its workings has 
been a preoccupation for several notable observers, and more often than not Friedrich 
Nietzsche has featured prominently in their accounts. For example, Paul de Man credits 
Nietzsche with recognising that the impulse behind all ‘genuine modernity’ is the hope of 
reaching a true present unencumbered by past mistakes and false knowledge. This true 
present will be a new point of origin marking a new departure. The problem, De Man argues, 
is that as a principle of origination, modernity turns into a generative power that is itself 
historical because it cannot but engender history, illustrating his point by recalling 
Nietzsche’s frequent resort to the image of a chain (De Man 1970:390). Bruno Latour 
similarly acknowledges Nietzsche when he points to the ‘illness of historicism’ that afflicts 
moderns: ‘They want to keep everything, date everything, because they think they have 
definitively broken with their past’ (Latour 1993:69). Breaking with the past requires a past 
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to break with, so that affirmations of modernity become as many iterations and painstaking 
reconstitutions of a past that avowedly is not in the present. Except that it is, because of 
moderns’ ‘incapacity to eliminate what they nevertheless have to eliminate in order to retain 
the impression that time passes’ (Latour 1993:69). Coming into focus here is a sensitivity 
shared by De Man and Latour to a paradox at the centre of the idea of modernity, to the 
importance of desire in the labour of being modern, and to the usefulness of a relational 
approach to critiquing modernity. Although De Man’s deconstructive approach and Latour’s 
method of leveraging critique from disjunctures between nature, politics and discourse are 
both helpful and important, I find Michel Foucault’s approach particularly useful because his 
critique draws out the relation between desire and paradox in a way that succinctly illustrates 
their mutuality and co-determination.  
Foucault’s reflections on ‘modernity’ in his essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ were 
prompted by his close reading of Immanuel Kant’s 1784 essay An Answer to the Question: 
What Is Enlightenment? (Foucault 2003; Kant 2009). Foucault saw in Kant’s essay a novel 
approach to thinking about the present and therewith a way into the problem of 
characterising modernity. Foucault begins by noting that Kant’s portrayal of Enlightenment 
as ‘exit’ or ‘way out’ departed from conventional forms of philosophical reflection on the 
present by characterising the present as historical difference. This difference is not the same 
as distinction, in the sense of belonging to a present distinguished by certain inherent 
characteristics. Rather, it is a relational difference, along the lines of the difference ‘today’ 
introduces with respect to ‘yesterday’ (45).4 Kant’s definition of Enlightenment as ‘man’s 
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’ suggests the locus of this difference is an 
emergent subjectivity, one more mature with respect to yesterday’s youth. Foucault is also 
interested in the formation and constitution of this new subjectivity. His interpretation of 
Kant’s understanding of Enlightenment—simultaneously a collective process and an act of 
personal courage that, taken together, superimpose the universal, the free, and the public 
uses of reason—stresses the modifications of pre-existing relations between will, authority, 
and the use of reason through which this subjectivity is formed (45-7).  
Foucault’s interest in Kant’s essay has less to do with Kant’s views on the difference 
introduced by the historical event of the Enlightenment than with Kant’s novel approach to 
the question he addresses. Although Foucault discounts Kant’s essay as minor within Kant’s 
larger body of work, he is drawn to it because Kant’s relational approach (today-as-
historical-difference) enables a perspective on the present that apprehends the self-
constituting dynamic on which modern subjectivity pivots. Developing the proposal that the 
Enlightenment as event inaugurates a subject position marked by a relation to time and 
                                                       
4 Unless otherwise indicated, page citations in this discussion refer to Foucault (2003). 
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therewith to itself in time, Foucault is looking for a way to represent the modern self-
understanding instantiated by this relation with the present such that the dynamo of history 
set in motion by this relation, along with its implications for modern self-understanding, is 
emphatic. Foucault draws on Charles Baudelaire, for whom being modern, according to 
Foucault, was less about ‘consciousness of the discontinuity of the passing moment’ and 
more about an attitude, one that ‘consists in recapturing something eternal that is not beyond 
the present instant, nor behind it, but within it’ (49). In contradistinction to the spectator’s 
posture of the flaneur, the man of modernity is distinguished by a will to exalt the present. 
For Baudelaire, as for Foucault, modernity is double-hinged, with one arm establishing a 
form of relationship with the present, and another establishing a form of relationship with 
one’s self: ‘To be modern…is to take oneself as an object of a complex and difficult 
elaboration’ (50). Thus for Foucault, modernity has an ontological and a practical dimension, 
the complex elaboration of which requires and presumes a particular type of philosophical 
interrogation and philosophical ethos. This type of interrogation is born of the 
Enlightenment; it simultaneously problematises man’s relation to the present, his historical 
mode of being, and the constitution of his self as an autonomous subject.5 This historical 
ontologising of the enlightened self occasions a modern philosophical ethos, an ongoing and 
endless practical critique of what we say, think, and do (51). As such, this philosophical 
ethos is the thread connecting our present with the Enlightenment.  
In this way Foucault develops his characterisation of modernity as a limit attitude: a 
way of thinking and feeling, acting and behaving that ‘marks a relation of belonging and 
presents itself as a task’ (48). Foucault’s characterisation of the modern philosophical ethos 
as a limit-attitude turns the Kantian question back on itself: whereas Kant drew attention to 
the limits of what is knowable, but in the form of a necessary limitation (‘limits knowledge 
must renounce exceeding’), the modern philosophical ethos directs us to query ‘whatever is 
singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints’ within what is given to us as 
universal (53). This limit attitude, practiced in the form of a possible crossing-over, neither 
takes universal structures as its objects, nor is transcendental or aimed at making 
metaphysics possible. Instead, it is critical and directed at the historical events that have 
constituted selves as doing, thinking, saying subjects. No longer does enlightened inquiry 
deduce from the form of what we are the limits of what we can do and know. Instead the 
modern critical attitude separates out from the contingencies that have made us the 
possibilities for saying, thinking, and doing differently: ‘It is not seeking to make possible a 
metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and 
wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (53-4). For this reason the modern 
                                                       
5  I retain Foucault’s masculine pronoun in recognition that the normative modern subject has historically been 
male and largely remains so. 
 23 
critical attitude is both practical and experiential; this work ‘at the limits of ourselves’ 
constantly ‘puts itself to the test…of contemporary reality’ such that it grasps both where 
change is possible and desirable, and the form this change should take.  
For Foucault, being modern is a practical attitude informed by a philosophical ethos 
rooted in a mode of interrogation that is modernity’s Enlightenment heritage. The impetus 
towards critique is a consequence of this attitude’s structure and effectiveness, each in a co-
dependent relation and mutually inclusive identity. This attitude accomplishes its effects 
because its form as historical ontological examination interrogates its own contingencies, 
and acts on these contingencies as the limits, the crossing of which will satisfy the will to 
freedom. But such satisfaction is as temporary as the crossing, for every action has its 
contingencies and temporalities, and so new limits enable new practices in the ceaseless 
critique of being modern; ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (54). Being 
modern, the being of being modern, means that the task of practical critique cannot be 
refused. But neither can the freedom it desires be achieved, because freedom that is identical 
with desire is always restricted by the transiency of desire’s fulfilment. And so the historical 
time of modernity is characterised by an enormous proliferation and intensification as the 
limits of knowledge are pushed outwards and the limits of the desiring self are elaborated 
with ever-growing complexity and refinement.6  
If the practical limit attitude characteristic of modernity refers to a kind of labour at 
the limits of Enlightenment reason, within the limits knowledge must renounce exceeding, 
then this labour is carried on differently in epistemological and ontological domains. 
Epistemological labour consists in adding to what is already known, by questioning and 
discovering, testing and elaborating, rejecting and correcting, modifying and adjusting, and 
similar procedures for submitting data to methodical analysis and thereby expanding the 
limits of knowledge. Ontological labour references work at the limits of the self. Rather than 
a metaphysical problem of transcending the limits of the self, ontological labour references 
identifying the contingent in everything given as universal and thereby multiplying the 
surfaces of appearance of the knowing self. Consequently, ontological labour draws attention 
towards embodiment, towards particularities of bodies and differences between particular 
bodies. The simultaneity of epistemological practice that tends to produce universal 
structures and ontological practice that tends to deconstruct universals into embodied 
contingencies establishes a self-perpetuating dynamic, a perpetual motion dynamo that 
animates and innervates modern history.  
This is all good and well, but it remains to explain how modernity as limit attitude is 
related with shamanism’s proliferations and intensifications. And why shamanism; why this 
                                                       
6 Foucault’s analysis of ‘the historical moment of the disciplines’ and their practice upon the body illustrates this 
kind of elaboration (Foucault 1977a:137-8, cf. 135-69). 
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evident desire for shamans and for what shamans are variously taken to represent? The 
implication of Foucault’s theory of modernity, that we should see the modern limit attitude 
at work in the discourse on shamanism, is confirmed by the heterogeneous proliferations of 
claims about shamans and pertaining to something like ‘shamanic religion’. Today there are 
more claims about an objective shamanic religiosity oriented around agentive spirits and 
‘non-ordinary reality’ than ever before and they are increasing; and yet every claim 
represents another surface of appearance, not of an objective shamanic religiosity, but of a 
desiring self. Shamanism as discourse illustrates well the dynamic between modern 
epistemological and ontological practices. This brings us to the second question. Eighteenth-
century European reports about shamans recounted shamans’ claims to knowledge beyond 
reason’s limits, claims that effectively renounced the limits of Enlightened reason. No 
wonder then the century of denunciation that followed: shamans were dismissed as so many 
charlatans, tricksters, and frauds. But where there are claims to a knowledge beyond reason’s 
limits, to a kind of practice that doesn’t merely labour at the limits but actually transcends 
them, these have strongly appealed to some moderns for precisely the same reason they have 
appealed to moderns who reject them. An aesthetic critique of modernity relies too on the 
modern limit attitude, even if only to renounce it (Asad 2003:45-52; cf. Tremlett 2008).  
One implication of Foucault’s thesis is that this kind of labour by and large is 
inescapable. Yet if every critique is merely another staging in the reproduction and 
elaboration of its respective object of knowledge and subject of desire, then there cannot be 
an Archimedean point from which to articulate a critique. Foucault was aware of this 
problem and recommended the method of historico-ontological critique to address it, 
although it is doubtful that his recommendations to steer clear of ‘all projects that claim to be 
global or radical’, or to confine one’s critique to ‘very specific transformations’—his 
examples include ‘relations between the sexes’ and ‘the way in which we perceive insanity 
or illness’—either escapes totalising systems of representation (‘…more general structures of 
which we may well not be conscious and over which we may have no control’) or diminishes 
reliance on the same discursive structures the modern attitude takes as its object of critique. 
This is Jacques Derrida’s well-known criticism of Folie et déraison:7 Foucault’s attempt to 
write a history of madness, ‘of madness itself’, is unfeasible because such a history must rely 
on the language of reason, ‘the language of psychiatry on madness’, on madness already 
constituted as ‘an object and exiled as the other of a language and a historical meaning which 
have been confused with logos itself’ (Derrida 2005a:33-4). Foucault did not satisfactorily 
address Derrida’s critique, although he accedes to it in his essay on Enlightenment. Without 
                                                       
7 An abridged English translation was published in 1967 titled Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in 
the Age of Reason; an unabridged translation was published in 2006 titled History of Madness (see Foucault 
2006, 1967). 
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mentioning Derrida, Foucault writes: ‘It is true that we have to give up hope of ever 
acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive 
knowledge [connaissance] of what may constitute our historical limits’ (Foucault 2003:54). 
That said, Foucault’s shift towards genealogy was partly a response to criticisms of the 
archaeological method of his earlier studies, including Derrida’s and Foucault’s own self-
critique (for example, Foucault 2002:183-4).8 
At a methodological level, however, genealogy works against the tide of differánce. 
The trace of a finite pattern of descent works in the opposite direction to the trace of infinite 
deferrals halted only by the instantiation of a metaphysics of presence or an originary 
violence, such as that which establishes law. Against the always already of deconstruction 
stands the intending will of the genealogist, whose objective is not to deconstruct so much as 
to reconstruct differently. Genealogy operates within the calculus of law, politics, and 
responsibility; it is not interested in aporias that disclose justice, ethics, and the gift of life as 
a supplement supplies a lack and adds an excess. Indeed, one could contrast genealogy and 
deconstruction in terms of modernity’s double-hinge, with genealogy resembling 
epistemological labour that tends to pursue new inquiries to circumscribe in new ways, while 
deconstruction resembles the inevitability of ontological labour that destabilises everything 
thought reliable and secure. I don’t want to push the contrast too far. My point is to 
acknowledge that this study of shamanism, while designed to destabilise and disrupt the 
imputed consistency and unity of ‘shamans’ and ‘shamanic religiosity’ as knowledge-
objects, also relies on the unity of a discourse about shamans and shamanic religiosities for 
the coherence and intelligibility of its critique. I address this issue more fully in the 
concluding discussion of Chapter Two.  
This acknowledgement relates to another arguably more fundamental problem. 
Foucault’s study of madness was unavoidably positioned external to the condition named 
‘madness’, because, as Derrida noted, it relied on a language about madness to represent and 
convey its critique, a reliance that was inevitable, inescapable, and undermined Foucault’s 
                                                       
8 Considerations of Derrida’s deconstructive critique have progressed considerably since Carlo Ginzberg 
(1992:xviii) claimed that Derrida transformed Foucault’s project ‘into silence pure and simple—perhaps 
accompanied by mute contemplation of an aesthetic kind’. Like Derrida, Gayatri Spivak, Derrida’s most loyal 
and consistent interpreter, is also acutely sensitive to the structures of language that ensure the Other as 
Subject is not accessible to Foucault, whose subject position is unalterably not-Other (Spivak 1999:268; 
cf.1988). Contra Ginzberg who reads Derrida’s ‘facile, nihilistic objections’ as the cessation of speech, Spivak 
considers the problem from the subject-position of an Other constituted by language that is not their own. In 
questioning whether the subaltern can speak, she asks of the conditions conducive to their speech act. Spivak’s 
question is foreshadowed by Derrida’s shifting interests away from prioritising the impossibility of an answer 
to the question posed by differánce towards placing greater emphasis on ethics and therewith the political. 
Referencing Derrida as much as Emmanuel Levinas, Spivak suggests ‘life is lived as the call of the wholly 
other, which must necessarily be answered…by a responsibility bound by accountable reason’. Thus Derrida 
outlines the ‘deconstructive embrace’ of justice and law, ethics and politics, gift and responsibility, and the 
aporia that links the undeconstructible first term of each pair with the calculus of the second term which 
supplies, via the supplement ‘and’, the imperative for responsible action (Spivak 1999:425-8; cf. Derrida 
2005b; Derrida 1999).  
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own aspirations to write a history from within. In doing so, Foucault’s study became an 
influential and enduring part of the structuration of a discourse about ‘madness’. A similar 
issue confronts this study, to the extent that it too is situated as external to ‘shamanism’ and 
relies on a vocabulary generated by scientific and literary discourses about shamans to 
critique that same discourse. The corollary to these respective observations is important. 
Foucault’s study of madness simultaneously reinforced a distinction between ‘madness’ and 
‘sanity’ and privileged the latter over the former because the alignment of his study with 
sanity (i.e. reason) is embedded in the very structure of language articulating his analysis. 
Similarly, this study of shamanism reinforces a distinction between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ 
and privileges the latter over the former because its practice of ‘secular’ scholarship and 
alignment with secularity is embedded in the language articulating my analysis. Formulated 
in these terms, the difficulty here exceeds the terms of a debate about methodology that has 
occupied scholars working in the academic field of the study of religions for several decades. 
That debate has grappled with the implications of the fact that ‘religion’ is a category of 
specifically European provenance and part of what we might name, after Heidegger, as the 
onto-theological tradition (in which ‘secularism’ is equally embedded) that cannot be 
universalised without perpetrating epistemic violence against those non-European cultures 
and traditions to which it is applied. That debate has progressed through critiques of 
phenomenological approaches to studying ‘religion’ (J. Smith 1987, 1982, 1978), the sui 
generis status of ‘religion’ (McCutcheon, 1997; cf. 1999), ideological labours implicit in 
utilising ‘religion’ as a universal category (Fitzgerald 2000; Masuzawa 2005), and 
acknowledged the field’s indebtedness to imperial conquest and colonial administration for 
providing data in the form of ‘religious’ Others (Chidester 1996; King 1999; Lopez 1995). 
However, in recent years this debate has rubbed up against the problem that the notion of 
‘secular’, as in ‘secular’ academic research and writing, is a category of similarly 
questionable provenance and universality, although one that, compared with ‘religion’, 
remained mostly unquestioned until relatively recently (for example, Asad 2003; Dressler 
and Mandair 2011; Fitzgerald 2007).  
The methodological problem coming into focus is that far from two independent 
universal categories, differentiation between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ is historically 
contingent upon a phase of human history, albeit only the last few centuries, in which 
European ways of knowing have dominated. More than that, this dichotomous differentiation 
has been an important and highly instrumental tool in that domination. By exporting religion 
to its colonies, ‘religion’ became a marker of difference from a European centre empowered 
by its mastery of ‘secular’ technologies, notably science, democracy, and capitalism, along 
with a self-serving monopoly of the ‘virtues’ it attached to them. This European self-
understanding qua ‘secular’ nevertheless has required the reality and universality of 
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‘religion’ for its own coherence, now modulated by a legislated differentiation between 
public and private domains. The academic study of ‘religion’ has of course been an 
important forum for constituting and perpetuating the normativity of this peculiarly Western 
dichotomy and modulation. The difficulty for scholars of ‘religion’ is therefore particularly 
acute: not only is the universality of ‘religion’ questionable, but the practice of ‘secular’ 
scholarship about ‘religion’ turns out to be problematic too. With some exasperation, 
scholars of religion increasingly ask whether it is possible, at a methodological level, to write 
about ‘religion’, ‘religious’ practices, ‘shamanic religiosity’, or indeed neoliberal economics 
or human rights law as ‘secular’ projects, in ways that do not perpetuate an assumption that 
these terms signify two distinct and universal categories, when in fact they are mutually 
imbricated, co-determining, and provisional?  
The problem, as Derrida noted, is that when we speak of ‘religion’ we are confronted 
with the problem of Latin, which is to say the globalisation of a language, but also the 
irresistible hegemony of a culture that is not Latin but Anglo-American:  
For everything that touches religion in particular, for everything that speaks ‘religion,’ 
for whoever speaks religiously or about religion, Anglo-American remains Latin. 
Religion circulates in the world, one might say, like an English word <comme un mot 
anglais> that has been to Rome and taken a detour to the United States. Well beyond its 
strictly capitalist or politico-military figures, a hyper-imperialist appropriation has been 
underway now for centuries. It imposes itself in a particularly palpable manner within 
the conceptual apparatus of international law and of global political rhetoric. Wherever 
this apparatus dominates, it articulates itself through a discourse on religion. From here 
on, the word ‘religion’ is calmly (and violently) applied to things which have always 
been and remain foreign to what this word names and arrests in its history. (Derrida 
2002a:66-7) 
Derrida noted further that the same can be said for the entire ‘religious vocabulary’, 
including ‘cult’, ‘faith’, belief’, ‘sacred’, ‘holy’, and similar terms, to which we might add 
‘ancestor spirits’, ‘spirit possession’, ‘trance’ and similar terms from the ‘shamanic’ 
vocabulary. The co-extensiveness of ‘religion’ and worldwide Latinization ‘marks the 
dimensions of what henceforth cannot be reduced to a question of language, culture, 
semantics, nor even, without doubt, to one of anthropology or history’: 
Globalatinization (essentially Christian, to be sure), this word names a unique event to 
which a meta-language seems incapable of acceding, although such a language remains, 
all the same, of the greatest necessity here. For at the same time that we no longer 
perceive its limits, we know that such globalization is finite and only projected. What is 
involved here is a Latinization and, rather than globality, a globalization that is running 
out of breath <essoufflée>, however irresistible and imperial it still may be. (Derrida 
2002a:67) 
From this perspective, comparative studies of religions in postcolonial contexts are 
particularly important and instructive, because they bring into sharp relief the Eurocentric, 
theological, and secularist presuppositions of the academy. Richard King has suggested 
postcolonial studies of religions are better conceived as a kind of ‘foreign body’ or ‘point of 
infiltration’ within the university that indicate opportunities to interrogate and debate the 
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academy’s preconceptions (King 2011:54). Or as David Chidester has put it, religion is not 
the object of analysis, but its occasion (Chidester 1996:259). That is one response to the 
problem of religion. Mandair and Dressler argue that a genealogical approach to studying 
‘religions’ ‘helps to release the space of the political from the grasp of the secularization 
doctrine’ by ‘bringing to light the often hidden function of secularism in religion-making’. 
Nevertheless, on its own, genealogical critique fails to grasp the nettle of ‘the circular 
relationship among history, secular critique, and the liberal imaginary’, whence the aporia at 
the heart of the religion/secular problematic. Indeed, Mandair and Dressler argue all three 
strands of postsecular scholarship, namely liberal secularist sociopolitical philosophy, 
‘postmodernist critiques’ of ontotheology (the quote marks are theirs), and genealogies of 
power, ‘[reify] the dialectic of the religio-secular construct and the politics in which it is 
embedded’. Instead, they call for a metaperspective that is both postsecular and 
postreligious, ‘and, to the extent that the religious and the secular are epistemologically and 
semantically linked, for a perspective that is post-secular-religious’ (Mandair and Dressler 
2011:19). Developing and testing the adequacy of such a perspective is the task set the 
eleven contributors to Dressler and Mandair’s recent edited volume Secularism and 
Religion-Making (Dressler and Mandair 2011; also see Mandair 2009).  
These critiques of methodology in the study of religions are important, productive, 
and highly stimulating. That said, at a methodological level, the ambition of my study is 
considerably more modest. While I shine a critical light on constructions of ‘religious’ 
objects, from ‘shamans’ and ‘shamanic practitioners’ to ‘sacred sites’ and ‘sangomas’, I do 
not exercise the same degree of critical engagement with the ‘secular’ status of, for example, 
‘human rights’ or ‘neoliberal governmentality’, or indeed this study as a form ‘secular’ 
research. For purposes of answering the questions informing this research, I acknowledge 
but do not engage the ‘impossible inheritance’ of globalatinised vocabularies nor the task of 
‘un-inheriting’ them via the kinds of metaperspectives proposed by Mandair and Dressler 
(on ‘un-inheriting’, see Mandair and Dressler 2011:18-9). Although bracketing this problem 
opens this study to criticism that it perpetuates this reification, sustaining a metacritique of 
globalatinisation at the same time as advancing a systematic critique of shamanism’s 
imbrications with indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism would confuse the focus 
and detract from the analysis. With this in mind, I am cognisant of the operations of 
globalatinisation in this study’s framing in terms of the double-hinged articulation of 
modernity. 
To summarise then, ‘modern’ in this study means a kind of subjectivity that emerged 
via developments and transformations in European culture and society between the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries and then proceeded. Modernity as epoch refers to the 
temporalisation of this mode of subjectivity and its indexing by instantiation of a range of 
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preferred political, social, and economic arrangements.9 This characterisation specifically 
rejects the historicist suggestion that modernity is the leading edge of universal human 
history unfolding, or that it signposts the telos of human development, universalised and 
periodised. The approach here is precisely the opposite. The notion of ‘modern’ and its 
preferences for certain social arrangements is historically a peculiarly European idea, and the 
project of extending it to all corners of the world has been animated by the logic of modern 
subjectivity itself. That is to say, the modern limit attitude has given rise to a range of ideas 
about a modern self, notably pertaining to individual autonomy and personal liberty, such 
that preferred arrangements, for example, secular liberal democracy, monogamous marriage, 
or capitalist economies, appear virtuous and the best possible ‘order of things’. To the extent 
that this study operates within this framework, this analysis could be said to participate in the 
project of ‘provincialising Europe’ (Chakrabarty 2000; cf. Chakrabarty 2002). But only to a 
limited extent. Although this study shares a similar critical orientation towards European 
modernity, the history told here does not narrate subaltern histories or aspire to mediate 
subaltern voices. This study is not about shamans or shamanic religiosities, although 
obviously it does implicate them. This study is about shamanism, a structure of knowledge 
and mode of discursive practice through which modern subjectivity has been formed and 
historically European concerns with interpolating the self into preferred socio-political 
arrangements and dispositions have spread around the world. Neither does this study assume 
an Archimedean vantage beyond modern limits. Rather, it is undertaken in the mode of a 
‘critical ontology of the present’ (Foucault 2003:56) that inevitably also instantiates the 
modern limit attitude that pivots modern subjectivity.  
Admittedly, this model of modernity assumes a subjectivity and temporality that is 
pre-modern or non-modern. A reliance that can only ever be a gesture of the powerful 
(Chakrabarty 2002:xix), this is why modern selves, at least initially, were European selves 
and why liberty, equality, and fraternity were denied non-European populations in Africa, 
Asia, Australasia and south Pacific, and the Americas, and indeed Europeans who were not 
male, landed, and monied. A few centuries later, however, we are all in various ways 
products of European modernity, albeit differently affected and shaped by globalised modern 
institutions and mechanisms for achieving certain social arrangements. Globalised modernity 
has brought us ‘into an altogether new condition of neighborliness’ (Appadurai 1996:29) and 
therewith transformed putative difference from into difference within. By this I mean to draw 
attention to how modernity encounters itself in similitudes and disjunctures, in difference 
                                                       
9 The Renaissance, Enlightenment, and French Revolution are sometimes cited to frame the cultural shifts in 
European society that brought about what has subsequently been called the modern epoch, although the 
temptation should be resisted to reduce complex processes and aggregates of situated interests and decisions to 
convenient signifiers. 
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that circles back on itself to be (re)presented as familiar but not the same, as different but not 
too much.  
There is something fractal-like in the shape and movements of contemporary cultures 
and the way these movements echo the ontological and epistemological labour that 
innervates modern subjectivity and animates history (cf. Appadurai 1996:46). To wit, as 
Piers Vitebsky has argued (see below), an organising trope of shamanism discourse has been 
that shamanic religiosity belongs in the past of remote tribes and the present of modern 
subcultures. Since the 1990s, however, a shamanic revival has appeared in the present of 
some of those tribes, who today are neither remote nor tribal, and who now, along with 
modern subcultures and often in the same ceremonies, practice something called 
‘shamanism’. Thus, argues Vitebsky (1995:188), ‘watertight distinctions’ between 
‘traditional shamanistic societies’ and New Age shamanic movements are no longer 
possible. The FSS’s report of its expedition to Tuva illustrates this problem (Brunton 1994). 
FSS Field Associates Director Bill Brunton conceived of the expedition to emulate the Dalai 
Lama’s 1992 visit to Tuva and celebration of Tuva’s Buddhist tradition that ensued. Brunton 
hoped to do the same for local shamanic traditions. Towards this end, Brunton enlisted the 
apparently enthusiastic support of Tuva’s then-President Sherig-Ool Oorzhak whose 
personal involvement elevated the FSS group’s successive meetings and joint public 
performances with prominent Tuvan shamans to national event. During the first of four FSS 
expeditions to ‘the Land of Eagles’, core shamanism, example par excellence of modern 
shamanism discourse, became a model for rehabilitating ‘their [Tuvans’] shamanism’, while 
this rehabilitation, undertaken in the mode of an authentic recovery of a pre-Russian past, 
formed a crucial part of Tuva’s project of post-Soviet nation formation and nationalist 
development. In this way, shamanism and nationalism, two quintessentially modern 
discursive modes, converge under the sign of primordial and pre-modern, and modernity 
circles back to confront its products as if for the first time. Similar patterns of resemblance 
and distinction are evident in indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism.  
A final point to make here is that the locus of modernity’s double-hinge is the body. 
Shamans’ bodies have been a focal point of shamanism discourse. Early reports from Siberia 
recounted tales of shamans who slashed their bodies and miraculously survived, while 
Enlightenment scientists’ took delight in unmasking these slashed bodies as concealed 
substitutes and repositioning shamans’ allegedly extraordinary bodies within ordinary limits. 
Theorists of neurosis focused on hysterical bodies to account for disordered minds, while 
romantics through the years have idealised shamans’ capacities to exit their bodies and 
undertake extraordinary journeys in disembodied worlds. As the shamanic idiom assimilated 
spirit-mediumship traditions in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, these idealisations 
adjusted to include shamans’ bodies that materialised extraordinary spirits in ordinary 
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worlds. Still other accounts are variously awed and fearful of shamans’ shape-shifting 
bodies, or shamans’ powers to impinge other bodies, whether by cure or affliction. In short, 
shamans’ bodies have been the focus of an elaborate discourse about spirit worlds beyond 
human worlds and supernatural agents among natural agents, and have provided troves of 
material with which moderns have delimited and distinguished their present from what came 
before.  
 
Genealogy and Archaeology 
More often than not shamanism is regarded as a category of world religion or spiritual 
technique; it is not conventionally thought of as a discourse. Yet ideas about shamans—who 
they are, what they do, how and why they do it—have been produced in agonistic relation 
with and are significantly reliant on Euro-American discourses for their meanings and global 
dispersal (DuBois 2009; Znamenski 2007). Sometimes these ideas have been directly 
concerned with people identified as shamans. For example, accounts by Russian and 
European travelers in Siberia prior to the eighteenth century reported that shamans were 
‘priests of the devil’ who dressed in antlers and furs and banged drums to summon demons 
(Petrovich 2001; Znamenski 2007:5-6). On other occasions, images of shamans have been 
instrumentalised to serve more oblique purposes. For example, in 1786 Catherine II (‘The 
Great’; b.1729 d.1796) wrote a play Komediia Shaman Sibirskoi in which she portrayed the 
fictional shaman Amban-Lai as a greedy charlatan who uses trickery to deceive gullible 
audiences. The play is not about shamans per se; it was the third play in Catherine’s satirical 
anti-Masonic trilogy. Catherine used the figure of the shaman as a literary device to ridicule 
and berate the Russian nobility who at the time had developed an interest in esoteric rituals 
and techniques, particularly freemasonry. In performing her opposition to such anti-
enlightened pursuits as freemasonry, Catherine displayed her enlightened intellect and in the 
same gesture sanctioned a prevalent consensus that shamans were cunning frauds (O'Malley 
1997; Voigt 2008).10 A century later shamans were cited as evidence of a bizarre syndrome 
afflicting people of a supposedly nervous disposition (i.e. women and shamans). Amateur 
ethnographers and other observers in the furthest reaches of Russia’s Asian empire combined 
the extant science of ‘hysteria’ with theories of environmental determinism to diagnose a 
range of behaviours as ‘arctic hysteria’. Whereas spirit possession was considered endemic 
among Russian peasant women in the nineteenth century and was explained with reference 
to female hysteria (Worobec 2001), arctic hysteria was the preferred explanation among 
                                                       
10 The play’s concluding lines, in which Kromov admonishes Ustinia, encapsulates Catherine’s message: ‘You 
resemble these shamans. Both you and they follow rules you’ve invented. At first you deceive only 
yourselves, but then you deceive everyone else who puts their faith in you’ (O'Malley and Catherine II 
1998:79; see also O'Malley 2006). 
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observers of indigenous populations in less ‘Russified’ and more ‘savage’ north-east Siberia. 
Thus Novakovsky (1924:113) could write, ‘this scourge of the northern tribes is the product 
of that media in which they are forced to live and lead a difficult struggle for existence’. Yet 
the reduction of shamanism to psychoscience worked the other way too, and it did not take 
much to adapt the notion of shaman-as-healer to shaman-as-primitive-psychoanalyst. Claude 
Lévi-Strauss called psychoanalysis ‘the modern version of shamanistic techniques’ and 
‘shamans and sorcerers’ precursors to psychoanalysts (Levi-Strauss 1963:204).  
It is tempting to suggest that the history of shamanism discourse proceeds in 
successive stages. For example, Roberte Hamayon (2004, 1995) has identified ‘devilisation’, 
‘medicalisation’, and ‘idealisation’ as the three main ‘lines of interpretation’ across three 
centuries of shamanism discourse. There is merit in her argument, except for her suggestion 
that these interpretations are successive. Methodologically, her reasoning is troubled by the 
same problem that troubled Foucault’s studies of psychiatry and madness (Foucault 1973, 
1967): the discursive regularities of successive epistemic structures fails to account for how 
one episteme gives way to another. Empirically, the long arcs of these interpretive lines 
undermine the chronology of Hamayon’s model. For example, George Kennan’s description 
in 1876 (pp.109-10) of the religion of the ‘Koraks’ as ‘little more than the worship of the 
devil’ recalls Petrovich’s and Witsen’s similar claims two centuries earlier. A century after 
Witsen and a century before Kennan, in the mid-eighteenth century Vasilii Zuev rejected his 
contemporaries’ preferred explanations of shamans’ unusual behaviour (‘general weakness, 
gullibility, or simple stupidity’) in favour of medical ones (‘I would rather classify his 
behaviour as a sort of illness’), thereby anticipating enthusiasm for arctic hysteria by more 
than a century (Zuev quoted in Znamenski 2007:10). Not long after Zuev advocated medical 
explanations for shaman’s seemingly bizarre behaviour, Johann Gottfried Herder began 
developing his ideas about poetry and music with reference to the ancient Greek shaman 
Orpheus (Herder 1800; cf. Flaherty 1992:132-49).11 Nearly a century later, this image of the 
shaman as essentially similar to ‘ancient ecstatics and artists’ (Von Stuckrad 2002:773) 
underpinned claims by participants in the Siberian regionalist movement, particularly 
Gregorii Potanin, that Siberia’s indigenous cultures were the source for Ancient Grecian 
cultural borrowing. In their view, the roots of European civilization were in ancient Siberia, 
not ancient Greece. Another century later, the theme inaugurated by Herder some two 
centuries earlier remained popular (for example Kirby 1975, 1974). Indeed, the notion that 
something like ‘shamanic consciousness’ is the origin of poetry and art has been a prevalent 
theme in much shamanism discourse, from the performance-installations of Joseph Beuys 
and Marcus Coats (Rothenberg 1967; Tisdall 1998; Walters 2010), to Allen Ginsberg’s 
                                                       
11 For more on German romantic interest in shamans, see Gloria Flaherty’s observations about shamanic motifs 
in Goethe, Mozart, and Herder (Flaherty 1992; cf. Von Stuckrad 2003, 2002). 
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likening Bob Dylan to a shaman (Scorsese 2005), to the curators of a 2008 Jackson Pollock 
retrospective in Paris doing the same with the famous abstract expressionist (Klein et al. 
2008). 
The lines of interpretation Hamayon identifies correspond less with successive 
epistemic stages, and are more contemporaneous and entangled than her schematic approach 
suggests. Although this does not necessarily undermine their usefulness, more useful perhaps 
is Gloria Flaherty’s (1992) attention to ‘paradigms of permissibility’ that have demarcated, 
regulated, prescribed and prohibited what may be said about shamans and shamanic 
religiosity at different times since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. With paradigms of 
permissibility, we are closer to what Foucault (2002:161) termed ‘the effective field of 
appearance’ in which knowledge objects are produced. For Foucault, archaeological 
description is interested in excavating the interplay of rules that make possible the 
appearance of objects and their representation in language within a given temporal period, 
and devotes an extended discussion in The Archaeology of Knowledge to the formation of 
objects and concepts, modes of enunciation, and strategies of elaboration that give unity and 
regularity to discourse and enable its normative power. It is not the statements or the 
resemblance of their formulations that matters—‘the dull grey of what everyone at a 
particular period might repeat’ (Foucault 2002:161)—so much as how discursive regularities 
specify a ‘field of appearance’ in which objects appear as products of discursive effects. 
However, as important as the interplay of rules that discriminate between statements that are 
permitted and prohibited and give unity to discursive formations12 is the interplay of rules 
that define the transformation of objects, ‘their non-identity through time, the break 
produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence’ (Foucault 
2002:36). The distinction is subtle but important. Attention to the interplay of the rules that 
makes possible the appearance of objects signals an analysis of the structure of a discursive 
formation; consideration of the interplay of the rules that define the transformation of objects 
suggests a critique of the formation of a discourse. The former is interested in the locus of 
power within a structure, while the latter adds a temporal dimension.  
The development of Foucault’s methodology from archaeology to genealogy is well 
known (for example, Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Gutting 2006; Hoy 1986; Mahon 1992; 
and Smart 2003). Foucault’s earlier studies tended to place greater emphasis on the 
appearance of objects (asylums, madness, prisons) and gave less attention to their 
transformation in time. Or more precisely, less attention to how discourse produces identity 
between non-identical objects via a range of discursive regularities that appropriate, 
transform, incorporate, and assimilate disparate and heterogeneous social forms and thereby 
                                                       
12 ‘What it seeks in the texts of Linnaeus or Buffon, Petty or Ricardo, Pinel of Bichat, is not to draw up a list of 
founding saints; it is to uncover the regularity of a discursive practice’ (Foucault 2002:160-161). 
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gives shape, structure, regularity and unity to a discursive formation over time. Foucault was 
aware of this limitation and acknowledged that archaeology is ‘a sort of motionless thought’ 
that ‘seems to treat history only to freeze it’ (Foucault 2002:183). The archaeological method 
suggests a vision of history as a succession of ruptures, an unsustainable rendering that 
cannot account for how a sudden break comes about or how discourses interrupted by this 
rupture are reconstituted and transformed according to new rules (Foucault 2002:193; cf. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983:79-103). Foucault saw a solution in Nietzsche’s changing usage 
of the terms ursprung (origin) and herkunft (descent), and two years after the publication of 
The Archaeology of Knowledge he signalled his new approach in his essay ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy and History’.13 Foucault took Nietzsche’s distinction between ursprung and 
herkunft and Nietzsche’s implicit critique of the search for origins via his analysis of 
descent, beginning with Untimely Meditations and articulated most fully in On the 
Genealogy of Morals, as the point of departure for his discussion of genealogy. For Foucault, 
‘the search for descent…disturbs what was previously considered immobile, it fragments 
what was considered unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent 
with itself’. Genealogy disrupts the continuity of a suprahistorical perspective by identifying 
the accidents, reversals, shifts, and transformations that make up human history (Foucault 
1977b:146-7). Genealogy opposes itself to the search for origins, and in this sense is a 
method of critiquing suprahistorical perspectives that perceive history as the unfolding of a 
long and continuous series of events in accord with the destiny of a people. Foucault thinks 
the historical sense can avoid the domination of a suprahistorical perspective ‘if it refuses the 
certainty of absolutes’ and cultivates ‘a dissociating view’ that perceives divergence and 
discontinuity, includes marginal elements and that is ‘capable of shattering the unity of 
man’s being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events 
of his past’ (Foucault 1977b:153). This is how Foucault arrives at his concept of effective 
history: ‘History becomes effective to the extent that it introduces discontinuity into our very 
being…it will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended 
continuity’ (Foucault 1977b:153). Genealogy suggests a kind of personal liberation from ‘the 
meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies’ (Foucault 
1977b:140).  
Foucault’s vision of history is one of shifting relations of power, unregulated, without 
beginning or end, without conclusion or ultimate intention in the sense of destiny or 
millenarian end, ‘a profusion of entangled events’: 
…the world of effective history knows only one kingdom, without providence or final 
cause, where there is only ‘the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance.’ 
                                                       
13 L'archéologie du Savoir was published in 1969 and in English translation in 1972. ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, 
l’histoire’ was published in 1971 and in English translation in 1977. 
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Chance is not simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every attempt to 
master chance through the will to power, and giving rise to the risk of an even greater 
chance. (Foucault 1977b:155)14 
Effective history affirms knowledge as perspective, it is explicit about its own grounding and 
its slant: ‘Its perception is a deliberate appraisal, affirmation or negation…Through this 
historical sense, knowledge is allowed to create its own genealogy in the act of cognition’ 
(Foucault 1977b:157). As a way of tracing historical decent, genealogy is also a method of 
critiquing notions of historical origins in idealised pasts. By paying close attention to the 
relations of power that describe the details of entangled events, Foucault advanced a 
methodology for critically analysing the descent of ideas, practices, products, styles, 
vocabularies, and the accumulations that collect into human history.  
The genealogy of shamanism presented in Chapter Two is concerned with the 
transformation of knowledge and ideas about ‘shamans’ up to the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The discussion pays attention to the accidents and contingencies that have shaped a 
discourse about shamans and transformed it in multiple registers as it descended through 
time to the end of the nineteenth century when it was embraced by advocates of the science 
of anthropology in North America. Influenced by the Boasian paradigm of cultural 
specificity, anthropologists undertaking detailed ethnographic studies of indigenous cultures 
nonetheless required a universal signifier not perceived as tainted by the language of the 
evolutionary paradigms they contested. Gradually, terms like ‘juggler’, ‘conjurer’, ‘priest’ 
and ‘medicine man’ were replaced with ‘shaman’. Yet discursive practice according to rules 
that make possible the appearance of objects and rules that define their transformation over 
time is not the whole story of how shamanism has proliferated and disseminated to contexts 
increasingly removed from eighteenth-century Siberia. Other kinds of practices have been 
important too, as I hope to illustrate in my discussions of indigenism, environmentalism, and 
neoliberalism. In each of these practical domains, shamans’ bodies have been crucial to 
shamanic discursive practice: shamans embody a bond that binds people with place, such 
that place articulates collective identity and founds the right, belonging to all peoples but 
particularly indigenous peoples, to self-determination in relation to their lands, territories and 
resources; shamans’ bodies supply valuable symbolic capital to a critique of anthropocentric 
mastery of nature, and embody a subject position from which to articulate that critique; 
shamans’ bodies are distinguished by relatively rare skills and abilities that offer shamans a 
competitive advantage amid neoliberal emphases on entrepreneurialism of the self, but for 
roughly the same reason also marks shamans’ bodies as targets of biopower. With these 
                                                       
14 ‘[T]he iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance’ is a quotation from the second treatise of 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals.  
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issues in mind, I supplement the Foucauldian approach to this study with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice.  
 
Field and Habitus 
The key elements of Bourdieu’s theory of practice are field and habitus because it is their 
conjunction that accounts for the logic of practice. Bourdieu (1979:vii) defines habitus as ‘a 
system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of 
structured, objectively unified practices’. As a system of disposition, habitus is ‘society 
written into the body, into the biological individual’ (Bourdieu 1990a:63). With the notion of 
disposition, Bourdieu is able to avoid the extremes of either rule-bound or completely 
unfettered action while retaining measures of both objective constraint and subjective will. 
Thus, ‘The habitus contains the solution to the paradoxes of objective meaning without 
subjective intention’ (Bourdieu 1990b:62). From the perspective of habitus, subjective 
agency appears as structured improvisation, which is to say, ‘a permanent capacity for 
invention’ (Bourdieu 1990a:63).  
In place of rules, Bourdieu posits strategies. One is unlikely to win a game of chess 
simply by playing by the rules. Indeed, one cannot play the game only by the rules because 
the game relies on always having options among the variations permitted by the rules of the 
game; the game is over when no options exist for one or both players. Players’ choice is a 
condition of the game, and playing the game means making tactical choices between 
alternatives permitted by the rules. The objective of chess is to gradually gain advantage 
against one’s opponent until their options are reduced to none and the game is won. In other 
words, strategy counts more than rules. Bourdieu readily admits that the game analogy is 
limited (Bourdieu 1990a:64). In reality we are born into the game of life (Bourdieu 
1990b:67). Since social rules are seldom explicitly recorded, one has to develop a ‘feel for 
the game’ to get by as much as get ahead in life. This kind of ‘practical sense’ is the logic of 
practice that Bourdieu wants to theorise (Bourdieu 1990a:108).  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the game analogy helps understand the other key 
element of Bourdieu’s theory. In Bourdieu’s model, a field is delimited by agents’ interests 
in the advantages at stake in the field. Bourdieu uses interest in the sense of the opposite of 
disinterest or indifference, rather than in the economic sense of utility (see Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:115-116). The field itself is structured by the configuration of objective 
relations between the positions occupied by agents (individuals, institutions, etcetera) and 
their placement is defined by the distribution of their power relative to the interests and 
stakes delimiting the field, and agents’ objective relation to other positions in the field. The 
distribution of power is central to Bourdieu’s model because it is the acquisition or loss of 
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power in its different forms, including its devaluation, that changes agents’ relative position 
and reshapes the field. Bourdieu (1997:46) uses the concept of capital to convey this idea:  
…the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a 
given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set 
of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in 
a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices.   
For Bourdieu an account of the structure and functioning of the social world is impossible 
without a notion of capital ‘in all its forms’. Fields—delimitations of the social world 
organised around specific interests—are structured by the distribution of relevant forms of 
capital ‘whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the 
field’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97). Bourdieu’s notion of capital developed over the 
course of his prolific output. While his earlier studies (for example Bourdieu 1979) use a 
concept of capital more closely attuned to structuralist Marxism, by the 1980s Bourdieu 
elaborated the concept more in line with Foucault’s notion of knowledge/power (for 
example, Bourdieu 1991; 1986; cf. 1980):  
Species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and as a stake 
of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus 
exist, in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity. 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:98) 
Capital exists in four principle forms: economic (convertible into money and 
institutionalised in property rights); cultural (cultural goods appropriated materially or 
symbolically and which may be institutionalised, for example in educational qualifications); 
social (durable networks of relationships which may be institutionalised in group 
memberships); and symbolic (capital endowed with a specifically symbolic efficacy, for 
example reputation, or perception of honour) (for discussions of types of capital, see 
Bourdieu 1997, 1991, 1977). Two important qualities of the forms of capital are, firstly, that 
they all presuppose embodiment. Capital is generated through labour and is embodied in the 
dispositions of the habitus. Secondly, capital is convertible. Economic capital may be 
converted into cultural capital, for example by purchasing a work of art. Social capital may 
be converted into economic capital, for example by selling club memberships that enables 
access to influential networks. This convertability means agents can use their capital in 
different fields.15 Crucially, however, capital neither exists nor functions except in relation to 
a field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:101).  
The conjunction of field and habitus accounts for the logic of practice, for the 
embodied practical sense that Bourdieu conveys as a ‘feel for the game’. Bourdieu 
(1990a:107-108) describes it as ‘a sort of ontological complicity, a subconscious and pre-
                                                       
15 Capital’s capacity for conversion has long been a problem in the public sphere, where proponents of greater 
transparency in government raise concerns about wealthy business people’s disproportionate degree of access 
to politicians and policy makers.  
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reflexive fit’ that manifests itself as practical sense, ‘an intentionality without intention 
which functions as the principle of strategies devoid of strategic design, without rational 
computation and without the conscious positing of ends’. The conjunction of structured 
fields of interest with systems of dispositions is Bourdieu’s solution to the excesses of 
objectivism and subjectivism (Bourdieu 1990a:124-6). To understand this, it is necessary to 
understand the relation between field and habitus as operating in two ways. The first 
operation is the relation of conditioning, whereby fields structure habitus and the habitus is 
shaped by the outcomes of contests over the stakes that constitute fields. As a system of 
dispositions, the habitus ‘is the product of the embodiment of the immanent necessity of a 
field’. The second operation is the relation of knowledge or cognitive construction. This 
relation works in the opposite direction, so that habitus ‘contributes to constituting the field 
as a meaningful world’, endowing it with sense and value so that it appears as worth 
investing energy and labour. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:127) 
Bourdieu describes the conjunction of field and habitus as a ‘double and obscure 
relation’. It is double because social reality appears to exists twice, in things and in minds, in 
fields and in habitus, and it is obscure because the accommodation and adaptation of habitus 
to field feels natural and the knowledge relations of the habitus appear to be the natural order 
of things. Bourdieu conveys this idea with the analogy of a fish in water: ‘…when habitus 
encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a “fish in water”: it does not 
feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:127). Analytically however, fields are prior to the structured dispositions of 
the habitus. On this point Bourdieu is clear: ‘the relation of knowledge depends on the 
relation of conditioning that precedes it and fashions the structures of habitus’ (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992:127). The outcomes of contests in fields, constituted by interest and 
structured by the distributions of capital possessed by agents participating in those fields, 
produce the dispositions of the habitus. In turn, these dispositions are embodied in agents as 
inclinations towards participating in particular fields and acting in particular ways in these 
fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:126-127). Although the mutual implication of relations 
of conditioning and relations of knowledge is crucial for Bourdieu’s theory of practice, from 
an analytical point of view, the direction of causality is clear: habitus follows fields.  
Capital, whether economic, cultural, or social, becomes symbolic capital when its 
arbitrary truth is misrecognised as legitimate knowledge, with concomitant standards of 
‘right’ values, ‘correct’ behaviour, ‘appropriate’ speech and comportment, and so on. In this 
sense, symbolic capital produces practical knowledge (Bourdieu 1990a:112). By 
‘misrecognition’, Bourdieu means that the interests inherent in particular actions are not 
perceived or are misidentified and the forms of practical knowledge mobilised by symbolic 
capital are thus regarded as ‘common sense’, ‘natural’ or otherwise beyond question. The 
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form of power inherent in symbolic capital is therefore particularly valuable because it 
enables its possessor to appropriate an authority to legislate or subvert the principles of 
classification that define the perception of interests and organise the calculation of stakes 
delineating a field (Bourdieu 1986:249, cf. pp.244-59). The resulting classificatory schema, 
in its misrecognition, is naturalised through the operations of the relations of conditioning, 
by which the outcomes of struggles in fields structures habitus, and the relations of 
knowledge, by which this conditioning effect is relayed back to the field in the form of 
embodied dispositions of which one is largely unconscious and scarcely aware (Bourdieu 
1990b:135-42). As the power that legitimates knowledge and demands conforming practice, 
agents with large stocks of symbolic capital are in a position to influence and even determine 
the rules of the game.  
It is a short step from grasping the operations of symbolic power to recognising the 
prevalence of symbolic violence in social space, of which masculine domination is a 
paradigmatic example (Bourdieu 2001b; cf. Adkins and Skeggs 2004) and religion is a 
‘quintessential form’ (Urban 2003:361; cf. Rey 2007; 2004). Similarly, it is a short step to 
recognise the importance of language in Bourdieu’s model. As Bourdieu observed, 
‘linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992:142). Indigenism is an instructive example. Indigenist discourse challenges ‘dominant 
fractions’ (Bourdieu’s phrase) of the international community of nations, institutionalised in 
the UN and international human rights law and styled after the Westphalian model. In a very 
practical sense, this challenge is leveled against dominant fractions’ exercise of symbolic 
power to organise the classificatory schema regulating who is entitled to a range of rights, 
privileges and protections. Indigenists took aim at the misrecognition of interests inherent in 
the Westphalian model of national sovereignty by contesting significations of several key 
terms of international law (‘indigenous’, ‘peoples’, ‘self-determination’, ‘land’, and so on). It 
was only as those struggles were gradually won from the 1970s onwards that indigenous 
peoples began winning substantive rights and material privileges and protections, as I 
discuss in Chapter Three. 
A range of criticisms have been levelled at Bourdieu’s theory of practice over the 
years, and these serve as guidelines for how to use his ideas (for example Calhoun, LiPuma 
and Postone 1993; R. Jenkins 2002; Swartz 1997). Probably the most frequent criticism is 
that Bourdieu’s theory overly relies on economic metaphors to illustrate the logic of practice. 
Bourdieu’s response is that the notions of interest, capital, cost, incentive and so on with 
which he explains the logic of practice are often understood in a narrowly economic way 
simply because the economic field is where we most frequently encounter these concepts. He 
counters that it is a mistake to reduce all economies to the logic of one singular economy, the 
economic economy. Bourdieu is concerned with ‘the principle of economy’. This principle 
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should be understood as a form of calculation of costs and benefits that enable a discovery of 
‘modes of behaviour that can be understood as investments aimed at the maximization of 
utility in the most different economic universes (in the extended sense of the word), in prayer 
or sacrifice…but also in the logic of symbolic exchanges’ (Bourdieu 1990a:92). 
Another frequent criticism is that Bourdieu’s theory is inherently pessimistic. For 
example, Hugh Urban (2003:360-1) reads Bourdieu as suggesting that social practice is a 
brutal game in which everyone is engaged in a never-ending competition over scarce 
resources with which to advance or protect their interests. Craig Calhoun frames the 
pessimism critique differently: it is not that Bourdieu’s analytical framework renders a 
negative, brutish view of social relations, but rather that his framework presents the general 
system of social and cultural organisation as basically conservative. He notes, for example, 
that the dynamic element of Bourdieu’s theory is not a structural quality as with the notion of 
contradictions in Marx or Hegel, but rather is located at the level of the strategic actor 
(individual or collective), while the pursuit of distinction, profit, power and wealth is the 
motive force of social life (Calhourn 1993:70; cf. R. Jenkins 2002:86-87). Calhoun’s larger 
question is how Bourdieu’s theory accounts for social transformation. The short answer is 
that Bourdieu’s theory is conservative insofar as it is quite effective as an explanation of 
adjustment and adaptation to hegemonic structures and less so with large or rapid social 
changes. Bourdieu’s theory of practice is essentially most useful at the level of the individual 
actor and less so at larger scales of abstraction.  
As far as this study is concerned, I am less concerned with individual practice and 
make greater use of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital and conversions into symbolic 
power. Bourdieu’s theory is particularly important in my discussion of the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance in Chapter Four where I argue that the possibility and effectiveness 
of the alliance was due to the rapidly increasing value of indigenous symbolic capital during 
the 1980s. Shamans and shamanic religiosities offered practical embodiments of indigenous 
symbolic capital and spurred proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse.  
Having sketched the terrain, and set out the methodological and theoretical parameters 
of this study, let me conclude this chapter by situating this study in relation to trends in 
researching and writing and shamans.  
 
Trends in Shamanism Research 
Early writings about shamans tended to be concerned with the origins of a religio-cultural 
institution apparently prevalent among indigenous populations of Central and North Asia. 
Opinion was divided between whether shamanic religiosity originated in Siberia or came 
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from elsewhere, India and China being favourite sources. In some versions of the former 
view, ‘shamanism’ was regarded as the original religion from which all other religions have 
emerged (I consider a version of this hypothesis in Chapter Two); in the latter view 
‘shamanism’ was regarded as a degeneration of ‘Brahmanism’ or ‘Lamaism’. Both accounts 
sought evidence for their respective hypothesis in philological analyses of the term 
‘shaman’, with the Sanskrit term sramana, Pali term samana, and Manchu term saman being 
favourites among orientalists. The Polish anthropologist Maria Czaplicka provides a useful 
summary of these philological arguments in her 1914 monograph Aboriginal Siberia: ‘In 
Sanskrit śram = to be tired, to become weary; śramana = work, religious mendicant. In the 
Pali language the word samana has the same meaning. These two latter words have been 
adopted by the Buddhists as names for their priests.’ Alternatively, ‘samam is a Manchu 
word, meaning ‘one who is excited, moved, raised’; śamman (pronounced shaman) and 
hamman in Tungus have the same meaning. Samdambi is Manchu: ‘I shamanize’, i.e. “I call 
the spirits dancing before the charm’” (Czaplicka 1914:197-8; see also Mironov and 
Shirokogorov 1924). Linguistic morphology invited cultural and historical comparisons. For 
example, based on philological analysis, F. Max Müller concluded: ‘Shamanism found its 
way from India to Siberia via Tibet, China, and Mongolia. Rules on the formation of magic 
figures, on the treatment of diseases by charms, on the worship of evil spirits, on the 
acquisition of the supernatural powers, on charms, incantations, and other branches of 
Shaman witchcraft, are found in the Tanjur, or the second part of the Tibetan canon, and in 
some of the late Tantras of the Nepalese collection’ (Max Muller 1868:233-4). Many 
Russian observers were of the same opinion (Znamenski 2004a; 2003a).  
However, some observers were unconvinced by either the Sanskrit or Pali evidence. 
American anthropologist Berthold Laufer thought the debate amounted to little more that the 
history of an error, and after weighing the evidence concluded ‘Tungusian saman, šaman, 
xaman, etc., Mongol šaman, Turkish kam and xam, are close and inseparable allies grown 
and nourished on the soil of northern Asia,—live witnesses for the great antiquity of the 
shamanistic form of religion’ (Laufer 1917: 371). Indeed, Laufer was dismissive of ‘pan-
Indianism, which held the minds of scholars enthralled…and the germs of which are not yet 
entirely extirpated’ (Laufer 1917:364). Turning inside out the question of Indic philological 
diffusion into central and north Asia, Laufer argued that the word ‘shaman’ found its way 
into both Indo-European and Uralic (Finnish; Hungarian) languages ‘as a scientific term’, 
and cited the noted Assyriologist A.H. Sayce to demonstrate the point. In the second volume 
of his Introduction to the Science of Language, Sayce wrote: ‘In Shamanism, so called from 
the Shaman or Siberian sorcerer, who is himself but a transformed ́srâmana or Bhuddhist 
missionary priest, we rise to a higher conception of religion’ (Sayce, 1880:293). Like many 
of his generation, including Spencer, Tylor, Levy-Bruhl, Frazer, and Durkheim (Olsen 
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2001:69), Sayce held an evolutionary view of ‘religion’. Sayce argued ‘religion’ developed 
from ancestor-worship and fetishism into the ‘higher conception’ Sayce identified with 
shamanism, then totemism, and eventually polytheism which ‘gives birth to its own 
destroyer’ in the form of a ‘Godhead’ ‘(who) becomes more abstract, more worthy’ as the 
generations pass  (Sayce, 1880:288-99; cf. Ward 1909). The transformation of ‘shaman’ into 
a type and ‘shamanism’ into a category accelerated as Anglo-American writings about north 
Asian cultures and societies proliferated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
a topic I explore in greater detail in Chapter Two with reference to North American 
anthropology.  
Another forum for scientific applications of ‘shaman’ and ‘shamanism’ concerned 
shaman’s mental states, or, recalling Roberta Hamayon, the ‘medicalisation’ of 
representations of shamans. Explanations of shaman’s strange behaviour in terms of the 
sciences of physiology and psychology were frequent from the end of the nineteenth century. 
Znamenski gives the early example of Russian physician M.F. Krivoshapkin who in 1865 
compared shamanism with hysteria and named the condition ‘hysterical demonomania’ 
(Znamenski, 2004:xxxvi). Taking up the theme, Bogoras wrote in 1910 that in ‘Studying 
shamanism, we encounter, first of all entire categories of men and women who either suffer 
from nervous agitation or who are obviously not in right mind or completely insane’, 
suggesting that this nervous agitation is especially noticeable among women because they 
are more prone to neurosis (Bogoras quoted in Znamenski, 2004: xxxvii). By the turn of the 
twentieth century, shamanism was also seen as a psychiatric condition linked with the 
environment and was described in theoretical terms as arctic hysteria. Maria Czaplicka and 
Swedish scholar of religion Åke Ohlmarks were particularly influential in popularising this 
explanation of shamans’ mental states, basing their observations on earlier fieldwork by 
Bogoras, Jochelson, Sieroszewski and others (discussed in Chapter Two). For example, 
Czaplicka claimed ‘the essential characteristic of a shaman is a liability to nervous ecstasy 
and trances’ and thought the notion of being called by spirits to the shaman’s vocation 
‘generally equivalent to being afflicted with hysteria’ (Czaplicka 1914:198,172). Czaplicka 
attributed this ‘pathology’, the title of the fourth and final part of her book, which also 
consisted in a single chapter titled Arctic Hysteria, directly to Siberia’s harsh environment: 
Shamanism seems to be such a natural product of the Continental climate with its 
extremes of cold and heat, of the violent burgas and burans [snow and wind storms], of 
the hunger and fear which attend the long winters, that not only the Palaeo-Siberians 
and the more highly cultivated Neo-Siberians, but even Europeans, have sometimes 
fallen under the influence of certain shamanistic superstitions. (Czaplicka 1914:168) 
In his Preface to Aboriginal Siberia, the anthropologist of religion R.R. Marett praised 
Czaplicka’s discussion ‘of those remarkable facts of mental pathology summed up in the 
convenient term “Arctic Hysteria”’. He continued, ‘This side of her work is all the more 
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important because, apart from these facts, it is difficult or impossible to appreciate justly the 
religious life of these Siberian tribes; and to say the religious life of a primitive people is 
almost to say their social life as a whole’ (Marret in Czaplicka 1914: vii-viii). In similar 
terms, Ohlmarks also emphasised the unique nexus of shamanism, hysteria and climate. He 
described Siberian ‘shamanism’ as ‘the great hysterical attack which ends with cataleptic 
collapse, partly the arctic delirium of persecution and spirit hallucination’ (Ohlmarks quoted 
in Znamenski, 2007:99; cf. Ohlmarks 1939:352). Although the theory of arctic hysteria did 
not endure, the relationship between ‘shamanism’ and psyche remained a preoccupation well 
into the twentieth century. For example, the French-trained Russian anthropologist Sergei 
Shirokogorov devoted several chapters of his ‘Psychomental Complex of the Tungus’ to the 
subject of shamans and the ‘psychomental conditions of shamanism’ (Shirokogorov 1935; 
for an overview discussion of psychiatric approaches to shamanism see Mitriani 1992). 
Psychiatry and psychology were important vehicles through which ‘shaman’ as type 
and ‘shamanism’ as category were universalised and applied to an ever-widening range of 
ethnographic data. By mid-century, however, psychiatric approaches, which tended to 
emphasise shamans’ personality, were losing favour to psychoanalytic approaches, which 
tended towards more sympathetic interpretations of shamans’ mental states in relation to 
their role and function within their community (for representative examples of these 
differing emphases see Boyer 1962; Devereaux 1969; Kraus 1972, Silverman 1967). 
Increasingly ‘shamanism’ was represented as a social institution in ‘primitive’, ‘pre-
modern’, or ‘traditional’ societies that channeled symbolically the fears and anxieties of 
local communities. Soon, however, medico-scientific representations of ‘shamans’ and 
reductionist explanations of ‘shamanism’ in terms of pathology or social role and function 
were challenged by non-reductionist accounts that saw in shamans’ experiences the essence 
of religion.  
Probably no scholar has been more influential in popularising interest in shamans in 
the West and expanding the application of the term ‘shamanism’ than the Romanian scholar 
Mircea Eliade (b.1907 d.1986). Eliade’s book Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy 
was originally published in French in 1951, when Eliade was living a self-imposed exile in 
Paris. An aspiring scholar of religion, Eliade taught briefly at the École Pratique des Hautes 
Études and used his appointment there to position himself in an international network of 
scholars of religion, which included the Italian historian of religion Raffaela Pettazzoni, 
Dutch phenomenologist Gerardus van der Leeuw, and German scholar of religion Joachim 
Wach. Eliade would eventually succeed Wach as Professor of the History of Religions at the 
University of Chicago’s School of Divinity in 1958, a position he held until his death in 
1986. Eliade’s achievements were considerable. He transformed the study of religions at 
American universities and beyond, deeply influenced a generation of students and scholars, 
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and through this expanding range of influence established ‘history of religion’ as a 
disciplinary field. Still, his ideas and his early political allegiances were heavily criticised 
even in his lifetime and especially since his death. His legacy has been a point of sometimes-
vociferous debate among scholars of religion and a lightning rod for wider debates about 
theory and method in scholarship about religion, particularly the validity and usefulness of 
phenomenological approaches to studying religion and the enduring impact of Eliadian 
phenomenology in the field of study of religions. It is not my intention to repeat those 
debates, nor engage with the suggestion that Eliade’s involvement with the Iron Guard and 
fascist politics in his native Romania influenced his scholarship. They are beyond the scope 
of this discussion and have been exhaustively addressed elsewhere (representative examples 
include Allen 1988; Alles 1988; Corless 1993; Dudley 1977; Kehoe 1996; McCutcheon 
2003, 1997:74-100; Rennie 2007, 2006, 2001, J. Smith 2004:61-100, 1987:1-23; Wedemeyer 
and Doniger 2010; on phenomenology in the study of religion, see Eliade and Kitagawa 
1959; Flood 1999; A. James 1985; McCutcheon: 1997:27-73; Murphy 1994). Instead, I want 
to restrict this discussion to Eliade’s book on ‘archaic techniques of ecstasy’ and its relation 
to shamanism discourse. It was only after Le Chamanisme et les Techniques Archaïques de 
l’Extase was expanded and published in English translation in 1964 that Eliade’s book 
became widely, although not unanimously, regarded as the authoritative study of shamanic 
religion and practice. This perception was doubtlessly aided by Eliade’s growing authority as 
the pre-eminent scholar of religion in North America, symbolic capital he used to establish 
the reputation of both his book and that also contributed to Shamanism becoming the 
‘turntable’ between intellectual discourses of the nineteenth century and popular 
appropriations of shamanism in the twentieth century (Boekhoeven 2011:128,138-9; Von 
Stuckrad 2002:173-4). Shamans occupy an important place in Eliade’s overarching 
intellectual project and his study of shamanic ‘techniques of ecstasy’ is presented as 
evidence of his theory of religion and illustrative of the appropriateness and usefulness of his 
comparative method. It is therefore useful to very briefly sketch Eliade’s account of religion 
before considering his representations of shamans (for more detailed summary discussions of 
Eliade’s theory of religion see Pals 1996; Rennie 1996).  
Eliade rejected reductionist explanations of religion in terms of physiology, 
psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, or art as simply false because they omit ‘the 
one unique and irreducible element in it—the element of the sacred’ (Eliade 1958a:xvii). 
This element ‘which belongs to [religion] alone and can be explained in no other terms’ was 
the key term and organising principle of Eliade’s theory of religion. In The Sacred and the 
Profane Eliade argued that the world comprises two fundamental and irreconcilable domains 
and therewith planes of existence, ‘the sacred’ and ‘the profane’. Whereas profane space is 
experienced as ‘homogenous and neutral’, sacred space is reality, it is ‘the only real and 
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real-ly existing space’. Eliade named the experience of the ‘nonhomogeneity of space’ 
‘religious experience’, and claimed it is a ‘primordial experience, homologizable to a 
founding of the world’: 
For it is the break effected in space that allows the world to be constituted, because it 
reveals the fixed point, the central axis for all future orientation. When the sacred 
manifests itself in any hierophany, there is not only a break in the homogeneity of 
space; there is also revelation of an absolute reality, opposed to the nonreality of the 
vast surrounding expanse. The manifestation of the sacred ontologically founds the 
world. …the hierophany reveals an absolute fixed point, a centre. (Eliade 1959a:21) 
The notion of ‘hierophany’ occupies a central place in Eliade’s work. Constructed of the 
Greek phaino (to appear; to manifest / be manifested; cf. kratophany, theophany, epiphany, 
ontophany), hierophanies are manifestations of the sacred that, as such, rupture the 
homogeneity of profane space and therewith reveal absolute reality. Since any object is 
capable of transfiguration into an hierophany, hierophanies are intensely paradoxical: ‘A 
sacred stone remains a stone; apparently (or, more precisely from a profane point of view), 
nothing distinguishes it from all other stones. But for those to whom a stone reveals itself as 
sacred, its immediate reality is transmuted into a supernatural reality’ (Eliade 1959a:12).  
Contrasted with sacred space manifested or revealed in hierophanies, in profane space, 
‘true’ orientation is impossible, ‘for the fixed point no longer enjoys a unique ontological 
status; it appears and disappears in accordance with the needs of the day.’ In place of a 
world, ‘there are only fragments of a shattered universe’ in which man is ‘governed and 
driven by the obligations of an existence incorporated into an industrial society’ (Eliade 
1959a:23-4). To live in a profane world is ontologically disorienting, whereas ‘[t]he sacred is 
saturated with being’ (Eliade 1959a:12): 
…the sacred is pre-eminently the real, at once power, efficacity, the source of life and 
fecundity. Religious man’s desire to live in the sacred is in fact equivalent to his desire 
to take up his abode in objective reality… (Eliade 1959a:28) 
This desire to live in a real and effective world, ‘a sanctified world’, Eliade claimed was the 
motive reason for elaborating ‘techniques of orientation which, properly speaking, are 
techniques for the construction of sacred space’. Not to be confused with human labour, ‘in 
reality the ritual by which he constructs a sacred space is efficacious in the measure in which 
it reproduces the work of the gods’ (Eliade 1959a:29). Eliade thought this labour of ‘making 
the world sacred’ and orienting one’s ontological being around a sacred centre was a 
primordial impulse, which is to say, a universal generative principle, that inseparably 
connected ‘religious conceptions’ and ‘cosmological images’ to form ‘the system of the 
world’: 
(a) a sacred place constitutes a break in the homogeneity of space; (b) this break is 
symbolized by an opening by which passage from one cosmic region to another is made 
possible (from heaven to earth and vice versa; from earth to the underworld); (c) 
communication with heaven is expressed by one or another of certain images, all of 
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which refer to the axis mundi: pillar (cf. the universalis columna), ladder (cf. Jacob’s 
ladder), mountain, tree, vine, etc.; (d) around this cosmic axis lies the world (=our 
world), hence the axis is located “in the middle,” at “the navel of the earth”; it is the 
Centre of the World. (Eliade 1959a:37) 
Eliade thought this orienting ‘cosmic pillar’, an axis mundi equivalent to ‘the centre of the 
world’ that connects ‘cosmic levels’ (i.e. underworld, earth and sky), grounds ontological 
being and founds our shared world. For Eliade, this ‘system of the world’ is the archetypal 
cosmogony reproduced in specific techniques of constructing sacred space, techniques that 
replicate ‘the paradigmatic universe created and inhabited by the gods’ (Eliade 1959a:34).  
In Patterns in Comparative Religion, Eliade clarified that his notion of the ‘Centre’ is 
not necessarily a cosmological idea (Eliade 1958a:367-9). Repeating the same point in 
Shamanism, Eliade explained that the Centre refers to the scene of any hierophany that 
‘manifested realities…not of our world, that came from elsewhere and primarily from the 
sky’ (Eliade 1964:259-60). It is pre-eminently a shaman’s technique of ecstasy that enables 
him, alone among ‘magicians and medicine men of primitive societies’, to journey between 
cosmic levels (Eliade 1964:259, cf. pp.5,107). Although the ‘morphology’ of shamanic 
techniques may vary, the ‘essential schema’ is everywhere the same: the shamans’ trance 
enables him to pass through an ‘opening’ or ‘hole’, the same hole through which passes the 
central pillar of the world and through which gods descend to earth and the dead descend to 
the underworld; ‘it is through this same hole that the soul of the shaman in ecstasy can fly up 
or down in the course of his celestial or infernal journeys’ (Eliade 1964:259).16 Mastery of 
‘archaic techniques of ecstasy’ that enable shamans to journey between cosmic levels 
differentiates shamans from other members of their clan as much as this ability distinguishes 
‘shamans’ as a type of magico-religious person (Eliade 1964:107).  
Eliade organised Shamanism around illustrating this thesis. The book begins with 
general comments related to ‘shamanism and mystical vocation’, followed by four chapters 
on initiation into the shamanic vocation (‘Initiatory Sicknesses and Dreams’; ‘Obtaining 
Shamanic Powers’; ‘Shamanic Initiation’; ‘Symbolism and the Shaman’s Costume and 
Drum’), and then a series of geographically named chapters (‘Shamanism in…’) beginning 
with ‘Central and North Asia’ and progressing through ‘Shamanism in North and South 
America’, ‘Southeast Asian and Oceanian Shamanism’, among the ‘Indo-Europeans’, and 
‘Tibet, China and the Far East’. The only continent from which Eliade does not draw 
examples is Africa. Explaining in a footnote that identifying shamanic elements in African 
religions ‘would lead us too far’, he refers readers to works by Adolf Friedrich, S.F. Nadel, 
                                                       
16 Eliade’s idiosyncratic advocacy of ‘the [morphological] method of delineating structures by reducing 
phenomena to archetypes’ owed much to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, especially Goethe’s 1790 monograph 
The Metamorphosis of Plants. Jonathan Z. Smith, probably Eliade’s most diligent and thoughtful critic, has 
written an excellent account of Eliade’s understanding and application of ‘morphology’ (J. Smith 2004:64-
100).  
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E.E. Evans-Pritchard, H. Baumann, and C.M.N White (Eliade 1964: 374n116). Using the 
encyclopaedic method Eliade associated with history of religions as an academic discipline 
(Olsen 2001), these chapters present ethnographic evidence illustrating the universality of 
the ‘cosmic pillar’ and the shaman’s ‘celestial ascent’ and descent to the ‘underworld’.  
Critical evaluations of Shamanism tend to repeat a common range of criticisms 
directed at all Eliade’s works, including that his approach to studying ‘religious phenomena’, 
including shamans’ ‘archaic techniques of ecstasy’, is ahistorical, crypto-theological, and 
motivated by a politics of nostalgia. Indeed, in his short ‘Forward’ to Shamanism Eliade 
argued that ‘all history is in some measure a fall of the sacred, a limitation and diminution. 
But the sacred does not cease to manifest itself, and with each new manifestation it resumes 
its original tendency to reveal itself wholly’. Continuing this stream of thought, he wrote, 
‘The shamanic phenomenon itself’ is of greater importance than the specificity of ‘various 
historical and cultural aspects’, for with shamanism ‘we are dealing with a complete spiritual 
world’, knowledge of which ‘is a necessity for every true humanist; for it has been some 
time since humanism has ceased to be identified with the spiritual tradition of the west, great 
and fertile though that it is’ (Eliade 1964:xxv-xxvi). I do not want to repeat well-known 
criticisms of Eliade’s work. Readers can consult the critiques cited above. More useful for 
the purpose of this review is to note the door Eliade opened towards representations of 
shamans that are more literary than conventionally academic. Indeed, for Michael Taussig, 
Shamanism ‘epitomises’ how ‘anthropology and the comparative history of religion 
established the “shaman” as an Object of Study’, by identifying a ‘type’ found in the 
Siberian wilderness, ‘now everywhere from New York City to Ethnopoetics’. In Taussig’s 
view, the trope of the shaman’s magical flight between celestial realms, ‘from life to death to 
transcendent rebirth…by means of “archaic techniques of ecstasy,” generally and mightily 
mysteriously male’, is a potent example of both ‘the mystifying of Otherness as a 
transcendent force’ and the ‘reciprocating dependence on narrative’ this stress on mystery 
entails. Contrary to Eliade’s influential thesis, the narrative structure of Eliade’s account, 
which is replicated in the structure and sequencing of the chapters of his book, is the 
exception, not the rule. If Eliade’s classic work on ‘shamanism’ illustrates anything, it is that 
‘a certain sort of anthropology and social science, geared to particular notions of the 
primitive, of story-telling, of boundaries, coherence, and heroism…has…recruited 
“shamanism” for the heady task of ur-narrativity’ (Taussig 1992:159-60, cf. Taussig 
1989:40-5, 1986). 
In similar vein, several of Eliade’s critics have drawn attention to his fiction-writing, 
including Daniel C. Noel whose discussion of literary sources for contemporary shamanism 
writing includes the observation that in 1949 Eliade took a break from writing Le 
Chamanisme to pen The Forbidden Forrest, in which the main character Stefan discovers ‘a 
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great and terrible secret’: ‘I understood that here on earth, near at hand and yet 
invisible, inaccessible to the uninitiated, a privileged space exists, a place like a paradise, one 
you could never forget in your whole life once you had the good fortune to know it’ (Eliade 
quoted in Noel 1997:30). Jeroen Boekhoven’s commentary on Eliade’s legacy contextualises 
his fiction-writing in relation to the Eranos network, a collection of primarily European 
scholars of religion, anthropologists, philologists, mythologists, and other intellectuals who 
shared a common commitment to mysticism, esotericism, and ‘privileging…the hidden and 
mystical side of religion’. Carl Jung was influential from the beginning and gradually his 
idea of the archetype became a focal point and organising idea for wide ranging discussions 
about the transcendent unity of all religions and the universal primordial tradition  
(Boekhoven 2011:142-3). The network developed its American roots with the establishment 
in 1940 of the American Bollingen Foundation. Named after Jung’s residence on the shore 
of Lake Zurich and funded by the wealthy philanthropists Paul and Mary Mellon, the 
Foundation sponsored publishing the Bollingen Series for the specific purpose of 
propagating Jungian ideas, particularly concerning archetypes, symbolism and mythology, 
and a universal collective unconscious. Boekhoven’s discussion attributes the success of the 
English translation of Shamanism to the growing influence in North America of ideas 
generated by this network concerning shamans, particularly in the work of Joseph Campbell 
and Eliade, both of whom were published in the Bollingen Series on several occasions (J. 
Campbell 1949; Eliade 1964; 1958b, 1954; see McQuire 1989 for a list of the Bollingen 
Series; on ‘the Bollingen Connection’ and shamanism discourse, see Boekhoven 2011:129-
61).  
Certainly, the ‘Bollingen Connection' suggests something of the genealogy of ‘a 
certain sort of anthropology and social science’ Taussig blames for mystifying otherness as a 
transcendent force. Boekhoven’s Bourdieusian analysis of mid-century representations of 
shamans in European and North American mysticism and esotericism illustrates some of the 
ways the key terms of shamanism discourse had diffused into European languages via the 
‘scientific’ languages of psychiatry, anthropology, psychology, and increasingly religious 
studies (see Boekhoven 2011:164-247). As well as enabling wider circulations in Anglo-
American discourse of representations of shamans that were increasingly more literary and 
popular than scientific and scholarly, these representations also increasingly displaced the 
reality of contemporary ‘real flesh-and-blood’ shamans, to borrow a phrase from Alcida 
Ramos (1998:275), with a Baudrillardian simulation of indigenous religiosity bordering on 
hyperreality (although not quite crossing the threshold, as I argue in Chapter Four). With 
Baudrillard in mind, Taussig (1992:79) wondered whether the signifier ‘shaman’ is empty or 
whether this emptiness is capable of being filled by innumerable meaning-makers, in which 
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case are we faced with ‘a world of anarchist semioticians striking back at the emptiness of 
postmodern life?’  
Consider Hungarian anthropologist and linguist Felicitas Goodman’s book Where the 
Spirits Ride the Wind: Trance Journeys and Other Ecstatic Experiences (Goodman 1990), in 
which she presents findings from her research into thirty bodily postures. She claimed to 
have ‘discovered’ that these induced specific kinds of trance states and visions that are 
neither temporally nor culturally contingent, but in fact universal. Frequently referring to 
shamans and drawing on Campbell and Eliade (‘the venerable father of shamanic studies’), 
Goodman suggested that ‘the secret of the postures was revealed by design’ and is of 
considerable importance:  
Like ‘other new movements…going in the same direction toward “the strange inward 
sun of life” [quoting D.H. Lawrence] …[the postures] take us to strange and beautiful 
worlds. They teach us to divine, to heal, and to celebrate. They comfort us and soothe 
our fears, better than any of our scientific achievements. And they thrill us with ever-
renewed, never-predictable adventure, adding the very stuff of miracles to a modern 
existence that all to often is drab an unappealing.’ (Goodman 1990:66)17 
Goodman makes a similar complaint in her previous book Ecstasy, Ritual and Alternate 
Reality: Religion in a Pluralistic World, on that occasion against the hostility to ‘religion’ 
shown by urbanites of ‘the modern industrial city’. As against the antagonism of modern 
‘city-dwellers’, Goodman celebrates ‘the hunter-gathers’, ‘the horticulturalists’, ‘the 
agriculturalists, and ‘the nomadic pastoralists’ whose community life is constructed around 
‘emotionality, spiritual ecstasy and mysticism, and strident supernaturalism’ which she 
claims is the ‘core of religion worldwide’ (Goodman 1988:170). Armin Geertz’s highly 
critical review of Where the Spirits Ride the Wind applies equally to Ecstasy, Ritual and 
Alternate Reality: ‘the only academic value of this book is that it can serve as a source for 
analysing New Age Shamanism, in other words, as a “sacred text”’ (Geertz 1993:370-1).  
Noel has coined the neologism ‘shamanthropology’ to describe this kind of research. 
A contraction of ‘shaman’ and ‘anthropology’, Noel’s term foregrounds the farce or ‘sham’ 
he suggests is propounded by ‘anarchist semioticians’ (Taussig’s phrase) like Goodman, 
Carlos Castaneda, Joan Halifax, and Michael Harner. These latter three writers Noel claims 
have been the leading figures in popularizing a style of writing about and representing 
‘shamans’ in terms of trance journeys and techniques of ecstasy. Noel focuses on the period 
between 1968 and 1982, years bookended by Castaneda’s The Teaching of Don Juan and 
                                                       
17 Goodman draws inspiration from D.H. Lawrence’s ‘the Hopi Snake Dance’. Originally published in 1924 in 
Theatre Arts Monthly, Goodman includes the following extract in Where the Spirits Ride the Wind: ‘We have 
undertaken the scientific conquest of forces, of natural conditions…the Hopi sought the conquest by means of 
the mystic, living will that is in man, pitted against the will of the dragon-cosmos. …We have made a partial 
conquest by other means. Our corn doesn’t fail us: we have no seven years’ famine, and apparently need never 
have. But the other things fail us, the strange inward sun of life. …To us, heaven switches on daylight, or turns 
on the shower-bath. We little gods are gods of the machine only. It is out highest. Our cosmos is a great 
engine. And we die ennui.’ (Goodman 1990:66; cf. Lawrence 1927) 
 50 
Halifax’s Shaman: The Wounded Healer. This temporal framing includes Harner’s The Way 
of the Shaman which confirmed the transformation of the genre from Castaneda’s blend of 
ethnography and evocation into popular and readily accessible techniques that, like 
Goodman’s postures, can be cultivated through appropriate training and practice (Castaneda 
1968; Halifax 1979, 1982; Harner 1980; more generally see Nicholson 1987; on debates 
about interpretation and authenticity in Castaneda’s writings about Don Juan, see De Mille 
1990,1976; on the ‘mainstreaming’ of ‘native spirituality’ in North America since the 
nineteenth century, see P. Jenkins 2004; P. Deloria 1994; on shamanthropology, see Noel 
1997). Since blends of evocative fiction-writing with academic ethnographic-writing about 
shamans can be traced at least as far back as the late nineteenth-century writings of Waclav 
Sieroszewski and other exiled critics of Tzarist policies, some of whom I consider in Chapter 
Two, Noel’s temporal frame is perhaps better regarded as a convenient signpost of 
intensifying popular interest in evocative, purportedly ethnographic writing about shamans 
(on Sieroszewski, see Knight 2000b; Manouelian 2006). Nevertheless, by the second half of 
the twentieth century a range of ideas about and attributions to ‘shamans’ and their ‘religion’ 
had formed a shamanic idiom far-removed from the reality experienced by ‘real flesh-and-
blood’ shamans. Andrei Znamenski (2004) alludes to this idea when he writes of the history 
of shamanism studies as ‘the adventures of a metaphor’. But it is not only writings about 
shamans by the likes of Max Müller, Czaplicka, Eliade, Castaneda, Harner, or Goodman. 
Also significant here are styles of contemporary shamans’ self-representation, whether neo-
traditionalist neo-shamans (for example Wallis 2003,1998) or indigenist shamans whose 
tactical choices about self-representation hold considerable significance for their cultural and 
sometimes physical survival, as I discuss in Chapter Four.  
Imbrications of popular and scholarly discourse on shamanism and the tendencies of 
this discourse towards citing shamans’ journeys in spirit worlds as evidence of the 
irreducible element of ‘the sacred’ or the origins of a timeless and unchanging universal ur-
religion have posed considerable difficulty to researchers interested in studying historically 
situated ‘shamanic traditions’ or the contemporary contingencies of persons described by 
themselves or others as ‘shamans’. ‘The pure products have gone crazy in the plasticity of 
flow’, Paul Johnson has suggested, adapting James Clifford’s influential observations about 
the cultural politics of ethnographic research and writing to Johnson’s work on the category 
of ‘indigenous religions’ formed amid global circulations of bodies and signs (Johnson 2002: 
301; Clifford 1988).  
Taussig’s Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing 
(Taussig 1986) is an excellent example of the fraught politics of ethnographic research and 
challenges of ethnographic writings in (post-) colonial societies (Colombia in Taussig’s 
case). As well as bearing very little resemblance to anything published by 
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shamanthropologists or scholars working in the Eliadian mode of historians of religion, 
Taussig argues his field research with ‘shamans’ suggests ‘a type of modernism’ that seems 
to atomise parts and destabilise the imputed whole. In place of a ‘centralizing cathartic 
force…there exists an array of distancing techniques involving and disinvolving the reader 
or spectator and thus, potentially at least, dismantling all fixed and fixing notions of 
identity’. Taussig recalls Roger Dunsmore’s commentary on the visions of Black Elk, 
famously told to Joseph Epes Brown and John Neihardt (Brown 1953; Neihardt 1932). 
Taking Black Elk ‘as a sort of paradigm of what it means to be a man of vision’, Dunsmore 
thought that Black Elk ‘overturned our expectation that the holy man arrives somewhere at 
the truth’. Instead, Dunsmore thought Black Elk ‘deeply involved in not knowing, and in the 
risk that when he gives his vision away it will be ignored, misunderstood, or misused’ 
(Dunsmore quoted in Taussig 1992:160-1). ‘It is to that not knowing, and to that risk, that we 
must, I feel, refer shamanic discourse’, writes Taussig, before inviting his readers to pause 
and contemplate the violence entailed both in the relationship between coloniser and 
colonised, and appropriations of indigenous cultures by ‘White mysticism’. Considered from 
the perspective of ‘a man of vision’ who is also a subject of colonial violence and violently 
dispossessed of his identity,  
the risk involved in giving the vision away looms very high indeed, and we then begin 
to realise what is incumbent upon us who receive the vision as members of a colonial 
institution—Anthropology, Comparative Religion, or whatever names and ciphers are 
here relevant. …What we do with that radical uncertainty is the measure not only of our 
ability to resist the appeal for closure, but also of our ability to prise open history's 
closure with the lever of its utterly terrible incompleteness. (Taussig 1992:161) 
Since the 1980s, the field of shamanism studies has expanded and diversified dramatically. 
Although several avenues of inquiry do not resist the appeal of closure—inductive theories 
of ‘shamanism’ as a common feature of human societies, a crucial stage in humans’ 
evolution (whether ‘religious’ or cognitive), a universal technique for transcending given 
reality—have endured, a range of research interests are also markedly more critical of 
previous scholarship and reflexive in their studies of shamans and shamanism. They 
demonstrate a willingness and commitment to prising open history’s closure, as Taussig put 
it. Illustrating the remarkable proliferations, intensifications, and dispersions of interests 
related to shamanism in the Anglophone academy are literature reviews by Jane Monig 
Atkinson (1992), Robert Adlam and Lorne Holyoak (2005), and Thomas DuBois (2011). 
Read together they map interests, problems and developments of shamanism scholarship 
since the 1980s Atkinson’s widely cited review references approximately 250 publications 
mostly from the 1970s and 1980s. A bit more than a decade later, Adlam and Holyoak 
surveyed over 600 publications up to 2003, all but four published after 1990, and 100 after 
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1999. Thomas DuBois’s review considers trends in shamanism research since Atkinson, and 
includes nearly 150 publications since 2000. 
A comparison of these reviews shows remarkable developments. In 1992 Atkinson’s 
discussion of two decades of research noted thematic interests in psychology and therapy, 
contextual analyses of politics, gender, and text/performance, and a postcript on neo-
shamanism and New Age religiosities. Although her postcript was the shortest of her 
discussions, she thought neo-shamanism was ‘the most significant development for the 
field’, wondered whether it would be sustained beyond another decade or two, and advised 
more reflexivity in scholarship because anthropologists, whose writings are a key source for 
neo-shamanists, are deeply implicated in these developments (Atkinson 1992:322-323). By 
2005, this research direction had yielded a range of inquiries probing methodology, identity 
politics, psychology, syncretism, bricolage, authenticity, and neo-shamanism’s imbrications 
with related developments, from modern paganism to environmentalism (Adlam and 
Holyoak 2005:530-534; cf. Harvey 2007; B. Taylor 2001b). Similarly, Atkinson (1992:320-
321) observed that attention to ‘non-verbal dimensions of shamanic ritual’ was encouraging 
consideration of relations between shamans and their audiences (as opposed to relations with 
spirits). A decade later, Adlam and Holyoak reviewed scholarship of the intervening years 
on methodological and theoretical considerations in shamanic performance and applications 
in studies of shamanic performance in South Korea and post-Soviet Russia, to argue for the 
importance of interdisciplinary approaches to performance as social phenomena of social 
scientific interest (Adlam and Holyoak 2005:519-527). Adlam and Holyoak’s survey also 
showed proliferations of archaeological approaches to studies of material culture, with 
consequences for historical reconstructions of past shamanic religiosities and implications 
for contemporary revivals of shamanic traditions and identities. This challenging and diverse 
research addresses shamans’ roles mediating between personal, social and political contexts 
in local, national and international forums, and the complex relations and circulations that 
result. 
Thomas DuBois steps back from the prolific output of shamanism research to take in 
trends since Atkinson’s review. DuBois suggests the most significant trend has been towards 
particularisation of research in subfield specialisations and ethnographic studies, the latter 
particularly in Asia (2011:102; cf. Ma and Meng 2011). Although DuBois does not mention 
Adlam and Holyoak, their review bears this out. Extending Atkinson’s and Adlam and 
Holyoak’s respective analyses, DuBois identifies particularisation with increasingly nuanced 
interests in shamanic material culture, entheogens, and gender and sexuality research, along 
with ground shifts in approaches to older interests that have revisited longstanding inquiries 
and enabled wholly new research interests and agendas. DuBois’s example of the latter is the 
shift in shamanic healing research away from scepticism towards credulity and curiosity. 
 53 
Although this shift was well underway during the 1980s, interests in shamanic healing as a 
function of socially-negotiated processes within a wider community have only more recently 
been addressed in related fields, including medical anthropology and performance studies 
(DuBois 2011:104). Similarly, long established lines of inquiry concerning gender and 
sexuality in shamanic traditions are being reassessed, resulting in new researches into, for 
example, sexualised relations between shamans and spirits, and spiritual marriage (DuBois 
2011:106; see also citations in Adlam and Holyoak 2005:528). 
A second major trend in shamanism research DuBois labels ‘transcendent and 
cognitive approaches’. Rather than atemporal or numinous, transcendent for Dubois means 
‘at a level of abstraction beyond the close ethnographic details of particularist research’ 
(2011:112-3). Transcendent and cognitive approaches rely on inductively derived cross-
cultural models and advance evolutionary approaches to the study of religions, either via 
history of religions or cognitive science of religion. A good example is Michael 
Winkelman’s (2010) theory of shamanism as ‘biopsychosocial paradigm of consciousness 
and healing’. Winkelman developed his theory over the course of nearly three decades of 
researching and writing about shamans in cross-cultural perspective, beginning with his 
hypothesis that pre-historic shamans adapted psychophysiological potentials universal 
among all human beings (trance, ecstasy, altered states of consciousness, etcetera) to the 
needs and contingencies of hunter-gatherer societies. Winkelman claims this adaptation 
began an evolution of religion in correspondence with a succession of magico-religious 
practitioner types he gives as Shamans, Shaman/Healers, Healers, Malevolent Practitioners, 
Mediums, and finally Priests. Although Winkelman’s theory is not much different from 
similar proposals a century ago (for example, Dixon 1908; McGee 1901; Ward 1909), and 
his claims about the  ‘universals’ of shamanic religiosity echo Mircea Eliade, Åke 
Hultkrantz, and Michael Harner (Winkelman 2006:91; cf. 2000:60-63), Winkelman 
elaborated and refined these earlier ideas in two ways. Firstly, at a methodological level, 
Winkelman’s initial study compared 47 societies selected from the Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample using cluster analysis of 98 analytical variables condensed from 200 descriptive 
variables in ten variable areas (Winkelman 1992, 1990, 1986; cf. Robisheaux 1997). 
Secondly, at a theoretical level, Winkelman elaborated his quantitative evolutionary 
approach by combining it with emerging interests in neuroscience and evolutionary 
psychology to argue that ‘neurognostic structures’ are innate to human physiology and that 
‘shamanism plays a central role in elucidating neurotheology’ (Winkelman 2002a:73, 
2002b:1873-4, 2004:197-8). Winkelman’s combination of statistical, cross-cultural analysis 
with ‘neurognostic or neurophenomenological perspectives’ (Winkelman 2000:58) forms the 
basis of his triple-argument that ‘shamanism’ is a universal evolutionary adaptation of 
hunter-gatherer societies, ‘the foundations of human cognitive evolution and spiritual 
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experience’ (Winkelman 2004:194), and ‘the biological origins of religiosity’ (Winkelman 
2006:89; for more examples see DuBois 2011:112-4).  
The third and last significant trend reported by DuBois (2011:111-2) is ‘rhetorical 
approaches’ to studying shamans. These approaches conceive of shamanism along 
Foucauldian lines as a construct, idea, notion, or metaphor. Historicising studies, such as by 
Marjorie Balzer, Jeroen Boekhoven, Gloria Flaherty, Roberte Hamayon, Caroline 
Humphrey, Ronald Hutton, Alice Beck Kehoe, Michael Taussig, and Andrei Znamenski, 
have turned their temporalising critiques towards the accidents, contingencies, and interests 
that have produced a modern discourse on shamanism. Hamayon and Flaherty have both 
been previously mentioned; Hamayon links a historicised account of shamanism with 
contemporary theoretical and methodological questions (Hamayon 2001, 1998, 1995, 1993), 
and Flaherty examines the eighteenth-century conditions of possibility for later imaginings 
of shamanism (Flaherty 1992, 1987). Kocku von Stuckrad’s research on nineteenth-century 
idealisations of nature in shamanism discourse echoes Flaherty, although his argument is in 
the form of a genealogy of contemporary Western esotericism (Von Stuckrad 2003, 2002; cf. 
Von Stuckrad 2005). More recently, Znamenski has written widely on shamanism in 
nineteenth-century Russia, paying close attention to Orthodox Christianity (2003b, 1999), 
the Siberian regionalist movement (2005, 2004), and Russian sources for historiography 
(2003a). In terms similar to Boekhoven (2011) and Noel (1997), Znamenski’s The Beauty of 
the Primitive situates these historical analyses in relation to ‘the Western imagination’ 
(Znamenski 2007). Although not normally a historian of Russian history, Ronald Hutton 
(2001) has similarly considered the historical sources for scholarship about shamans and 
Siberia, and finds considerably more contingency, inconsistency, and outright invention than 
much contemporary confidence admits. In similar critical vein is Alice Beck Kehoe’s 
critique of what she terms the primitivist tradition in European studies of shamanism, 
particularly in the work of Eliade and Hultkrantz (Kehoe 2000, 1996).  
Michael Taussig’s Shamanism, Colonialism and the Wold Man: A Study in Terror and 
Healing (Taussig 1986) places similar emphasis on representations of shamans in discourses 
about non-European Others, although Taussig’s approach is also considerably different and 
even unique among ‘rhetorical’ approaches. To begin with, Taussig’s critique of 
‘shamanism’ is firmly grounded in ‘thick’ ethnographic description based on his years of 
fieldwork in Colombia. Writing thick description is particularly challenging in a post-
colonial society like Colombia because, like other colonial ‘spaces of death’ in the Americas 
and Africa, Colombia is marked by ‘cultures of terror’, ‘mediator par excellence of colonial 
hegemony’: ‘With European conquest and colonization, these spaces of death blend into a 
common pool of key signifiers binding the transforming culture of the conqueror with that of 
the conquered’ (Taussig 1986:5). Cultures of terror are eminently mysterious, Taussig 
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suggests, because they flourish by means of rumour, are nourished by an intermingling of 
silence and myth, and produce ‘conditions of truth-making and culture-making’ that resist 
interpretation. Gesturing to the politics of ‘writing culture’, Taussig suggests that the reality 
of cultures of terror makes a mockery of understanding and derides rationality, and pointedly 
asks what sort of speech, writing, and construction of meaning can manage and subvert it 
(Taussig 1986:8-9; see George Marcus’s criticism of Taussig’s earlier The Devil and 
Commodity Fetishism in South America, Marcus 1986:176-80; Taussig 1980). Taussig has 
responded to these challenges by developing a highly idiosyncratic rhetorical style 
distinguished by emphases on thresholds, mystery, and performance which owes more to 
Benjamin than Foucault, notwithstanding his Foucauldian emphasis on the ‘truth effects’ of 
discourses that are themselves neither true nor false (Taussig 1996:288). However, the 
discourses that interest Taussig are the discourses of colonial terror in South America (of 
which shamans in Colombia are a part), not shamanism discourse per se. Taussig hardly 
refers to the history of European discourses about shamans (philological, medical, esoteric, 
etcetera) and does not mention Siberia in his ‘study in terror and healing’. He saves those 
criticisms for his subsequent work on ‘the nervous system’ (I use quotation marks to flag 
that, as with much of Taussig’s writing, the obvious meaning is usually the beginning of a 
much more elaborate and surprising unfolding), although as I showed earlier even here his 
criticisms are restricted to a perfunctory demonstration of the utter uselessness of the 
Eliadian account for ethnographic studies of cultures of terror and spaces of death (Taussig 
1992:159-61, 165, cf. Taussig 1989:40-1). Although ‘shamans’ appear fairly frequently in 
Taussig’s writings (see also Taussig 1999, 1998, 1993), his focussed ethnographic research 
has limited value for the discursive approach developed here, despite his broad agreement 
with the emphases placed by rhetorical approaches to studying shamanism on historical 
conditions of possibility for imagining and representing shamans. Although Taussig also 
conceives of shamanism as a discourse, his style of writing does not engage shamanism in 
these terms. In this sense at least, his approach offers a useful counterpoint that draws out 
some of the limitations of rhetorical approaches and conceiving of shamanism as an idea or 
construct that can be critiqued via Foucauldian genealogy (a proposal I adapt to this study in 
the conclusion to Chapter Two). 
This kind of historicising or ‘rhetorical’ scholarship is closest to the approach I 
develop in this study. However, as well emphasising the contingencies of previous 
scholarship and the historical circumstances of researchers, I am also interested in how this 
knowledge is effective in the contemporary world, hence my decision to supplement a 
Foucauldian emphasis on genealogy with a Bourdieusian emphasis on practical fields. 
Recalling Foucault’s observation, that ‘People know what they do; they frequently know 
why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does’ (quoted in 
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Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983:187), I am interested in how circulating knowledge about 
shamanism encounters related discursive fields, and how these imbrications stimulate and 
generate new inflections, articulations, and representations, thereby further proliferating and 
disseminating shamanism discourse to new practical contexts. I am particularly interested in 
how shamanism discourse multiplies, fragments, and circles back to encounter itself in 
unfamiliar forms. More than that, I am interested in how three centuries of shamanism 
discourse establish the conditions of possibility for feedback loops that tap earlier formations 
of the discourse for practical purposes in the present time. This is where I hope this study of 
shamanism in relation to indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism offers new 
insights.  
An essay by Piers Vitebsky (1995) is a good example of what I have in mind. 
Vitebsky’s interest in how shamanic knowledge mediates global historical processes led him 
to compared declining shamanic religiosity among the Sora, a scheduled tribe in eastern 
India, with the shamanic revival among the Sakha people of the Sakha Republic, a semi-
autonomous state in the Russian Federation. For the Sora, historically an individual’s sense 
of self was linked with ancestors, a relationship mediated by agricultural production and 
consumption via appropriate rituals on particular plots of land attached to particular 
ancestors. However, as market economics transformed Sora subsistence, this mediation 
became increasingly inappropriate. Agricultural production was sold and consumption 
became detached from the particularity of plots. With deterritorialisation, grain became 
merely food and was no longer a carrier of one’s parents’ spirit or soul. Shamanic religiosity 
declined. Whereas the Sora had many shamans but not shamanism, the Sakha had few 
shamans but were becoming increasingly attentive to something called ‘shamanism’. 
Vitebsky noted that the Sakha shamanic revival responded to the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and therewith new opportunities to assert autonomy for the indigenous Sakha people, 
stimulated to a considerable extent by the region’s valuable gold and diamond deposits. 
However, this revival was less inclined towards a religious sensibility attached to the local 
environment and more towards an abstract sense of ethnicity: ‘they know their knowledge 
about shamanic ideas, not as habitus but as facts’, facts packaged with proprietary copyright 
and trademark (286). Amid federal devolution, shamanic knowledge distinguished Sakha 
land, national identity and knowledge from other kinds of identities and knowledges in other 
places. The Sakha’s hitching of local shamanic knowledge to global environmental concerns 
in the form of their possession of indigenous knowledge valued elsewhere instrumentalised 
the global idiom of environmental concern to legitimate ethnic claims. The Sakha succeeded 
where the Sora failed because, as Vitebsky puts it, the exchange rate for converting local 
knowledge into global currency favoured the Sakha: gold and diamonds below and a 
political vacuum above. 
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But what happens when emphasis shifts from local knowledge to global setting? 
Vitebsky notes that for New Age enthusiasts, shamanic religion has never been indigenous. 
As with the Sakha shamanic revival, New Age shamanic knowledge also advances a critique 
of here and now and relies on notions of time and place other than here and now to do so. 
But if shamanic knowledge is a kind of re-localisation, in the hands of New Agers it is on a 
transnational scale, and that ‘local elsewhere’ is ‘avowedly foreign’—native America, 
Amazon basin, southern Africa, Siberia, ancient Europe, and so on. In a global setting, New 
Age shamanic knowledge is cosmopolitan and universalist, not nationalist or accommodated 
to the desires of sovereign power, and for the same reason is stripped of much that would 
distinguish a local character. Michael Harner’s ‘core-shamanism’, discussed in Chapter 
Four, is paradigmatic of this tendency (Harner 1980; cf. Townsend 1999). If shamanic 
religiosity is becoming a kind of world religion as Cox (2003) suggests, Vitebsky argues it is 
in a globalised form in which local elements that don’t travel well are stripped away, as in 
the Sora example, while those that do are adjusted and assimilated to the discursive 
regularities of global idioms and interests, as in the Sakha example (Vitebsky 1995:196; cf. 
2000:66).  
Since ‘watertight distinctions’ between ‘traditional shamanistic societies’ and New 
Age shamanic movements are no longer plausible (Vitebsky 1995:188), the challenge is how 
to theorise imbrications and mediations between and among traditional and neo-shamanic 
religiosities, and articulate their effects. There is irony in this effort. Not long ago, modern 
discourse aligned so-called ‘traditional shamanistic religion’ with pre- or non-modern 
societies, while New Age religiosities were identified with modern industrial subcultures. 
Yet when one considers that struggles to elaborate such quintessentially modern ideas as 
human rights have been fought hardest by indigenous and colonised societies; that the lesson 
of modernisation (that development requires a nation and a state) is nowhere more 
appreciated than among those for whom nationalism is both a response to systematic 
underdevelopment and a delivery vehicle for the promise of progress; that the penetration of 
the commodity form into previously less commoditised domains of identity, knowledge, and 
culture is felt most acutely in so-called traditional societies, then it appears that postcolonial, 
underdeveloped, and traditional societies are in the vanguard of contemporary history. 
Arguing this point, Jean and John Comaroff suggest that ‘the signposts of history unfolding’ 
are in the south not the north. Postcolonies around the world are harbingers of the future 
rather than legacies of failed imperialisms and reverse ‘the taken-for-granted telos of 
modernity’ (J.L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:40).  
The case studies considered in this research tend to support this view. Whether 
indigenist critiques of human rights law and jurisprudence, anthropocentrism and symbolic 
economies of indigenous authenticity, or neoliberal entrepreneurialism and statecraft, these 
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examples show how discursive and embodied practices of formerly (and arguably still) 
colonised peoples implicate shamanism in several of the most significant global processes 
and developments transforming how people live together in the world today. But not only 
formerly (or still) colonised people or in postcolonial states. A key concern for all these case 
studies is demonstrating the political economy of historical processes and social change. 
This research perspective comports with Adlam and Holyoak’s predictions for studies of 
shamanism. Writing in 2005, they suggested future research would pay greater attention to 
‘considerations of consumerism, the effects of late capitalism, commodification, the impact 
of new technologies and the changing profiles of cultures in circulation’ (Adlam and 
Holyoak 2005:535). Certainly these problems are receiving attention in shamanism research, 
as Adlam and Holyoak’s and Dubois’ reviews suggest, although I would add to this list the 
role and place of the state. The state has become an important problem for a range of 
research interests and scholarly disciplines considering shamanic religiosities (Thomas and 
Humphrey 1996). Prominent among these have been shamanic revivals in north Asia 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Marjorie Balzer has been consistently 
attentive to how these revivals imbricate indigenous identity, state power, and economic 
reproduction, particularly although not exclusively in Sakha Republic (Balzer 2008, 2003, 
1996, 1993; Balzer and Vinokurova 1996). Related research has considered revivals in 
relation to neotraditionalism and nationalism and the shamanic market place amid social 
anxiety and societal disorder (Buyandelgeriyn 2007; Humphrey 1999; Laruelle 2007; 
Lindquist 2005; Siikala 2000).  
Another focus area for research on shamanism and the state is South Korea, where 
shamanism has been instrumental in alternately legitimating state hegemony and challenging 
political authority. Several researchers have written on instrumentalisations of shamanism 
alternatively by Park Chung-hee’s government following his 1961 coup d’état and the 
student-led reform movement (for example Choi 1997; Janelli 1986; Sorenson 1995a, 
1995b). Korean shamanic religiosity usefully illustrates another important issue for a 
historical contextual critique of shamanism. Since Mircea Eliade popularised mystical ascent 
and heroic journey into spirit worlds as the essence of shamanic religiosity, scholars have 
debated whether ‘spirit medium’ traditions and ‘possession states’ can be considered 
shamanic. Noting the problem of agency and control, several scholars have noted that 
traditions emphasising soul flight correspond with traditionally nomadic societies where 
shamans tend to be male, whereas in traditions predicated on spirit possession most mediums 
are women and the household is the site of ritual activity (Atkinson 1992:317; Reinhard 
1976; Lewis 1989). Some scholars have argued that a decline in the soul flight type and rise 
in the possession type in East Asia corresponds with the expansion of state authoritarianism 
and consequent loss of shamans’ charismatic authority (Anagnost 1987:59n2). In Korea the 
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vast majority of shamans are women and a disproportionate number of their clients are too 
(A. Kim 2005:296; see also Hogarth 1999; Howard 1998; Kendall 2010, 1998, 1985; C. Kim 
2003; Walraven 1983). Undoubtedly gendered aspects of shamanism discourse raise 
important question for shamanism studies, as the successive literature reviews cited above 
make clear. However, adding these questions to this study’s research agenda or weaving 
feminist perspectives into this study’s theoretical framing would add too many layers of 
complexity and ultimately detract from the focused discussions I pursue in respective 
chapters. On questions of the state, I discuss examples from Central and South America in 
Chapter Four, while the South African state is a focus of Chapter Five.  
This study contributes towards engaging a range of problems adumbrated by Adlam 
and Holyoak’s flagging of consumerism, late capitalism, commodification, new 
technologies, cultures in circulation, as well as the state. Although these problems are 
relevant not only to shamanism research, this study shows the increasing salience of 
shamanic religiosities in practical domains in which shamans’ significance was previously 
more marginal if not irrelevant. Shamanism and shamanic religiosities adumbrate new kinds 
of problems, including but far from restricted to developments in human rights 
jurisprudence, anxieties about anthropocentric mastery of nature, and intensifications of 
neoliberal entrepreneurialism and governmentality. Beyond these specific examples 
considered in detail in the following chapters, this study demonstrates shamanism 
increasingly designates a range of challenges human societies will be compelled to grapple 
with in the coming decades, from climate change, to the place of religion in public life, and 
several more in between. Some of these are considered in this study’s concluding chapter.  
 
Structure and Outline 
In addition to the current introductory chapter, the study consists of five core chapters. 
Chapter Two presents a genealogical account of shamanism from the eighteenth century to 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Although this chapter ostensibly serves to describe 
the formation of shamanism discourse and dispersal from Siberia, it is also intended to 
engage the genealogical method critically by demonstrating its inevitable implication in 
modernity’s double-hinge, as I make clear in the chapter’s concluding discussion. Chapter 
Three describes the history of the indigenist peoples movement. Although shamanism 
momentarily appears to recede, the significance of shamanism becomes apparent when it 
resurfaces as part of the solution to the problem of self-determination for indigenous peoples 
within sovereign states. Regarded within the architecture of this study, the analysis presented 
in Chapter Three further enables the subsequent discussions in chapters Four and Five, in 
which indigenous symbolic capital and indigenous knowledge emerge as key problematics 
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for contemporary shamanism discourse. I draw these problematics together in Chapter Six 
by way of recapitulating the thesis of this research: that oscillations between epistemological 
and ontological labours have proliferated and elaborated a discourse about shamans by 
supplying a discursive syntax to a diverse array of interests related to shamanic religiosities. 
These interests have in turn become imbricated with this discourse and extended its effects 
into new practical domains, where shamanism’s accommodation to diverse practical interests 
has been consolidated, adding new mechanisms and relays that enable its further 
proliferation and longevity. I end this study with some comments about implications and 
opportunities for further research.  
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Chapter Two: Shamanism 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents an historical overview of a discourse about shamans that emerged from 
imperial Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is historical in the sense 
that it recapitulates a fairly well-known story about changing reports about shamans, who 
they were, what they did, their roles, social status, techniques, experiences, mental states, 
and so on. Most scholars emphasise the determinative role of the European Enlightenment 
and Russian imperialism in establishing the ‘paradigms of permissibility’ for representing 
shamans (Flaherty 1992), and this discussion will echo those assessments. As such, I revisit 
well-tilled ground, some of it extensively, and some of it less so. At any rate, it is not my 
intention to revise (much less overhaul) this genealogy of shamanism that with some 
variations has been well-documented and tested against available sources (e.g. Flaherty 
1992, 1988, 1987; Francfort and Hamayon 2001; Hutton 2001; Thomas and Humphrey 
1996; Von Stuckrad 2003; Znamenski 2007, 2004b, 2003a, 2003b, 1999).  
My intention is slightly different. At one level, I recount this history so that the reader 
may be more familiar with the provenance of that category of person we today call a 
shaman. It is afterall the key category of the discourse this study takes as its central object. 
At a more sophisticated level, however, I also want to demonstrate the operations of 
modernity’s double-hinge in the articulation of epistemological circumscription and 
ontological contingency. This is perhaps where the historical account I present here acquires 
a genealogical quality. The following discussion pays close attention to the chance accidents, 
idiosyncratic appraisals, false understandings, and innumerable related contingencies that 
inflected a range of interests and inquiries pertaining to shamans and in turn shaped and 
sustained this discourse during these two centuries and since. Is this attention to the 
contingent limits within the circumscribed unity of knowledge about shamans sufficient to 
disrupt that imputed unity? I hope so. But it too relies on a dialectic between labour that on 
the one hand tends to proliferate and disperse statements about shamans, and on the other 
tends to multiply and condense the surfaces of appearance of a knowing self; the genealogy I 
present here does not (because it cannot) escape the double-hinged articulation of 
epistemological and ontological labour. Seen from this perspective, this genealogy has a 
performative aspect that involves the (body of the) reader in elaborating this discourse and 
reproducing a specifically modern subjectivity. I revisit this problem in this chapter’s 
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conclusion, but flag it now so that the reader may be alert to where this discussion is 
heading.  
Some clarifications are necessary at the outset. The timeframe I have chosen happens 
to coincide with the periodisation of centuries. Although records mention persons resembling 
people subsequently known as ‘shamans’ prior to the eighteenth century, the modern 
discourse on shamanism emerged with the ambitious project of Tsar Peter the Great (b.1762 
d.1725) to reform Russian state and society. Peter’s Grand Embassy tour of Europe (1697–
1698) instilled in the young Tsar a vision of a modern, developed Russia on par with the 
highest European civilisations. Peter became convinced that Russia needed closer alignment 
with European culture and society and set about transforming Russia from backward, feudal 
principality on the margins of Europe into a civilised, enlightened, modern imperial power. 
Accordingly, he embarked on a programme of social, educational and government reforms, 
adopted an expansionist foreign policy backed by a modern military, founded an Imperial 
Academy of Sciences to rival the Royal Society and the French Academy of Sciences, and in 
1721, just three years before his death, he proclaimed as the Russian Empire all the territory 
from St Petersburg to the Pacific. The Academy sponsored expeditions across Siberia and 
their reports about Siberia’s indigenous plant and animal life, climate, topography, geology, 
astronomical observations, and cartography also included some of the earliest reports about 
shamans. A discourse about shamans grew in step with Russia’s settlement of and changing 
attitudes towards its Asian possession. On the other end of this frame is the turn of the 
twentieth century, when the term ‘shaman’ was systematically applied to indigenous ritual 
specialists and ceremonial officiates beyond Siberia. I discuss this development with 
reference to the notion of shamans’ ‘emigration’ to the Americas and the gradual 
supplementing and then supplanting of terms like ‘priest’, ‘conjurer’, and ‘medicine-man’ 
with ‘shaman’, so that by 1908 the president of the American Folk-lore Society could deliver 
as his presidential address a paper on ‘Some Aspects of the American Shaman’ in which he 
remarked on ‘the general uniformity’ of shamans from the Arctic north to Patagonia (Dixon 
1908:12). 
As for my distinction between Russia and Siberia, usually Russia refers to a political 
entity and Siberia the geographical region of north Asia. However, I use the terms to 
distinguish between imperial centre and colonial possession that in geographical terms 
loosely corresponds respectively to the regions west and east of the Ural Mountains. As the 
Urals were regarded as the natural boundary between Europe and Asia, it is fair to say that in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Siberia was regarded as Russia’s Asian possession. 
Early in the seventeenth century Russian Cossacks had reached the Pacific coast and by mid-
century there were scattered Russian settlements as far eastward as the Chukchi Peninsula 
and along the Amur River. However, Peter’s proclamation of the Empire rapidly accelerated 
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Russian conquest and settlement. Shamans were among the most exotic and unfathomable 
aspects of native life encountered by Russians and from this imperial context emerged a 
discourse on shamanism.  
 
Discovering Shamans 
Reports by European adventurers and explorers of their encounters with indigenous ritual 
specialists in Siberia first piqued the curiosity of Europeans in the late seventeenth century. 
Nicolaas Witsen’s account of his travels in parts of Siberia during 1664-5 provided the first 
significant account of shamans. A former mayor of Amsterdam, Witsen (b.1641 d.1717) 
described a person he calls a ‘schaman’ and accompanied his description with a drawing of a 
person with clawed hands and feet, wearing a hooded fur coat and antlers, holding a flat 
drum. The illustration was captioned ‘Tungus schaman; or, The Priest of the Devil’ 
(Znamenski 2007:5-6). The Swede Philip Johann von Strahlenberg (b.1767 d.1747) provided 
the next significant account of shamans (Von Strahlenberg 1970:397). An officer in the 
Swedish army exiled for thirteen years in Siberia following his capture by Russian forces at 
the Battle of Pultawa in June 1709, Strahlenberg subsequently accompanied German 
physician Daniel Messerschmidt on the latter’s journeys into the Siberian hinterland during 
the early 1720s. Strahlenberg’s account, published in German in 1726 and in English 
translation in 1738, was the first to deal extensively with the shaman’s drum and included a 
detailed drawing and favourable comparison with the drums of the Saami of northern 
Scandinavia. Strahlenberg’s was also the first account of Siberian shamans that reported the 
hallucinogenic properties of the flyagaric mushroom, although his text mentions nothing of 
the mushroom’s ritual use (Von Strahlenberg 1970:397). As for Messerschmidt, the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences had him surrender his notes, although they were later made available 
to scholars working under the auspices of the academy. They make clear that Messerschmidt 
saw shamans as tricksters and frauds (Flaherty 1992:48). 
The first scientific expedition across Siberia took place from 1733-1743 and was 
directed towards the Kamchatka peninsula, on the north Pacific Rim between the Okhotsk 
Sea in the west and the Bering Sea in the east. Under the leadership of Captain Vitus Bering 
(b.1681 d.1741), the Great Northern Expedition (First Kamchatka Expedition) led to a 
proliferation of new information about shamans as each of the expedition’s more prominent 
participants published their notes and memoirs in the years following. As their writings make 
clear, many of these enlightened explores regarded it their responsibility to expose shamans’ 
fraud. For example, the Russian naturalist Stephan Krascheninnikow took great satisfaction 
in exposing the tricks of the Itel’man shaman Karyml’acha. He claimed Karyml’acha’s trick 
of slashing a seal’s bladder filled with blood and concealed under his clothes while claiming 
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to be slashing his himself was so cheap and poorly executed, ‘I could not help laughing at 
the simplicity of the trick, which the poorest player of legerdemain would have been 
ashamed of’ (quoted in Flaherty 1992:48; see also Narby and Huxley 2001:29-31). German 
historian Gerhardt Friedrich Müller was similarly scathing. On one occasion, he insisted a 
Sakha shaman perform for a specially selected audience. After the audience exposed her 
tricks, Müller forced her to sign a confession of her fraud. He later wrote:  
It suffices to say that all of them [séances] are basically similar. Nothing miraculous 
happens. The shaman emits an unpleasant howling, while jumping about senselessly 
and beating a flat drum which has iron bells attached inside to intensify the din… It 
does not take long, however, to be convinced of the futility of the farce, of the deceit by 
those earning their living in this way. (quoted in Znamenski 2007:8) 
Still, Müller was on the whole more careful in his descriptions of indigenous rituals and 
customs than his colleague the botanist and chemist Johan Georg Gmelin, whom Müller 
chided for representing the religious ceremonies of the Tartars ‘in some details, but almost 
too comically’ (quoted in Black 1989:46). Gmelin wrote of a shaman’s performance he 
witnessed: 
At length, after a lot of hocus pocus and sweating, he would have us believe that the 
devils were there. He asked us what we wanted to know. We put a question to him. He 
started his conjuring tricks while two others assisted him. In the end we were confirmed 
in our opinion that it was all humbug, and we wished in our hearts that we could take 
him and his companions to the Urgurian silver mine, so that they might spend the rest of 
their days in perpetual labour. (quoted in Narby and Huxley 2001:28) 
The Second Kamchatka Expedition (1768-1774) continued the reporting strategies of 
the first. Johann Gottlieb Georgi, a German scientist, explorer and expedition member, 
admitted to his readers that he had shortened his account of shamanic ‘magic and conjuring 
tricks due to their obvious foolishness’ (quoted in Znamenski 2004a:xxii). If shamans were 
still fools and frauds, reporting strategies also developed new themes with modified, though 
no less contemptuous, conclusions. Petrus Simon Pallas, a German botanist and zoologist 
who led the Second Expedition, reported: ‘Usually these shamans are the most cunning 
people. Through skilful interpretation of their own dreams and other tall tales they achieve a 
respected status’ (quoted in Znamenski 2007:7). Both foolish and cunning, towards the 
second half of the eighteenth century still another characterisation was added. Georgi, for 
example, noted that shamans are ‘partly barefaced impostors, partly deceived fanatics’ 
(quoted in Hutton 2001:33). In other words shamans were simultaneously deceivers (whether 
foolish or clever) and madmen who ‘shout’, ‘twist their mouths’, and ‘produce pranks 
characteristic of the insane and behave as madmen’ (Znamenski 2007:7).  
As the century drew to a close, reporting on shamans centered on their psychological 
makeup, particularly the shamans’ supposed hypersensitivity and excitability. Georgi 
connected these traits with the climate, topography and general environment. Vasilii Zuev, 
Pallas’ eighteen-year-old research assistant, was particularly intrigued by shamans’ mental 
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state, going so far as to name madness and fear as defining qualities of shamans’ vocation: 
‘When you irritate the shaman too much, he becomes wildly insane. He gallops, rolls on the 
ground, and hoots. In such moments, the shaman is ready to hit people around him with what 
he holds in his hands.’ Speculating on the cause of the shaman’s ‘insanity’, Zuev is 
confounded: ‘I do not know how to explain this. It could be their general weakness, 
gullibility, or simple stupidity,’ adding, ‘To be honest, I would rather classify his behaviour 
as a sort of illness’ (Zuev quoted in Znamenski 2007:10). In the course of a century, the 
figure of the shaman had been a satanic agent in league with the devil, a foolish impostor, a 
clever charlatan, and a lunatic suffering from mental illness.  
At the same time that Enlightenment explorers and scholars were preoccupied with the 
mental states of shamans, many also became preoccupied with the origins of shamans’ 
rituals and traditions. Gerhardt Müller, for example, in his History of Siberia, wondered 
whether shamanic religiosity originated spontaneously among Siberian natives or whether it 
migrated to Siberia from elsewhere. Deciding upon the latter, Müller proposed India, from 
where it spread across northern Asia and into Scandinavia. For Müller, shamanism was a 
degenerative version of Hinduism. His contemporary Georgi agreed with the degenerative 
thesis: ‘Because of wars, rebellions, population movements, wanderings, the lack of 
education, and the misinterpretation of tales by stupid and deceiving priestly people, this 
order [shamanism] was turned into disgusting idol worshipping and blind superstition’ 
(Georgi quoted in Znamenski 2007:12-3). For both Müller and Georgi, the imputed 
polytheism of shamanic belief was evidence of its degenerative character. These twin 
concerns with origins and mental states have been enduring preoccupations for scholars ever 
since. In the nineteenth century, however, these concerns were increasingly tied with and 
perceived through the prism of Russia’s relationship with Europe and its imperial 
aspirations.  
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Russia held dominion over all the territory 
from the Urals to the Bering Sea, the arctic ocean to the southern steppes, and now set about 
populating its empire with Slavs and extracting Siberia’s natural wealth. These imperial 
strategies were fraught with difficulties, not least the sudden and precipitous decline of the 
fur trade and the harsh environment that seemed to preclude settlement and productive 
exploitation of the land. Thus the imperial vision of ‘our Peru’, ‘our Brazil’, ‘our East India’, 
and ‘our Nile’ gave way to a pervasive cynicism about Siberia’s value as a colonial asset and 
activated anew Russia’s ambivalence regarding its relationship to and status in Europe 
(Bassin 1991:771). As ambivalence towards Europe took hold of Russian political discourse 
and intellectual life, attitudes towards Siberia mirrored anxieties and aspirations at the 
imperial centre in St. Petersburg. For some, barren, primitive, backward Siberia confirmed 
Russians’ worst anxieties about Russia’s lowly status among European states. For others, 
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however, Siberia was an Eden that would satisfy Russia’s search for positive qualities and 
virtues to seed a new, authentic Russian identity. This latter aspiration was reflected in the 
shifting terms of shamanism discourse, away from concerns with priestcraft, cunning fraud 
and madness and towards interests in native culture, mythology, and religiosity. 
  
Between Occident and Orient 
The first half of the nineteenth century was a time of crisis and introspection for Russia. The 
advent of romanticism re-oriented the intellectual and creative environment of Europe and 
challenged Russia to recalibrate its standing and status. At the same time, invasion by 
Napoleon’s armies prompted Russians to doubt whether they would or could be part of the 
European community of nations, a question that seemed definitively answered by the 
Crimean War at mid-century. Russia responded with mournful introspection that gradually 
developed into a national debate about the nature and substance of Russian identity and the 
positive values and virtues that distinguished the Russian people (Bassin 1999:37-8).1 
Certainly, many thought that none existed. Peter Chaadayev famously captured this 
sentiment in his Philosophical Letter, published in 1833, in which he lamented the emptiness 
of Russian history: 
We do not belong to any of the great families of the human race; we are neither of the 
West nor of the East, and we have not the traditions of either. Placed, as it were, outside 
of time, we have not been touched by the universal education of mankind…Among us 
there is no internal development, no natural progress; new ideas sweep out the old, 
because they are not derived from the old but tumble down upon us from who knows 
where. We absorb all our ideas ready-made, and therefore the indelible trace left in the 
mind by a progressive movement of ideas, which gives it strength, does not shape our 
intellect. We grow, but we do not mature; we move, but along a crooked path, that is, 
one that does not lead to the desired goal. We are like children who have not been 
taught to think for themselves…(Chaadaev 1978:162-8).2 
Since the Petrine era, Russia had moulded itself in the image of European states. But as pride 
gave way to abjection and the terms of Russia’s unique contribution to modernity and unique 
worth as a (European) people remained illusive, Russian enthusiasm for Europe gave way to 
antipathy and deep ambivalence, notwithstanding Russia’s intellectual debt to German 
intellectuals. Indeed, this ambivalence was underlined by Russian experiments with 
nationalism that aped the German example (Bassin 1999:38; Saunders 1982:58). The history 
                                                       
1 In Russian historiography this debate is referred to as ‘the Russian idea’, a rubric for Russian concerns and 
anxieties about Russia’s place and purpose in the world (see Aizelwood 2000; Greenfeld 1992). The collapse 
of the Soviet Union saw this debate revived (see Helleman 2004; McDaniel 1996; Pandey 2007). 
2 At face value, Chaadaev’s letter—received ‘like an exploding bomb’ (Zenkovsky 1953:150)—sabotaged 
Russia’s self-image by renouncing Russia’s worth. Although more nuanced interpretations have also been 
offered (see Aizelwood 2000), his letter is still sometimes cited as the opening salvo in the long conflict 
between westernisers and Slavophiles in Russian nationalist debates (Utechin 1965:96; cf. Seton-Watson 
1967:258).  
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and genealogy of Russian nationalism in the nineteenth century is beyond the scope of this 
discussion (see Bassin 1999; Greenfield 1992; A. Miller 2008; Riasanovsky 1976; Rowley 
1999; Saunders 1982). For present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge this ambivalence 
because it is within this context that shamanism discourse develops in the second half of the 
century.  
Several historians of Russian imperialism have argued that this ambivalence 
stimulated among some influential Russian intellectuals a ‘messianic sensibility’, a sense of 
Russia’s calling that was held to supersede the conflicts and disputes between westernisers 
and slavophiles or moderate liberals and opposition radicals (Bassin 1999:44-5; see Duncan 
2000; Greenfeld 1992).3 Messianism represented more than an ideal. As a special virtue and 
unifying force of Russian identity, messianic thinking identified action towards fulfilling its 
messianic calling with a moral obligation. As demands grew to extend Russia’s political 
influence (regardless of practical possibilities or political implications), messianic 
nationalism became ‘the cradle of an unbridled imperialism: the nation, the chosen vehicle of 
God’s designs, sees in its political triumph [beyond its borders] the march of God in history’ 
(Hans Kohn quoted in Bassin 1999:47-8). Much of this energy was naturally directed 
towards southeast Europe and fostering pan-Slavic unity (Bassin 1999:48-9). But from the 
1840s and 1850s, this energy was also directed eastwards as the messianic mission engaged 
transformations in Russian Orientalism. 
During the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries Russia’s intellectual elite 
shared in the ‘oriental renaissance’ that swept Europe (Schwab 1984). Russia saw in Asia, 
particularly China, the realisation of civilisation’s most exalted qualities—high moral 
principles, veneration of tradition, and intellectual enlightenment, all qualities Russians 
thought were not (yet) sufficiently realised in their own society.4 From the 1830s, however, 
ideas about the Orient began changing, and fairly rapidly the idea developed that the Orient 
had fallen into decay and stagnation. As Bassin (1999:51) succinctly puts it: 
Fascination and veneration gave way with surprising ease to condescension and disgust, 
and rather than spiritual enlightenment, lofty aesthetic accomplishment, and virtuous 
and wise social principles, the East now came to epitomise precisely the opposite: social 
degeneracy and intellectual and spiritual inanition.  
Russia’s estimations of the Orient were related directly to competition between Nicholas’s 
Official Nationality and the popular messianic nationalism of the likes of Alexander Herzen. 
                                                       
3 Bassin illustrates this point with Alexander Herzen: ‘We shared a common love…From early childhood, a 
single strong, instinctive, physiologically passionate feeling was imprinted on us as it was on them…And, like 
Janus or the two-headed eagle, we looked in different directions, but at the same time a single heart was 
beating within us.’ (quoted in Bassin 1999:45) 
4 This vision of the Orient particularly appealed to Tzar Nicholas (b.1796 d.1855) because it accorded closely, he 
thought, with his own vision of autocratic rule. His Minister of Education Uvarov agreed and established an 
Oriental Academy in St. Petersberg. Studies of Russian Orientalism have become a highly productive area of 
scholarship in the post-Soviet era (for example Bower and Lazzerini 1997; David-Fox 2006; Knight 2000a; 
Tolz 2009, 2005; Van der Oye 2010). 
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The ease and rapidity with which Russian Orientalism reversed its attitude towards the 
Orient is a measure of how quickly the messianic sentiment was catching on. Russian 
Orientalism thus became an increasingly important element in the Russian national discourse 
as competing interpretations of the Orient refracted the political contest.5  
Writings about shamans and shamanism in the nineteenth century should be 
understood against this backdrop. By and large, later scholars of shamanic religion did not 
situate their analyses with due reference to this context, certainly not the range of prominent 
scholars whose work established an ahistorical canon of what shamanic religion is and what 
shamans do. While it has become almost passé to critique Eliadian phenomenology or 
Joseph Campbells’ deistic naturalism,6 for the most part critiques of these scholars have 
addressed questions about how we ought to approach the study of religions and less often the 
consequences and implications of how we have already studied religions. This problem can 
be illustrated with reference to the Altai deity Ülgen and the researches of the Siberian 
regionalist movement.  
 
Wilhelm Radloff and Bai-Ülgen 
Russian ambivalence towards Europe stimulated new appraisals of Siberia and more positive 
interests in the region’s native inhabitants, including shamans. Although Wilhelm Radlof’s 
influence was only felt in the last decades of the century, the sympathetic turn between the 
1840s and 1860s created enabling conditions for Radlof’s later contributions. Two scholars 
were particularly important in this regard. Dordji Banzaroff (b.1822 d.1855), an ethnic 
Buryat educated at Russian universities and therefore in a unique position regarding Russian 
attitudes to indigenous religiosity, argued forcefully against the enlightenment position that 
shamanism was a degeneration of some other tradition that had migrated north from India or 
China: 
Careful study of the subject shows that the Shamanistic religion…did not arise out of 
Buddhism or any other religion, but originated among the Mongolic nations, and 
consists not only in superstitious and shamanistic ceremonies…but in a certain 
primitive way of observing the outer world—Nature—and the inner world—the soul. 
(quoted in Czaplicka 1914:167, cf. Czaplicka 1999) 
                                                       
5 Bassin (1999:51) captures the sentiment: ‘While hyper-conservative proponents of Official Nationality such as 
Uvarov were entirely sincere in their admiration of the Chinese ability to enjoy “leur supreme bonheur dans la 
plus parfaite immobilité” [their supreme happiness in perfect stillness], no quality served to make the Orient 
more thoroughly reprehensible in the eyes of the restless nationalists, obsessed as they were with remaking 
and improving their own society through constructive activity.’ 
6 See for example Campbell’s four-volume Masks of God. Consisting of Primitive Mythology (1959), Oriental 
Mythology (1962), Occidental Mythology (1964), and Creative Mythology (1968), Campbell’s intended 
writing ‘the first sketch of a natural history of the gods and heroes…’ (J. Campbell 2000:5). 
 69 
It is perhaps significant that Banzaroff was inspired by the naturphilosophie of Alexander 
von Humboldt, particularly Von Humboldt’s insistence, inspired by Herder, on the influence 
of natural environments in shaping human societies (Znamenski 2007:18). For present 
purposes, it is enough to recognise that for the first time shamans and their beliefs and rituals 
were represented as authentic, indigenous, and worthy of serious scholarship. 
The second scholar is Matthias Alexander Castren (b.1813 d.1853). A Finnish 
philologist and folkore enthusiast, Castren was probably the first, and in the 1840s certainly 
the most significant, to explicitly relate shamanism with nationalism, in his case Finnish 
nationalism. Castren, as he put it himself, ‘could not pause before finding a connection that 
links the Finnish tribe with some other larger or smaller groups in the rest of the world’ 
(quoted in Znamenski 2004a:xxvii). That connection Castren found via comparative 
philology. In the course of his studies, however, Castren also speculated on similarities 
between Siberian shamans and indigenous ritual specialists among the Sami and stressed the 
positive role of shamans in their communities (see Musi 1997:79-85). In Castren’s view, 
shamans were heroic figures who ‘conquer nature not only through vigorous bodily 
movements and incomprehensible words,’ but through the sheer force of will (quoted in 
Znamenski 2004a:xxvii).7 Contrary to the Enlightenment view of shamans as passive 
recipients of the commands of superior supernatural forces, Castren regarded shamans as 
active social agents.  
Banzaroff’s and Castren’s work indicated how attitudes towards shamans were 
changing. They took seriously shamans’ roles as social actors, the former by arguing for the 
authentic indigeneity of shamanic beliefs and rituals, and the later by situating indigenous 
peoples within a network of genetic, philological and cultural relations that extended from 
northern Europe to the Caspian Sea. In doing so, they asked new questions about the origins 
and development of shamanic institutions and their relation to the myths, beliefs and ritual 
practices of traditions from which shamans were previously thought to be particularly vile 
aberrations. Banzaroff’s and Castren’s more positive views of shamans modified the 
discursive field to an extent that enabled Radloff’s enduring contribution. Enduring because 
Radlof was a key source for Mircea Eliade’s account of shamanism, and because it was on 
Radloff’s recommendation that Franz Boas contracted Waldemar Bogoras, Waldemar 
Jochelson and others to the Jesup North Pacific Expedition (see below).  
                                                       
7 Castren was not the first to connect Siberian indigenous religiosity with the Sami people of Lapland. As early as 
1726, Strahlenberg commented about the ‘Czeremissi, or Scheremissi’, ‘a pagan people under the Government 
of Casan’ in the Volga river basin, ‘There is a great Affinity between their Tongue and that of the Finlandians; 
But it is now very much mix’d both with the Russian and Tartarian’. About the ‘Barabintzi’, ‘A Heathen 
nation, between the Cities of Tara ad Tomskoi’, he says ‘… they and the Finnlandians were formerly one 
Nation.’ Besides linguistic similarities, he notes that ‘They make Use of such Drums as the Laplanders do’ 
(Von Strahlenberg 1970:334-5, 354-5). 
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Radloff is well-known as an orientalist and his contributions to Turkic philology are 
widely documented (see Hatto’s Introduction in Radlov and Hatto 1990), although his role in 
shaping shamanism discourse by and large has not been taken up by shamanism scholars, 
despite his considerable influence. Znamenski (2007:33-4) credits Radloff with breaking the 
speculative tradition of shamanism scholarship and notes that until the twentieth century, 
Radloff’s work, along with Castren’s, remained the principle works on shamanism in the 
West and Radloff’s rendering of shamans was the basis of many European encyclopaedias’ 
entries on shamanism. Radloff also played an inspiring role in the ethnographic researches of 
the Siberian regionalists in the last decades of the century and his influence can be traced via 
the regionalists and exile ethnographers of the late nineteenth century into the heart of the 
shamanism discourse as it was formulated in North America in the early decades of the 
twentieth century.  
A German by birth, Wilhelm Radloff (b.1937 d.1918) was educated at the University 
of Berlin. Upon graduating in 1858, Radloff and his new wife relocated to Siberia where he 
took a post as a schoolteacher at Barnaul, in the Altai region of Siberia’s southern 
borderlands. While at Barnaul, he undertook philological investigations in local languages 
and recorded and collected local heroic myths. Under his adopted name Vasilii Vasilievich 
Radlov, he gradually rose to prominence among Russia’s educated elite. Among his offices, 
Radloff was a founder of the International Association for the Exploration of Central Asia, 
director of the Asian Museum in St. Petersburg, and, as one of the deans of Russian 
anthropology, a prominent collector and publisher of folklore texts comparable to some 
extent with the stature of Franz Boas in North America (Elisseeff 2000:11, 24n81, Harvilahti 
2000:215; Znamenski 2007:33-4, 2003a:9-11). Educated in the German romantic tradition, 
Radloff was influenced by Von Ritter’s and Von Humboldt’s natuurphilosophie as well as 
romantic Orientalism’s emphasis on comparative linguistics and philology. He brought with 
him to Russia a sympathetic approach to indigenous religiosity, lamenting that ‘the poor 
shamans are not as bad as they are usually perceived’. Noting that shamans ‘are carriers of 
the ethical ideals of their people’ and ‘no worse than clerics of other religions’, he placed 
shamanism on a par with Buddhism, Christianity and Islam (Radloff quoted in Znamenski 
2007:36). He continued Banzaroff’s argument that shamanism was indigenous to the region 
and not a distortion or degeneration of ‘Brahamism’ or ‘Lamaism’. He also continued the 
philological studies begun by Castren and it is for this work that he is most remembered. 
Still, his letters of the 1860s were an ethnographic classic for later scholars of shamanism 
and formed the basis of his two-volume work Aüs Sibirien [From Siberia] (Radlov 1884).  
Probably Radloff’s most enduring contribution to the discourse on shamanism is the 
Altaic spirit Ülgen. Radloff introduced to shamanism discourse what has been termed ‘the 
Ülgen séance’, which thereafter rapidly gained pre-eminent status in ethnographic 
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representations of central Asian shamanism. The Ülgen séance became a key topic in 
Eliade’s work on shamanism, where Ülgen is a centrepiece of Eliade’s discussion of 
shamanic cosmology, the shaman’s election by spirits and his celestial ascent (Eliade 
1964:190-204, see also pp.77-8, 275-8, 1958a:105-6). The Ülgen séance refers to a transcript 
of an Altaian ritual addressed to the spirit Ülgen, and includes prayers, supplications and the 
shaman’s utterances. As such, it is apparently the first complete textual record of a shaman’s 
ritual invocation of spirits and the focus of the first part of the second volume of Radloff’s 
classic work (Radlov 1884:19-50; Znamenski 2003:281-2). However, Radloff neither 
recorded the transcript of the ritual nor did he witness it. It is not even clear that there was an 
event to witness. The provenance of the text is between the 1840s and 1850s in the Altai 
region of southern Siberia from an unidentified Russian orthodox missionary who recorded it 
in the Altaian language from an Altai native. It is unclear whether this person was a shaman 
or not. As the text consists only of a ritual invocation and does not mention the ritual setting, 
it seems likely the missionary did not witness a particular séance and simply recorded what 
was told to him. There are no surviving clues as to the nature of their relationship, the scene 
in which it unfolded, or the specific purpose of making the record. All we have is the 
anonymous manuscript, which was stored in the archives of the Altaian Orthodox mission, 
where the missionary and ethnographer Vasilii Verbitskii discovered it. Verbitskii published 
the text in its entirety in a Siberian newspaper in the 1870s, where Radloff read it for the first 
time.8 Radloff then translated parts of the text into German and published them in 1884 in 
Aus Sibirien, from where it was picked up by the burgeoning field of Siberian regionalist 
ethnographers in the last decades of the century as well as a new generation of North 
American anthropologists and mythologists in the early decades of the twentieth century. On 
the path to canonisation, in 1895 Mikhailovskii (1895:74) called Ülgen ‘the celestial 
deity…who dwells on the golden mountain in the sixteenth heaven’, in 1925 Leo Sternberg 
(2004:139) called him ‘the Lord of Heaven’, and in 1936 Nora Chadwick named him ‘the 
highest god of the Heavens’. Elaborating on the séance, she wrote: ‘The ceremony is, in fact, 
not merely, not even primarily, a dramatic spectacle, but a piece of religious communion, 
shared by the whole tribe, and a kind of public sermon…’, adding in a footnote, ‘We may 
compare Moses and the giving of the Law at Mount Sinai’ (Chadwick 1936a:95).  
Chadwick thought the ‘minute observations of the traveller and field worker’ 
insufficient for ‘(coming) to any kind of just estimate of the phenomenon known as 
shamanism’. That estimation requires ‘the synthetic work of the arm-chair anthropologist’, 
who must ‘essay to reconstruct history’ by examining the oral traditions among the people 
                                                       
8 Eliade (1964:190n37) gives the place and date of this publication as Tomsk in 1870. The missionary 
ethnographer Verbitskii republished the entire text, as he found it in the archive, in 1893 in the original Altain 
accompanied by his translation in Russian. 
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concerned. These may then be compared with reports of fieldworkers concerning shamans’ 
dress, dance, general technique with sculpture, paintings and any inscriptions of the past 
which have been preserved in more civilised neighbouring countries’. Thus she qualified her 
lengthy study Shamanism among the Tartars of Central Asia: ‘These considerations must be 
my excuse for offering some observations on a class of people of whom I have no first-hand 
knowledge. Like many others who have written on this subject I have never seen a shaman 
and am ignorant of their languages.’ (Chadwick 1936a:76-7) A specialist in Turkic epic 
poetry, Chadwick’s armchair synthesis began with the observation that Turkic ‘oral 
literature’ is closely related to Turkic spiritual ideas and concepts (Chadwick 1936a:98, 
1936b:291). One of the main spiritual ideas and concepts known to Siberian observers via 
Radloff was Ülgen and Ülgen came to feature prominently in Chadwick’s work. Thus, in her 
work on oral epics of Central Asia, she divided the cosmology of the ‘Turkic religion’ into 
‘two spiritual environments which are mutually hostile’, ‘the highest one…ruled by…Bai 
Ülgen’ and a second one, in which ‘The personnel live underground, and their ruler is Erlik 
Khan’ (Chadwick and Zhirmunsky 1969:98). This dualistic rendering of Ülgen, who is ruler 
of heaven and giver of the law, and ‘wicked Erlik’, who is ruler of the underworld and 
associated with illness and harm, is found in earlier accounts by orthodox missionaries 
(Znamenski 2007:37; cf. Znamenski 2003b), as well as early ethnographers, for example 
Mikhailovskii (1895:77,72-3). On another occasion, she inserted Ülgen into narratives in 
which he is not mentioned. For example, upon reading an account of a healing ritual among 
the Yukut of northern Siberia (present-day Sakha Republic) recorded by Sierozsewski 
probably in the 1880s and reproduced in Mikhailovskii (1895:92-95) and Czaplicka 
(1914:233-239), Chadwick noted that ‘The invocation concludes…with a prayer to the 
‘Greybeard’ that the shaman’s thoughts may be approved, and his requests granted’. Grey-
beard, she insisted (‘I have no doubt’) refers to ‘Kydyr or Ülgön, the highest god in heaven’. 
She attributed her confidence to ‘the oral literature of the Tartars’ wherein Ülgen ‘is 
generally represented…with a grey beard so long that he treads on it as he walks—a 
sufficiently striking description of a god of the beardless Tartars’ (Chadwick 1936a:96). 
Though Chadwick does not cite her sources for this claim, throughout her work she cites the 
authority of Radloff’s fieldwork and acknowledges that her knowledge, or as she puts it, ‘our 
knowledge’, of Tartar ‘oral poetry’, ‘is derived chiefly from the great collection…of Radlov’ 
(Chadwick 1936b:291-2).  
Besides rendering Ülgen as equivalent of the Abrahamic god, the path to canonisation 
also established the Ülgen séance as a kind of liturgical text, increasingly rigid and 
inflexible. Eliade, for example insists that ‘its structure is always the same’ and therefore ‘It 
has not been thought necessary to mention all these differences, which chiefly affect details’ 
(Eliade 1964:190). Significantly, successive generations of scholars not only cited Radloff, 
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but recognised the text’s obscure origins in Altaic mission records and acknowledged the 
role of the missionary ethnographer Verbitskii in bringing it to Radloff’s attention. However, 
having obliged the conventions of good scholarship, these scholars went on to elaborate their 
arguments, apparently convinced that having identified the source of their data, they 
enhanced the authority of their narrative rather than called into question the reliability of 
their data. Thus Ülgen entered the discourse on shamanism via a translation in German of a 
partial reproduction of a record retrieved from a missionary archive and produced several 
decades earlier by an unknown missionary, of an event he did not witness, from the 
testimony of an unknown informant (Znamenski 2007:37, 2003a:281-2).9  
The Ülgen séance is an instructive example of the workings of the discourse around 
shamanism and the homogenising universalism that has brought into being the figure of the 
shaman as a key trope in western discourses on indigenous religiosity. It demonstrates a 
tendency towards transforming a particular event or narrative account into a universal 
structure based on particulars that are operationalised as universal features. This movement 
in thought necessitates silencing or ignoring the situatedness of that particular element, and 
obscuring the production of that universalism in discourse. The particularities of the Ülgen 
séance that have been most widely universalised relate especially to shamanic cosmology 
and the notion of the shaman’s ascent to heaven via the various celestial levels of the Cosmic 
Tree / Pole / Pillar of the World. Eliade’s writings on shamanic cosmology are foundational 
to Eliade’s work in comparative mythology and morphology of religions and he consistently 
evidences these writings with reference to Radloff’s rendering of Ülgen. Sometimes he relies 
on additional sources, but they too rely on Radloff (for example Eliade 1958a:105-6). And 
yet, as Znamenski (2007:36) has noted, Ülgen was only one of the chief spirits for a few 
Altaian clans; some clans never mentioned Ülgen and others did not consider him a major 
deity.  
Radloff’s ethnographic research was extremely limited, as Radloff himself admitted 
when he acknowledged that his information was primarily derived from ‘hints’ and ‘legends, 
fairy tales, stories, and songs’ (Radloff quoted in Znamenski 2003:10). Not only did Radloff 
not undertake ethnographic research among the Yakut of northern Siberia, he did not have an 
opportunity to witness the shaman’s dramatic ritual performance he had read about in the 
                                                       
9 The obscure provenance of the Ülgen séance and its subsequent canonization in shamanism discourse recalls 
other occasions when indigenous cultural artefacts, both material and intangible, have been proclaimed an 
importance disproportionate to their status in the culture from which they were elevated. Examples include 
Spencer and Gillen’s recollection of the Tjilpa cosmogonic myth about Numbakulla, recorded in 1896, 
republished with substantial revisions in 1927, and recounted by Eliade to evidence his theory of a cosmic axis 
orienting sacred space (Eliade 1973:51-3, 1959a:32-5; cf. J. Smith 1987). Another example is The Tibetan 
Book of the Dead. Collected quite randomly by Walter Evans-Wentz and published by him in 1927, it became 
a mainstay of esoteric and spiritualist literature. As Lopez wryly notes, ‘One wonders how the course of 
Western history might have changed had Major Campbell, the British officer, given Evans-Wentz a monastic 
textbook on Buddhist logic, for example’ (Lopez 1998:52; cf. Lopez 2011).  
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memoirs and reports of travelers. He relied on second-hand accounts, and sometimes third- 
and fourth-hand accounts, as the Ülgen example demonstrates: ‘Shamans, who could 
become our sole reliable source in this matter, usually are afraid to expose their secrets. They 
always surround themselves with an air of mystery, which is so important in their vocation’ 
(Radloff quoted in Znamenski 2004a:xxix). He did however have several close encounters. 
On one occasion, he met two former shamans, both converts to Christianity, who refused to 
divulge their secrets on account of their new faith. In a telling example of the circumstances 
of ethnographic fieldwork in the imperial borderlands of southern Siberia, Radloff recounted 
their refusal:  
Our former god is already furious at us for betraying him. You can imagine what he can 
do if he learns that we, on top of everything else, betray him. We are even afraid more 
that the Russian God might find out how we talk about the old faith. What will save us 
then? (quoted in Znamenski 2004a:xxix)  
We may reasonably assume that Radloff’s account is less a verbatim report than a 
representation of their dilemma meant to explain his difficulty in obtaining their cooperation. 
The closest Radloff came to witnessing the fabled shaman’s ‘gothic-like’ séance was the 
ritual cleansing of a dwelling following a death in the family, a ceremony Radloff noted 
included elements of the classic shamanic performance. Reflecting on the experience, 
Radloff wrote:  
This wild scene, magically illuminated by fire, produced in me such a strong impression 
that for a while I watched only the shaman and forgot about all those who were present 
here. The Altaians were also shocked by this wild scene. They pulled out their pipes 
from their mouths and for a quarter of hour there was a dead silence. (Quoted in 
Znamenski 2004a:xxix)  
Besides this performance and a short thanksgiving prayer shared with him by a Teleut 
shaman, Radlov reconstructed a picture of shamanism from, as he put it, ‘fragmentary 
utterances of adherents of shamanism and shamans themselves’ (quoted in Znamenski 
2003:10).  
Whatever the reliability or otherwise of Radloff’s ethnographic fieldwork, the bigger 
issue at stake here is the ways in which the field of research into Siberian shamans pioneered 
by Radloff in the last decades of the nineteenth century came to produce an archive of 
ethnographic texts that in turn became the bedrock of subsequent scholarship on shamans. 
The challenge is to articulate in history the emergence of this new field. Some clues have 
already been suggested with reference to Russia’s ambivalent relationship with Europe. I 
want to flesh these out by considering the Siberian regionalists and political exiles that 
conducted this research and authored this scholarship. Their intellectual project was 
intimately entwined with this ambivalence and their scholarship, its range, approach to data, 
research methods, language, tone and style of its analyses, selections, omissions, motives 
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and purposes all contributed to shaping and structuring a discourse about shamans that 
sustained a research agenda that arguably endures today.  
 
Regionalists in Eden 
From the late 1850s a group of intellectuals and activists formed around a common interest 
in promoting Siberia’s development and its role in Russian national life. All were Russian 
and educated in European Russia, though most were born in Siberia and many were exiled 
there on account of their political activities. They were nationalist in orientation, in a pan-
Russian rather than pan-Slavic or Siberian-separatist sense. In other words, theirs was a 
multicultural approach and they agitated for recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and a 
withdrawal of the paternalism that marked the Russian state’s orientation to ‘aliens’ (i.e. 
Siberian indigenes). They saw themselves as a variant of the Great Russian People, 
‘grounded in territorial, social, and historical differences’ (Watrous 1993:117). Politically, 
the regionalists advocated a federalist Russian state, with different regions granted 
considerable autonomy to manage their affairs and saw models for emulation in British 
Canada, Australia, and especially the federal constitutionalism of the United States of 
America. As federalists, they saw their future with Russia but nevertheless wanted greater 
autonomy for Siberia to direct its own policies of modernisation and development. The best-
known proponents of regionalism were Grigorii Nikolaevich Potanin (b.1835 d.1920) and 
Nikolai Mikhailovich Iadrintsev (b.1842 d.1894) and the movement reached the height of its 
influence in the 1880s with the publication of Iadrintsev’s Siberia as a Colony. However, 
from this pinnacle, the movement declined, particularly following the opening up of Siberia 
to the forces of modernisation and class formation, increased Russian immigration following 
the inception of the Trans-Siberian railway project, as well as shifting government policies 
aimed at Russifying indigenous populations. With Iadrintsev’s death in 1894, the ‘golden 
age’ of Siberian regionalism passed, though regionalist advocates continued agitating under 
the leadership of Potanin until his death in 1920, by which time the Romanov dynasty had 
ended and the dawn of the Soviet era had fundamentally altered the nature of Russian 
domination in north Asia (Kovalaschina 2007; Watrous 1993:227; Forsyth 1992:154-85, 
216-9).10 
                                                       
10  Stephen Watrous summarises the regionalists’ political aspirations: ‘...their views stressed a mix of equal 
rights and self-determination for Siberia, reflecting a perceived absence of both throughout the three centuries 
of Siberia’s inclusion within the Russian empire. Regionalists sought, on the one hand, to gain for Siberia 
whatever liberties, rights, and opportunities Russians west of the Urals enjoyed; on the other, they wished the 
central government to assure a more open and autonomous development for Siberia—to be less like Russia, if 
so desired.’ (Watrous 1993:113; also see Bassin 1999; Diment 1993; Forsyth 1992; Grant 1997; Kovalaschina 
2007; and Slezkine 1994. For a discussion of dissident and regionalist attitudes to the United States during the 
nineteen thcentury, see Bassin 1991:776-9, Slezkine 1994:114, and Watrous 1993:120- 1). 
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From the perspective of a genealogy of shamanism, the significant issue is that the 
intellectual project initiated by the regionalists to create a new Siberian imaginary and 
elevate Siberia’s status in the eyes of Russians significantly impacted representations of 
shamans in late nineteenth-century Siberian historiography, played an instrumental role in 
facilitating shamanism’s expansion into North American scholarship, and had deep and long-
lasting influences on the shape of shamanism discourse well into the twentieth century. 
Russia’s intelligentsia, of which the regionalists were a part, in some instances prominently 
so, sought virtues and values that would distinguish Russians as a distinct people, along with 
a sphere of influence in which to project Russia’s destiny as redeemer of the project of 
modernity. Siberian indigenous myths, rituals, symbols and culture more generally offered 
valuable resources to Russian messianic nationalism and the image of the shaman that 
emerged during this period is deeply inflected with this history and characterised by its 
contradictions, notably the ambivalent tensions between antipathy towards Europe and 
mimicry of European norms and values.  
Iadrintsev, for example, wrote of the ‘unforgettable impression’ left on him by a 
shaman’s ritual performance he witnessed:  
I remember that night when I had to stop at that place. That mysterious beautiful night 
with thousands of bright stars spread over the awesome mountains full of savage beauty 
and poetic charm. I saw the shaman in a fantastic costume decorated with rattles and 
snake-like plaits. Feathers were sticking from his helmet, and in his hands he held a 
mysterious drum. At first, the shaman circled around the fire. Then he jumped out of the 
shelter to bark to the open air. My ears still can hear his magnificent howling, his call 
for spirits, and the wild mountain echo that responded to his invocations. (Quoted in 
Znamenski 2003:12)  
That impression was published in 1885, five years after Iadrintsev first visited the Altai. 
During his first visit, he noticed what he perceived as striking similarities between Siberia 
and ancient Greece. Writing in 1880 to a friend in Switzerland, Iadrintsev enthused:  
Mores and customs of local savages are extremely interesting. Their religion is 
shamanism. But what is shamanism? This is Pantheism. In a nutshell, the Altai is 
Greece, where everything is animated: rivers, mountains, stones; here one can hear 
thousands of legends and what legends they are!11 (Quoted in Znamenski 2003:12)  
Znamenski (2004b:148) has noted that Iadrintsev in his travel notes frequently compared the 
Altai and ancient Greece.12 While Iadrintsev speculated on the structural similarities between 
                                                       
11 Similarly, Chadwick saw parallels between the ‘oral poetry of the Tartars’ and the ‘early epic poetry of 
Europe’: ‘…the types of characters depicted, and the action of the poems are closely analogous to those of the 
Homeric poems and of Beowulf’. The main difference in her view was that central Asian poetry relates ‘not to 
the actual, but to the spiritual experiences of their heroes…and heroines…in sharp contrast to most of the oral 
poetry of Europe’, with the exception of the Homeric and early Norse epics: ‘Odyseuss would have found 
himself in a perfectly familiar milieu among the heroes of the Kara-Kirghiz.’ (Chadwick 1936b:291)  
12 Eric Dodds, writing in 1951, also linked shamanism with Greece, although in a more historical manner than 
Iadrintsev’s romanticism. Dodds described Orpheus and Pythagoras as shamans, but generally was skeptical 
about shamanistic elements in the Greek epics (Dodds 2004:251, 265n47). Citing Dodds among others, Eliade 
rejected suggestions of shamanic elements in the Dionysian ecstasy: ‘…the few figures of Greek legend who 
can be compared with shamanism are related to Apollo’ (Eliade 1964:388). 
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shamanism and pantheism that rendered the Altai analogous to Greece, his friend and 
colleague Grigorii Potanin went further to argue that Christianity emerged from shamanism. 
Reversing the degenerative thesis favoured by enlightenment scholars, Potanin’s ‘oriental 
hypothesis’ drew parallels between southern Siberian and central Asian shamanic legends 
and Hebrew, Russian, early Christian and European medieval mythologies (Kovalaschina 
2007; Znamenski 2003). Drawing on Castren’s philological researches, Potanin announced:  
Now I am inclined to think more than ever that Christianity originated from the Finnish 
tribes in Southern Siberia. That Mongol Nestorian vision according to which Christ was 
called Erke was not a sect brought from the West but it was the origin of Christianity. 
The legends of the mission, of God’s son, appeared in Siberia. (Quoted in Kovalaschina 
2007:116n39, cf. pp.96-8). 
Potanin concluded:  
We clearly see that it is the central Asian shamanic legend that lies at the foundation of 
the legend about Christ, and that the image of Christ himself was shaped according to 
the image that had existed many centuries earlier in inner Asia. (Quoted in Znamenski 
2007:46) 
The regionalists shared Castren’s and Radloff’s romantic sentiments, but employed these for 
different ideological purposes, to demonstrate that Siberian culture was on a par with, if not 
superior to, European culture. Both Iadrintsev and Potanin advanced strategies to suggest 
that Siberian shamanism was at the roots of European civilisation, though in this effort 
Potanin arguably surpassed Iadrintsev in boldness. By postulating the origins of Christianity 
in Siberian shamanism, Potanin’s oriental hypothesis argued for an alternative to romantic 
orientalism’s claim that the roots of western civilisation were in India:  
[Southern Siberia] is the genuine motherland of humankind. It was here that the first 
seeds of Christian legends were planted. Now I am quite sure that the Eden of Adam 
and Eve was located at the sources of the Irtysh River on the banks of which I was born. 
(Quoted in Znamenski 2003:45-6) 
Andrei Anokhin, an ethnomusicologist particularly interested in Ostiak and Altaian 
shamanism in western and southern Siberia respectively, thought, ‘Shamanism represents the 
peak of expressive skills of the Altaian singing, people with weak nerves are not able to 
withstand the power of the feelings which are transmitted through a shaman’. Comparing the 
‘shamanic mystery plays’ with Hebrew psalms, he found in them ‘the same incorruptible 
sincerity that reflects a simple, but deeply sensitive soul, the same metaphors, the same 
magnificent pictures of surrounding nature’ (Anokhin quoted in Znamenski 2004b:150; cf. 
2003:50-4). As with Radloff, Potanin and Gavriil Ksenofontov (Potanin’s student and 
another advocate of the Judeo-Christian debt to shamanism), Anokhin’s work was a key 
source for contemporary and later participants in the discourse on shamanism, including 
Campbell, Eliade and Sternberg (for example J. Campbell 2000: 251-2; Eliade 1964: 36-44, 
200-1; Sternberg 2004:104).  
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Yet for all their efforts to elevate shamans’ image in the eyes of the Russian public, 
Siberian indigenous cultures presented a dilemma to the regionalists. On the one hand, the 
regionalists regarded Siberia’s indigenous peoples as signposting a new pan-Russian identity 
oriented eastward and away from Europe. Under the intellectual leadership of Potanin and 
Iadrintsev, the regionalists celebrated natives’ close-knit communities and the value natives 
supposedly placed on equality and independence. Potanin remarked on ‘their phenomenal 
honesty and the heavenly [raiskie] rules of their social life’ (quoted in Slezkine 1994:116). 
In regionalists’ eyes, Siberia’s natives demonstrated a model of social organisation that 
stressed values and virtues the regionalists thought lacking in Europe, including European 
Russia (i.e. west of the Urals). On the other hand, Siberia’s indigenes were a potent symbol 
of Siberia’s backwardness and lack of development. ‘The moral lives of the aliens,’ wrote 
S.S. Shashkov, ‘is a bizarre mixture of repulsive vices and patriarchal virtues’ (quoted in 
Slezkine 1994:115). In addition to disgust at filthy natives who feasted on raw meat, by the 
latter decades of the nineteenth century a new theme was emerging that lamented how 
natives were corrupted by Russian lifestyles. For example, N.V. Latkin complained:  
Drunkenness, knavery, laziness, apathy, and a feebleness caused by various sicknesses, 
smallpox, and especially venereal diseases…have changed the character of this people, 
which used to be known for its courage, valor, agility, kindness, and truthfulness. 
(quoted in Slezkine 1994:116) 
The regionalists’ dilemma was of course a product of their contradictory desire to reject 
European identity and simultaneously identify with European values and aspirations. This 
ambivalent impulse suggests something of the regionalists’ attitude towards European Russia 
and it is significant that the regionalists were dissidents, exiles and outspoken critics of 
Tsarist autocracy. Setting aside for the moment the ideological articulations of backward, 
primitive and savage natives, certainly indigenous populations were in dire straits, both 
physically and economically. However, the regionalists were astute enough to recognise that 
the extreme penury in which many natives survived was a consequence of Tzarsist 
exploitation, abuse and neglect (Forsyth 1992:158-63). The regionalists felt a moral 
responsibility for Siberia’s indigenous peoples, much as the Russian intelligentsia accepted 
moral responsibility for the Russian peasantry. As Iadrintsev put it, ‘Every time we hear 
about their predicament, we should experience pangs of conscience’ (quoted in Slezkine 
1994:117). However, in Siberia’s colonial context, the predicament that concerned the 
regionalists was not merely the decline in the condition of natives; regionalists were very 
concerned that indigenous peoples faced extinction, a circumstance that were it to come to 
pass, would confirm Russia and its imperial ambitions as comparably dishonourable and 
unconscionable as the English, French or Spanish.  
The regionalists’ solution to the dilemma of honest natives brought low by Russian 
vices was to advocate a civilising mission to indigenous populations. For regionalists 
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anxious to avoid comparison with the European imperial powers’ treatment of indigenous 
populations, this civilising mission was more than a matter of conscience, it was a matter of 
pride. Reflecting a general transformation in Russian elite politics, the regionalists’ strategy 
redefined savagery as poverty and backwardness as indigence, largely attributable to unjust 
imperial policies towards Russia’s colonial possession. Yet this was not a revolutionary 
reformulation away from the evolutionary schema that underpinned imperial attitudes to 
native populations in Africa, the Americas and India no less than Siberia, and parallels with 
paternalist notions of the ‘white man’s burden’ are clear. This civilising mission called on 
new administrators to humanise government, merchants and traders to stop unfair practices, 
and missionaries to devote themselves to educational work. This was, as Iadrintsev put it, 
‘the obligation of the superior race engaged in spreading civilization’ (quoted in Slezkine 
1994:117). Potanin agreed. Referencing Siberia’s far eastern region, he wrote in 1861, ‘the 
role of further developing civilization [in the Amur region] has fallen to Russia’ (Potanin 
quoted in Bassin 1999:197). Slezkine suggests these transformations in how natives should 
be treated stemmed from a transformation in how natives were understood. Now natives 
were regarded as having rights: ‘The preservation of alien tribes, the spread of education 
among them, as well as their involvement in civic and educational life, is as much the 
historic right of aliens for human existence as it is the historic duty of the Russian people in 
the East’ (Iadrintsev quoted in Slezkine 1994:117). In this way, Russia’s civilising mission 
was promoted as according with natives’ rights on grounds of their humanity rather than 
their citizenship, while the civilising mission in practice amounted to the Russification of 
Siberian native populations (Forsyth 1992:154-62; Slezkine 1994:116-7). 
An important plank in the regionalists’ strategy to civilise Siberia was educating 
Russians about indigenous cultures, a task the regionalist scholars saw as their unique role 
and obligation as members of the superior race engaged in spreading civilisation. They 
achieved this by several means, including books, pamphlets and ethnographic exhibitions. 
Znamenski recounts such a staging in 1909 in the city of Tomsk (Znamenski 2004b:153-5, 
2003:15-6). Organised by Potanin, ethnomusicologist Andrei Anokhin, and archaeologist 
and ethnographer V.A. Adrianov, this performance transformed Tomsk’s ‘hall for public 
gatherings’ (dom obshchestvennogo) into a Siberian ‘house of culture’, complete with animal 
skins, depictions of a polar night, and a huge block of ice. Before crowding spectators, native 
actors dressed in the traditional garb of Altaians, Buryats, Tartars, and Khanty performed 
live ethnography by playing musical instruments, reciting excerpts from their epic legends, 
and displaying scenes from native life with household items, sacred altars, and replicas of 
native dwellings. The centre of attention for much of the evening was an Altaian shaman 
named Mampyi. Mampyi collaborated closely with Potanin and his colleagues, by 
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contributing to devising the structure of this ethnographic theatre and promoting the 
regionalists’ project to recover indigenous cultural identity.  
According to Znamenski, a contemporary account published in the journal 
Etnograficheskoe Obozrenie describes how Mampyi divided the evenings’ shamanic 
performance into several acts. First Mampyi described the meaning of the ritual he was 
about to perform, before donning his costume and addressing a fire. Then he addressed 
several ancestral spirits in a ‘whirling dancing manner’, and finally concluded his 
performance by removing his costume and in ‘a singing manner’ explained the meaning of 
the ceremony he had just performed. Six days later, Mampyi performed as a living 
illustration accompanying a scholarly paper read by Adrianov on the basics of Siberian 
shamanism. That evening at the Tomsk Technological Institute the paper was read again and 
Mampyi repeated his performance for a third time. Znamenski reports that Potanin and his 
colleagues were so inspired by the success of their ethnographic showcase that they sought 
and found other shamans with whom they staged similar ethnographic performances in 
several other cities, including Barnaul and Irkutsk (Znamenski 2007:51). It is perhaps also 
worth noting here that Mampyi was a key source and collaborator of Anokhin’s and 
Mampyi’s account formed the basis for Eliade’s discussion of Altaic shamans’ decent to the 
underworld (Eliade 1964:200-4). Mampyi is also the only shaman for whom Eliade had 
specific ethnographic data, recorded by Anokin. Eliade’s other sources on Altaic shamans 
are Radloff and Potanin, both of whom rely on second-hand accounts and are filtered 
through Mikhailovski and Chadwick, whom Eliade cites in his footnotes. 
The regionalists mobilised Siberian indigenous cultures in their efforts to formulate 
and articulate a distinct and worthy pan-Russian identity. Siberia’s most exotic and well-
known emblem of indigenous religiosity offered a vitalising element and so featured in their 
writings and their broader project to stimulate a new vision of Siberia that could form the 
basis of that pan-Russian identity. Yet for all their ambition, the regionalists tended to 
confine their research and writings to south and western Siberia, particularly the Altai 
region, which was also a favourite holiday destination for Potanin and his colleagues. The 
situation was somewhat different in north and eastern Siberia. Economic and industrial 
development had hardly touched most parts of the north and east, unlike the southern steppes 
where Russian settlement, manufacturing and merchant trading were rapidly transforming 
Siberian society. More generally, policies of Russification had not had nearly as much 
impact in the northeast as in the southwest, to a large degree because few Russian 
administrators and missionaries were willing to tolerate the harsh, inhospitable climate. The 
climate similarly ensured Russian settlers stayed away on account of the immense difficulty 
of productively settling the land. As a result, the northeast remained largely unchanged, or 
certainly far less changed by Russian imperialism than the south. In terms of the discourse 
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on shamanism, this fact held two implications. First, many indigenous communities were 
still nomadic and relied on hunting and fishing as well as their reindeer herds for survival, 
unlike in the south where natives increasingly adopted sedentary lifestyles and Russian 
customs. The second implication is that the northeast remained a favourite destination to 
which to banish political dissidents and troublemakers. These two implications converged 
when political exiles from tsarist Russia turned to ethnography in a bid to occupy themselves 
in the long, lonely years of their involuntary fieldwork. Some, like Vladimir G. Bogoraz 
(Waldemar Bogoras) and Vladimir Ilych Jochelson (Waldemar Jochelson) went on to 
establish successful academic careers on the basis of their involuntary Siberian exile. 
Although not as easily given to the romantic musings of the regionalists, exiles and 
regionalists were familiar with one another’s work and in some cases were on personal 
terms. Yet the exiles identified first and foremost as Europeans. In this respect their self-
understanding distinguished them from the regionalists. They were also more scientifically 
inclined and brought distinctly European epistemological orientations to bear on their 
research. This distinction is demonstrated in sharpest relief with reference to exiles’ writings 
and ideas about shaman’s mental states, a theme the exiles gathered under a heading that was 
as much a diagnostic designation as a rubric for all manner of strange behaviours exhibited 
by natives.13  
 
Arctic Hysteria 
The subject of shaman’s mental states is as old as the discourse itself. Russian and European 
observers interpreted shamans’ bizarre behaviour while in trance as evidence of an abnormal 
and deficient mind. Generally, the question of shaman’s apparently strange and abnormal 
behaviour was approached by successive travelers, authors and scholars within the 
paradigms of permissibility of their period. Up to the early eighteenth century, shamans’ 
behaviour was attributed to possession by devils. During the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment, shamans were seen as stupid and mad, or alternatively clever charlatans 
engaged in a performance for duplicitous ends. During the nineteenth century, romantic 
nationalists such as Iadrintsev and Potanin, though still committed to rational 
demystification, were nevertheless moved by shamans’ professed ability to commune with 
spirits and impressed by the respect accorded them by their fellow natives. Yet since at least 
                                                       
13 A second important distinction I acknowledge but have chosen to omit from this discussion is the exiles’ 
tendency to blend fictive writing with scientific research. Waclav Sieroszewski is a notable example 
(Manouelian 2006; Theodoratus 1977; more generally, see Knight 2000b). Although an interesting discussion 
could be had with reference to experimental styles of ‘writing culture’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and 
Fischer 1986), I have omitted this discussion because available space is insufficient for a meaningfully 
engagement, and the problematic I want to draw out is sufficiently demonstrated by exiles’ representations of 
arctic hysteria.  
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the second Kamchatka expedition, when Zuev classified shamans’ bizarre behaviour as a 
variety of illness, observers had sought to pathologise shamans as a means to gaining 
explanatory control over what otherwise escaped their comprehension, if not rational 
explanation. In the last years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth, 
this pathology went by the name ‘arctic hysteria’, a term, when applied to shamans, that 
proposed a causal relation between geography, climate, and mental states. This approach to 
apprehending shamans was another strategy to bring shamans under normative control by 
submitting the cultural institution of shamanic religiosity to scientific disciplinary power. 
Although the history of describing shamans as mentally ill begins more than a century 
before, the nineteenth-century discourse on female hysteria offered a widely accepted 
‘scientific’ explanation for shamans’ behaviour and the prevalence of arctic hysteria among 
native populations was a common feature in reports and writings by exiles. Stanislaus 
Novakovsky summarised exiles’s accounts of arctic hysteria in a 1924 article. He reported 
‘all travelers are unanimous that women are especially susceptible to hysterical disorders’ 
and quoted Sieroszewski to support his claim: ‘Girls are also subject to this disease, but it is 
women who are especially susceptible and more so after marriage or after unfortunate child 
birth’ (Novakovsky 1924:119). Similarly, Waldemar Jochelson reported that arctic hysteria 
is widely prevalent among women, up to half the female population. He reasoned, ‘As these 
fits develop mostly in grown-up girls or young women, it may be inferred that they are in 
some way connected with the sexual functions’ (Jochelson 1975b:31). Nineteenth-century 
medicine’s preoccupation with female hysteria was familiar to the exiles, and they were 
quick to interpret shamans’ behaviour in terms of hysteria. They saw in the shaman’s leaps, 
shouts, screams, mimicry, contortions, sweating, shivering, shaking, twitching, and similar 
physiological signs indicators of a deranged mind, nervous disorder and neurosis. While the 
exiles reported that arctic hysteria was an affliction common in women, they noted ‘nervous 
attacks’ afflicted men too, ‘shamans in particular’ (Jochelson 1975a:416-417). Similarly, in 
The Chukchee, Bogoras (1974:426) introduced his discussion of ‘the psychology of 
shamans’ by noting, ‘shamans are very nervous, highly excitable persons, often almost on 
the verge of insanity’. Jochelson (1975a:47) too emphasised shamans’ nervous disposition: 
‘Those that become shamans are usually nervous young men subject to hysterical fits, by 
means of which the spirits express their demand that the young man should consecrate 
himself in the service of shamanism.’  
The suggestion that men were also prone to hysteria seemed to undermine the 
contention that this ‘nervous disease’ had something to do with female ‘sexual functions’. To 
some extent, this problem was obscured (and thereby resolved) by its attribution to male 
shamans, rather than men in general, because this attribution invoked long-standing 
suspicions about shamans’ mental states. This was one strategy to deal with the problem of 
 83 
men afflicted by a condition supposedly prevalent among women.14 A different strategy 
accounted for the affliction in terms of causal factors independent of differences between the 
sexes. In contrast with the first strategy that relied on popular medical discourses of the time, 
the second strategy drew on geographical determinism and posited the arctic climate as the 
main causal factor. In general, a combination of both strategies was deployed, depending on 
the category of person under consideration and the extent of Russification at their location. 
The less Russified and more ‘savage’ the area, the stronger the preference for arctic hysteria; 
the inverse accounted for a preference for female hysteria (see Worobec 2001). Thus 
Novakovsky (1924:113) could say of arctic hysteria, ‘this scourge of the northern tribes is 
the product of that media in which they are forced to live and lead a difficult struggle for 
existence’.  
Among these northern tribes, Jochelson (1975a:416) reported that arctic hysteria is 
‘widely prevalent among the Yukagir, Tungus [Evenki], Yakut, and also among the Russian 
immigrants’. However, Jochelson thought the Yukaghir of the Kolyma river basin were the 
worst afflicted; The Koryak mentions arctic hysteria only briefly and refers readers to his 
report The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirized Tungus because ‘all the forms of this disease 
occur developed to the highest degree’ among the Yukaghir of the Upper-Kolyma river 
region (Jochelson 1975b:31; cf. 1975a:416n2). Jochelson (1975b:30-3) distinguished two 
forms of arctic hysteria. Menerik he suggested is indistinguishable from ‘fits of hysteria in 
civilised countries’. He continued:  
As these fits develop mostly in grown-up girls and young women, it may be inferred 
that they are in some way connected with the sexual functions. Among the young male 
population, hysterical fits are principally due to the influence of religious imagination. 
They are observed in the nervously strained youths who are inclined to become 
shamans.  
Menerik is female hysteria manifested in shamans. The menerik episode begins with the 
afflicted person singing ‘the wishes of the spirit that tortures him’. They are usually in a 
seated position and this stage may continue for a day or more. In the next stage of the 
menerik,  
suddenly the patient looks like a savage, or, with an air of exaltation, begins to sing, 
first gently, then louder, waving his arms and swinging his body…the future shaman 
complains, in the song, of the spirits that compel him to start the shaman’s career, 
strangle him, and threaten death if he does not consent to follow their call. Sometimes it 
is apparently the spirit himself, that has entered into the patient, who sings…Often the 
singing is followed by cramps, contractions, or an attack of epilepsy.  
Jochelson (1975b:33-4) described another form of arctic hysteria with reference to the Yakut 
term meriak. He admitted this condition is stranger and more complicated than menerik, but 
                                                       
14 It is worth noting the circularity of this argument. Shamans are not like normal men; they are particularly prone 
to nervousness and thus are more like women, in which case their neurotic behaviour can be explained 
because, being more like women, they are more prone to neurosis and hysteria.  
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suggested that in general it consisted in ‘extreme impressionableness…fright and timidity’. 
With this form of arctic hysteria, the afflicted person is easily given to shock and fear at the 
slightest suggestion, following which they shout obscenities, often referencing genitals, 
usually female but on occasion male too, and apparently involuntarily. Jochelson reported 
this condition usually afflicted women and estimated that half the population of women aged 
30 or 40 years and older was afflicted, giving several examples. A variation of this form of 
hysteria, also classified under the term meriak, consisted in extreme imitation, which 
Jochelson compared with hypnosis: 
The effects of the hypnotist are produced while setting in motion, by words or by 
postures, certain ideas in the subconscious mind of the subject. In arctic hysteria, 
suggestions like hypnotic ones take place with the full consciousness of the person, 
when he is awake. The auditory and visual impressions (the latter are absent in 
suggestions of artificial sleep act on the mind of the patient in evoking certain actions 
not only with his full consciousness, but even against his wish. He has no power to 
restrain himself. Besides, the suggestion may be intentional or unintentional on the part 
of the person who makes it. Even animals or natural forces may bring about hypnotic 
states. Everything uncommon, everything that strikes the mind of the patient through 
the organs of sight or hearing, evokes in him repetitions. The patient repeats the sounds 
of animals and the words of men, which he has heard; he imitates certain postures of 
grimaces, and does everything which he is told to do, even the most absurd, ridiculous, 
indecent, or dangerous things.  
This kind of uncontrollable imitation renders the afflicted person vulnerable to abuse and 
Jochelson cites examples of Yukaghirs abused in this way both by their fellow clans people 
as well as Russians.15 
As one might expect, doing ethnographic research in a society afflicted by this kind of 
pathology can be difficult. Jochelson (1975b:35-6) recalled the incident of a woman he 
wished to photograph. Having positioned her by a screen, he instructed her to look at the top 
of the camera and not move. ‘(H)er face became as if petrified, and her eyes motionless. 
Fearing that such a state might end in a fit, I hastened to tell her to get up. She at once got up 
and went away.’ However, it could also be dangerous too, not only for the person afflicted 
with meriak, but also for the person suggesting behaviour to imitate or abusing the person 
thus afflicted. Jochelson explained this in terms of contradictory brain functions. At the 
moment of suggestion two brain functions activate independently and contradictorily. While 
a ‘reflectory half’ submitted without control, a ‘conscious half, although suppressed, and 
powerless to counteract the automatic action,’ initiated resistance by attacking the ‘supposed 
hypnotizer’, with a knife, axe or any improvised weapon at hand. Bearing in mind that 
persons afflicted with meriak are susceptible to suggestion regardless of the intention of a 
                                                       
15 The manner in which mimicry, when abused in this way, becomes obedience is intriguing. Jochelson recounts 
the incident of a woman who seized a horse by the tail upon instruction of a young man standing nearby. She 
was about to be dragged away, when he instructed her to let go. What is being abused here is not the woman’s 
capacity for imitation, but her obedience to instruction. The sociologically interesting question is the reported 
prevalence of this behaviour (imitation or obedience among women of a certain age and abuse of these women 
by men), although unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this study. 
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suggester, conceivably anyone can find themselves under attack at any moment for any 
innocuous suggestion. Aware of these dangers, Jochelson thought it dangerous to experiment 
with ‘patients’ when there was no-one around to retrain ‘their outbursts of resentment’, 
although he adds that ‘in the eyes of the natives, I was too important a man to be assaulted or 
struck with impunity’. By way of demonstrating this point, Jochelson (1975b:37) recounted 
an incident in which a Yukaghir woman, ‘being frightened at the crack of the shutter of my 
camera, rushed not at me, but at my Cossack, who was standing by, at the same time 
exclaiming the names of the male sexual organs, and trying to take hold of his’. Accounting 
for this incident in terms of his model of simultaneous, contrary brain impulses, Jochelson 
adds to his model a capacity for strategic discrimination: ‘She must, then, have consciously 
transferred her anger from me, who was the cause of her fright, to another person, who could 
be assaulted.’  
Jochelson described a curious society. A sizeable portion of the population—half of 
all women over 30 years, the majority of younger women, and all shamans—was susceptible 
to uncontrollable behaviour, ranging from soft singing for several hours, to seizures, 
profanity, undressing in public, disappearing for hours into the arctic tundra, day or night 
wearing nothing but light clothes and sometimes naked, and given to committing violence 
against themselves and others at apparently inoffensive suggestions. At the same time, 
people in this state sometimes displayed an uncanny capacity for reasoning, such as the 
woman who substituted for Jochelson his Cossack companion. In another example, we may 
infer a degree of strategic reasoning was involved when the spirits that had caused a teenage 
girl to suffer hysterical fits released her upon her parents’ acquiescence to their demand to 
give their daughter a new dress (1975b:31-2). There is a sense of perplexity in these and 
other ethnographers’ observations about arctic hysteria, a sense that they are not quite 
confident they have understood or adequately explained this strange affliction. They seem 
ambivalent and their tone appears to alternate between dissatisfaction with the extent of 
explanatory control asserted with theories of contradictory brain functions and distinctions 
between hysteria types, determination to explain this phenomenon in terms of mental 
impairment, and resignation that the phenomenon in question possibly escapes rational 
explanation. Dissatisfied but lacking alternative explanations, Bogoras, Jochelson, 
Sieroszewski and their exiled peers settled for reporting and describing in the style of the 
mildly perplexed (cf. T. Miller 1999). 
This episode is reminiscent of Taussig’s discussion of the strange coexistence of faith 
and skepticism reported by Boas about Kwakiutl attitudes towards the efficacy of shamans’ 
healing techniques, a problem Taussig contrasts with Evans-Pritchard’s efforts to uncover 
Zande witchdoctors’ ‘tricks of the trade’. Likening Kwakiutl shamanism to a slippery fish 
(‘the more you try to pin it down, the more it wriggles’), Taussig notes Evans-Pritchard’s 
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faith in ethnography: ‘In the long run, however…an ethnographer is bound to triumph. 
Armed with preliminary knowledge nothing can prevent him from driving a deeper and 
deeper wedge if he is interested and persistent’ (quoted in Taussig 1998:242). The 
resemblance with the exiles’ reports about arctic hysteria is simply that, like the tricks of 
Kwakiutl shamans and Zande witchdoctors, the phenomenon of arctic hysteria seemed to 
elude arrest at the hands of ethnographers’ wedge of scientific reason. I don’t want to push 
the comparison too far and I recognise that interest in shamans’ mental states is a somewhat 
different inquiry from interest in the tricks and techniques of indigenous healers. However, I 
think these two images, the slippery fish and the driving wedge, suggest something of the 
troubled relationship between what shamans are and their representation in language. By 
merging the theory of female hysteria with a putative relationship between mental states and 
‘that media in which they are forced to live’, the theory of arctic hysteria drove the wedge a 
little deeper. Yet still the slippery fish of shaman’s mental states eluded circumscription and 
epistemological containment. In the final discussion of this chapter I want to draw out this 
problem more explicitly by considering the importance of language in the emigration of the 
term ‘shaman’ to North America. Thereafter I will return to this image of driving wedge and 
slippery fish by way of conclusion. 
 
Emigration 
Since the late seventeenth century, an indigenous term ‘shaman’ had been translated as 
‘juggler’, ‘conjurer’, ‘sorcerer’, ‘priest’, ‘wizard’, and so on. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century, however, ‘shaman’ was proffered as the equivalent term in English for 
different native terms. I want to consider this problem in relation to North America. The 
important backdrop for this development was the emergence in the north-American context 
of ethnography and anthropology as scholarly disciplines, particularly Franz Boas’s 
influential studies of indigenous communities on Baffin Island and along the continent’s 
north-west coast. The particularist and relativist method developed by Boas and the 
generation of peers and students he influenced had to manage a dilemma, one inherent in 
modernity’s double-hinged articulation of ontology and epistemology: ethnographic 
particularism must work with cross-cultural categories if it is to establish a science of 
anthropology founded on comparative analysis. The following chapters will show that this 
dilemma is an inherent quality of modernity’s double-hinge. Not only that, but the familiar 
available terms—‘sorcerer’, ‘conjurer’, ‘priest’, ‘medicine-man’, and the like—belonged to a 
discourse the new particularist method intended repudiating.16 During the 1880s, while Boas 
                                                       
16 The Boasians embraced historical particularism and cultural relativism as a means of articulating a critique of 
evolutionary theories of human development and progress. Boas’ influence and critiques of the ‘Boasian 
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was still experimenting with his method, these terms were gradually being supplemented and 
gradually supplanted by the term ‘shaman’. During the 1890s, when the Boasian 
methodological emphasis on ethnographic particularism was growing in influence and the 
theory of cultural diffusion was growing in popularity, ‘shaman’ was embraced for providing 
a cross-cultural comparative category that was acceptable because of its native provenance, a 
claim sustained in turn by ethnographic research from Alaska and the north-west that 
supported the diffusion theory in relation to North-East Asia.  
The notion that North American medicine-men were similar to Siberian shamans was 
already suggested in the eighteenth-century writings of American adventurer and explorer 
John Ledyard. Well-known as the chronicler of Captain Cook’s last voyage, Ledyard’s 
accounts of his travels in Siberia included favourable comparisons between ‘the Shamant’ 
and ‘Priests’ of ‘savage’ Asia and America, ‘and collaterally of every other untutored being’ 
(Ledyard 1966:191-2; cf. Carver 1781:384-7). Jared Spark’s 1828 biography of Ledyard was 
republished several times during the nineteenth-century and contributed to elevating 
Ledyard’s status. By the mid-nineteenth century the term ‘shaman’ was becoming more 
familiar to American audiences, for example through articles like ‘Description of a Siberian 
Shaman’, published in at least three US newspapers.17 In 1854 Randolph Marcy gave 
‘shamans’ as a synonym for ‘medicine-men’ in his Exploration of the Red River of Louisiana 
in the year 1852. The passage related to a Comanche ‘medicine-lodge’ and Marcy, who also 
authored the well-known Prairie Traveler hand-book, reproduced it in his 1863 book Thirty 
Years of Army Life on the Border (Marcy and McClellan 1854:107; Marcy 1863:60). Both 
titles were republished on several occasions. ‘Medicine man’, ‘conjurer’ or less commonly 
‘priest’ were still widely preferred, particularly since most ethnographic research was still 
collected by serving or retired military personnel schooled in the social evolutionary ideas of 
the era. However, with moves towards professionalising ethnographic research during the 
1870s and particularly after the founding of the Bureau of Ethnology in 1879, this language 
began to change.  
Consider, for example, Albert Gatschet. Born in Switzerland and trained as a linguist 
at Bern and Berlin, Gatschet travelled to North America to study native languages. He was 
soon working for the United States Geological Survey and Bureau of Ethnology. In April 
1877 Gatchet presented a paper to the American Philosophical Society on the language of 
the Timucuan people of the Florida peninsula. Gatschet’s paper included English translations 
                                                                                                                                                           
paradigm’ are well-known and do not need repeating here. For critical discussions of Boas’ influence and 
legacy, see Cole (1999), Darnell (1998), Lewis (2001), and Valentine and Darnell (1999). For discussions of 
Boas’ debt to German romanticism, see citations in Darnell (2001:187). See Znamenski (2007:58-63) for a 
discussion of Boas in relation to shamanism discourse. 
17 Originally published in Sharpe's London Magazine in November 1846, ‘Description of a Siberian Shaman’ 
was reprinted in Sartain's Union Magazine of Literature and Art, 10 (January-June 1852), pp.250-1; The 
National Magazine, 1 (July-December 1852), pp.250-2; and The Crayon 2(12)(19 September 1855), p.182. 
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of Timucuan words; for the Timucuan ‘itufa’ Gatschet gave ‘sorcerer, wizard, medicine-
man’ and for ‘ituhu’ Gatschet offered ‘to pray, conjure, invoke, charm, bewitch’ (Gatschet 
1877:640). By 1880, Gatschet had subtly modified his translation. In another paper read 
before the Society, Gatschet abandoned his earlier translation of itufa and instead formed a 
noun from his earlier translation of ‘ituhu’, so ‘itufa’ was now translated simply as ‘conjurer’ 
and ‘ituhu’ became ‘to charm, bewitch’ (Gatschet 1880:486). He also introduced another 
Timucuan word, ‘iarua’, translated as ‘sorcerer, conjurer’. Gaschet obtained the new term 
from Rene de Laudonniere's reports of his travels in Florida and credits the translation to De 
Laudonnierre, but adds his own explanatory note: ‘This epithet given to the Timucua 
shamans refers to their prophetic power and the convulsions affected by them to obtain 
oracles of war; from yuru to tremble, to be shaken or contorted’ (Gatschet 1880:500). 
Gatschet’s note references his introductory comments where he recalled observations by the 
seventeenth-century Franciscan Padre Francesco Pareja about the ‘incantations’ of Timucuan 
‘conjurers’, who ‘after contorting himself in the most terrific manner for about twenty 
minutes’ advised the chief (these are Gatschet’s term). Pareja’s reports, which Gatschet 
thought to be among ‘the most precious relics of Floridian antiquity’ (Gatschet 1877:628-9) 
prompted him to note: ‘In a people which believes in the power of conjurers over ghosts and 
spirits, the influence of the bewitcher or shaman must be necessarily immense’ (Gatschet 
1880:473). This appears to be the first occasion Gatschet uses ‘shaman’ in his writings; by 
1883 he was using ‘shaman’ as an English equivalent term, giving ‘conjurer, Shaman’ as the 
English translation for ‘Ka'tchmish’ in a paper on the Shetimasha Indians of southern 
Louisiana (Gatschet 1883:156-7). 
W.J. Hoffman provides another illustration. Only two weeks before Gatschet read his 
Shetimasha Indians paper before the Anthropological Society of Washington, Hoffman read 
to the Society a paper comparing pictographs he studied in California in 1882 with similar 
examples collected in Alaska. Hoffman described each pictograph individually and then 
interpreted the series as a narrative. Yet Hoffman’s choice of language suggests his 
individual descriptions were already interpretations. For example, his description of 
engravings on an ivory bow included the following (numbers correspond to the pictograph 
sequence):  
… 8. The hunter, or narrator, sitting on the ground in an attitude of supplication. He is 
asking the Shaman for success in the chase. 9. The Shaman. Incantations are performed 
by making short circular movements with the hands, above and on either side of the 
head. A Shaman is always drawn with one or both hands elevated, and the gesture for 
this personage is made as if he were performing such ceremonies. In the present 
instance the left arm is still raised, while the right is extended toward the supplicant, 
signifying that the request has been granted. 10. The Shaman's winter lodge. 11. Trees 
surrounding the habitations of this individual. I2. The Shaman's summer 
habitation.…(Hoffman 1883:140) 
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This style of using ‘shaman’, in which Hoffman assumed his readers’ familiarity with 
‘shaman’ so that further description or explanation was unnecessary, is typical of his paper 
(see also pp.143,146). For example, Hoffman stated of a pictograph showing ‘an ornamented 
head, with body and legs having an indefinite termination’: ‘The only interpretation that can 
be offered is that it represents a Shaman’; he says no more (Hoffman 1883:131). The only 
description of ‘shaman’ I have found in Hoffman’s work is a footnote to an article published 
in 1881: ‘The term “medicine” is usually applied to anything partaking of the nature of a 
charm or fetish, and is prepared with attendant ceremonies by a “medicine chief” or shaman’ 
(Hoffman 1881:240n). His paper on pictographs also offered ‘shaman’ as the single English 
translation of several indigenous words, a preference he repeated in subsequent articles. 
However, his later articles swapped the order of presentation by giving English words 
followed by their indigenous translation. So, for example, in the Waitshum’ni dialect, 
Hoffman gives ‘Ang ̣̣'̗tru’ as the indigenous word for ‘Shaman’ (Hoffman 1886b:374). 
Another article published in the same issue of Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society gave Selish translations for approximately 360 English words, including ‘Chief’, 
‘Friend’, ‘Indian’, ‘Whiteman’, ‘Frenchman’, and ‘Shaman’ (Hoffman 1886a:363). In 1888, 
Hoffman published ‘Pictography and Shamanistic Rites of the Ojibwa’, a prelude to his 
lengthy 1991 study of Ojibwa Midē´, ‘or shamans’ (Hoffman 1891, 1888), which was 
submitted to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution as the Seventh Annual Report of 
the Bureau of Ethnology. Hoffman’s article on Ojibwa ‘shamanistic rites’ in the third issue 
of American Anthropologist’s inaugural volume was not the first in the volume to allude to 
shamanism in its title; the previous issue included ‘The Prayer of a Navajo Shaman’ by 
Washington Matthews (1888). Another example of an anthropologist who embraced the term 
‘shaman’ during the last two decades of the eighteenth century, the entry for ‘priest’ and 
‘medicine-men’ in the index of Matthews’ monograph on Navaho legends referred readers to 
the entry for ‘Shaman’ (Matthews 1897; cf. Matthews 1894, 1888, 1886, 1885).  
James Mooney also belongs in this survey. Mooney seems to have first used ‘shaman’ 
in a one-page commentary in issue four of The Journal of American Folklore (Mooney 
1889a). His favourable comparison of a Huron cosmogonic myth described by Horatio Hale 
in issue three with his own account of a Cherokee mythological hero named Tawiskalû 
published in issue two makes the point that ‘Tawiskalû is invoked by the Cherokee shamans 
in many of their secret formulas’ (Mooney 1889a:67). Yet Mooney’s original discussion, in 
the journal’s second issue, did not mention shamans and referenced only ‘medicine-man’ 
(Mooney 1888:98). Mooney similarly speaks of ‘Cherokee shamans’ on a different point of 
comparison with another article from issue three (Mooney 1889a:67). A month later 
Mooney’s ‘Cherokee Mound-Building’ described the ‘shamanistic rites’ through which the 
carefully constructed mounds and attached symbols ‘were invested with…fatal magic 
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properties’ (Mooney 1889b:167-8), and a year later Mooney’s description of ‘Cherokee ball 
play’ (contemporary lacrosse) gives prominence to ‘shamanistic ceremonies’ and the role of 
‘shamans’ in preparing players for competition (Mooney 1890). Mooney reverted to 
‘medicine-man’ in The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890, although 
here too on occasion he uses ‘shaman’ as a synonym (Mooney 1896:922). 
Franz Boas’ writings indicate a similar transformation. His early publications about 
his research on Baffin Island and among Kwakiutl communities on the north-west coast do 
not mention shamans and refer instead to ‘medicine-men’ and similar terms (see 1888:57, 
1887:400, 1884:261). For example, in 1887 Boas wrote of the Baffin Island Eskimos: ‘By 
their help [i.e. help of spirits] a man may become what is called angakoq, a kind of priest or 
wizard. The spirits help him to discover the causes of sickness and death, and therefore he is 
the medicine-man’. From 1889, however, he began using ‘shaman’, writing about the 
Snanaimuq of British Columbia in volume two of American Anthropologist:  
Sickness is produced by the touch of the ghosts, who, according to the belief of the 
Snanaimuq, appear in the shape of owls. The sick are cured by the shamans, who do not 
use rattles in their incantations. Shamans acquire their art by encounters with spirits, for 
whose apparition the novice prepares himself by long-continued bathing in lakes and by 
rubbing the body with cedar twigs ‘to remove all bad smell.’ (Boas 1889:326)18 
Like Hoffman before him, from the early 1890s Boas published vocabulary lists of 
indigenous translations of English words and settled on ‘shaman’ as his preferred English 
term. For example, in ‘Vocabularies of the Tlingit, Haida and Tsimshian Languages’, Boas 
gave indigenous terms for ‘shaman’ (Tlingit: iqt; Haida: sk·ā'g·a; Tsimshian: suwa'nsk), 
‘hairdress of shaman’ (Tlingit: k’īts; Haida: gyiētl), ‘shaman's hat’ (Tlingit: wak·), ‘shaman’s 
rattle’ (Haida: dlkum hitaga'ñgō), ‘dance of shaman’ (Tlingit: iqt dāidē'dē; Haida: sk·ā'g·at 
wīkat-sō), ‘song of shaman’ (Tlingit: iqt k·’a cī'reē), and ‘baton of shaman’ (Tlingit: 
wū·sag·a'; Haida: t’ask·´) (Boas 1891). He published a similar list of Kwakiutl language 
(1893). When Boas published the Salish story of Wā'walis in 1895, both his line-by-line 
translations and revised summary edit of the complete English translation used ‘shaman’ as 
his English term (Boas 1895:35-38). When in 1898 he published his collections of folklore 
of the Tillamook, indigenous inhabitants of North America’s Oregon coastal region, he 
dispensed with providing the text in the Tillamook’s language and provided instead his 
summary edit in English, with ‘shaman’ as his English term. For example, in the story of 
The Six Travelers, Boas describes how the chief, seeking revenge on the Killer Whale,  
hired a powerful shaman… They had four canoes lashed together and covered with a 
platform of planks, on which the shaman was dancing. When they approached the rock, 
the shaman ordered the people to hide their faces and to turn backward. They turned the 
canoes, and the shaman began his incantations… (Boas 1898:34, cf. pp.32-3)  
                                                       
18 It is not clear why Boas specifically mention rattles, although it may reference an earlier passage on marriage 
ceremonies (Boas 1889:322) or an earlier article in which rattles and drums feature prominently in the story of 
the cannibal Ham´ats’a (Boas 1888:59). 
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Gradually ‘shaman’ displaced ‘medicine-man’, ‘conjurer’, ‘sorcerer’ and the like. This 
displacement was intellectually validated by the Jesup North Pacific Expedition (1897—
1902), under directorship of Boas, which treated the north Pacific on both sides of Bering 
Strait as a single cultural area,19 and cemented in 1908 by Roland Dixon’s presidential 
address to the annual meeting of the American Folk-lore Society. Dixon began his address 
on ‘Some Aspects of the American Shaman’ by declaring his intention to ‘extend rather than 
restrict the meaning of the term’:  
I… shall use it as applying to that motley class of persons, found in every savage 
community, who are supposed to have closer relations with the supernatural than other 
men, and who, according as they use the advantages of their position in one way or 
another, are the progenitors alike of the physician and the sorcerer, the prophet, the 
teacher, and the priest. (Dixon 1908:1) 
Comparing examples from the arctic to Patagonia, Dixon surveyed how shamans came to 
their vocation; their roles, status and standing in the community; and specialisation, 
functional differentiation, and typological evolution from ‘healer-shaman’ in lower stages of 
development to ‘shaman-priest’ in higher ones. Noting the ‘general uniformity of these 
characteristics throughout both continents’, Dixon concludes that ‘the American 
shaman…serves as an illustration…that…the culture of the American Indians is 
fundamentally one in type, influenced perhaps slightly here and there by other cultures, but 
yet in spite of this autochthonous’ (Dixon 1908:12). By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, a discourse about shamans had travelled some ways from imperial Russia, conveyed 
by language as much as by the interests and proclivities of a new generation of professional 
scholars.  
By way of concluding this chapter, I want to revisit the task I set at the beginning 
when I suggested the analysis I present here would consist in both genealogical and 
performative aspects, the former relating to a critique of shamanism’s emergence in history, 
and the latter relating to the operations of modernity’s double-hinge in representing that 
critique.  
 
Genealogy and the Double-Hinge 
The presentation of a genealogy of shamanism discourse suggests something of the 
relationship between epistemological and ontological labour and the alternation between 
strategies that circumscribe shamans as a category or type, and contingencies that escape 
circumscription and erode the imputed stability of shamanism as a knowledge domain. I 
want to tease out the operations of this relationship by considering the operations of 
                                                       
19 On Radloff’s recommendation, Boas recruited Bogoras, Jochelson and Sternberg for the Siberia part of the 
research (Znamenski 2007:65). On the Jesup Expedition, see Kendall and Krupnik (2003). 
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modernity’s double-hinge in the genealogy presented in this chapter. I’d like to begin by 
recalling Taussig’s contrast between a driving wedge and a slippery fish because I think it 
usefully contrasts the two arms of this hinge.20 The driving wedge references epistemological 
labour that incessantly works at the limits of what is knowable to expand the boundaries of a 
circumscribed domain of knowledge. The slippery fish references ontological labour in 
which the possibility of transparent apprehension and arrested circumscription is denied by 
the very contingencies of the knowing self.21 Epistemological labour expands limits by 
cleaving one into two and circumscribing a new, enlarged knowledge domain; ontological 
labour multiplies limits by insisting on a temporal vantage on epistemology, such that each 
instantiation of circumscription has its unique contingencies on which is erected the fragile 
edifice of the universal. The result is endless oscillation between circumscribed unity and 
embodied contingency in which both are locked in a dialectical embrace and neither the 
wedge nor the fish gains the upper hand.  
I find the chronophotograph a striking emblem of this relationship. Developed by 
Étienne-Jules Marey and other early pioneers of photography, Marey photographed moving 
objects at twelve frames per second for one second and superimposed the photographs to 
form a single composite image of an object in motion. By dividing objects into sequential 
elements, entirely new observations became possible and the outer limits of what was 
regarded knowable were defined anew. Yet the corollary of a circumscribed and unified 
knowledge-object is a knowing subject who sees in twelve different instantiations of a 
circumscribed knowledge-object, the locomotion of pole-vaulting for example, twelve 
contingencies on which the unity of pole-vaulting relies (Figure 1). These contingencies are 
established in two dimensions. First, in sequence, so that we see first the tip of the vaulter’s 
pole, then half its’ length enter the frame, followed by ten images of the vaulter in different 
positions between jumping and landing (that is to say, ‘read’ in the correct sequence). 
Second, in relation to the photographer-witness, whose body corresponds in time with the 
scene they are recording and who recognises in this correspondence that the division into 
twelve is arbitrary and necessarily must be infinitely divisible if it truly corresponds with the 
whole of their witnessing experience. Regarded in this way, the chronophotograph is 
emblematic of the relationship between a driving wedge that divides to circumscribe and a 
slippery fish that recognises in the delimited contingencies of the series the necessary 
                                                       
20 Although I borrow these images from Taussig, I do not use them quite in his enigmatic way. For Taussig, the 
driving wedge and slippery fish is a metaphor for a relationship between exposure of fraud and skilled 
revelation of skilled concealment (Taussig 1998; cf. 1993). Taussig (1999) also elaborates this idea in relation 
to transgression. See Alberts (2008) for a discussion of this idea with regards authenticity in religion.  
21 There are echoes of Derrida here, and the driving wedge and slippery fish could be adapted to relate the 
relationship between logocentrism and différance. However, whereas for Derrida deconstruction is intrinsic to 
the structure of language and necessitates logocentrism to arrest the contagion of endless deferral (Derrida 
1976:49; cf. Derrida 1973), in this discussion I am more interested in foregrounding the productivity of this 
relation by emphasising its dialectic.  
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incompleteness of a circumscribed, unified truth about pole-vaulting (or galloping in another 
famous example).22 
 
 
 
Figure 1: chronophotograph by Étienne-Jules Marey, circa 1890 
 
 
In the preceding genealogy of a gradual expansion of a domain of knowledge about 
shamans and shamanic religiosity I have paid close attention to the contingencies supporting 
the edifice of a universal shaman. I have tried to pay attention to the strategies, modalities 
and regularities that circumscribed shamans (who they were, what they did, their roles, 
status, techniques, experiences, mental states, and so on) as well as the accidents, deviations, 
reversals, and idiosyncratic appraisals along the way that sustained a discourse about 
shamans. To that extent, the discourse on shamanism I have presented here is similar to a 
chronophotograph, with its delimitations, sequence and circumscribed unity. Yet there is still 
a third dimension that bears some consideration. The relation between a composite image 
and a viewer is a relation between a representation of the past and the viewer’s present. The 
chronophotograph is both a representation of time, of the circumscribed unity of 
differentiated moments ordered into a composition, and a representation in time. Regarded in 
this historical dimension, the chronophotograph becomes a critical image, or at least acquires 
critical potential. Certainly the intention of my genealogical study is a critical one—to show 
the fragile contingencies supporting a structure of knowledge about shamans widely 
regarded today as coherent, stable, reliable. However, this critical potential only becomes 
possible or readily apparent when genealogy recognises its limits, which is to say, gives 
itself over to critique by acknowledging that the divisions and sequencing supporting its 
circumscription are contingencies too, to say nothing of the details of thematic, stylistic, and 
innumerable other choices. Put another way, a critical genealogy of shamanism must 
establish a relationship between the dialectical composition of its epistemological and 
                                                       
22 Eadweard Muybridge famously settled the question whether all four hooves of a galloping horse are 
simultaneously off the ground during a single stride. Muybridge displayed his photographs in a moving series 
rather than a chronophotograph, and his zoopraxiscope was an early experiment in motion pictures.  
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ontological labours on the one hand, and a viewer’s perception of that composition on the 
other. This perception is a form of practice, inheres in the body, and embodies the modern 
limit attitude and labour dialectic this limit attitude occasions.23 We see here the complete 
operation of modernity’s double-hinge and the way it forms a dialectic between 
epistemological and ontological labour, as well as the way this dialectic becomes data for a 
new, second-order labour that will in turn occasion a third-order labour and so on as 
statements about shamans proliferate and disperse, and embodied instantiations of modern 
subjectivity multiply and condense. This is what Foucault means by writing ‘effective 
history’ and why he recommends genealogy be in the mode of historico-ontological critique: 
‘Nothing in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-
recognition or for understanding other men’ (Foucault 1977:153; cf. pp.153-7, 2003:53-4). 
In the following chapters I hope to develop an effective history of contemporary 
shamanism by considering the emergence of shamans in legal discourses that have secured 
rights for indigenous peoples; promotions of shamans as indices of sustainable human 
development who supply valuable symbolic capital to a critique of anthropocentric mastery 
of nature; and finally, professional shamans who, by embodying a specifically neoliberal 
homo economicus, are eminently governable, but for the same reason are not reducible to 
homo legalis and therefore resist circumscription by sovereign power. Each of these 
discussions will consider the operations of modernity’s double-hinge in relation to these 
respective topics. However, they will not explicitly foreground the third dimension relating 
the chronophotographic image of time with the viewer/reader in time as I have done here. 
This chapter has acknowledged this problem by demonstrating its operation and therewith 
illustrating the full and perpetual turn of the double-hinge. With this acknowledgement, I 
want to reinstate the circumscription of a first-order dialectic and give this study over to the 
reader to complete the circuit linking representation with critique.  
 
 
 
 
                                                       
23 This formulation is adapted from Walter Benjamin’s critique of surrealism (Benjamin 1986b cf. Alberts 
2008:131-3).  
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Chapter Three: Indigenism 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter develops a more oblique perspective on shamanism and the double-hinged 
technique for which it serves as a metonym than the more direct approach of Chapter Two. I 
develop this perspective by considering the emergence in history of ‘indigenous peoples’ as 
a transnational identity discursively distinguished from other kinds of identities. I argue that 
the terms of this distinction, along with their consistency and coherence, have been 
formulated only relatively recently, and that this identity operates at a transnational level to 
unite geographically dispersed indigenes in a political project at a scale larger than the 
cultural or ethnic boundaries of specific indigenous communities. In this sense ‘indigenous’ 
is a political identity and ‘indigenism’ is its corresponding discourse. Particularly, I am 
interested in how the notion of a special relationship between collective peoples and their 
ancestral lands is represented in indigenist discourse in specifically cosmological terms (and 
here shamanism is the rather more oblique referent), and how this representational strategy 
in turn has been used to both claim and advance indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-
determination. To be clear then, I am not concerned with ethnographically defined 
communities of ‘native’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘tribal’ or ‘small peoples’, but rather with the 
discourse that identifies ‘indigenous peoples’ as political entities along with delineating the 
concerns that ostensibly unite them. 
The crucial category for indigenism is self-determination, by which indigenous rights 
advocates mean the right of ‘all peoples’ guaranteed in Article 1 of both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights to ‘freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’. For indigenous peoples, exercise of this right is 
entwined with rights to their ‘lands, territories and resources’. This phrase developed 
gradually. During the 1970s, the United Nation Special Rapporteur’s decade-long study of 
problems facing indigenous populations (discussed below) considered lands and territories 
separately and hardly mentioned resources. The International Labour Organisation’s 
(hereafter ILO) Convention 169 established in 1989 (also discussed below) specifies that 
‘the term land…includes the concept of territories’, and that land rights include rights to 
natural resources on and below the land. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples adopted in 2007 uses the phrase ‘lands, territories, and resources’ ten times and only 
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once uses any of the three terms in isolation from the others, in Article 31 on indigenous 
peoples’ cultural rights, which includes the right to their ‘genetic resources’.1 
I will argue that the cosmological rendering of a special bond between people and 
place amounts to what Jan Penrose has called ‘practices of territoriality’, by which she 
means practices and agentive processes of bounding space (Penrose 2002:279). As Penrose 
shows, the importance of territorial practices is that they are the means by which people 
harness the latent material and emotional qualities of space. Harnessing these qualities 
confers power, emblematically represented in the hyphenated bond between nation and state. 
The ascendency of the nation-state model has encouraged the notion that territoriality is 
primarily a geographic expression of power. But although geographic conceptions of 
territory predominate, the defining characteristic of territory is that it is bounded, not that it 
is geographic. As Annsi Paasi suggests, ‘boundaries may be simultaneously historical, 
natural, cultural, political, economic or symbolic phenomena and each of these dimensions 
may be exploited in diverging ways in the construction of territoriality’ (in Penrose 
2002:280). So, although territorial practices always take material space as their objective 
focus, how space is bounded varies, as are the kinds of relational bonds cultivated between 
people and bounded spaces that in turn transform lands into territories.  
Indigenous activists have been adept at mobilising different notions of boundaries to 
advance their territorial claims in the face of considerable resistance from nation-states. 
Indeed, one of the greatest obstacles to securing rights for indigenous peoples has been the 
argument made by states that recognising indigenes as peoples, as opposed to simply another 
demographic category of people, confers a collective right to self-determination and 
therewith a right to secession or statehood, thereby threatening the contiguity of states’ 
geographic territories.2 It is noteworthy that the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the UN General Assembly only after indigenous 
activists accepted the solution that had solved this problem in previous conventions (notably 
ILO Convention 169) by inserting into the text a specific qualification denying a causal link 
between a right to self-determination and a right to sovereign independence. Thus, Article 
46[1], the last of the Declaration, reads:  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
                                                       
1 Convention 169 is the only major binding international legal instrument specifically addressing the rights of 
indigenous peoples. As of February 2012 it has been ratified by 20 countries, mostly in Central and South 
America, and is the subject of an international campaign to persuade all ILO members to assent to its 
provisions (ILO 2013; UNPO 2013). The Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 2007 is not legally binding. The Declaration was adopted with 143 countries in favour 
and 11 abstentions. Only Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and USA voted against. 
2 For a discussion of ‘the battle of the “s”’, see Niezen (2003:60-65). 
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which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States.  
This concession by indigenous activists would have been difficult to accept in the 1970s or 
1980s, when activists were still primarily oriented by an anticolonial emphasis on self-
determination and sovereign independence. However, indigenous territorial practices have 
shifted over the years and have created a circumstance whereby this denial of ‘external self-
determination’ has become tolerable and even compatible with indigenous claims.  
Legal scholar Karen Engle (2010) has observed that indigenous claims to self-
determination since the 1970s have advanced two different ways of understanding this right. 
One version equates self-determination with a right to secession and statehood, another with 
autonomy within a state. The stronger version recalls treaty agreements between settler-
colonists and indigenous societies, draws inspiration from anticolonial struggles in the UN 
era,3 and is pursued in terms of a collective right to self-determination guaranteed by the 
Charter of the United Nations and both International Covenants. The softer version draws 
inspiration from indigenous self-understanding to formulate a non-separatist form of self-
determination. In this version, culture more than geography bounds territory and bonds 
people with place, and territorial practices are undertaken in terms of an individual, human 
right to culture. Engle argues further that these two competing understandings of self-
determination broadly mirror a distinction in indigenous activism between the global north 
and the global south. During the past decade, she argues, the softer version has gradually 
won the debate as indigenist activists have won greater autonomy for indigenous peoples at 
the substate level by advocating their claims in terms of a human right to culture. Indigenists 
and indigenous communities in Central and South America have been at the forefront of 
these debates, and the inter-American human rights system has functioned like a laboratory 
where the softer version has been tested against international human rights laws. Several 
recent test cases have elaborated the softer version’s kernel ideas in terms of applicable laws, 
have found this legal route to be highly effective at advancing indigenist claims, and have in 
turn conveyed these ideas into global human rights jurisprudence and legal precedent.4  
However, and this is the crux of the problematic developed in this chapter, for substate 
autonomy to satisfy indigenists’ desire for self-determination, it must be recognised and 
guaranteed by law to be practical, while still retain its ontological dimension to be 
                                                       
3 By UN era I mean the period following World War Two when the basic architecture of international human 
rights law comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the two International Covenants 
(1966) were adopted by the UN General Assembly and institutionalised in the UN’s structures.  
4 Jurisprudence may be glossed as the philosophy and theory of law. As I explain later in this chapter, 
jurisprudence is interested in the relationship between society and the practice of law. Indigenous rights have 
been a prominent interest for lawyers, jurists and others involved in developing human rights jurisprudence in 
recent decades, and gains by the indigenous peoples movement are reflected in jurisprudence as well as case 
law that have transferred jurisprudential ideas into legal precedents. 
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meaningful. The ontological requirement has seen the sudden saliency in human rights 
jurisprudence of indigenous cosmology, but the legal requirement requires universal 
categories because the realm of law and policy can only operate at the level of epistemology. 
So the shaman appears, somewhat unexpectedly, in the field of indigenist discursive 
practice, as that field has been constituted in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
recent years. The interesting aspect of the solution to indigenous claims to self-determination 
being developed in the inter-American legal system and carried to other jurisdictions by 
force of legal precedent is the subtlety of the reliance on shamanism. That is not to suggest 
this reliance is light or optional. It is quite the opposite. But it is off-hand, as if the shaman 
was always there, waiting in the wings for a cue, whereupon the operations of modernity’s 
practical limit attitude are set to work interpolating indigenous ontology into the 
epistemology of human rights law.  
This chapter comprises four discussions. The first introduces indigenism, clarifies key 
terms, and considers the conditions of possibility that have been conducive to indigenism’s 
emergence on the global stage since the early 1970s. The second discussion demonstrates the 
articulation and consolidation of a remarkably consistent transnational indigenous identity 
that has successfully unified globally distributed indigenous communities into a political 
project to secure rights for indigenous peoples, of which the most important is the right to 
self-determination. The third discussion considers the strategic shift away from emphasis on 
a hard right to self-determination towards a softer right to indigenous autonomy at a substate 
level. This discussion along with the last, in which I consider several precedent-setting legal 
judgments emerging from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in recent years, are 
where the kinds of territorialising practices that will fulfil a desire for self-determination 
reconceptualised as autonomy become so important. I argue that indigenists have turned to 
indigenous cosmology to convey the bond between people and place into law. As a form of 
territorial practice, the expression of cosmology is no longer supplemented by ritual, but 
rather by a discursive language, an episteme in the Foucauldian sense, about shamans. In the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, that means speaking about ‘the indigenous 
cosmovision’, ‘intertemporality’, ‘shamans’, ‘shamanic rituals’, and ‘shamanic knowledge’.  
 
Indigenism  
Indigenous, indigenist, indigenism 
Before proceeding, I should clarify my use of the term ‘indigenous’. Who counts as 
indigenous is a notoriously thorny question and none of the many definitions proposed over 
the years have been entirely satisfactory. For their part, indigenous activists have historically 
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deferred defining who is indigenous in favour of a positive right to self-definition, 
guaranteed by the self-determination provisions of the Universal Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.  
As I use the term, ‘indigenous’ is a transnational identity produced during the course 
of political struggles and accompanying debates since the late 1960s about communities and 
societies of ‘natives’, ‘aboriginals’, ‘small peoples’, and ‘tribal peoples’, the nature of the 
problems confronting them, and the range of solutions that will remedy their often, if not 
always, desperate situation. Indigenous identity, in this view, has been produced discursively 
and is a product of indigenist discourse, or indigenism. Not to be confused with 
indigenismo,5 indigenism as I use the term may be understood as a discourse that emerged in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s oriented by the reinvigorated struggles of indigenous activists 
and their non-indigenous supporters (hereafter referred to as indigenists) to combat 
assimilation policies, protect indigenous communities against further encroachments on their 
territories, and secure collective rights and special protections for indigenous peoples at the 
international level, particularly through the UN system.  
This approach is similar to Ronald Niezen’s, for whom indigenism is an ‘invented 
tradition’ and ‘indigenous’ the corresponding political identity. As such, indigenism has 
much in common with and much distinguishing it from other kinds of invented traditions, 
prompting Niezen’s attentiveness to similarities and distinctions between indigenous and 
ethnic identities, and indigenism and ethnonationalism (Niezen 2003:6-11; cf. Niezen 
2009:17-43). Niezen’s approach is usefully contrasted with Alcida Ramos’s. Like Niezen, 
Ramos is an activist-anthropologist with decades of experience working with indigenous 
communities in the Amazon basin. Advancing an analysis at once broader and more 
circumscribed than Niezen’s, Ramos sees indigenism in Brazil as ‘an elaborate ideological 
construct about otherness and sameness in the context of ethnicity and nationality’ that 
functions in ways similar to European Orientalism: ‘Indigenism is to Brazil what Orientalism 
is to the West…just as “the Orient is Orientalized,” so is the Indian Indianized’ (Ramos 
1998:6-7; see also 2003:356-79). Whereas Niezen conceives of indigenism as a rights-based 
discourse through which a new transnational identity has been produced, Ramos conceives 
of indigenism more broadly, as a discursive formation linking mass media agencies, creative 
writers, missionaries, activists, anthropologists, state actors, and indigenes themselves. At 
the same time, whereas Ramos focuses more narrowly on Brazil and beyond that the 
Amazon basin, Niezen’s perspective is global.  
                                                       
5 In South America, indigenismo was initially a late nineteenth-century mestizo cultural and political movement 
concerned with vindicating indigenous populations after centuries of abuse (Coronado 2009). By the 1940s, 
however, the ‘Indian problem’ was seen mainly in terms of social and economic development, acculturation 
and Ladinoisation were seen as variably both inevitable and desirable, and indigenismo became a policy 
framework aimed at assimilating indigenous populations to mestizo identity (Sieder 2002b:191; Stavenhagen 
2002:26). 
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As anthropologists and activists, both Niezen and Ramos are personally experienced 
and invested in the politico-legal struggles that have shaped indigenous identities. Yet the 
differing emphases of their perspectives have led them to develop their research in different 
ways. Ramos’s analysis of ‘the manipulation of primordialities’ and the emergence of the 
‘hyperreal Indian’ has led her to propose indigenism as ‘an American Orientalism’ (Ramos 
2003:356, 373; see also Ramos 1994). Niezen’s interest in the gains of indigenous peoples’ 
legal protections in recent decades has led him to consider the role of human rights discourse 
in forming a new global, transnational identity (Niezen 2003).6  
This chapter develops a narrower view similar to Niezen’s legalistic approach (Anaya 
2004; Kingsbury 2001, 1998; Tennant 1994). I conceive of indigenous identity as a 
transnational identity category that has emerged on the global scene largely in response to 
indigenous peoples’ struggles for human rights. As a discursive formation, indigenism also 
implicates discursive areas besides law, and along with Ramos and others (for example, 
1993; 1998), I am alert to indigenous activists’ instrumentalisations of certain essentialist 
representations in advancing their human rights agendas, and the implications these continue 
to have for indigenous activism today, issues I explore in Chapter Four. Where my own 
interest differs from both Ramos’s American Orientalism and Niezen’s transnational 
legalism is with regard to the place and role of indigenous cosmology in territorialising 
practices.  
 
The changing field of human rights discourse 
Struggles by indigenous communities to protect their lands and ways of living from 
encroachment by settler societies are centuries old. However, it is only relatively recently 
that the legitimacy of these struggles have become widely recognised and notion of 
‘indigenous peoples’ has become an accepted part of international discourse. Partly this is 
because the notion of ‘peoples’ suggests something like ‘nation’, in which case indigenous 
peoples ought not be restrained or impeded from determining their social and political future, 
including exercising territorial sovereignty. Of course, this is precisely what settler societies 
have done for centuries. Indeed, among indigenous activists, the potency of broken treaties 
stems from precisely the point that a treaty is a solemn agreement between nations, and 
persistent refusal by one nation to honour that agreement amounts to refusal to acknowledge 
the peoplehood of another nation who have not refused the same. In recent decades, 
however, this has begun to change as the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’ has received wider 
                                                       
6 More recently, Niezen has examined this problematic ‘at both ends of the spectrum’, which is to say, ‘as a 
transnational phenomenon that is pushing the boundaries of supra-state activism’, and ‘as a source of legal 
standards and expectations of social justice that are contributing to ethnic formalism, sharpening the 
boundaries of belonging, and redefining the cultural reference points of collective identity’ (Niezen 2009:xiii).  
 101 
acceptance. An important question is why this has changed. Why, after centuries of 
persecution and neglect, have indigenous peoples’ grievances come to the fore and enabled 
the formation and consolidation of a transnational indigenous imaginary?  
In short, what changed was the terrain on which indigenous struggles were contested. 
Several factors and processes intersected over a period of several decades to alter the context 
of indigenous struggles and create a more enabling political context for indigenous 
aspirations. Probably the most consequential development was the Allies’ rhetoric during 
World War Two about the rights of peoples to collective self-determination, notably in the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941. Notwithstanding the Allied powers’ regret and backpedalling after 
the war, this rhetoric proved valuable to anticolonial revolutionaries and intellectuals from 
Africa to Indo-China who demanded independence and eventually dismantled European 
empires. This rhetoric also led to the establishment of an institutional mechanism—the 
United Nations Organisation—through which the principle of national self-determination 
could be advanced, by way of defining, explaining and defending ‘the fundamental rights of 
all peoples’. 
For indigenous peoples, claims Ken Coates (2004:231-3), the post-war years were 
significant because the rhetoric and politics of decolonisation helped indigenous 
representatives and sympathisers draw attention to indigenous peoples’ plight and favourably 
transformed the discursive context of indigenous peoples’ struggles. Niezen (2003:40-50) 
makes roughly the same argument. He also emphasises the significance of anticolonialism, 
decolonisation, and struggles for self-determination, and similarly attributes the rise of 
indigenism to changes in international law, particularly the regime of human rights laws 
ushered in by the UN. Two more factors he attributes are, first, the failure of assimilation 
policies, both in terms of socio-economic outcomes and political costs (indigenous 
communities did not want to be assimilated into dominant societies and increasingly resisted 
assimilation policies), and second, the rise of international non-governmental organisations 
(hereafter NGOs) and the consolidation of something like an international civil society. For 
both Coates and Niezen, the major transformations have involved rights and international 
law, and have focused on the UN. In turn, these transformations at the international level 
have altered transnational discourse around indigenous issues, so that non-indigenous 
audiences and potential sympathisers ‘discovered how to hear the words and pleas’ of 
indigenous peoples (Coates 2004:231). It is important to qualify Coates’ and Niezen’ 
analyses with an acknowledgement that they pitch their respective arguments at the 
international level and have in mind multilateral forums like the UN and ILO. At the state 
level, reconsiderations of rights coupled with the politics of decolonization did not always 
increase the political power of indigenous groups or favourably alter the discursive context 
of indigenous struggles. Postcolonial nationalisms have often repudiated diversity in favour 
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of national homogeneity, an issue that became a frequent discussion point at meetings of 
indigenous representatives at the UN (for example Parkipuny 1987; cf. Baviskar 2007 on 
adivasis and Hindu nationalism in India). 
At a transnational level, Coates’ and Niezen’s respective analyses, although broadly 
correct, represent these intersecting processes as broadly contemporary with one another, 
and yet fail to explain why it wasn’t until the 1970s that indigenous political struggles really 
took off. During the 1950s and 1960s, the rights that mattered were collective rights, while 
human rights were largely moribund. In other words, the emergence of the indigenous 
peoples movement during the 1970s coincided with the rapid proliferation and widespread 
embrace of the human rights framework on the international scene, despite the anticolonial 
claims to collective self-determination that stimulated indigenous activism. Coates and 
Niezen are correct that this turn towards human rights created an enabling environment for 
indigenous activism in recent decades. But it was the internationalisation of the human rights 
paradigm that achieved this, not an international embrace of self-determination and its 
institutionalisation via the UN. It is important to keep this distinction in mind, because it has 
implications for understanding how indigenist discourse proceeds from the 1990s. Legal 
scholar and historian Samuel Moyn’s revisionist history of human rights (Moyn 2010) does 
not say much about rights for indigenous peoples, but the historicising lens he focus on how 
human rights came to be embraced globally goes a long ways towards explaining why 
indigenism took off during the 1970s.  
 
Human rights and the moral transcendence of politics 
Samuel Moyn argues the human rights born in 1948 only began to show signs of life in the 
1970s. Prior to that and as far back as the eighteenth century, the rights that mattered 
belonged to nations. These rights spoke of collective self-determination, not protection of 
individuals, and were essentially anticolonial; ‘Human rights simply were the struggle for 
self-determination’ (2010:109). By the late 1960s, however, new visions of social change 
proliferated around the world. Moyn wonders why, amid ‘the massive infusion of energy to 
social mobilization’ (Moyn 2010:133), human rights survived and managed to capture the 
collective imagination?  
Moyn’s thesis is that the turn to human rights occurred because human rights 
substituted moral for political utopianism. The vision of a different, better, world premised 
on human dignity and worth appealed in large part because it enabled actors in diverse 
contexts to make common cause at the same time that competing alternative utopianisms 
became seen as unviable. More than that, the vision of the universal irreducible worth of 
individual human beings offered leverage against contending utopianisms by framing the 
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minimalist vision of human rights as a moral critique of the maximalist utopianism of 
Marxist, socialist, nationalist, pan-African or pan-Arabian visions, ‘a convergence that often 
began as a strategic retreat from those prior, more grandiose utopianisms’ (Moyn 2010:121). 
The aspiration towards a moral critique of politics facilitated by human rights appealed 
because it appeared to transcend politics by restoring to activism the sense of a pure cause 
once sought in politics itself but now regarded as impossible. As one of Jan Eckel’s sources 
said of Amnesty International: ‘working to make the world a slightly less wicked 
place.…Sending a card…will not change the world very much. But it is surely worth 
investing a little time and postage to try to help two other individuals to secure justice, or at 
least find courage’ (quoted in Moyn, 2010:147). This imagining of a moral utopia and its 
substitution for a failed political one is the achievement that enabled the ascendency of 
human rights from the 1970s after two decades of failure.  
But the appeal of moral utopianism was not in itself sufficient to displace variants of 
political utopianism. ‘What mattered most of all,’ Moyn argues (2010:132), ‘was the 
competitive forum in which human rights had to win their way. For human rights were only 
one among other ideologies that could have prospered, and did in fact, as absorption of the 
Cold War contention of social models entered its 1960s decline’. In this competition, human 
rights were seen as preferable not only because they were strategically valuable and 
practically feasible, but also because they were seen as morally pure. At the same time, the 
notion of moral constraints to politics appealed to disparate actors because this fiction 
insulated their ideas from political sanction, even if their activism made them a target. In this 
sense, ‘the fiction of moral autonomy from politics was a condition of political relevance’, 
because morality could retain its purity ‘even where politics had shown itself to be a soiled 
and impossible domain’ (Moyn 145-6, 170).  
The relevant period for Moyn is the decade following 1968. By 1968, the few NGOs 
that worked with the concept of human rights envisaged by the Universal Declaration 
concluded that the UN had failed to become the primary forum for human rights activism 
promised by the Dumbarton Oaks agreements and envisioned in the Universal Declaration. 
The 1968 conference in Tehran marking the Universal Declaration’s 20th anniversary made 
this much clear. Egerton Richardson, Jamaica’s ambassador to the UN and in 1963 the first 
proposer of a UN human rights year, wrote in his contribution to an NGO response to the 
Tehran conference: ‘Tehran was our moment of truth…when we saw what it means to be 
promoting the cause of Human Rights by working mainly through governments’ (quoted in 
Moyn 2010:128). In similar vein, British political scientist H.G. Nicholas would later remark 
on ‘the inherent absurdity of an organization of governments dedicating itself to protect 
human rights when, in all ages and climes, it is governments which have been their principal 
violators’ (quoted in Moyn 2010:129).  
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Moyn’s impressive discussion of the events, historical processes, and the ideas 
underpinning them shows the linkages and influences between disparate movements in the 
decade following 1968. It is too much to summarise Moyn’s discussion here. It suffices to 
note that Moyn’s analysis alights on east European dissidents who found in human rights a 
language for conveying their critique of the failings of Marxist utopianism in the wake of the 
Prague Spring; on Latin American leftists whose alliances with Amnesty International drew 
international attention to rightwing dictatorships in that region and their links with foreign 
governments, notably in Washington;7 on liberation theology’s appeal to human rights 
groups who recognised in liberation theology’s notion of moral constraints on politics strong 
echoes of the explicit framework of human rights activism being developed simultaneously 
in other parts of the world; on the importance of international NGOs, particularly Amnesty 
International, as agents linking disparate local movements within an emerging transnational 
human rights framework; on the adoption of human rights language by liberals in the United 
States and the embrace of the human rights paradigm by the Democratic Party, culminating 
during the first year of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in 1977; and on dissidence in eastern 
Europe, particularly the moral philosophy of Vaclav Havel, whose vision of politics as 
morality alone received its most coherent and systematic articulation in Havel’s essay ‘The 
Power of the Powerless’, wherein he tries to show ‘the very special political significance of 
morality in the post-totalitarian system’.8 It is not that any one actor or factor explains the 
proliferation of human rights imagination and rhetoric during the 1970s. Rather, human 
rights emerged gradually in different contexts and for different reasons, each enabling 
further preferences for rights rhetoric amid declining alternatives.9 This series of synergistic 
and coalescent movements displaced competitors and contributed towards globalising human 
rights as a discursive paradigm for representing a utopian vision oriented by universal human 
dignity and anchored in personal morality.  
As a novel framework for a utopian reimagining of the limits of being human, two 
interrelated aspects of the human rights paradigm are significant. On the one hand, the notion 
of the universality of human dignity and worth conveys a critique of the contingencies and 
                                                       
7 This even as they recognised that ‘the success of their denunciations depended on keeping radical claims for 
social change separated from their human rights activism’ (Markarian, quoted in Moyn, 2010: 142). 
8 For Havel, human rights meant more than a moral transcendence of politics; he sought the permanent 
substitution of morality for politics: ‘It is of great importance that the main thing—the everyday, thankless, 
and never ending struggle of human beings to live more freely, truthfully, and in quiet dignity—never impose 
any limits on itself, never be half-hearted, inconsistent, never trap itself in political tactics, speculating on the 
outcome of its actions or entertaining fantasies about the future. The purity of this struggle is the best 
guarantee of optimum results when it comes to actual interaction with the post-totalitarian structures.’ (Havel 
1985:89) 
9 Notable for its absence from Moyn’s survey are the various political movements associated with identity 
politics since the 1960s. Moyn places these movements in the same genealogy as the earlier civil rights and 
woman’s movements, which he interprets as part of much longer struggles over the form of the nation-state 
and the meaning of citizenship (Moyn, 2010: 31ff).  
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expediencies of politics. Imagined as issuing from personal and private individual 
conscience, the notion of natural justice on which it relies can only operate at the ontological 
level. The notions of ‘conscientious objectors’ and ‘prisoners of conscience’ are illustrative. 
On the other hand, law circumscribes the moral transcendence of politics conveyed in the 
idea of universal human rights. More specifically, the language of law, the requirements of 
consistency, the specificity of words and their referents (‘self-determination’, ‘land’, 
‘territory’ and so on), places the utopian vision of moral transcendence within 
epistemological limits. We see here the operation of the modern limit attitude and the 
perpetual oscillation between ontological labour at the limits of the knowing self, and 
epistemological labour that operates at the limits knowledge must renounce exceeding. From 
this perspective, the link between the emergence of indigenism and the new human rights 
paradigm is significant beyond simply the emergence in history of a political context more 
conducive to redressing indigenous peoples’ longstanding grievances. The emergence of 
indigenism is also linked with the double-hinge of the modern limit attitude, and indicates 
another turn, a revolution in the technical sense, of the perpetual motion dynamo animating 
and innervating modern history.10 
 
Indigenism’s double-hinge 
Indigenous movements’ agitation for self-determination took off at precisely the moment 
that self-determination as the principle content of human rights was waning and a liberal 
notion of individual human rights was rising. Prior to the 1970s and at least since 1923 when 
Cayuga chief Levi General Deskaheh travelled to Geneva to personally petition the League 
of Nations,11 indigenous activism was oriented by the notion that ‘nations’ have a natural 
right to self-determination. The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the UN Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples formally equipped 
anticolonial nationalism with this right after 1960 (UN 1960). Article 2 of the Declaration 
reads: ‘All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
                                                       
10 The situation of human rights today shows something more of this tendency to reinscribe limits that may be 
transcended, then reinscribed, transcended again, and so on. As a moral critique of politics, human rights 
became an alternative to maximalist visions. But by displacing maximalist visions, human rights have since 
become the global framework for achieving the grand political mission of freedom, identity, prosperity, and 
justice. Today, as Moyn puts it, human rights ‘assume the very maximalism they triumphed by avoiding’, and 
cites the proliferation of interest in ‘governance’ in postcolonial states to illustrate his point (2010:9, 221-5; 
see also Reif 2004; UNHRC 2007). Today the fiction of the autonomy of human rights from politics is less 
easily maintained amid charges of inconsistency and subordination of universal human rights to the 
contingencies and expediencies of politics (see 2006).  
11 Chief Deskaheh’s petition to the League of Nations was ignored, although his efforts marked one of the earliest 
attempts by indigenous peoples to seek recourse though international institutions (Anon. 1991; Niezen 
2003:31-6). 
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development’. Article 6 qualified this right, however, by restricting it to ‘dependent peoples’ 
in ‘Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories’, adding: ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or 
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible 
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’. The anticolonial 
emphasis on self-determination was poorly suited to indigenous activism because it 
envisaged colonisation by a foreign power rather than domination by a settler society, broken 
treaties notwithstanding. Although post-war anticolonialism was crucial in galvanising an 
indigenous political consciousness, as Coates, Niezen, and Engle all acknowledge, it did not 
offer much by way of actual gains for indigenous peoples’ struggles. Indeed, from the 1940s 
to 1960s laws and policies pertaining to indigenous populations were designed to promote 
assimilation into dominant societies (Tennant 1994). Gains and advances for indigenous 
struggles only began happening much later, after human rights had displaced anticolonialism 
and other competing utopian imaginaries and had gained for indigenous movements 
recognition—on moral grounds—that their grievances might be legitimate and at least 
merited closer attention. This attention, when it finally came, was framed in terms of 
discrimination against indigenous populations, rather than self-determination for indigenous 
peoples.  
It may seem trite to suggest that the history of indigenism and indigenist political 
struggles since the 1970s has been oriented by the challenge to attain collective self-
determination within the framework of individual human rights. However, this broad claim 
and especially the means by which indigenous aspirations have been realised in recent years 
has been profoundly consequential, and not only for the many indigenous communities 
around the world who have at last achieved some measure of recognition and protection 
following centuries of violence, or the many more who today stand a better chance of 
securing the same. The successes of an indigenist political project have occasioned new 
assessments of what being modern means, of modernity’s limits, and therewith of insertion 
points for leveraging still more freedom at the limits of prevailing standards of normative 
justice.  
The history of indigenism is a response to two demands. First, indigenist discourse has 
had to accommodate the concepts of collective self-determination to the conceptual 
framework of individual human rights, while still retaining ‘indigenous’ as both a collective 
identity and irreducible at the ontological level. As indigenous leader George Manuel put it 
in 1974, ‘aboriginal peoples can only argue the morality of their case’ (quoted in Wright 
1988:376). Second, indigenist discourse has had to articulate these reformulated concepts in 
the language of law, but in such a way that this circumscription at the epistemological level 
of laws and governing policies retains the ontology of ‘being indigenous’. This articulation 
of limitations is modernity’s double-hinge at work in indigenism. The fulcrum on which it 
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rests is the problem of territorialisation, of bounding space and bonding it with identity, for 
which the interpolation of indigenous ontological being into the epistemology of human 
rights law is territorial practice par excellence.  
At this point, we have arrived at the problem of indigenous cosmology, or more 
precisely, at a perspective on the question of indigenous cosmology. ‘Indigenous 
cosmology’, like ‘indigenous peoples’, is a discursive construct and operates in a similar 
way. Ronald Niezen’s (2003:9) observations about indigenism are apposite of ‘indigenous 
cosmology’ too:  
It sets social groups and networks apart from others in a global ‘we-they’ dichotomy. It 
identifies a boundary of membership and experience that can be crossed only by birth or 
hard-won international recognition. It links local, primordial sentiments to a universal 
category. 
As a universal category, ‘indigenous cosmology’ (singular) was brought into being in the 
course of indigenist struggles. Unlike ‘indigenous peoples’, however, it took a while longer 
for this category to gain the kind of power it has today. From the 1970s, indigenous religious 
practices (they were still represented in discourse in plural terms) were a means of 
representing an identity between indigenous communities and lands. Through the 1970s and 
1980s indigenous religiosity was increasingly important in underwriting a transnational 
indigenous identity that could claim rights specifically on behalf of ‘indigenous peoples’. 
More recently, as indigenous self-determination transformed into indigenous autonomy 
within states, the potential of ‘indigenous cosmology’ to deliver self-determination for 
‘indigenous peoples’ become clearer. ‘Indigenous cosmology’ has provided a crucial basis 
for legal arguments to secure indigenous title to ancestral lands, territories, and resources. It 
is as if a key has been found that solves, for indigenists at least, a significant portion of the 
problem of territorialisation, of interpolating indigenous being into human rights law. This 
issue is the subject of this chapter’s concluding discussion, where I consider the Awas 
Tingni case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and reintroduce shamanism to 
the discussion. Indigenism’s elevation of cosmology and religiosity as a fundamental 
dimension of indigenous identity and rights to self-determination emerged into a space 
conceptually framed by a European discourse about shamans and conveyed via projections 
of European power/knowledge. As a universal category, ‘shaman’ has been an instrumental 
part of indigenism’s double-hinged interpolation of ontological being and legal 
epistemology. Thus trial testimony and court judgments speak of ‘shamans’, ‘shamanic 
religion’, ‘shamanic rituals’, and ‘shamanic knowledge’. At the same time and as part of the 
same process, the category’s usefulness in elaborating jurisprudence and legal precedent has 
added the authority of judicial judgments to shamanism discourse, extended shamanism’s 
field of application into the global field of international law, and added law’s emphasis on 
consistency, rationality and citation to shamanism’s discursive regularities.  
 108 
 
Transnational identity formation at the UN 
Beginnings 
Since it is impossible to summarise all the associations and alliances, themes and issues, 
challenges, failures and successes involved in the emergence of an indigenous movement 
from the early 1970s, I will limit this discussion to a few important events. In North 
America, the nascent American Indian Movement (hereafter AIM) was galvanised politically 
by a new willingness to challenge the authority of the federal government, and intellectually 
by a critique of Euro-American thought, exemplified by the seminal writings of Vine Deloria 
(1973, 1969). In the US, this willingness was famously associated with the reoccupation of 
Wounded Knee in the Pine Ridge reservation in February 1973. Following a 71-day stand-
off with the federal government, AIM initiated a campaign for legal mechanisms to protect 
indigenous peoples’ rights, a precursor to what became the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Coulter 2009:543). In South and Central America, the situation was 
quite different. Indigenous peoples who continued to live traditional lifestyles on their 
ancestral lands faced encroachments on their territories. Suspended between state 
authoritarianism on the one hand and Marxist revolutionary struggles on the other, 
indigenous peoples throughout the region but particularly in Mesoamerica and the central 
Andean highlands where 85 percent of Latin America’s indigenous populations are 
concentrated (Sieder 2002a:2), found it extremely challenging to organise into regional 
associations. Nevertheless, the new human rights ascendency enabled their struggles via a 
growing concern among missionaries and anthropologists working with local indigenous 
communities, leading to a rapid growth of indigenous federations from the late 1960s 
(Brown 1993:316, 322n17). A conference in 1971 in Barbados was an important moment. 
Organised by the World Council of Churches as part of its Programme to Combat Racism 
and attended primarily by anthropologists from the region, the Declaration of Barbados 
emphasised ‘the Indian is an agent of his own destiny’, noted ‘the beginnings of a pan Latin-
American [Indian] movement’, and affirmed ‘the right of Indian populations to experiment 
with / and adopt their own self-governing development and defence programmes’ (WCC 
1971). 
The first significant inter-continental meeting of indigenous leaders was in 1975 in 
British Columbia, Canada. Representatives of indigenous groups from North and South 
America, Australia, New Zealand, and Scandinavia argued forcefully for an international 
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and formed the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples (hereafter WCIP) to advance this goal (Coates 2004:244-5; Dahl 2009:39-40). At 
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the same time, AIM pushed to establish an International Indian Treaty Council (hereafter 
IITC) accredited with NGO status at the UN. Accreditation was granted in 1977 and a few 
months later the Council organised the Native American Delegation to the International 
NGO Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, held 
in Geneva in September (Niezen 2003:44-5). The IITC circulated a draft indigenous peoples’ 
rights declaration at the conference (Coulter 2009:544; Eaglewoman 2009:560-2; Niezen 
2003:44-5).  
One of the many registers of the new turn to human rights after 1968 was the UN’s 
attention to racism. Although racism had been a UN concern since the UN’s founding and 
apartheid in South Africa was a recurring agenda item since the 1950s and especially after 
the UN Special Committee on Apartheid (later renamed the Special Committee against 
Apartheid) was established in 1963, it wasn’t until the 1970s that racism became a priority 
issue for the Commission on Human Rights. In 1973, the same year as the siege at Wounded 
Knee, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and declared the Decade for Action to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination. The Decade opened a new channel for indigenous 
activism.  
The UN NGO conference in Geneva was organised by the UN Sub-Committee on 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonization as part of the UN Decade and 
was attended by fifty international NGOs, representatives of sixty indigenous groups from 
fifteen countries, representatives of UN agencies including the Commission on Human 
Rights and the Commission on the status of Women, as well as observers from forty UN 
member states (Niezen 2003:44-5). From this impetus, the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations was established in 1982, giving indigenous peoples around the world 
a permanent forum at the UN and certifying the ‘Fourth World’ movement’s emergence onto 
the world stage. As Niezen (2003:45-6) has noted, the Working Group quickly became the 
largest UN forum dealing with human rights issues, for the most part directed towards 
drafting an international declaration on indigenous peoples’ rights.  
In the space of a decade, the problems facing indigenous populations had moved from 
being among the world’s most persistently disparaged and ignored issues to being accorded 
the legitimacy of a dedicated space at the most important organisation for international 
relations. Later, a chairperson of the UN Working Group would remark that indigenous 
peoples ‘are the first grassroots movement to gain direct access to the UN’ (Erica-Irene Daes 
quoted in Erni 2008:13). Although only the beginning of a much more challenging and 
protracted struggle to ‘make place’ at the UN (Muehlebach 2001), by any reckoning this was 
a significant accomplishment, considerably enabled by the human rights turn of the 1970s. It 
is telling, for example, that 1977, the crucial year for the new rights ascendency in Moyn’s 
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model, was also a crucial year for global indigenous activism, when arguably the four most 
important international conferences of indigenous activists during the 1970s took place in as 
many months.12 
During indigenism’s formative decade, something like a transnational indigenous 
identity began emerging on the world scene. As one might expect, indigenous peoples’ 
relationship with their ancestral lands was a vitalising element of this identity. Indigenous 
activists and their supporters in multilateral forums like the UN advocated indigenous 
peoples’ unique relationship with their ancestral lands as the basis for securing special 
measures and protections that would secure indigenous peoples’ rights to their land, 
resources and territories. This unique relationship was framed in terms of cosmology and 
mediation by spirits, and injected a spiritual and religious element into the core of what it 
meant to be indigenous. The first major UN report on indigenous populations relied on this 
framing. 
 
UN Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations 
By any reckoning, the study by Special Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo of ‘the problem of 
discrimination against indigenous populations’ is impressive. Conducted over a decade and 
comprising nearly 1500 pages organised into 10 thematic areas13 and published in 20 
chapters over three years, the Special Rapporteur’s study comprehensively profiled the 
nature of discrimination faced by indigenous populations in thirty-seven countries and 
territories (UNCHR 1981b).14  
Two aspects of Cobo’s study are particularly relevant for the present analysis. The 
first is that it is framed entirely in terms of human rights. It is, as its title indicates, a study of 
discrimination against indigenous populations; it says little about indigenous self-
determination. The study’s methodology proceeded by describing the situation of globally 
distributed indigenous populations, and assessed this against established legal protections, 
measures, and special provisions. Consequently, the resulting profile of discrimination 
                                                       
12 These conferences were the inaugural Inuit Circumpolar Conference (Alaska, June), Barbados II (Barbados, 
July), the Second General Assembly of WCIP (Sweden, August), and the UN NGO conference (Geneva, 
September). In 1981, when UN Special Rapporteur José Martínez-Cobo began reporting on his study of 
discrimination against indigenous populations (see below), he narrowed his discussion of international action 
to these four events in 1977 and suggested these meetings were preeminent among the innumerable meetings 
of this period (UNCHR 1981a:par.114). 
13 These thematic areas were ‘health’, ‘housing’, ‘education’, ‘language’, ‘culture’, ‘occupation, ‘employment 
and vocational training’, ‘land’, ‘political rights’, ‘religious rights and practices’, and ‘equality in the 
administration of justice and legal assistance’.  
14 The thirty-seven countries are: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark (Greenland), Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France (French Guyana), 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Sweden, United States of 
America, Venezuela. Notable exceptions are countries in Africa and the then-Soviet bloc. 
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emphasised limitations and shortcomings in existing human rights instruments. As a 
historical document, the report illustrates precisely the ascendency of human rights and 
ejection of self-determination that marked the transition from post-war self-determination to 
post-1968 human rights.  
Secondly, at a discursive level, the report is a significant intervention in the 
formulation of indigenous identity as a global, transnational category. Indeed, a substantial 
part of the Special Rapporteur’s work involved defining ‘indigenous’, ‘indigenous 
population’, and ‘indigenous peoples’ and the various interim reports completed on the way 
to the final report spent considerable effort inventorying the component parts of indigenous 
identity, notably, that indigenous peoples have a historical continuity with lands 
subsequently confiscated, that they consider themselves distinct from dominant societies, 
and that they wish to continue existing in accord with their own distinct cultures and 
customs.15 The Special Rapporteur finally settled on the following definition:  
Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. (UNCHR 1983b:para.379) 
By using the terms ‘indigenous populations’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ interchangeably and 
across all but one continent, the study lends the authority of no less a body than the UN to 
the legitimacy of indigeneity as a transnational identity. That the Special Rapporteur could 
refer to ‘indigenous peoples’ with such apparent ease suggests the extent to which the human 
rights paradigm had displaced the self-determination one, notwithstanding, on the one hand, 
the encouragement this usage gave indigenous activists who continued to frame their claims 
in terms of a hard right to external self-determination (i.e. statehood), and on the other hand, 
the deepening intransigence of states to indigenous claims and their subsequent resistance to 
the work of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations.  
Be that as it may, this formation of a transnational indigenous identity holds my 
interest because an important aspect of that identity is its articulation in terms of a 
cosmologically-oriented and spiritually-mediated relationship between indigenous peoples 
and their lands. Put another way, if indigenous advocacy for rights to land title indexed 
indigenous peoples’ sameness in the sense of an entitlement already enjoyed by non-
indigenous people, indigenous peoples’ special and unique relationship with their ancestral 
                                                       
15 The question of defining the meaning of indigenous has been a productive, if intractable, problem through the 
history of the indigenous peoples movement. For a discussion of the difficulties of establishing positive 
definitions of ‘indigenous peoples’, see Niezen (2003:18-23). For arguments in favour of a constructivist 
approach, see Kingsbury (1998). 
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lands indexed their alterity. In the following discussion I want to show this articulation with 
reference to the Special Rapporteur’s study, particularly Chapter 17 on land and Chapter 19 
on religious rights and practices.  
At two hundred and three pages, almost double the second longest chapter (on 
education), Chapter 17 makes clear that the range of indigenous grievances pertaining to 
dispossession of their ancestral lands is varied and complex. This is hardly surprising given 
that land has been arguably the most controversial and most compelling of indigenous claims 
against settler societies (para.288).16 The chapter on land deals mainly with indigenous rights 
of ownership and countries’ measures protecting or denying that right, in accordance with 
the study’s methodology.  
The first thing one notices about the chapter is the slippage from the particularities of 
‘indigenous populations’ to a generic category of transnational ‘indigenous peoples’:  
Before considering the measures adopted in the various countries, a few brief remarks 
should be made on the significance and importance which the land has for indigenous 
populations. It must be stressed that there is a fundamental difference between the 
relationship which indigenous peoples have with the land and the relationship which 
other sectors of the population of the countries covered by this study have. It will then 
be easier to understand why all indigenous peoples throughout the world place so much 
emphasis on the land and land tenure, to place the problems of land and land tenure in 
their proper perspective and to have some idea of what indigenous peoples think and 
feel when land—their land—is at issue.’ (para.50)   
Elaborating this ‘fundamental difference’, the study notes that ‘discoverers, conquerors and 
settlers who invaded erstwhile purely indigenous territory’ utilised a secular and 
individualistic concept of ‘absolute ownership’ of land, one that rendered land as possession 
and commodity, gave the landowner rights to make use their possession as they liked, and 
established the parameters of what is today spoken of in terms of land tenure (para.55). 
Contrasted with this concept,  
[f]or indigenous peoples, the concept of land tenure had a very different meaning. It 
belonged to the community; it was sacred; it could not be sold, leased or left unused 
indefinitely. Between man and the land there was a relationship of a profoundly 
spiritual and even religious nature. They spoke of Mother Earth and its worship. For all 
those reasons it was in no way possible to regard it as a mere possession or still less as a 
commodity. (para.56) 
Subsequent paragraphs sample customary laws regulating indigenous, co-operative 
communal tenure of property to illustrate and evidence this distinction between indigenous 
and settler concepts of land. The issue for this discussion is the significance the Special 
Rapporteur’s study attaches to the sacred, spiritual or religious quality of indigenous 
concepts of land, along with the importance of this quality in distinguishing indigenous 
among other kinds of identities. To begin with, the report makes clear that this ‘profoundly 
spiritual and even religious’ relationship is foundational: ‘The whole range of emotional, 
                                                       
16 Unless indicated otherwise, subsequent citations refer to relevant paragraphs of Chapter 17 (UNCHR 1983a).  
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cultural, spiritual and religious considerations is present where the relationship with the land 
is concerned’ (para.51). For indigenous peoples, land is the source of identity and life:  
It is land that defines the group (clan, tribe, people or nation), its culture, its way of life, 
its life style, its cultural and religious ceremonies, its problems of survival and its 
relationships of all kinds within the community and with other groups and, above all, its 
own identity. Land is synonymous with the very life of indigenous populations. 
(para.73) 
Recalling Penrose’s thesis about territorial practices, it is indigenous peoples’ active 
relationship with land that transforms land into territory and activates its generative potential 
so that identity and life may flow from it. Contrasting this kind of active relationship with 
the relationship non-indigenous populations have with land, the report draws attention to the 
indigenous ‘attitude of respect and veneration’ for land, an attitude that distinguishes non-
indigenous approaches to ‘the development of land and its effective use’ from indigenous 
approaches that are, ‘in ecological terms, more rational and sound’ (para.65). This 
convergence between an ecological and a venerative attitude is mentioned again later when 
the Special Rapporteur writes, 
The religion of indigenous peoples, their culture, self-esteem and respect are today also 
based largely on a continuing and sacred relationship with ancestral land, certain 
specific areas of which must remain undisturbed. (para.72)  
There is therefore considerable scope for conflict when non-indigenous groups or state 
authorities disturb sacred lands, deny indigenous peoples access to sacred lands, or desecrate 
land regarded as sacred by indigenous communities by using it in ways that violates 
indigenous laws.  
This problem is addressed in Chapter 19 on Religious Rights and Practices (UNCHR 
1982).17 Although most of the chapter’s sixty pages are addressed to assessing measures by 
states to protect the ‘religious rights and practices’ of ‘indigenous populations’ (notably, ‘to 
profess and practice their religion of belief’; ‘not to be compelled to participate in the 
activities of any religion or belief’; ‘not to be discriminated against on the ground of religion 
or belief’; ‘not to be compelled to receive instruction in a religion or belief contrary to their 
convictions or to the wishes of indigenous parents or legal guardians’), a section on access to 
and protection of sacred places shifts into the terminology of ‘indigenous peoples’. Noting 
that ‘The attachment of indigenous peoples to their land is a fact well noted in history’ 
(para.172), the Special Rapporteur continues: ‘It is also a well-established fact that 
indigenous peoples all over the world hold certain areas of their ancestral land as holy’ 
(para.173). Subsequent paragraphs explain that lands may be sacred for indigenous peoples 
because certain ‘sacred places’ are ‘the dwelling place or embodiment of spiritual beings’ or 
contain burial grounds, architectural structures, sculptural works, ‘or other natural features of 
                                                       
17 Subsequent citations refer to relevant paragraphs of Chapter 19 (UNCHR 1982). 
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religious significance’; notes that this sacred character gives rise to ‘religious laws governing 
the sites’, including obligations and prohibitions concerning who may or may not visit the 
site, for what purpose, and appropriate rituals and manner of conduct; as well as notes 
consequences to the individual, group or community if laws are not observed or the physical 
character of sacred lands is altered, including ‘damages [to] the spiritual nature of the land, 
[and endangering] the well-being of the indigenous religious practitioners in their roles and 
religious obligations as guardians and preservers of the natural character of specific land 
areas’ (para.182). Notwithstanding these kinds of conflicts, which are the Special 
Rapporteur’s topical concern, the issue for this discussion is the report’s emphasis on the 
sacred quality of ‘indigenous peoples’’ ‘special attachment’ to their ancestral land, one that 
involves ‘a combination of aesthetic appreciation, socio-cultural sympathy and deep-seated 
spiritual and religious feeling’ (UNCHR 1983a:para.71).  
This point is reiterated in Chapter 22 on Conclusions, Proposals and 
Recommendations, where the Special Rapporteur prefaces his summary of ‘indigenous 
peoples’’ ‘natural and inalienable right’ to their lands, territories, and resources by 
emphasising that ‘it is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all their 
beliefs, customs, traditions and culture’:  
For such peoples, the land is not merely a possession and a means of production. The 
entire relationship between the spiritual life of indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, 
and their land, has a great many deep-seated implications. Their land is not a 
commodity that can be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely. (UNCHR 
1983b:paras.196-7) 
This discursive representation of a sacred foundational and generative relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands was and remains the crucial plank in the 
formulation and articulation of a global transnational indigenous identity, one that is 
distinguishable from other kinds of global, transnational identities, and therefore capable in 
theory of vestment with specially reserved rights and protections. Transforming this 
capability into actuality was the task of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. 
 
UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
The UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982 (hereafter WGIP or 
Working Group). ‘The first United Nations mechanism on indigenous peoples’ issues’ (UN 
2009:2), the WGIP’s mandate was, as the Special Rapporteur put it, ‘to deal exclusively with 
problems concerning the observance of the rights and freedoms of indigenous populations 
throughout the world’. In practical terms this meant requesting information from states and 
other sources, reporting on states’ compliance with relevant norms and standards, and 
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monitoring and ensuring indigenous participation in the evolution of those standards 
(UNCHR 1983b:paras.304-5). From only thirty indigenous and non-indigenous participants 
at the WGIP’s first meeting in 1982, within two decades over 1000 participants were 
attending WGIP’s annual meeting, the vast majority of them from indigenous communities 
(Muehlebach 2001:420). This growth was consequential to the Working Group’s decision in 
1983 to permit direct participation by representatives of indigenous communities. ‘An 
unprecedented breakthrough’ in the state-centric UN system (UN 2009:2), the Special 
Rapporteur praised the WGIP’s ‘wide approach’ as ‘indispensible’ to executing its mandate 
(UNCHR 1983b:para.306). He also recommended the WGIP produce a draft declaration on 
indigenous peoples’ rights (para.312), although the recommendation was hardly necessary 
given that indigenous demands for a declaration had been a catalyst for the indigenous 
peoples movement in the 1970s. These same activists now had an institutional home and 
voice at the UN. Preparing a declaration was a focus of the Working Group’s activities from 
its inception and significantly contributed to the WGIP becoming the largest UN forum 
dealing with human rights issues (Niezen 2003:46), notwithstanding that it took eleven years 
to produce a draft,18 and a further 15 years before the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples was agreed and finally adopted in 2007 (UN 2007). Thus, the WGIP was 
key in consolidating a transnational indigenous identity, united by a common experience of 
alienation, suffering and powerlessness as much as by a shared project to articulate rights 
and entitlements and devise legal mechanisms that would, if not remedy, at least improve the 
situation of indigenous peoples in their different contexts. 
Although the WGIP was the only multilateral forum specifically mandated to monitor 
and promote indigenous issues globally, including developments of applicable norms and 
standards, it was not the only international forum developing and promoting rights for 
indigenous peoples. From the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the international legal and 
policy framework pertaining to indigenous peoples shifted towards mechanisms that would 
not only recognise the legitimacy of indigenous peoples’ grievances but also protect their 
livelihoods and secure their futures (Anaya 2004; Tennant 1994). These mechanisms were 
instrumental in consolidating and normalising the notion of a cosmologically oriented unique 
relationship between people and place as the core of indigenous identity. Notable examples 
are the ILO’s Convention 169 (hereafter ILO169), the World Bank’s Operational Directive 
4.20 on Indigenous Peoples, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 23 on 
interpreting the minority rights provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s General 
                                                       
18 The first draft of the Declaration was presented to the UN at the commencement of the International Year of 
the World’s Indigenous People on international human rights day on 10 December 1992, the same day 
Rigoberta Menchú of the K’iche’ people in Nicaragua was awarded the Nobel prize for peace. 
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Recommendation 23 affirming that discrimination against indigenous peoples falls within 
the scope of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination.  
ILO169 was groundbreaking. Adopted in 1989 after a three-year drafting process, 
ILO169 was the first international legal instrument to attempt to define who may be 
considered indigenous and establish their rights within the international legal system (Mato 
1997:177).19 ILO169 contains several articles relevant to indigenous peoples’ land rights, 
notably Articles 4, 7, and 13-19. For purposes of this discussion, the most important is 
Article 13(1), which emphasises ‘the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values 
of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories…and in particular 
the collective aspects of this relationship’ (ILO 1989).  
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 23 clarified the provisions of 
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR). The 
ICCPR, along with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, form the pillars of the international human 
rights system, although unlike the Universal Declaration, the two covenants are binding 
treaties. Adopted in 1966, they came into force in 1976. The ICCPR’s Article 27 recognises 
the rights of ‘ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities’, and by the 1990s some indigenous 
peoples, such as the Yanomami of the northern Amazon basin, had enjoyed some success 
relying on these provisions to persuade the court of the deficiencies of the less specific 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (cf. Wiessner 2011:204n51; Coulter 
et al. v. Brazil). Recognising the tidal changes in international law, in 1994 the newly 
established office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued General 
Comment 23 on Article 27 property rights. The Comment clarified that ‘one or other aspects 
of the rights’ protected by Article 27 ‘may consist in a way of life which is closely 
associated with territory and use of its resources’, that ‘[t]his may particularly be true of 
members of indigenous communities’, and that ‘the [Human Rights] Committee observes 
that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with 
the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples’. The comment 
concluded ‘The protection of [Article 27] rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and 
continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities 
concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole’ (UNHRC 1994:paras.3.2,7,9). 
General Comment 23 made it unequivocally clear that Article 27 protections apply to 
indigenous communities and may be relied on by them (Engle 2010:115-6), as indeed 
                                                       
19 Along with ILO Convention 107, a 1957 document advocating assimilation of indigenous populations that was 
superseded by ILO169, these two conventions are the only major binding international instruments 
specifically dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights.  
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happened shortly thereafter in a case involving the Ainu of Japan’s Hokkaido island (Kayano 
et al. v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee (Nibutani Dam Decision). 
Then, in 1997, the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(hereafter CERD) issued its own General Recommendation 23 clarifying and affirming that 
the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) apply to indigenous peoples. Like the ICCPR, although in less 
stringent language than ILO169, General Recommendation 23 also emphasised the 
connection between indigenous cultural identity and land and called on signatory states to 
recognise indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands, to restore their title, or provide adequate 
compensation when this was not possible (CERD 1997:paras.2,3,5).  
These developments demonstrate the growing salience of indigenous issues in 
international law, and illustrate that the question of a special and unique relationship between 
people and place remained axiomatic of indigenous peoples’ struggles. Special Rapporteur 
Cobo’s report went a long way towards establishing indigeneity as a global, transnational 
identity category in terms of a cosmologically oriented, spiritually mediated special and 
unique relationship between people and place. Even if the question of its cosmological 
orientation and its mediation by other-than-human agents was less emphatically 
foregrounded in policy and legislation, this dimension remained pivotal to its discursive 
articulation, particularly at WGIP.  
 
UN report on indigenous peoples’ relationship to land 
In the same year that CERD issued its General Recommendation, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights appointed WGIP Chairperson Erica-Irene Daes to prepare a Special 
Rapporteur’s report on indigenous peoples’ relationship to land ‘with a view to suggesting 
practical measures to address ongoing problems in that regard’ (UNCHR 2001:para.1).20 The 
bulk of the report, compiled over four years, addressed legal issues related to restoring 
indigenous title to their lands and reversing legal doctrines by which indigenous peoples 
have been dispossessed of their territories.21 For purposes of this discussion, two aspects of 
the report are important. The first is the report’s reiteration of indigenous peoples’ 
‘relationship with the land and all living things’; it is, as the Special Rapporteur wrote, ‘at 
the core of indigenous societies’ (para.13). The second aspect is the report’s integration of 
indigenist discourse from multiple discursive sites into a coherent analytical framework. 
Both these aspects succinctly encapsulate the report’s second section, titled ‘relationship of 
                                                       
20 Unless indicated otherwise, citations refer to the relevant paragraphs of the Daes report (UNCHR 2001). 
21 The 1992 case Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) in the Australian state of Queensland repudiated the colonial 
doctrine of terra nullius and was a high-water mark in these efforts, although subsequent developments have 
reversed some of these gains (see Scott and Mulrennan 2010). 
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indigenous peoples to their lands, territories and resources’. The Special Rapporteur recalled 
discussions at the WGIP about ‘the spiritual, social, cultural, economic and political 
significance to indigenous societies of their lands, territories and resources for their 
continued survival and vitality’ (para.12). Citing supporting research and publications, the 
report reiterated that indigenous peoples’ ‘unique relationships to their traditional territories’ 
distinguish and sustain ‘the spiritual and material foundations of their cultural identities’, and 
went on to quote an indigenous lawyer activist to similar effect: ‘the Aboriginal vision of 
property was ecological space that creates our consciousness, not an ideological construct or 
fungible resource...Their vision is of different realms enfolded into a sacred space...It is 
fundamental to their identity, personality and humanity’ (para.14). 
Thereafter, the report recapitulates the responsiveness of ‘the international 
community’ to indigenous claims, beginning with Special Rapporteur Cobo’s report. The 
new report repeats the earlier report’s conclusion about the importance of knowing and 
understanding ‘the deeply spiritual special relationship between indigenous peoples and their 
land as basic to their existence’, and follows that paragraph with this one, also quoted from 
Cobo’s conclusions and recommendations chapter: 
For such peoples, the land is not merely a possession and a means of production. The 
entire relationship between the spiritual life of indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, 
and their land, has a great many deep-seated implications. Their land is not a 
commodity which can be acquired, but a material element to be enjoyed freely. 
(UNCHR 2001:para.16; orig. UNCHR 1983b:para.197) 
The Special Rapporteur recalled Article 13 of ILO169, the draft Inter-American Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and Article 25 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples to emphasise that indigenous peoples’ ‘profound relationship’ with their 
lands, territories and resources comprises collective and intergenerational aspects, as well as 
social, cultural, spiritual, economic and political dimensions and responsibilities (para.20). 
The notion of a ‘profound spiritual and material relationship’ (para.121) between peoples 
and place at the core of indigenous identity recapitulates a quarter-century of indigenist 
discourse and in a sense frames the analytical framework the report proposed. The 
framework itself differentiates the kinds of problems indigenous peoples face today in 
relation to their lands, including states’ failures to acknowledge indigenous peoples’ 
relationship with land, demarcate indigenous titles, implement just laws and reform 
discriminatory ones, and protect the environment, along with issues relating to expropriating 
and returning indigenous lands, and relocating indigenous communities. For present 
purposes, the important point is not only that this framework rests on the indigenist 
formulation of a cosmologically oriented special relationship, but also that this analytical 
synthesis is made possible by the consolidation of transnational indigenous identity since the 
mid 1970s.  
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A comparison between the Daes and Cobo reports suggests the extent of indigenism’s 
gains during the intervening years. One might think of the older report as centrifugal, in the 
sense of proliferating discursive sites, and the more recent report as centripetal, in the sense 
of integrating diverse and disparate discursive practices into a central organising 
architecture. Whereas Cobo reported on existing measures (in 1983) that protected 
indigenous land rights and ‘steps taken’ to guarantee indigenous interests, Daes summarised 
key provisions of the most significant legal innovations since the earlier report, including 
two that were still in draft form and not yet adopted. Whereas the earlier report was framed 
in terms of an audit of protections, the later report emphasised the subsequent convergence 
of ‘principles’ and ‘international standards’ informing ‘the main or most important legal 
materials’ pertaining to indigenous peoples’ relationships to their land. A twelve page annex 
inventoried pertinent articles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, CERD’s 
Recommendation 23, ICCPR Article 27 and General Comment 23, ILO169, Rio Earth 
Summit’s Agenda 21, World Bank’s Operational Directive 4.20, and the Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A further annex listed a selection of salient cases from 
Australia, Canada, International Arbitration Tribunals, International Court of Justice, 
Permanent Court of International Justice, and the United States of America.  
From the late 1980s, drafting international legal instruments protecting indigenous 
peoples’ rights was a prolific and highly contested site of human rights discourse that drew 
in a range of indigenous organisations and activists, intellectuals, and professionals, 
particularly lawyers and anthropologists, many of whom were indigenous too (see T. Turner 
1997, Warren and Jackson 2002:3-13, and Wright 1988). Although progress on the draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was painfully slow, achievements on other 
fronts meant that by the end of the twentieth century, a considerable apparatus of legal rights 
and recourses, standards and norms, and monitoring and reporting mechanisms was in place 
(see Pritchard and Heindow-Dolman 1998). Even if states’ compliance was poor, the fact 
that legal standards were being elaborated and refined, and that non-compliant states were 
increasingly held accountable against these standards, was in itself a considerable 
achievement that indicated the direction of prevailing winds in indigenous human rights 
protections. Litigation initiated by indigenous peoples opened a new field of discursive 
practice that brought to bear its own considerable structure of authority. The following 
discussion gives historical background to indigenous peoples’ reconceptualisation of self-
determination as autonomy, before examining cases before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights.  
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From self-determination to autonomy 
Diversity at the WGIP 
Following the WGIP’s 1983 decision permitting direct participation by indigenous delegates, 
the forum became more diverse and gradually transformed from one dominated by delegates 
from the Americas and the global north into one more representative of the diversity of the 
world’s indigenous peoples (Muehlebach 2001:435-6).22 As the forum became more diverse, 
so indigenists adjusted their strategic orientation.  
The first shifts began with the flourishing pan-Indian movement in South and Central 
America from the mid-1980s in tandem with nascent transitions towards less authoritarian 
forms of governance across the continent. Although South and Central America had been a 
focus area for the WGIP since its inception, indigenous delegates from Latin America often 
were unable to attend WGIP sessions in person, and relied on transnational activist networks 
to represent their interests. Indigenous activism along with representatives’ capacities to 
participate in international forums like the WGIP was restricted by a combination of military 
governments (Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador), Marxist revolutionary movements (Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador), discredited bureaucratic infrastructures responsible for managing 
Indian affairs, as with Brazil’s Fundaçäo Nacional do Indio, and indigenes’ economic 
marginalisation and social deprivation following decades of indigenismo policies. However, 
as political negotiations in several American states produced constitutional amendments and 
reforms, and as governance structures became more open, accountable, and tolerant, local 
indigenous communities’ capacities to forge regional, transnational alliances improved.23 
These efforts were spurred at the international level by the changing legal framework, 
particularly ILO169, and were supported by indigenous leaders’ participation in international 
conferences, usually funded by foreign NGOs and sometimes governments (mainly 
European). At a national level, subsequent negotiations over constitutional reforms offered 
unprecedented opportunities to establish indigenous rights and legal protections in domestic 
                                                       
22 Only 30 indigenous and non-indigenous participants attended the WGIP’s inaugural meeting in 1982. 
Indigenous organisations from Asia began attending WGIP annual meetings from 1984. Among the first were 
representatives from the Cordillera region in the Philippines, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, 
followed by Ainu from Japan, Naga from India, Chin from Burma, and Karen from Thailand. Maori delegates 
began attending from 1988, followed by more delegates from the Pacific region, including from Hawaii in 
1989. Also in 1989 Massai representatives from East Africa attended, followed by Twa from Rwanda, San 
from Southern Africa, Ogoni from Nigeria, and Taureg groups from West Africa. The end of the Cold War 
also saw representatives of ‘small peoples’ from the Russia Federation begin attending. In 1992, more than 
600 delegates from five continents attended the WGIP’s annual meeting (Boutros-Ghali 1994:11); by 1999 
that figure had risen to nearly 1000. The Americas still sent the most delegations. According to Muehlebach 
(2001:420), the 1999 WGIP was attended by approximately 46 South and Central American delegations, 40 
Asian, 31 North American, 23 African, 9 Australian, 6 North Asian/Siberian, 5 Pacific, 4 Inuit and 2 Saami 
delegations, and about 6 explicitly transnational indigenous organisations.  
23 Constitutional amendments were adopted in Bolivia (1994), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), Mexico (1992), 
Nicaragua (1986), Paraguay (1992), Peru (1993), and Venezuela (1999). (For discussion of specific legislative 
reforms, see Graham 1987; Stavenhagen 2002:32-4; Van Cott 2006, 2002, 2000, 1994). 
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law. The new pan-Indianism was also spurred by indigenous activists’ desire to respond to 
the approaching quincentennial of Colombus’s voyage and the beginning of European 
conquest of the Americas. Their response included highly publicised activist interventions 
such as at the inaugural UN Earth Summit, hosted by Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Little 1995), 
and ultimately convinced the UN to declare 1993 the International Year of Indigenous 
Peoples.24  
This intensification of indigenous activism in Latin America also contributed to the 
diversification of indigenous participation at the WGIP. As a global forum for working out 
indigenous positions on a vast range of issues, the WGIP, particularly its annual meetings, 
was crucial in uniting indigenous peoples around the world around a common experience of 
alienation, suffering and powerlessness, and a shared project to devise legal mechanisms that 
would improve their respective situations. These efforts naturally fostered transnational 
indigenous cohesion and solidarity. Yet notwithstanding solidarity and community of 
purpose, there were and remain important differences between different indigenous peoples’ 
respective struggles. In the Americas and northern Europe (and arguably parts of 
Australasia), indigenous struggles are quite different from those in Africa or Asia (Barnes et 
al. 1995; Erni 2008). For example, in Brazil and Canada, where indigenous peoples have 
already secured a range of rights and entitlements, indigenous struggles today are mainly 
focused on maintaining and protecting those achievements. In parts of Africa, by contrast, 
definitions of who and what constitutes indigenous are not yet settled, even provisionally. 
Hodgson reports that San and Masai, of southern and east Africa respectively, are still 
engaged in a politics of identity as they struggle to form viable and durable coalitions and 
link themselves into the transnational indigenous rights movement (Hodgson 2002a:1043; 
see also Hodgson 2002b; Mutume 2007; Sylvain 2005, 2002). Neither is the situation 
uniform within continental regions, as Jackson and Warren have demonstrated with 
reference to Central and South America (2005; Warren and Jackson 2002a; see also Sieder 
2002b; Van Cott 2002, 1994) and examples from the Russian Federation show with 
reference to north Asia (Xanthaki 2004; Köhler and Wessendorf 2002). More generally, 
states in Asia and Africa have complex histories of movement and displacement that do not 
fit easily with notions of a timeless past prior to a single moment of displacement by foreign 
settlers. Governments in Africa and Asia often draw considerable legitimacy from their 
claim to being indigenous too, and invoke these claims to elevate post-independence 
nationalist unity and subordinate ethnic diversity. Indeed, this problem was highlighted by 
the first appearance at the WGIP of indigenous delegates from Africa when Moringe 
                                                       
24 Indigenous leaders had wanted 1992, the quincentennial year, but accepted the UN offer of 1993 instead 
(following objections from Brazil, Spain, and the United States) because, among other reasons, they reasoned 
two years to advocate their grievances was better than just one (NACNY 1994:21). The International Year 
was succeeded by the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples from 1995.  
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Parkipuny, a representative of East African Massai, criticised African governments’ 
repudiation of social diversity in favour of a chauvinist version of national unity: ‘…the vital 
need to consolidate national identity and unity…should never be pursued to the exclusion of 
the protection of the legitimate rights of vulnerable minorities. To do that undermines the 
very objective of national unity…’ (Parkipuny 1987; cf. Hodgson 2002b). Some African and 
Asian governments counter-argued that the problematic of indigenous peoples and state 
power applies only to settler societies, such as in the Americas, Australia, or New Zealand, 
and that in their respective polities the minority rights already established in international 
law, not least ICCPR Article 27, are appropriate and sufficient (on these debates see 
McIntosh 2000; Niezen 2003:21, 72-6; UNCHR 1999).  
 
Self-determination vs autonomy 
Legal scholar Karen Engle has researched these debates with reference to indigenists’ 
approaches towards securing rights. She argues that indigenist discourse distinguishes 
between two versions of indigenous self-determination, as a collective right to secession or 
statehood and as autonomy within the state, and suggests that a preference for these versions 
roughly correlates with a distinction between the ‘global north’ and the ‘global south’, 
respectively (Engle 2010: 71). Although Engle’s distinction between north and south 
corresponds with the socio-economic distinction between developed and developing states, 
used, for example, in the UN’s Human Development Index, she is more interested in a 
discursive difference: the global north, in her analysis, is marked by the political resonance 
of the notion of a global ‘Fourth World’ movement. The phrase ‘Fourth World’ rose to 
prominence in north America following the 1974 publication of The Fourth World: An 
Indian Reality by George Manuel, an indigenous leader and soon to become chairperson of 
the Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs (Manuel and Posluns 1974). The point of 
comparison for Manuel was the Third World, which in the early 1970s seemed to be on a 
path to independence in a way that had not been made available to indigenous peoples. To 
the extent that the Fourth World idea mobilised around post-war anticolonialism, cited 
broken treaties, and drew attention to ‘the geopolitical situation in which indigenous peoples 
found themselves’ (Engle 2010:49), the global north, including Australia and New Zealand, 
advocated the strong form of self-determination. From its inception, Fourth World has 
referred to all indigenous peoples around the world, not only those in the global north, and 
was eventually embraced globally. However, Engle notes that ‘the bulk of the research and 
activism using the title remains in the global North, as that is where the early organisation 
took place’ (Engle 2010:51-2). She illustrates the point with reference to the World Council 
of Indigenous Peoples founded by Manuel in 1975. Until its dissolution in the mid-1990s, 
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the Council published the Fourth World Journal and maintained the Fourth World 
Documentation Project, although all but one of its nine directors were from tribes in North 
America (Engle 2010:52). Today the Council’s work is continued by the Center for World 
Indigenous Studies. Co-founded by Manuel in 1984, the Center conducts research, offers 
consulting services, publishes Fourth World Journal, and hosts the Chief George Manuel 
Library, for which it is credited by the Centre’s Jay Taber (2011) as ‘the premier indigenous 
think tank and archival repository serving the Fourth World’.  
The notion of a global Fourth World movement has not had as much resonance for 
indigenous peoples outside the global North. Contrasting indigenous advocacy between 
North and South America, Engle notes the different significance land has in these respective 
political contexts. Whereas land dispossession galvanised indigenous activism in North 
America, indigenous advocacy in South and Central America has been oriented by 
endangered cultures, traditions and identities, often in tandem with the exploitation of 
indigenous peoples’ labour on lands they continued to occupy (Engle 2010:55). As the 
indigenous peoples movement has globalised via the work of the WGIP as well as 
expansions and consolidations of transnational indigenous networks via other forums, 
including NGO advocacy, this orientation towards traditions and cultures has come to 
distinguish the contours of indigenous advocacy in the global South, including Africa and 
Asia.  
Having set up her analysis in these terms, Engle argues that a shift has occurred in 
indigenous advocacy since the late 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to this, indigenist discourse 
was mostly framed in terms of the anticolonialism of a global Fourth World imaginary, 
including deliberations at the WGIP. However, as participation increased from the global 
South, a subtle shift occurred from a strong version of external self-determination towards a 
softer version of indigenous autonomy within states. Several factors contributed to this shift. 
One was the changing domestic politics of countries in south and central America and Africa 
that enabled greater participation by indigenous representatives from these states in 
transnational indigenous advocacy networks. This participation in turn influenced debates 
about desirable and acceptable forms of indigenous self-determination. Indigenous 
participants from parts of Asia (particularly India, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand) favoured 
an autonomy model. Another factor was recognition that states’ unwavering resistance to 
indigenous challenges to their territorial contiguity, combined with lack of indigenous 
resources, meant the strong version of self-determination was increasingly impractical. Still 
another factor was the steady progress in securing legal protections in terms of individual 
human rights, such as ILO169, ICCPR Article 27, and ICERD. Engle (2010:95) estimates 
that by the mid-1990s indigenous representatives by and large had given up their claim to a 
strong right to external self-determination. Instead, indigenist discourse began to favour an 
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array of rights and privileges guaranteeing indigenous peoples greater autonomy within the 
states in which they live.  
Engle’s analysis is somewhat over-determined in the sense that she draws the 
distinctions and correlations in terms that are arguably more dichotomous than has actually 
been the case. For example, Benedict Kingsbury (2001:229-31) traces a similar trend, but 
differentiates five ‘conceptual structures’ underpinning indigenous claims to self-
determination, and pays closer attention than Engle does to convergences between the 
competing interests of indigenes and states. In fairness to Engle, her analysis is concerned 
with comparing the relative strengths and limitations of pursuing protections for indigenous 
peoples through collective land rights versus individual cultural rights, and the trend she 
characterises is widely reported and accepted (for example, Kipuri 2009; Muehlebach 2003; 
Wiessner 2011). The relevant point for this discussion is that in recent years international 
human rights law has accorded greater recognition to culture and heritage in protecting 
indigenous peoples’ rights, and has thereby made available new avenues towards securing 
greater autonomy for indigenous peoples within the states in which they live. This shift 
opened new avenues for indigenist recourse and several precedent setting cases have 
contributed to elaborating jurisprudence around the right to culture as a means to securing 
land title. 
Developing Engle’s analysis, I want to argue that autonomy became an acceptable 
vehicle for self-determination claims because the notion of indigenous ‘lands, territories and 
resources’ had become so closely entangled with indigenous identity, culture, and tradition 
that an individual right to culture offered a viable strategy for winning collective land claims 
and title protections. In other words, this mainstay of indigenous activism no longer 
necessitated a politically unwelcome, hard right to external self-determination. This viability 
is among the important discursive effects of a quarter-century of indigenist discourse about a 
unique cosmological bond linking people and place. The instrumentalisation of this special 
bond, first in indigenist discourse and identity politics and then in corresponding human 
rights law and jurisprudence, recalls Penrose’s thesis about territorialisation. It amounts to a 
kind of territorial praxis by which space is bounded, peoplehood is made, and the collective 
right of peoples to determine their futures in relation to their territories is secured. I want to 
illustrate this argument with reference to several judgments by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACHR), beginning with the landmark Awas Tingni case decided in 2001, 
before concluding this chapter by returning the discussion to shamanism.  
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The Awas Tingni case 
Trial and Judgment  
The Awas Tingni are a community of indigenous Mayagna people living in Nacaragua and 
Honduras. In the 1950s they began petitioning the Nicaraguan government to demarcate 
their lands, all without success. In 1996 Nicaragua’s government issued logging concessions 
to a Korean company in lands claimed by the Awas Tingni, prompting the community to 
begin legal proceedings to have the concessions withdrawn and their lands demarcated in 
their favour. The case eventually was taken to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter IACrtHR). Although the IACrtHR has not always shown willingness to advance 
indigenous peoples’ rights (Van Cott 1994:7), since the 1990s the court has become a global 
leader in developing jurisprudence around indigenous rights (Engle 2010:127; Wiessner 
2011).  
The question before the court in the Awas Tingni case was whether the Nicaraguan 
government’s decision to grant logging concessions to third parties on land claimed by the 
Awas Tingni community violated Article 21 (right to property) and Article 25 (right to 
judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Nicaragua is a 
signatory. The court’s judgment, passed by 7 to 1, affirmed the Awas Tingni community’s 
communal ownership of their ancestral lands and instructed the Nicaraguan government to 
demarcate their territory as well as abstain from any actions that would affect their use and 
enjoyment of their ancestral lands (p.441).25 From a legal perspective, the significance of the 
judgment was how the court interpreted the right to property protected by Article 21. 
Representing the Awas Tingni community, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (hereafter the Commission) argued for a broad interpretation of Article 21, one that 
recognised not only the traditional and communal nature of indigenous property rights, but 
also the reliance of the community on their relationship with their territory for their general 
wellbeing.  
Testimony at the trial repeated familiar themes about the importance of cosmology in 
delimiting space and creating territory. An exchange between Judge Cançado Trindade and 
anthropologist Theodore MacDonald, a witness appearing for the community, is a typical 
example (pp.172-3): 
PRESIDENT CANÇADO TRINDADE: I have just one question. In response to one of 
the questions of the Agent of the Illustrious State of Nicaragua, you referred to a 
relationship with the Mayagna Community, and I am referring to the expression ‘in the 
sense of boundaries.’ Could you elaborate, explain to us of what that consists, in the 
cosmology of the Community, this ‘sense of boundaries?’  
                                                       
25 Unless indicated otherwise, subsequent citations refer to page numbers of the trial transcript published in the 
special issue of the Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (IACrtHR 2002; cf. Vuotto 2004). 
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WITNESS THEODORE MACDONALD: Yes, I mention sense because, in the 
beginning, there were not many conflicts over this. They had an idea of their territory; 
the idea comes, as you mention, from the cosmology. If you could show me the map, 
that would help. 
Those hills are the main ones, according to them; inside of those hills live the spirits of 
the mountain, chiefs of the mountain, that in Mayagna are called Asangpas Muigeni. 
They control the animals around that region.  
In order to harvest those animals, there must be a special relationship with the spirits of 
the mountain. On many occasions, the cacique, also a kind of shaman that they called 
Ditelian, can maintain that relationship with the spirits; then the presence of the animals 
and the possibility of using the animals, through hunting, is based on the cosmology and 
has a lot to do with the boundaries because, according to them, those masters of the 
mountain are the owners of the animals, especially the mountain pigs that roam in 
herds, and they roam around the mountains. And to be able to take those animals, there 
must be a good relationship with the spirit that lives inside the mountain. To achieve 
that good relationship, time must pass, so there is a strong bond within the cosmology, 
with these sacred sites, the spirits that live inside and their brothers that are members of 
the Community, that have special relationships—spiritual, they can be called—with the 
animals of the mountain that allows them to go to the hunt. That is their sense of being 
with the territory. 
MacDonald goes on to explain that there are two types of sacred places in the Awas Tingni’s 
cosmology: the first is cemeteries and burial sites, and the second is hills inhabited by the 
spirits who own the animals hunted by community members. ‘So…up to a certain point, it is 
a spiritual act, to go hunting, and it has much to do with the territory that they enjoy.’ This 
idea of spirits residing within the hills was introduced in the earlier testimony of Charlie 
McLean, a member of the Awas Tingi community,26 who told the court about Asangpas 
Muigeni, ‘the spirit of the mountain; it is the same form as a human, but it is a spirit always 
lives under the hills’ (p.156, cf. p.146).  
Sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen appeared as an expert witness for the community. In 
his testimony he explained to the court the difference between the Awas Tingni’s concept of 
territory and the modern concept of land. He told the court that ‘the concept of the land must 
be extended beyond that which a certain modernity asks that we see it as land, as simply, as I 
said a moment ago, an instrument of production’. Expanding on this broader concept of land, 
he argued land must be understood ‘as a part of the geographic space and the social space, of 
the symbolic space, of the religious space with which the history of indigenous peoples is 
connected and with which the current functioning of those same peoples is 
connected…peoples whose essence is derived from their relationship with the land’. Land 
‘gives life to an entire culture, to an entire nation,’ and for this reason the concept of territory 
must be understood in broader terms too: ‘Territory as a geographic space, as a physical 
space, but also as a social and symbolic space with which the culture identifies itself’. This 
relationship between people and territory therefore is mutually constitutive: ‘land does not 
belong to us, but rather, that we belong to the land’. (pp.176-7) 
                                                       
26 Upon being asked, McLean told the court he was named by a Christian missionary (IACrtHR 2002:154-5).  
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Finding in favour of the Awas Tingni community, the court’s judgment noted that 
‘human rights treaties are live instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution 
of the times and, specifically, to current living conditions’ (p.429). The court therefore 
thought it necessary to iterate ‘some specifications…on the concept of property in 
indigenous communities’. Remarking that ‘among indigenous peoples there is a 
communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective ownership of the land’, 
the judges agreed with witness testimony about the foundational significance of the 
relationship between people and place for indigenous culture, identity, and survival: 
‘[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood 
as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their 
economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not merely a 
matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element which they 
must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future 
generations.’ (p.430)  
This paragraph about ‘the concept of property in indigenous communities’ has been widely 
quoted by subsequent cases citing the precedent set by the Awas Tingni judgment.  
The judges of the court were acutely aware that they were applying the law in new and 
innovative ways and that their ruling would have far reaching implications for indigenous 
rights jurisprudence. Recognising this significance, three judges of the court, including Court 
President Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, authored a Joint Separate Opinion in which they 
commented on ‘one of [the case’s] central aspects, namely, the intertemporal dimension of 
the communal form of property prevailing among the members of the indigenous 
communities’ (p.443).  
The opinion begins by noting the importance of land for the community’s cultural and 
religious development. The judges emphasised ‘their [Mayagna Community’s] 
characterisation of the territory as sacred, for encompassing not only the members of the 
Community who are alive, but also the mortal remains of their ancestors, as well as their 
divinities’. The judges recalled testimony about family members and material artefacts 
buried in particular hills, ancestral spirits residing there, and the obligations stemming from 
these fact. They cited testimony about types of ‘sacred places’ for the Mayagna community 
and their general assessment that ‘the lands of the indigenous peoples constitute a space 
which is, at the same time, geographical and social, symbolic and religious, of crucial 
importance for their cultural self-identification, their mental health, their social self-
perception’. They quoted from the Court’s judgement that ‘the relationship with the land is 
not merely a question of possession and production but rather a material and spiritual 
element that they ought to enjoy fully, so as to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it 
to future generations’. (pp.443-5) 
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It is this ‘conceptual element’ that the judges ‘consider […] necessary to enlarge’, 
‘with an emphasis on the intertemporal dimension of what seems to us to characterize the 
relationship of the indigenous persons of the Community with their lands’. This 
‘intertemporal dimension’ at once gives rise to the communal form of land ownership among 
indigenous communities, and at the same time distinguishes it from ‘the civilist (private law) 
conception’. Noting that without the use and enjoyment of their lands the Mayagna 
community ‘would be deprived of practising, conserving and revitalising their cultural 
habits, which give a meaning to their own existence, both individual and communitarian’, 
the judges argued that Article 21 property rights ‘ought to, in our view, be appreciated from 
this angle’ (p.445). The difference between the perspective the judges are developing and the 
perspective that has normally prevailed in interpreting Article 21 protections is neatly 
encapsulated in the judges’ repetition of Stavenhagen’s testimony, that, ‘just as the land they 
occupy belongs to them, they in turn belong to their land’. The notion that the fortunes and 
future of the community is identical with their lands accounts for the ‘necessary prevalence’ 
of conservation over ‘simple exploitation’ in indigenous concepts of land ownership, and is a 
crucial aspect of the intertemporal dimension the judges wish to foreground: 
The concern with the element of conservation reflects a cultural manifestation of the 
integration of the human being with nature and the world wherein he lives. This 
integration, we believe, is projected into both space and time, as we relate ourselves, in 
space, with the natural system of which we are part and that we ought to treat with care, 
and, in time, with other generations (past and future), in respect of which we have 
obligations. Cultural manifestations of the kind form, in their turn, the substratum of the 
juridical norms which ought to govern the relations of the community members inter se 
and with their goods. (p.445) 
The judges argued that the passage has been steady from cultural manifestations of 
integration to judicial norms and case law that recognise and protect indigenous social 
organisation. They cite several judgments of the IACrtHR demonstrating this. With the 
Awas Tingni case, however, the judges felt it was necessary to ‘[go] into greater depth in the 
analysis of the matter, in an approximation to an integral interpretation of the indigenous 
cosmovision, as the central point of the present Judgment’ (p.446). The Court’s 
interpretation and application of Article 21, 
… represent, in our view, a positive contribution to the protection of the communal 
form of property prevailing among the members of that Community. This communal 
conception, besides the values underlying it, has a cosmovision of its own, and an 
important intertemporal dimension, in bringing to the fore the bonds of human 
solidarity that link those who are alive with their dead and with the ones who are still to 
come. (p.447) 
In some ways, the Awas Tingni judgement runs counter to Engle’s thesis that the trend 
in international law has been from a collective right to self-determination to an individual 
right to culture. The case was, after all, brought by the community, not individual 
community members, and arguably the most significant feature of the judgment is that it 
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affirmed that indigenous peoples hold a collective right to their land (Wiessner 2011). 
However, the adaptation could also be read the other way around, as an individual right 
applied to protect collective claims. The question of where modifications of collective and 
individual rights meet each other is complex and perhaps best left to legal experts to assess. 
The issue I want to draw out is the centrality in this judgment of a cultural bond between 
people and land (as opposed to purely economic instrumentality or political sovereignty 
associated with ‘a certain modernity’). This bond is crucial not just for indigenous 
communities like the Awas Tingni, but for human rights law pertaining to indigenous 
peoples. Certainly the importance of this bond has been gaining traction in human rights 
jurisprudence for several years, as the preceding discussion shows. With the Awas Tingni 
judgment, this bond, which has been so important in the identity politics of indigenist human 
rights advocacy since the 1970s, became a part of legal precedent in jurisprudence of 
indigenous peoples’ human rights.  
 
Jurisprudence and precedent 
Jurisprudence may be construed broadly as connecting the practice of law with society. It is 
concerned, as Freedman explains in the 8th edition of Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
‘with rule-governed action, with the activities of officials such as judges and with the 
relationship between them and the population of a given society’. As ‘the study of general 
theoretical questions about the nature of laws and legal systems, about the relationship of 
law to justice and morality and about the social nature of law’, jurisprudence has a great deal 
to say about ‘the meaning of social knowledge’ (Freeman 2008:3,10-1). Legal precedent is 
an important aspect of jurisprudence, because it references the chain of judgments that give 
weight and meaning to judicial authority. Defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘an already 
decided decision which furnishes the basis for later cases involving similar facts and issues’, 
legal precedent clearly can have a restraining effect on elaborating and developing law in 
new or innovative ways. As legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin explains (1986:88), 
precedent means that jurisprudence always tends towards convergence and agreement: 
The practice of precedent, which no judge’s interpretation can wholly ignore, presses 
toward agreement; each judge’s theories of what judging really is will incorporate by 
reference, through whatever account and restructuring of precedent he [sic] settles on, 
aspects of other popular interpretations of the day. Judges think about law, moreover, 
within society, not apart from it; the general intellectual environment, as well as the 
common language that reflects and protects that environment, exercise practical 
constraints on idiosyncrasy and conceptual restraints on imagination. The inevitable 
conservativism of formal legal education, and of the process of selecting lawyers for 
judicial and administrative office, adds further centripetal pressure.  
As Dworkin emphasises, this centripetal pressure or converging tendency is inherent in 
jurisprudence because legal precedent is a foundational principle of rational legal argument. 
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This is so even in precedent-setting judgments, such as the Awas Tingni case. For example, 
in setting out the complaint before the court, the Commission noted that Nicaragua was party 
to the ICCPR, and recalled a 1983 judgment by the same court that cited ICCPR article 27 in 
affirming indigenous peoples’ right to ‘special legal protection’ in issues relating to the 
integrity of their cultures (IACrtHR 2002:56). The Commission also drew the court’s 
attention to ILO169, CERD’s General Recommendation 23, as well as the (then) draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and Proposed American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In this sense, the innovative aspects of practising precedent 
refer to the court’s granting its assent and authority to a new form of application of what was 
already present in the law. By applying the law in new ways, the court is elaborating 
jurisprudence pertaining to indigenous peoples’ issues. By granting its authority to these 
elaborations by way of legal judgments, it is not only increasing the centripetal pressure of 
jurisprudence, but also strengthening the architecture of indigenism.  
After nearly half a century of indigenist discourse, legal precedent has become among 
one of the most powerful of its discursive regularities. In the decade since the court’s 
judgement, the Awas Tingni case has been cited in several subsequent judgments favourable 
to indigenous complainants. Many of these citations reference not only the case and its 
outcome, but quote from the judgment or use virtually identical phrasing, particularly from 
paragraph 149 about the indigenous concept of property. The following are a sample of 
representative cases.  
In a 2004 case Mayan indigenous communities v. Belize, several Mayan communities 
complained to the IACHR about their eviction from their lands by the government of Belize. 
Finding in their favour, the Commission noted, ‘the jurisprudence of the [inter-American 
human rights] system has acknowledged that the property rights of indigenous 
peoples…arises from and is grounded in indigenous custom and tradition’ (para.117). 
Quoting from the Awas Tingni judgement, the Commission recalled that ‘the close ties of 
indigenous people with the land must be recognised and understood as the fundamental basis 
of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival’, and 
emphasised that its approach was ‘consistent with developments in the field of international 
human rights law more broadly’. The ruling cited the Awas Tingni case, ILO169, General 
Comment 23, General Recommendation 23, as well as domestic law in member states of the 
Organisation of American States (para.97).  
In the 2005 judgement Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the court found in favour of 
the survivors of a 1986 massacre of indigenous Maroon villagers at Moiwana by agents of 
the government of Suriname. The issue at the centre of the complaint was that survivors 
were subsequently prevented from returning to their village and therefore were unable to 
resume their traditional way of life, including performing ceremonies with respect to their 
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murdered kinspeople, whose spirits consequently were not at peace. Finding in favour of the 
Moiwana community, the judges recalled the Awas Tingni case: ‘For [indigenous 
communities], their communal nexus with the ancestral territory…consists in material and 
spiritual elements that must be fully integrated and enjoyed by the community, so that it may 
preserve its cultural legacy and pass it on to future generations’ (para.131). As in the Awas 
Tingni case, judge Cançado Trindade wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he 
argued that ‘the grave damage caused to [the survivors of the massacre] was…a true spiritual 
damage, which seriously affected, in their cosmovision, not only the living, but the living 
with their dead altogether’ (para.78). As ‘an aggravated form of moral damage’ (para.71), 
this spiritual damage at the centre of the Moiwana community case ‘takes us even further 
than the emerging right to the project of life’ towards ‘the right to a project of after-life’ 
(paras.66-70, 2). 
Since 1990 the Xákmok Kásek in Paraguay had been trying to secure legal title to 
their ancestral lands. In a 2010 case Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the 
court found in favour of the community. Citing the Awas Tingni judgment, the court ruled 
(paras.174-6),  
The culture of indigenous communities is part of a unique way of living, of being, 
seeing, and acting in the world, formed due their close relationship [sic] with their 
traditional lands and natural resources, not only because it is their main means of 
subsistence, but also because the relationship is an integral element in their cosmology, 
their religion, and therefore their cultural identity. […] For the members of the Xákmok 
Kásek Community, cultural features like their own language (Sanapaná and Enxet), 
their shaman rituals, their male and female initiation rituals, their ancestral shamanic 
knowledge, their ways of commemorating the dead, and their relationship with the land 
are essential for developing their cosmology and unique way of existing. 
 
The Xákmok Kásek case was the third in a decade successfully brought against the Paraguay 
government by indigenous communities (The two other cases were Indigenous Community 
of Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, and Indigenous Community of Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay). All 
three cases involving Paraguay, along with the Mayan and Moiwana cases, added to the 
growing body of case law applying the Awas Tingni precedent to interpreting indigenous 
property rights. For example, in a 2007 case Saramaka People v. Suriname, the complainants 
quoted the Awas Tingni judgment, cited Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Sawhoyamaxa v. 
Paraguay, and Moiwana v. Suriname, as well as a familiar ensemble of international law, 
before reminding the court that these judgments ‘have all been based upon the special 
relationship that members of indigenous and tribal peoples have with their territory, and on 
the need to protect their right to that territory in order to safeguard the physical and cultural 
survival of such peoples’ (para.90). As in the cases already mentioned, the court decided in 
favour of the indigenous complainants and ordered the offending government to adopt 
various remedial measures, including demarcating and titling indigenous territories.  
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Today human rights jurisprudence recognises that space historically delimited in 
cosmological terms is sufficient grounds for recognising indigenous territorial claims and 
enacting protections. Recalling the rhetoric of anticolonial independence and the hard 
version of self-determination underpinning indigenist discourse in the 1970s, it is perhaps 
surprising that indigenous religiosity has become such a consequential factor in securing 
legal title and control over indigenous peoples’ ancestral territories. Yet recalling Penrose’s 
characterisation of territoriality as ‘a geographic strategy that connects society and space’ 
(Penrose 2002:279), the crucial development in human rights jurisprudence pertaining to 
indigenous peoples’ land rights in recent decades is that it has elaborated and expanded the 
ways in which international law recognises that people may be connected with the spaces 
they inhabit. It has, in effect, broadened the ways in which law accepts that territories may 
be bounded and delimited. This broadened interpretation of territoriality has favoured 
indigenism’s characterisation in cosmological terms of the special and unique bond between 
indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands, and made indigenous cosmologies increasingly 
relevant among indigenists’ strategic repertoire of territorial practices. 
 
Discursive Imbrications 
Dispensing with an objection is a useful way to revisit the argument outlined in this chapter. 
An objection may be levelled that indigenous cosmology has always been an important 
instrument in indigenous communities’ territorial practise. Indigenous rituals and myths have 
always been crucial to the strategies by which people establish and affirm their bonds with a 
place and underwrite their self-understanding as ‘of a particular place’. Although this 
observation is generally correct (although notions of timeless homogeneity and universality 
of ‘indigenous cosmology’ are more problematic), my point is that while these kinds of 
territorial practices, along with social ones like practices affirming kinship ties, or economic 
ones related to occupation or utility of ‘lands, territories, and resources’, once were sufficient 
to stake territorial claims, that is no longer the case. Today, territorial practices require 
modern law (as opposed to customary or other forms of local law) and notions of individual 
rights, to property, to title, to culture. In this circumstance indigenous cosmology has been 
demonstrated to be more effective at securing those rights than have social or economic 
forms of bonding people with place. But it is not indigenous cosmology as it is practiced in 
ritual that matters most (although ritual matters too). Rather, what matters is how indigenous 
cosmology is discoursed and represented in language. It is at this juncture that shamanism is 
imbricated with indigenism because the centuries-long discourse about shamans offers 
indigenists and jurists alike a common structure of knowledge, an episteme in the 
Foucauldian sense, that permits mutual intelligibility.  
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Indigenist discursive practice has not produced a rubric signifier that subsumes 
indigenous religious diversity like ‘indigenous’ subsumes local cultural diversity.27 In this 
circumstance, shamanic religiosity has seemed to many people, such as the witnesses and 
judges at the IACrtHR, to be an approximate and sufficient encompassing rubric. 
Discursively representing indigenous cosmology as ‘shamanic’ can be understood as a kind 
of translation that interpolates local religious diversity into a universalised category. This 
kind of translation continues the interpolation of particulars into universals that began in 
eighteenth-century Russia. Reports by European explorers indicate that local Siberian 
communities had many different names for their ritual specialists, and these varied by 
community and the specialists’ role within the community (Flaherty 1992:72-5; Hutton 
2001; Siikala 2004:153). Why exactly the term ‘shaman’ won out among alternatives is not 
entirely clear, and, I would argue, not particularly relevant for this discussion. Far more 
relevant is that ‘shaman’ and its derivatives (‘shamanic’, shamanist’, ‘shamanism’) entered 
European languages via German (schamanismus) and was conveyed to different regions and 
applications beyond north Asia via projections of European power/knowledge globally, 
beginning with North American anthropology in the nineteenth century. Indeed, Soviet 
prohibitions on shamanic religiosities following the Russian Revolution and their decline 
across North Asia during the period of Soviet authoritarianism coincided with the expansion 
of shamanism’s discursive field in the Americas. As in Russia’s north Asian empire, 
interpolations of local religiosities across the Americas into a generalised shamanic idiom 
relied extensively on translating local terms into the European languages in which 
shamanism was discoursed, notably English, French (chamanisme) and Spanish 
(chamanismo) (for early examples, see Eliade 1964:297-302, 323n101). From this 
perspective, indigenism’s elevation of cosmology and ritual as a fundamental dimension of 
indigenous identity emerged into a space linguistically and conceptually framed by a 
European discourse about shamans. Thus anthropologist and witness Theodore MacDonald 
could tell the court in the Awas Tingni case about ‘the cacique, also a kind of shaman that 
they called Ditelian’, and the judges of the IACrtHR could rule on the importance of the 
Xákmok Kásek’s ‘shamanic rituals’ (‘los ritos de chamanismo‘) and ‘ancestral shamanic 
knowledge’ (‘los saberes ancestrales chamánicos‘).28 
The mutual intelligibility enabled by recourse to shamanism discourse also permitted 
the court to distinguish between what is and is not acceptable to the current values informing 
contemporary jurisprudential thought. Hence we have successive Separate Opinions 
                                                       
27 When scholars of religion consider this question, the discussion tends towards producing taxonomies of 
‘indigenous religion’ in which ‘spirit possession’ and ‘shamanism’ often feature prominently, and are 
increasingly supplemented by ‘paganism’ and the religious traditions ‘indigenous’ to Europe (Harvey 1999).  
28 The judgments of the IACrtHR are published in Spanish and English. The translations used here are from the 
Court’s Spanish judgments. <http://www.corteidh.or.cr> [Accessed: 15 December 2011]  
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supplementary to the court’s judgement in which several judges elaborate on the ‘indigenous 
cosmovision’ with reference to ‘the intertemporal dimension’ they feel is insufficiently 
regarded in current case law but which they feel contemporary jurisprudential thought 
demands be addressed. The judges were self-conscious about the weight of legal precedent 
and the Separate Opinions were partly intended to give further elaboration and substantiation 
of the reasoning underlying the court’s judgement. By elaborating arguments that strengthen 
the precedent, the judges ensured the precedent’s durability, which was surely their aim. By 
ensuring the durability of the precedent, however, they were also strengthening a powerful 
structural relay for identifying certain key tropes with shamanism and proliferating and 
dispersing these to other jurisdictions. Emphases on rationality, precedent, and citation in 
writing laws, delivering authoritative judgments, and developing jurisprudence have added 
these same qualities to the discursive regularities of shamanism discourse. Among ideas 
conveyed into contemporary jurisprudence pertaining to indigenous rights and identified 
with shamanic religiosity are the notions that plants, animals and topographical features of 
local environments embody spirits or are otherwise inhabited by spiritual agents, including 
but not limited to human ancestors. Similarly prominent in the jurisprudence of indigenous 
peoples’ rights is the idea popularised by much neo-shamanic literature that the ordinary, 
material world is only the visible aspect of a larger experiential universe that includes what 
Michael Harner and others have termed ‘non-ordinary reality’.  
We glimpse here modernity’s practical limit attitude and the operations of the double-
hinge. Indigenous cosmology as territorial practice is practical within indigenism’s political 
project because it connects the specificities of ontological being (‘being indigenous’) with 
the epistemological requirements of modern law. At the epistemological level, indigenous 
cosmology is represented in discourse in terms of shamanism and relies on universal 
categories developed in the course of three centuries of shamanism discourse. Yet, in 
rendering judgement, the court is self-consciously developing jurisprudence in a field of 
human rights law it feels would benefit from elaboration at the refined limits of what the 
court judges is just. In this sense, the court is seeking to interpolate the epistemological 
content of the matters before the court back into the ontological dimension of being, not 
indigenous, but universally human and rightfully entitled to dignity and worth. In this 
manner, the court affirms and validates the utopian vision of a moral transcendence of 
political contingencies achieved via the operations of modernity’s double-hinge.  
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Chapter Four: Environmentalism 
 
 
 
 
 
In Chapter Three I showed modernity’s double-hinge operating in indigenism’s 
instrumentalisation of cosmology to secure a right to self-determination modified as greater 
autonomy at a substate level, and the responsiveness of jurists to this solution. Shamanism 
was absent from much of that discussion until autonomy became an acceptable solution to 
the impasse indigenists found themselves at in their negotiations with states. As that solution 
was pursued in the Awas Tingni case and subsequent cases, the figure of the shaman 
emerged, apparently without much difficulty, to supply a discursive formulation with which 
indigenists and jurists could expand the limits of law to accommodate indigenous peoples’ 
land rights via a right to culture. In the present chapter, I want to illustrate a different way in 
which modernity’s double-hinge operates in shamanism discourse, by considering 
shamanism’s imbrications with environmentalism. A qualification is necessary from the 
outset: environmentalism signifies a wide range of inquiries pertaining to concerns about the 
earth biosphere as human habitat, and human development within the carrying limits of 
natural environments. These concerns are the general background to my more focused 
interest in the historical specificity of what I have termed the indigenist-environmentalist 
alliance.  
The specific genesis of this alliance was an alignment of interests during the 1980s 
between indigenist struggles in the Amazon Basin and revisions of transnational 
conservation practices. This alignment reframed indigenous cultural survival as an 
environmental issue and linked biodiversity conservation with cultural conservation. Among 
the consequences of this framing was the relatively sudden visibility of indigenous peoples 
in transnational environmental advocacy networks and multilateral forums, a degree of 
visibility that in turn supplied indigenous symbolic capital to an ecocentric critique of 
anthropocentric mastery of nature. The basic terms of this critique may be summarised as 
disavowing a distinction between natural life and human life, and privileging sustainable 
development over economic development, biological diversity over instrumental human 
gain, and ethical responsibilities towards future generations of life over legal obligations 
towards the present generation of humans (M. Smith 1998:4-17, 96-100). The symbolic 
economy of indigenous authenticity stimulated by this alignment generated the idea of the 
‘ecological Indian’ whose ‘cosmovision’ exemplified ecocentric values and whose lifeways 
embodied ecocentric ethics and sustainable practices. As an idealisation of a non-modern 
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Other who was ‘more of nature than in it’ (Nadasdy 2005:292), the ecological Indian bore 
much resemblance to the ‘noble savage’. But whereas the noble savage was denigrated and 
maligned as a remnant of an outdated romanticism, the prominent contribution of indigenists 
to representations and portrayals of indigenous ecocentrism gave the ecological Indian 
considerable credibility and authority. Indigenous symbolic capital underwrote the 
ecocentric critique of anthropocentrism and in the same movement rehabilitated the noble 
savage reidentified as the ecological Indian.  
These developments over a relatively short period of time inflected shamanism 
discourse in two important ways. Firstly, representations of indigenous religiosity and 
culture emerging from the imbrication of indigenist and environmentalist fields of social 
practice were seen by many proponents of shamanism as validating and giving indigenous 
authority to an aesthetic critique of modernity in which shamans have historically featured 
prominently. The basic terms of this (neo-romantic) critique may be summarised as 
privileging unconstrained experience over subject-centered reason, intuition over scientific 
method, evocation over representation, and perceiving amnesia and loss in place of freedom 
and emancipation (Tremlett 2008:68).1 Within the western academy, shamanism’s role in 
conveying an aesthetic critique of modernity is often associated with religious studies 
scholars interested in phenomenological approaches to studying religion, among whom 
Mircea Eliade is usually regarded as the apotheosis of a line that can be traced via Raffaele 
Pettazzoni, C.J. Bleeker, W. Breda Kristensen, Gerardus van der Leeuw, Rudolf Otto, Louis 
Jordan, and Cornelius P. Tiele (Flood 1999; McCutcheon 1997). Outside the academy, 
shamanism’s role in conveying this critique is most frequently associated with New-Age 
aspects of the 1960s counter-culture movements (Heelas 1996; cf. York 1995), notably 
Carlos Castaneda and later Michael Harner. Significantly, however, the genealogy of the 
critique itself goes back to the nineteenth century and the milieu of romanticism and 
spiritualism in Europe and its colonies (Van der Veer 2001; Von Stuckrad 2003, 2002),2 as 
well as American transcendentalism. Indeed, several proponents of transcendentalist thought, 
notably Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, were key figures in the tendency 
towards sacralising nature, and along with wilderness preservationist John Muir, are widely 
regarded as among the most influential antecedents of the twentieth-century green movement 
(B. Taylor 2009). The emergence of an ecocentric critique vested with indigenous symbolic 
capital went a long way towards reviving and reinvigorating an aesthetic critique that had 
                                                       
1 For an extended discussion of the aesthetic and philosophical contours of European Romanticism during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that calls into question simplistic dichotomous presentations of its 
core preoccupations, see Hawthorne (2006). 
2 The example of the nineteenth-century Siberian regionalist movement discussed in Chapter Two is also 
relevant in this regard.  
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begun to appear hackneyed and stale amid the eclecticism of New Age syncretism and 
bricolage.  
Consequently, and this is the second point, as ecocentrism cached an aesthetic critique 
of modernity with indigenous symbolic capital, so did shamanism’s styles of representation 
adjust to reflect these changed circumstances. Prior to the indigenist-environmentalist 
alliance, much shamanism discourse tended to efface the contingencies and particularities of 
indigenous shamanic traditions with the regularities of universal structures and patterns. 
Local practices still featured, but they were usually (poorly) surveyed as equivalent 
examples of ‘traditional’, ‘primitive’ or ‘archaic’ practices from a bygone era rapidly 
receding as the modern epoch advanced. Eliade’s classic text on shamanism as well as his 
frequent allusions to shamanic religiosity elsewhere in his writings are obvious examples of 
this tendency (Eliade 1964), although the tendency itself is better attributed to enthusiasm for 
the phenomenological method, in scholarly as much as popular discourse.3 With the 
emergence of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance and increasing visibility of indigenous 
shamans, this kind of effacement became untenable. More than that, however, the emergence 
of an economy of indigenous symbolic capital ensured indigenous shamans became 
desirable partners in the labours of representing and promoting universal shamanism.  
The final discussion of this chapter develops these two interrelated inflections of 
shamanism discourse by considering Michael Harner’s theory of ‘core shamanism’ and the 
representational strategies of his Foundation for Shamanic Studies. I have chosen this 
example for two reasons. Firstly, Harner has been one of the most influential promoters of a 
universal, generic shaman for modern, popular audiences. As Roger Walsh and Charles Grob 
put it in their introduction to Harner’s chapter in their book, ‘What Yogananda did for 
Hinduism and D.T. Suzuki did for Zen, Michael Harner has done for shamanism, namely 
bring the tradition and its richness to Western awareness’ (Harner 2005:160). Secondly, 
Harner’s promotion of core shamanism straddles the indigenist-environmentalist alliance, 
and therefore offers comparative material for testing how representations of shamans have 
changed over the years. The short of it is that while Harner’s popular book The Way of the 
Shaman, first published in 1980, is not influenced by indigenism and mentions neither 
indigenous peoples nor environmental concerns, Harner’s Foundation for Shamanic Studies 
goes to considerable lengths to align core shamanism with the new eco-politics of 
indigenism. 
The focus of this chapter is the historical emergence of a symbolic economy for 
indigenous authenticity in which the essence of indigenous identity is rendered as ecocentric 
                                                       
3 Although Eliade only wrote one book on shamanism, albeit one of his longest and best known, Eliade’s general 
writings on religion frequently returned to the shaman’s ‘archaic techniques’ of ecstasy to illustrate his theory 
of religion and to emphasise religion’s irreducibility (for example, Eliade 1969, 1960, 1959a, 1959b, 1958). 
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disposition, represented in sacred, transcendent, or numinous terms, and positioned as a 
vantage from which to articulate a critique of anthropocentric mastery of nature. The chapter 
comprises three discussions. I begin with a recent example from South Africa of an 
indigenous community’s partnership with a transnational environmentalist NGO. This 
example usefully adumbrates some of the discursive and practical effects of this symbolic 
economy and how these have travelled and still endure in a location at some remove from 
indigenist struggles in Amazonia during the 1980s. This example also introduces the 
problem of agency and indigenous peoples’ tactical choices about self-representation to 
advance their interests. Whereas transnational NGOs may promote essentialist 
representations of indigenous peoples’ inherent closeness to nature, for indigenous peoples 
these representations often reflect tactical choices about securing interests within structures 
of opportunity and constraint generated by the symbolic economy itself. These ideas are the 
focus of the chapter’s second discussion in which I give an historical account of the alliance. 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice and symbolic capital, I consider the historical 
alignment of indigenist and environmentalist interests, trace the emergence of a symbolic 
economy of indigenous authenticity, and illustrate the increasing prominence of the shaman 
as figure of ecocentric disposition. I do not consider the gradual dissolution of the alliance 
since the late 1990s as this development has not diminished or significantly altered 
representations of indigenous ecocentric disposition in sacred or numinous terms, as the 
recent South African example illustrates.4 The chapter’s third and final discussion steps back 
from environmentalism to consider how representations of shamans as exemplars of 
ecocentric disposition within an environmentalist domain have impacted shamanism 
discourse. I consider this question with reference to Michael Harners’ theory of ‘core 
shamanism’ as an example par excellence of universal shamanism. The curious issue here is 
why a universal theory would need to adapt its representations to changing proclivities and 
contingencies. This question leads to the chapter’s concluding discussion, where I revisit the 
analysis developed through these successive discussions from the limit perspective of 
modernity’s double-hinged labour.  
 
                                                       
4 Put briefly, an alignment of interests is not the same thing as their convergence. Several observers questioned 
the extent to which conservationists and indigenists shared common interests and some predicted a future 
falling out (Redford and Stearman 1993). Certainly there were always tensions, and by the new millennium 
cooperation between conservation organisations and indigenist associations was deeply compromised (Chapin 
2004; Colchester 2003).  
 139 
Ramunangi Land Claim 
Phiphidi Falls 
The vhaVenda identify themselves as an indigenous peoples of southern Africa whose 
ancestral territories are in the Soutpansberg mountains of South Africa’s northern Limpopo 
province. In 2005 a group of vhaVenda woman, concerned that younger generations were 
losing their attachments to traditional customs, initiated a project to recover, conserve, and 
promote vhaVenda heritage. According to a timeline summary of subsequent events 
prepared by The Gaia Foundation in London (hereafter GAIA) and published online, ‘Out of 
this process [the vhaVenda women] identified the degradation of sacred sites and the 
obligatory practices associated with them as one of the root causes for the disorder in their 
community’ (GAIA 2010). A group of older woman, identified as Makhadzis or ‘sacred site 
guardians’, formed an organisation called Dzomo la Mupo through which they coordinated 
efforts between different local communities. Around 2008, the Makhadzis discovered that 
planning was at an advanced stage to develop a picnic site beside a waterfall near the town 
of Phiphidi. The Makhadzis’ concern related to two sacred sites at Phiphidi Falls: a rock atop 
the waterfall called LanwaDzongolo, and a site beneath the falls called Guvhukuvho. The 
Makhadzis were concerned that the development would violate customary laws, prohibitions 
and obligations regarding the sites. A vhaVenda clan, the Ramunangi, claimed to be 
traditional custodians of LanwaDzongolo and Guvhukuvhu and took up the cause of 
protecting Phiphidi Falls.  
Clan leader Phanuel Mudau had been engaging local traditional leader Jerry Tshivhase 
for several years in an effort to have the Ramunangi customary claim to custody of 
LanwaDzongolo and Guvhukuvhu recognised by traditional authority. According to the 
Ramunangi’s lawyer, discussions had dragged on inconclusively for at least a decade, during 
which time LanwaDzongolo was destroyed to quarry stones for a new road to a nearby 
hospital and planning advanced to develop the site at Guvhukuvhu. The Ramunangi were not 
consulted in either instance, while their concerns grew about the punishment their ancestors 
would visit upon the vhaVenda people for failing to prevent spoliation of the two sites. 
When bulldozers moved onto the proposed picnic site in 2010, the Makhadzi organization 
Dzomo la Mupo along with several clan members obtained an interim court injunction 
against further construction. The injunction was extended in 2011 to the local municipality 
and construction company pending further litigation (Chennels n.d., 2012a, 2012b).  
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The universality of sacred sites  
Viewed from the wider perspective of my study, the Ramunangi case illustrates the kind of 
interpolations of locality into globality and particularities into universality with which this 
study is concerned. A document drafted in 2008 by a lawyer on behalf of Ramunangi 
claimants provides a striking example. Titled ‘The Ramunangi Claim of Rights to the Sacred 
Sites of Phiphidi Waterfalls’ and citing ‘Ramunangi Tribal Leaders’ as co-authors, the 
fourteen-page document was circulated to several government agencies to place on record 
the Ramunangi’s claim and to establish a basis for further advocacy (Chennels n.d.). 
Prepared with support from GAIA, it is among downloadable resources from the websites of 
GAIA and Earth Island Institute’s Sacred Land Film Project. 
Most of the document focuses narrowly on local details of the Ramunangi’s claims at 
LanwaDzongolo and Guvhukuvhu. Topics include the history of the Ramunangi’s presence 
in the region, their ‘customs, traditions and beliefs’, sacred sites in their territory, Phanuel 
Mudau’s unsuccessful approaches to traditional authorities, the destruction of 
LanwaDzongolo, and the Makhadzis’ concerns that ‘the gods would punish them for the lack 
of respect’. However, these local details are contextualized by an explanation of ‘the 
universality of sacred sites’:  
Throughout history, sacred sites have existed in all cultures and all parts of the world. 
They have always been founded upon a core set of natural features, such as mountains, 
caves, rock outcrops, springs etc. In all cultures, sacred places are seen as crossing-over 
points, sited between the mundane and the spirit world: entry points into another 
consciousness. Not simply seen as just another place in the landscape, sacred sites carry 
a whole set of rules and regulations regarding people’s behaviour, and imply a set of 
beliefs connected with the non-material world, often in relation to the spirits of the 
ancestors and a belief in gods or spirits. 
Sacred sites, the Ramunangi’s lawyer explains, are important nodes in the earth’s ‘immune 
system’, ‘like acupuncture points around the planet’. As ‘a concentration of energy in the 
ecosystem’, sacred sites are usually ‘manifest as places of high biodiversity or areas which 
play a vital role in maintaining the health of ecosystems’. Thus, ‘Indigenous peoples have 
developed an acute level of eco-literacy over generations of living in a range of eco-
systems,’ and ‘all have special custodians of these sites’ who possess the right knowledge 
and training that enables them to ‘interpret the law’ governing these sites and the ecosystems 
that they connect: ‘Indigenous peoples from around the world consider sacred sites to be 
places where the voice of Nature can be heard by those who are literate…’ By protecting 
these sacred sites where ‘cultural, spiritual and ecological significance’ converge, indigenous 
peoples have maintained ‘the health of their ecosystem, which has sustained their livelihoods 
over millennia’. Yet after millennia of relative health, today the earth’s immune system is 
weak and vulnerable. Violations of natural law are cumulatively reducing biodiversity, 
weakening ecosystems, and placing the biosphere under the greatest strain. Tampering with 
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sacred sites, argues the Ramunangi’s lawyer, ignores the role of sacred sites in maintaining 
ecosystem resilience, and mitigating and adapting to climate change: ‘Sacred sites provide 
the fundamental framework that supports the energetic, biological and hydrological immune 
systems of the Earth. This is why indigenous peoples insist that these last vestiges of pristine 
nature must not be violated’ (Chennels n.d.:5-7). 
In this analysis, sacred sites are indicated by concentrations of life energy in 
ecosystems. They are places where nature speaks, and spirits and ancestors reside; where 
mundane reality may be transcended and another kind of consciousness attained; where the 
false consciousness of anthropocentrism is discarded and the interdependent unity of self and 
natural world is revealed. But not everyone is capable of ‘crossing-over’. As custodians of 
these ‘entry points into another consciousness’, indigenous peoples’ high levels of eco-
literacy mark them as exemplars of a relationship with natural ecosystems and earth’s 
biosphere that is absent among the rest of humanity. In the context of the current ecological 
crisis, this deficit is increasingly acute, the critique it implies is increasingly apocalyptic, and 
the elevation of indigenous knowledge is increasingly millenarian. In this sense, indigenous 
peoples—the idea of indigenous peoples more so than particular communities of indigenes—
are exemplars of an ideal that also conveys a complicated critique of industrialisation and 
modernity’s disenchantment, as well as a lament for what has been lost in the course of 
becoming modern.  
 
Wild law 
The analysis presented in the Ramunangi’s Claim of Rights document draws extensively on 
a report commissioned by GAIA. Authored by Anthony Thorley and Celia Gunn (2007), the 
report argues that environmental degradation has caused permanent damage to earth’s ‘life 
support systems’; that the ‘root cause’ of this damage is humans’ orientation toward the 
world, one marked by domination and exploitation in which humans are agents and the 
natural world is their domain of control; and that sacred sites ‘as foci of spiritual belief and 
expression’ are crucial to reorienting human beings so that catastrophe can be averted. It is 
notable that Thorley and Gunn specifically have in mind those who inhabit the ‘secular 
western industrialized world’ and practice ‘western thinking and culture’, and their report 
uses variations of these and similar phrases interchangeably and repeatedly, including 
‘western mindset’, ‘secular culture’, ‘the industrial world’, and ‘industrial culture’. The 
qualification is important because it underpins the distinction Thorley and Gunn want to 
make between a modern mode of being and a non-modern one they identify with indigenous 
ontology. In Thorley and Gunn’s analysis, this reorientation consists in a paradigm shift 
from a human-centered ‘view of the world’ to an earth-centric ‘experience of the world’, in 
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which human beings live in harmony with other members of the earth community, without 
domination or exploitation. Transforming an anthropocentric worldview into ecocentric 
experience is no small task, but anthropocentrists are not without help. The first principle of 
ecocentrism is that one is never alone, hence the importance of sacred sites where nature’s 
voice is heard. Also, anthropocentricism did not always predominate. Although many 
humans, perhaps most, are no longer ecocentric, this loss is not irretrievable and neither is it 
universal; many humans still inhabit an ecocentric world. Hence the importance of 
indigenous peoples whom the authors portray as living ‘harmoniously in their sacred lands’ 
and whose ‘spiritual observances’ are pivotal to ‘maintaining rich biodiversity and cultural 
coherence’ (2007:15-6).  
On this account, environmental policies and regulatory laws will be effective only if 
they are premised on ecocentric experience, rather than the anthropocentrism that orients 
modern law. Some legal scholars and activists have embraced this profoundly challenging 
task as a moral imperative stemming from ecocentrism itself. They identify their work as 
‘earth jurisprudence’ and their branch of law as ‘wild law’. A concept pioneered by South 
African attorney Cormac Cullinan, who in turn was deeply influenced by Arne Næss’s 
notion of deep ecology and the ideas of ecotheologian Thomas Berry (Cullinan 1999; cf. 
Burdon 2011), in a ‘wild’ legal system, law governs relations between not just human 
beings, but all inhabitants of earth. As ‘places of origin’, sacred sites are ‘the sources of all 
knowledge and the natural law which informs and supports the local culture’. Accordingly, it 
is the responsibility of highly skilled indigenes to interpret and apply the wild law of these 
places, as Thorley and Gunn explain (p.145):  
If the sacred site is the source of the law, it is people such as elders and shamans who 
dialogue with that source and act as interlocutors in practical disputes and occasions 
when special decisions have to be made. Indeed…they are mediators between the world 
of humans, of nature and of the spirit world. This is what they believe is the role of the 
true ‘wild lawyer’.  
As practitioners of wild law, indigenous elders and shamans emerge from this account as 
ecocentric exemplars and are pivotal to a critique of modern anthropocentrism.  
 
GAIA’s Sacred Sites Network 
Protecting indigenous sacred sites is a centerpiece of GAIA’s work and an important part of 
GAIA’s advocacy for earth jurisprudence. The Sacred Sites Network (hereafter SSN) is a 
project run by GAIA that partners with representatives of indigenous communities ‘to 
strengthen their traditional knowledge, practices and governance systems in order to protect 
their sacred sites and territories’ (GAIA 2012b). London-based GAIA works through 
partnerships with local organisations in three targeted regions. In the Altai Republic, GAIA 
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has partnered with The Foundation for Sustainable Development of Altai and the Uch 
Enmek Nature Park, along with international partners Sacred Lands Film Project and 
Cultural Survival, to protect Karakol Valley and Mount Uch Enmek. Both are regarded as 
sacred places ‘revered by the Altaian's…since ancient times’. In GAIA’s view, Karakol 
Nature Park Uch Enmek, established in 2001 and managed by ‘indigenous people who 
respect the traditional principles and ethno-ecological consciousness of their cultural 
heritage’, is a precedent-setting model of ‘ethno-park’ development ‘where people who 
choose to live respectfully towards their cultural and natural heritage are able to establish 
legal recognition to govern their bio-cultural landscapes according to their Earth-centred 
laws’ (GAIA 2012c). In the Colombian Amazon, GAIA works with local partner Gaia 
Amazonas to protect the Yuisi rapids on the lower Apaporis River. Reportedly regarded by 
local indigenes as the place where human beings were created, Colombia’s Environment 
Minister Carlos Costa is quoted as saying, ‘This area has a rich cultural tradition that 
includes a number of shamanistic practices and rituals that provide the humans with the 
knowledge necessary for living in and protecting this world’ (quoted in Gaia Amazonas 
2012:10).  
The last of GAIA’s SSN focus areas is Phiphidi Falls. In this case, the link between 
local Makhadzi organisation Dzomo la Mupo and international networks of environmental 
NGOs, including GAIA, African Biodiversity Network, and Genetic Resources Action 
International, is The Mupo Foundation. Established by local vhaVenda woman Mphatheleni 
Makaulule, the foundation ‘strengthens local communities in ecological governance by 
reviving indigenous seed, facilitating and encouraging intergenerational learning, and 
rebuilding confidence in the value of indigenous knowledge systems’ (MUPO 2012). GAIA 
director and co-founder Liz Hosken serves on the Foundation’s board. Makaulule explains 
that Mupo ‘describes the origin of creation, the creation of the whole Universe. When we 
look at Nature we see Mupo. When we look at the sky we see Mupo. Mupo means all that is 
not man-made’ (GAIA 2012a). On this account, Mupo is a vhaVenda version of the 
ecocentric vision promoted internationally by GAIA and identified with a sacralised vision 
of James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, which postulates that all organisms on earth form with 
their inorganic surroundings one self-regulating ecosystem (Lovelock 1979). 
The SSN project illustrates the transnational advocacy role that GAIA has carved out 
among the plethora of non-governmental organisations working at intersections between 
indigenism and environmentalism. It also illustrates the importance of indigenous religiosity 
as symbolic capital in GAIA’s advocacy work, and the ways in which GAIA has made 
symbolic capital out of partnering with indigenous communities and their representatives. 
For example, in November 2009, GAIA organised a week-long workshop in South African 
with members of the vhaVenda community and indigenous delegates from Colombia and 
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Altai. Short films and various articles subsequently disseminated online by GAIA and its 
partners evidence and validate GAIA’s advocacy work by citing benefits to the indigenous 
communities and delegates with which GAIA works.  
The Ramunangi example illustrates how the operations of an economy of indigenous 
symbolic capital tends to displace the contingencies of the Ramunangi’s territorial claim 
with abstract representations of universal indigenous religiosity. The requirement that 
indigenous claims such as the Ramunangis’ comport with the structural logic of a symbolic 
economy in which indigenous religiosity is represented as laudable exemplar of ecocentrism 
means that the contingencies of a particular context are replaced by the economy’s 
universalised abstractions—the purported identity between indigenous peoples and nature, 
indigenous knowledge and ecological knowledge, cultural diversity conservation and 
biodiversity conservation, indigenous development and sustainable development, and of 
course the universality of an indigenous cosmovision and religiosity itself. At the same time, 
however, this replacement of contingency with universality leads to an auxiliary requirement 
for a reinscription of contingency, because the specificity of indigeneity qua indigenous is 
the quality that distinguishes it from non-indigenous and is the kernel of its value as 
symbolic capital. In other words, universal indigenous religiosity requires difference within 
what is circumscribed as universal; indigenous religiosity can only be universal if different 
and distinct peoples on three continents attest to this fact, not just once, but repeatedly. It is 
in this sense that this symbolic economy participates in the dialectic between the ontological 
and epistemological arms of modernity’s double-hinge. Rather than an endless oscillation, 
however, the alternation between replacement and reinscription is better perceived as a new 
instantiation on each occasion, just as the modern limit attitude labours only at the limits and 
does not (because it cannot) retread old ground. The logic of this symbolic economy is 
important to the analysis of modern shamanism because it accounts for its hyperreal quality 
and the sense in which the modern limit attitude trades in simulations of indigenous 
authenticity to support a posited ‘core’ to universal shamanic religiosity.  
 
Indigenist-Environmentalist Alliance 
In this discussion I want to draw out the logic of this symbolic economy by considering its 
historical emergence from transformations in conservation practices that brought about an 
alliance between indigenous peoples and environmentalists. I will argue that the shift from a 
‘fines and fences’ approach to preserving natural environments5 towards conservation 
                                                       
5 This conservation strategy advocates that areas be delimited and fenced off from human activity and that 
trespassers be fined or prosecuted. It is premised on the notion that human activities are detrimental to 
conservation objectives, that nature ought to be protected from human interference, and that coercive 
 145 
practices that would sustain human development led to the emergence of an economy for 
reified symbols of indigenous authenticity. As the structural logic of this symbolic economy 
‘played out’, as Bourdieu might say, the figure of the shaman became identified with 
possession and safe-keeping of valuable indigenous knowledge, about indigenous 
conservation practices, the healing properties of plants, indigenous stewardship of nature, 
and ultimately what the modern world needs to do to prevent degradation of natural 
environments and avert the catastrophic consequences that will follow. The note of 
millenarian expectation in this characterisation is not hyperbolic. For example, reporting on a 
2009 visit to London by well-known Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa, Britain’s 
Guardian newspaper claimed ‘Shaman returns to London with warning about future of his 
people in the Amazon and people all over the planet’ (Vidal 2009). The Guardian published 
their story under a headlined announcing, ‘When Davi Kopenawa Yanomami leaves home, 
you know the world is in trouble’. I will revisit the Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa later. 
For the moment, I want to suggest that this figure is a bricolage, a variable composition of 
elements that together render indigeneity as ontological alterity and the measure of a 
difference between an ecocentric disposition towards nature as habitat and an 
anthropocentric inclination towards mastery of nature for purposes of extracting resources.  
To an extent, the ascendency of ‘sustainable development’ forged a political 
environment (or ‘field’ in the Bourdieusian sense) more conducive to advancing indigenous 
peoples’ interests in a way homologous to how the ascendency of human rights utopianism 
created a more enabling context for indigenous peoples in the field of international law. 
However, the situation is more complicated than such an account would indicate. Sustainable 
development was also, like indigenism, a consequence of the ascendency of human rights 
discourse. As it emerged into the field of environmentalism (sustainable development was 
not only, nor even primarily, a form of conservation practice initially), it was in the form of a 
critique of the omission from the ‘fines and fences’ approach of social and economic 
questions in favour of biological and ecological ones. The shift towards sustainable 
development as conservation practice could be interpreted as a consequence of human rights 
utopianism’s sensitivity to the ethics of displacing or disrupting communities to establish 
protected conservation areas, and the dilemmas of ‘meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987:24). 
For this reason, I consider indigenism and environmentalism as distinct but imbricated fields, 
each structured by differential stakes. In the field of indigenism, the stake for indigenous 
peoples is cultural survival, framed as a positive right to self-determination in relation to 
lands, territories and resources. In the field of environmentalism, the common stake for 
                                                                                                                                                           
measures are necessary to ensure pristine nature is segregated from polluting and destructive humans. For a 
critical case study, see Brockington (2002; cf. Daniel Brockington and Igoe 2006). 
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various shades of green activists (Harries-Jones 1993) with interest in the field is humanity’s 
survival, framed as an imperative to devise new ways of living within earth’s ecological 
limits. The interests of both indigenists and environmentalists intersect around issues of 
control and use of lands, waters and the resources they contain. The range of intersections, 
from agreement to opposition and the variations of common- and cross-purposes between 
them, delimit the range of imbrication of the fields.  
Whilst this is perhaps an over-determined formulation, difficult to demonstrate 
empirically by Bourdieu’s standards,6 this image of imbricated fields provides a heuristic 
framework: forms of capital generated and mobilised by interested practices helps to make 
sense of an increasingly generic image of shamanic religiosity distilled by the operations of 
symbolic economies of indigenous authenticity, generated in turn by the structural logic of 
imbricated fields of practice. It is this element that I want to tease out in the following 
discussion. 
 
 
Aligning interests 
For much of the 1970s and 1980s, when indigenous peoples and conservationists had little to 
do with one another, concern about environmental impacts of modernisation policies 
stimulated considerable debate about what should be done. Gradually the ‘fines and fences’ 
approach was supplanted by conservation practices oriented towards sustaining human 
development. The shifting emphasis recognised that simply sealing off tracts of wilderness 
did not address advancing environmental degradation and ignored ethical questions about 
social impacts of displacing populations and restricting their activities. The new approach 
affirmed that human development and environmental conservation were interlinked. 
Consequently, conservation practices were needed that would sustain human development. 
Notable moments in this shift were adoption in 1980 of the World Conservation Strategy: 
Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (IUCN et al. 1980) by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature, the World Wildlife Fund (renamed World 
Wide Fund for Nature in 1986), and the UN Environmental Program, and the 1987 report of 
the World Commission on Environment and Development titled Our Common Future (the 
Brundtland Report; WCED 1987). Although the World Conservation Strategy oriented 
conservation towards sustainable development and precipitated a new kind of conservation 
practice, the Integrated Conservation and Development Project, the Brundtland Report 
established sustainable development as the paradigm of socio-economic development in an 
                                                       
6 Recalling Bourdieu’s studies of the judgment of taste or the field of academic practice (Bourdieu 1986, 2001), 
one can imagine the rich detail a similar study of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance would produce, as 
well as the demands of such an undertaking. 
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age of resource conservation. Throughout the 1980s a consensus grew that conservation 
practices needed to establish collaborative partnerships with local communities. This was not 
yet a bottom-up approach, but it did leave more room for people than the purely scientific 
approaches of biologist conservationists. At the same time, sustainable development was still 
mainly an aspiration, a hypothesis that lacked data, a model still in the early stages of testing. 
The shift towards conservation practices able to sustain human development therefore 
stimulated a search for models of sustainable use of natural resources (see Dove 2006; 
Fischer and Black 1995; McNeely and Pitt 1985; Stevens 1997; cf. Luke 1995).  
It was in this context that indigenous peoples began to receive a warmer reception 
from environmentalists. Conklin and Graham (1995:697-9) have summarised the benefits for 
environmentalists and indigenists of their new alliance in the Amazon basin. For 
environmentalists these included opportunities to study and model indigenous practices of 
sustainable resource use that could feed into the demands of the new conservation and 
development paradigm, in turn creating an ecological rationale for defending indigenous 
land rights. Data about indigenous resource management also supplied evidence for an 
ecological critique of economic development models promoted by multilateral lending 
agencies; after decades of so-called underdevelopment, Indians were now championed as 
holding the keys to rational development. Partnering with local indigenous communities also 
strengthened environmentalists’ moral position and allowed environmental organizations to 
claim they were defending the politically disempowered, not merely protecting flora and 
fauna.  
For indigenists, benefits included a new and potentially more compelling frame in 
which to promote their advocacy of indigenous self-determination. The language of 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development enabled indigenists to reframe 
cultural survival as an environmental issue, and simultaneously gained them powerful new 
allies. International support also offered indigenists channels to communicate their claims 
independently of statutory or official government channels, enabling indigenous peoples to 
place their grievances before the international court of public opinion. This offered valuable 
leverage, as the widely publicised Kayapó and Yanomami examples demonstrate (discussed 
below). As Conklin and Graham put it (1995:697), ‘Environmentalists discovered the value 
of indigenous knowledge, and environmental organizations discovered the strategic value of 
allying with indigenous causes’. 
The alignment of indigenist and environmentalist interests was very much a tactical 
choice. Recalling that practice embodies a conjunction of field and habitus, of interest and 
disposition, one could argue that the shift from a ‘fines and fences’ approach towards 
conservation practices that would sustain human development altered the structured 
dispositions of indigenous people’s habitus. Conklin and Graham suggest that indigenist and 
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environmentalist interests appeared to converge partly because of a pragmatic alignment, but 
that mainly the alliance was a function of a (then) nascent ‘global ecological 
imaginary…based mostly on abstract notions about the convergence between native and 
environmental visions for the future’. In this vision of ‘transcultural eco-solidarity’, 
indigenous peoples’ cultural difference was highly valued and marked them as ‘natural 
partners’ (Conklin and Graham 1995:697).  
 
‘How should an Indian speak?’ 
As interests aligned in the new Amazonian eco-politics, a range of practical problems arose 
for indigenists and environmentalists alike over how they might cooperate. One of the 
biggest challenges was communication. Lacking a common language or familiarity with 
each other’s cultures, misunderstandings were frequent and adumbrated a range of 
impediments to cooperation that became an ongoing part of managing partnerships. This 
problem operated in both directions, but the asymmetry of the relationship meant that 
although environmentalists and development workers professed their willingness to listen to 
indigenous peoples to ensure indigenous needs were being met, indigenous communities and 
their representatives still carried the burden of adapting the style and form of their 
communication to the expectations of their new partners.7 As the indigenist-environmentalist 
alliance unfolded during the 1990s, an increasingly salient question for indigenists was ‘how 
should an Indian speak?’. 
Framing this question with reference to Amazonian Indians, anthropologist Laura 
Graham researched linguistic practices employed by indigenous peoples to ‘perform’ or 
instantiate their identity and legitimate their ‘otherness’ (Graham 2002), and illustrated the 
issue with three emblematic examples. The first is a 1991 case where a delegation of Waiãpi 
representatives were effectively muted when their translator was barred from participating in 
a meeting with representatives of Brazil’s government. Graham notes that relying on an 
indigenous language to communicate effectively may be a serious liability ‘in situations 
where the potential for political gains rests solely on a speaker’s ability to communicate 
propositional content’ (Graham 2002:192).  
On the other hand, this liability can be ameliorated in situations ‘where the indexical, 
or pragmatic, properties of an indigenous language are valued’. Although this economy of 
value could be shut out of the closed-door meeting between the Waiãpi delegation and 
government representatives, the situation was different in more public forums where the 
                                                       
7 Although both indigenists and environmentalists shared common interests, environmentalists were advantaged 
in this partnership by their greater familiarity and experience in dealing with transnational advocacy networks, 
communicating with potential supporters, lobbying decision makers, fundraising, and controlling financial 
resources.  
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cultural capital of indigenous alterity was constrained only by the structural logic of the field 
in which it held currency. In such situations, indigenous cultural capital can offer political 
advantage. Graham’s example is a public meeting in 1987 in the Brazilian city of Goiânia 
addressed by the Xavante leader Warodi. The first between indigenous peoples, traditional 
rubber tappers, and landless forest occupiers, the 100-strong audience included local 
activists, intellectuals, university students, professors, and journalists. Among other 
outcomes, the Goiânia meeting resulted in the formation of the Forest Peoples Alliance, 
which subsequently became an important political force in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Graham reports that as Warodi spoke, a ‘palpable hush’ fell over the auditorium: ‘Although 
the referential content of Warodi's message was opaque, the aesthetic value of the aesthetic 
performance was unmistakable’(Graham 2002:196). However, there is a disadvantage: 
resorting to translators means indigenous representatives lose control over the semantic-
referential content of their message.  
Translators bear a heavy responsibility for how they re-present the message they are 
translating. Warodi’s speech was translated by Paulo, one of a handful of Xavante men sent 
as children to grow up in cities, learn Portuguese, and acquire the cultural knowledge of 
Brazilian society—the dominant society’s system of structured dispositions—so that they 
could later assist the Xavante in their negotiations with the Brazilian state (Graham 
2002:192-3,196). In his translation, Paulo faithfully repeated Warodi’s criticisms of 
government administrators and the effects of ranching, but omitted Warodi’s several 
references to two Xavante mythological creators, The One Who Pierced His Foot and The 
One Who Created The Sea. As Graham explains, for Paulo these references were not 
germane to Warodi’s principal topic and would have distracted from Warodi’s point with a 
lengthy and disruptive explanation. Yet from a symbolic perspective, Paulo’s omission 
denuded Warodi's discourse of symbolic weight and in the end the only noteworthy aspect of 
Warodi’s speech was his performance. As Graham puts it, ‘Part of the performance's 
symbolic value is literally lost in translation’ (Graham 2002:198).  
This brings us to intercultural mediators and Graham’s third example. Mastery of a 
dominant language means much greater control for indigenous speakers over the referential 
content of their message. But the trade-off for ‘bilingual culture brokers’ is that 
demonstrating such mastery can diminish their authenticity and therewith their legitimacy as 
speakers ‘for’ or ‘on behalf of’ indigenous peoples. Challenged to underwrite the authority 
of their speech, speakers may insert culturally specific content, for example by using 
indigenous words to refer to particular places, plants, spirits, myths and so on. Indigenous 
speakers may also employ symbols of indigenous alterity to signify their authentic 
indigenous identity: body paint, headdresses, and body ornamentation have all featured 
prominently in indigenist struggles in the Amazon basin. These representational strategies 
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have been pursued to considerable effect by several well-known indigenous representatives 
and have brought them national, regional and sometimes international fame (for notable 
examples see Conklin and Graham 1995:704). In this circumstance, bilingual indigenous 
speakers become intercultural mediators as they negotiate symbolic economies of indigenous 
authenticity. The three kinds of representation Graham outlines are usually combined in 
practice. She insists, however, that their hybrid forms cannot been regarded as ‘culture loss’ 
or lacking authenticity, concepts that reference Eurocentric nostalgia. Rather, linguistic 
hybridity and borrowings should be recognised for productive incorporation of new concepts 
(‘biodiversity’, ‘biosphere’, ‘environment’) and creative blending to advance indigenist 
interests, foremost of which are indigenous capacities to meaningfully engage the global 
world of which they are now a part. The downside for these cultural brokers is that 
fraternising with governments and NGO representatives for long periods away from the 
communities on whose behalf they claim authority to speak fosters alienation and frequently 
generates suspicions at home. Furthermore, as culture brokers’ symbolic capital 
(authenticity, authority, legitimacy, reputation, etc.) becomes increasingly dependent on the 
operations of the symbolic economy of indigenous authenticity, they become increasingly 
vulnerable to the estimations of NGOs and funding agencies about the extent of their 
authenticity. Should they fail to meet expectations about how ‘real’ Indians speak, comport 
themselves, and convey their concerns, they can find themselves caught by ‘the essentialist 
boomerang’ (Ramos 2003:373-5) and swiftly stripped of their status and standing in 
transnational NGO support networks (Brown 1993:317-8; Conklin and Graham 1995:704). 
Alcida Ramos has approached this problem from the opposite perspective. Whereas 
Graham draws attention to the communicative strategies and representational practices of 
Amazonian Indians, Ramos is interested in the administrative demands for rationality and 
efficiency in organisations seeking to support indigenous communities. Ramos begins by 
recounting a frequent complaint that the professionalisation of support groups has led to the 
routinisation and bureaucratisation of NGOs at the expense of organisational objectives. As 
organisations’ goals are gradually accommodated to the system of rules and regularities 
developed to increase administrative efficiency, the balance of resource allocation between 
administration and services becomes skewed and the relationship between means and ends 
becomes confused. This is a familiar process and relatively unremarkable of NGOs 
generally, at least for those of us experienced with organizational bureaucracy. For 
indigenous communities, however, the logic of the bureau is alien and gross 
misunderstandings are common. With this disjuncture in mind, Ramos (1998:274) poses the 
following questions: 
What is to be done about the Indians’ otherness that is so resistant to domestication by 
the bureau’s logic? How is it possible to control that otherness and render it compatible 
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with the ‘impersonal and functional goals’ of bureaucratic organization? How can 
anyone overcome the disjunction between the organizational impetus of the NGOs and 
the need to act in the interstices of indigenes and non-indigenous polities? The 
Weberian vocation of the office seems especially inappropriate for dealing with the 
interethnic question for the simple reason that the Weberian ‘rationality’ it cherishes is 
at odds with both the ethos of most indigenous cultures and the ‘irrationality’ of most 
relationships involving Indians and non-Indians. How to rationally administer 
irrationality is the ultimate challenge for indigenist NGOs. 
Ramos argues that NGOs working with indigenous communities solve this dilemma by 
creating a ‘bureaucratizable Indian’, a ‘model Indian’ with which they can work to achieve 
the organisation’s objectives. However, as professionalised NGOs begin working more and 
more with the model Indian and less and less with ‘real flesh-and-blood’ Indians, the 
organisation’s objective (supporting Indians) is substituted with the means of doing so (the 
model Indian). Composed of signs of authentic ‘Indianness’, the model Indian is akin to a 
Baudrillardian simulacrum, a simulation of indigenous authenticity, a hyperreal Indian.8 As 
‘the fabrication of the perfect Indian whose virtues, sufferings, and untiring stoicism have 
won him the right to be defended by the professionals of human rights’ (Ramos 1998:275-6), 
this hyperreal Indian is ‘an ethical hologram’ distinguished from ‘real flesh-and-blood 
Indians’ whose problems, demands and choices contradict and exceed the organisation’s 
interests in defending Indian’s rights. Real Indians enter into commercial arrangements with 
loggers and mining companies; they relinquish claim to some of their lands in exchange for 
title to the remainder; they request tractors, electric generators, and equipment to modernise 
their agriculture; they splinter into competing factions, and generally pursue their interests as 
they conceive them within the contingencies of their circumstances (Ramos 1998:267-70; cf. 
Graham 2002:198-200). In contrast, the simulation of real Indians ‘molds the Indians’ 
interests to the organization’s shape and needs’, not least for funding.9 Crucially, this 
‘epidemic of value’ (Baudrillard’s phrase) is structurally unavoidable. As the model that 
justifies the NGO’s purpose, ‘the figure of the hyperreal Indian is bound to spread…in a 
mounting process of conformity and uniformity until indigenous grievances and NGO 
responses become virtually undifferentiated’ (Ramos 1998:278-9; cf. 2003).  
Between NGOs’ simulations and ‘flesh-and-blood’ Indians’ self-representations is a 
complex circulation of images mediating between what NGOs want to support and what 
Indians want to obtain. Admittedly, Ramos’ somewhat abstract analysis fails to acknowledge 
                                                       
8 On the simulacrum Baudrillard wrote: ‘It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. 
It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say of an operation of deterring every 
real process via its operational double, a programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers 
all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes. Never again will the real have the chance to 
produce itself—such is the vital function of the model in a system of death, or rather of anticipated 
resurrection, that no longer even gives the event of death a chance.’ (Baudrillard 1994:2) 
9 ‘Model Indians are what justify funding and personnel for their defense, for otherwise how would it be possible 
to convince financing agencies to contribute to the protection of recalcitrant Indians who manage their own 
alliances with whomever they choose, including some of the most hardened opponents of the Indian cause?’ 
(Ramos 1998:278) 
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the considerable diversity within ‘the NGO sector’, the relative newness of this phrase 
perhaps testimony to the rapid expansion of this segment that is neither of the market nor the 
state (cf. Fisher 1997). Nonetheless, I think Ramos’ analysis usefully conveys in general 
terms the operations and implications of a symbolic economy of indigenous authenticity that 
arose amid an alignment of interests between indigenists and environmentalists. Moreover, 
her analysis has much in common with related discussions of the operations and implications 
of this economy in the Latin American context (Becket 1996; Brown 1998; Jackson and 
Warren 1995; Varese 1996), and several ethnographic studies that have explored indigenous 
peoples’ practices in relation to economies of ‘Indianness’ in Latin America (Canessa 2007; 
Fisher 1994; Gow and Rappaport 2002; Lucero 2006; Santos-Granero 2009; Veber 1996, 
1992).10 As a spokesperson for the Rainforest Foundation explained to political scientist 
Alison Brysk (1994:36): ‘The rainforest card is stronger than the indigenous card. They 
[indigenous people] know that, and we [NGOs] know that—and without that, indigenous 
peoples wouldn’t have a chance in hell’. Less blunt is the assessment of a representative of 
prominent indigenous rights advocacy NGO Cultural Survival who told Brysk, ‘We see 
ourselves as a human rights organization in the broadest sense, and that was certainly our 
first track of contact with indigenous rights. But we've moved into ecology...clearly, it works 
better’ (Brysk 1994:36).11 
At stake in Graham’s and Ramos’s respective analyses is the structural logic of a 
symbolic economy for indigenous authenticity. If indigenous peoples want to be heard by 
audiences they recognise have some influence in addressing their needs, they are required to 
present their problems and concerns in ways that conform to their audiences’ expectations of 
how authentic indigenous peoples ought to speak, dress, and behave. Precisely what these 
expectations are depends on the audience, but within the general economy of the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance, elements include a ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ disposition towards living 
in balanced harmony with the natural environment, consuming only as much as they need, 
and not exceeding what nature can replenish. As we saw earlier with the Ramunangi 
example, this disposition is typically identified with an indigenous worldview or 
cosmovision in which ecological conservation and sustainable living are regarded as spiritual 
principles, conveyed in myth, and vested with sacred value, with attendant rites and 
obligations. The difficulty with this structure of expectation and requirement is that it 
                                                       
10 As transnational indigenism has become more prominent in parts of Asia, a similar critique of political 
instrumentalisations of indigenous authenticity by NGOs and indigenous peoples alike has emerged there too, 
for example with reference to China, Indonesia, and Thailand (see Hathaway 2010; Li 2000; Santasombat 
2004; Walker 2001). See also the special issue of Identities (1999) on ‘Environmentalism, Indigenous Rights, 
and Transnational Cultural Critique’.  
11 Brysk’s distinction between three different kinds of ‘networks’ within ‘the northern green community’ graded 
by the extent to which they affirm or reject indigenous priorities in advocating green policies adds a measure 
of differentiation to Ramos’s homogenous NGO managerialism. Brysk differentiates between indigenist 
environmentalist, conditional indigenist, and conservationist NGOs. 
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establishes its own principle of authority and legitimacy, and becomes inescapable. Thus, 
every instance of indigenous self-representation becomes, for non-indigenous audiences at 
least and arguably for indigenous ones too, the measure of authenticity for subsequent 
representations. Far from a neat, sequential, or linear process implied by the simplest version 
of this formulation, it is more accurate to conceive this process as a cascade of imitations and 
modified improvisations. Lacking an original referent of authentic indigeneity but still 
deeply reliant on a notion of indigenous authenticity, one is left with a Baudrillardian 
simulacrum, a hyperreal simulation, no less real, affective, or consequential, but impossible 
for any one indigene to embody without qualification or mitigation of their shortcoming, 
even if that shortcoming is framed as cultural loss attributable to territorial conquest, 
environmental degradation, and encroachments of modernity. Thus the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance gives rise to a symbolic politics of indigenous authenticity in 
which indigenous peoples’ ecological and spiritual proximity to nature is both a kind of 
identity and a site of difference, a laudable fact and an aspirational desire, and a means to an 
end.  
 
Symbolic politics and ecological indians 
Writing in the mid-1990s, Conklin and Graham (1995) researched the (then) new eco-
politics shaping local struggles in the Amazon basin. Drawing on Bourdieu, they argued 
these were primarily ‘symbolic politics’ in which ideas and images more than common 
identity or economic interests mobilised political actions that drew together actors across 
wide gulfs of distance, language, and culture. Amazonian Indians possessed ‘symbolic 
capital’, and as Amazonian conflicts were linked into growing anxieties in the global north 
about unsustainable futures, indigenous peoples became key symbols in a wider effort to 
rethink modern societies’ relationships with natural environments and devise appropriate 
legislative and policy reforms to put the planet on a sustainable path. As Conklin and 
Graham put it, ‘positive ideas about Indians and their relations to nature have become a 
potent symbolic resource in transnational politics’ (Conklin and Graham 1995:696).  
In fact, from the earliest days of indigenism, indigenists have sought to 
instrumentalise positive ideas about indigenous peoples’ relations with nature to underwrite 
their claims to self-determination. Framed in terms of indigenous guardianship or 
stewardship of nature, these ideas and images were usually conveyed in the form of a 
critique of ‘Western civilisation’ (Muehlebach 2001:417). An early example is a presentation 
by representatives of the Hau De No Sau Nee to the UN NGO conference in Geneva in 1977, 
who informed the conference that ‘The technologies and social systems which have 
destroyed plant and animal life are also destroying the Native People. And that process is 
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Western Civilisation’ (Anon. 1991:77). In similar vein, in 1979 the WCIP’s George Manuel 
told an international conference in Mexico, ‘Not until the emergence of the nation or the 
political state was the harmony between human beings and the environment upset’: 
This world exists as a balance between natural and supernatural forces. Both forces 
make up the real environment that one must accept…The balance between the natural 
and the supernatural was and continues to be violently disrupted by those who would 
seek short-term benefits by extracting natural resources at rates, and in amounts, greater 
than can be naturally replaced. (WCIP 1979) 
Whereas nation-states are motivated by ‘growth, consumption and the idea of progress’, 
Manuel insisted that indigenous peoples believe human beings are ‘thinking, acting and 
growing individuals with souls and spirits’ and extend ‘this belief…to animals and plants 
that fill our environment’: 
Because indigenous peoples live in close proximity to the natural world and the 
supernatural world, a relative balance is maintained through limited growth and 
moderate consumption…Indigenous peoples have, by virtue of their way of life, 
protected and preserved lands, water, plants and animals that represent the last major 
undeveloped resources in the world. (WCIP 1979) 
These ideas were developed further at a workshop on ‘Indigenous Ideology and Philosophy’ 
at the National Aboriginal Conference in April 1981 in Canberra, Australia (WCIP 1981), 
and later that year presented by the Conference’s Cedric Jacobs to the International NGO 
Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land in Geneva, Switzerland (C. Jacobs 1981).  
Claims about indigenous peoples’ closeness to nature operated on two levels. First, 
they distinguished ‘indigenous peoples’ at an ontological level by emphasising indigenous 
peoples’ otherness from modern subjectivities in terms of their rejection of a distinction 
between natural and supernatural worlds. Conveyed in the mode of a critique, indigenists 
portrayed this modern distinction as posing a growing threat to the long-term future of 
humankind. Second, indigenous peoples’ closeness to nature underwrote indigenous peoples 
claim to special legal protections and privileges. So, at the Mexico conference, which was 
about fisheries resources, Manuel concluded his presentation by emphasising that ‘Where 
tribal people or other indigenous peoples can be defined as the principle guardians over a 
resource like fish, they must be recognized as the permanent authorities over the use and 
management of the resource’. As we saw in Chapter Three, ontological alterity is put 
forward as the basis for legal right. During the 1970s, indigenous ontological alterity held 
limited symbolic currency beyond certain networks of New Age enthusiasts (of whom 
indigenists were highly critical, for example, Churchill 2003; V. Deloria 1973), and counted 
for little where it mattered most, in the field of international human rights law. However, the 
shift towards sustainability in transnational environmentalism and development—for which 
resource-rich rural regions of underdeveloped countries were a key focus—foreshadowed a 
considerable increase in the symbolic capital of indigenous ontological alterity.  
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If indigenous symbolic capital was a traded stock, it spiked sharply in 1989. In that 
year, the Kayapó people in Brazil’s Pará province persuaded the World Bank to withdraw 
funding from the Brazilian government’s Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project. The 
Kayapó delivered this blow to encroachment on their territories not by lobbying the World 
Bank directly (although see Ramos 1998:216), but by producing a protest spectacle at a 
meeting with representatives of Eletronorte, the company behind the project. The 
confrontation at the town of Altamira produced headlines around the world. The Kayapó had 
secured their international audience the previous year when two of their leaders undertook a 
speaking tour of Europe and North America to draw attention to both the development and 
the meeting at Altamira. Partly arranged by Friends of the Earth and Survival International 
(environmentalist and indigenist NGOs respectively), the appearance of these exotic 
Amazonian Indians at news conferences in the UK, Holland, Italy, Germany, Belgium, 
Canada, and the United States drew considerable attention and attracted celebrity support, 
notably from British rock star Sting and Anita Roddick, founder of cosmetics company The 
Body Shop. Sting invited Kayapó chief Ropni to join him on his concert tour, while Roddick 
subsequently used images of Kayapó in traditional dress in her company’s Trade Not Aid 
advertising campaign. The contingent of foreign media who trekked to Altamira witnessed a 
mixture of popular protest and political rally, and dramatic images of hundreds of Kayapó 
men and woman adorned with traditional headdresses, face paint, body ornaments and 
brandishing machetes and clubs at Eletronorte representatives made headlines around the 
world (Fisher 1994; Ramos 2003, 1998; T. Turner 1995, 1991a).12  
The Kayapó halted the hydroelectric project with a combination of ‘their keen 
instrumentalization of cultural primordialities, their shrewd political sagacity, and their 
tremendous organizing drive’ (Ramos 2003:363).13 Yet media coverage missed much of the 
point, which was the Kayapó’s demand for an end to decisions about Amazonia’s 
development without their participation in decision-making (Ramos 1998:217). Rather than 
greater agency in decision-making processes that affected Kayapó society, arguably the most 
significant outcome of the protest rally at Altamira was that it firmly established the link 
between threats facing indigenous cultures and threats facing natural environments. Indeed, 
later that same year the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon 
Basin called on ‘the community of concerned environmentalists’ and ‘international funders 
of Amazonian development’ to ‘consider allying yourselves with us, the Indigenous Peoples 
of the Amazon, in defense of our Amazonian homeland’ (COICA 1989). In May 1990 
                                                       
12 The campaign against the dam was also notable for the Kayapó’s use of videography and engagement with 
international media (T. Turner 1991b; Moore 1994). 
13 This proved only temporary. Two decades later, Brazil is less dependent on foreign financing and less 
susceptible to international pressure. In June 2011, Brazil’s environmental regulatory agency approved the 
project, prompting a new campaign against the development. 
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representatives of 14 indigenous organisations and 24 international environmental 
organisations signed The Declaration of Iquitos, a formal ‘Indigenous and Environmentalist 
Alliance for an Amazon for Humanity’ (COICA 1990a, 1990b; cf. Mato 1997). COICA 
subsequently formed the Alliance for the Environment, a network of sister city partnerships 
linking over 400 European municipalities with the new eco-politics of local struggles in 
Amazonia (Brysk 2000:98). The Altamira meeting did not inaugurate the framing of cultural 
survival in terms of environmental conservation, but the vivid depiction of this frame 
dramatically increased the symbolic capital of indigeneity.  
Another example of local politics mediating transnational anxieties about ecological 
destruction in Amazonia is the case of the Yanomami people of Brazil’s northern border 
region with Venezuela. The plight of the Yanomami first came to the attention of concerned 
publics beyond Brazil in 1989 when a Yanomami shaman and community leader, Davi 
Kopenawa, travelled to Sweden to receive the Right Livelihood Award on behalf of Survival 
International.14 In the mid-1980s Yanomami lands were overrun by an army of garimpeiros 
(small scale gold prospectors) who brought with them epidemics of measles and other 
diseases, slashed and burned the forests, and murdered local Yanomamis. Survival 
International estimated that by the late 1980s 40,000 garimpeiros had overrun Yanomami 
territory and 20 percent of Yanomamis had died of respiratory infections, malnutrition and 
malaria introduced by the gold miners (Survival International 2012; cf. Woodman et al. 
2007). As with the Kayapó, the Yanomami case generated international headlines, and Davi 
Kopenawa, much like Kayapó leaders Payakan and Chief Ropni, became a cultural broker 
mediating the plight of his people for far away audiences, and an emblem of the link 
between cultural survival and ecological conservation. International attention to the 
Yanomami’s plight prompted much debate within Brazilian society about what should be 
done. One outcome was that Brazil’s government proclaimed a series of protected areas 
reserved for Yanomami use and habitation. However, a different range of outcomes deeply 
inflected how the challenges facing Amazonian indigenous populations were represented in 
public debate, both at the level of Brazilian national politics and at the level of transnational 
environmentalism (Conklin 2002). 
Amazonian Indians became, for northern audiences particularly, emblems of an 
emerging ‘global ecological imaginary’. The key feature of this ecological imaginary, as 
Conklin and Graham have argued, is that it ‘emerges not from the realm of concrete 
everyday experience but in the circulation of collectively held images’ (Hamilton, quoted in 
Conklin and Graham 1995:697). In other words, it does not require (much less rely on) face-
to-face contact between indigenous and non-indigenous agents. Dislocated from the 
                                                       
14 Known as the alternative Nobel Prize, the annual Right Livelihood Award is awarded in Stockholm in the days 
before the Nobel Prizes. 
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contingencies of cultural production and consumption, the global ecological imaginary 
trades in increasingly reified and abstract images and tropes of indigenism, while the range 
of application of ideas signified and resignified by these representations is increasingly 
universalised and absolute. As Ramos has put it with reference to Brazil, ‘Brightly colored 
feathers and esoteric shamanic séances are some of the most fitting items for this purpose 
both for their visual appeal and for the reassuring confidence that, thanks to protective 
ethnographic ignorance, social distance is comfortably preserved’ (Ramos 2003:378; cf. 
Conklin 1997). One of the key tropes of this ecological imaginary was that indigenous 
peoples possess arcane knowledge that would unlock the solution to sustainable 
development.  
In the early 1990s, the notion that indigenous peoples live in close harmony with 
nature fitted neatly with the new demand for examples of sustainable development that could 
be modelled and replicated. From this vantage, ‘tradition’ was seen in a new light. Data 
about how indigenous communities mitigated against drought, fires, and floods; cultivated 
crops and stored surpluses; mediated and resolved conflicts; protected against or healed 
affliction, and a host of similar inquiries related to the reproduction of indigenous life, 
became a focus of interest for ecologists and development practitioners, and for NGOs, 
funding agencies and other institutional actors. The operations and dilemmas of this 
economy of essentialised representations of indigeneity—by which I mean framing 
strategies, juxtapositions, associations, occlusions, and handling of contradictions—have 
been important in validating and giving authority to ‘indigenous knowledge’ framed in terms 
of biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. For example, Beth Conklin (2002) 
has demonstrated how reframing indigenous peoples’ public image from combative 
‘warriors’ to ‘stewards of the forest’ shifted the locus of indigenous identity from historical 
occupation and subsequent dispossession of lands and territories to possession of local 
knowledge about environmental resources, plant and animal species, and biodiversity. This 
reformulation generated increasingly generic representations of shamans as keepers of 
valuable local knowledge, and placed medicinal and ritual plant use at the centre of 
shamanic practice and expertise (Conklin 2002:1056-7; cf. Langdon 2006). The campaign to 
protect the Yanomami and particularly the role of Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa was 
an important factor in cementing the association between the need to conserve arcane 
‘indigenous knowledge’ and the specialist role of shamans in indigenous societies. 
Indigenous knowledge and particularly shamans’ knowledge became synonymous with an 
ecological critique of disenchanted modernity, in much the same terms as had been 
articulated since the 1970s by indigenists like Vine Deloria and George Manuel. Indeed, 
indigenists adapted notions of indigenous guardianship or stewardship of nature to the 
discursive regularities of ‘indigenous knowledge’ in the service of ‘biodiversity 
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conservation’ and sustainable development (Dove 2006; Escobar 1998; Muehlebach 2001). 
Largely detached from local contingencies and complexities, reified notions of indigenous 
knowledge and cosmology mobilised symbolic capital cached in essentialised images and 
tropes of indigenous peoples’ proximity to nature. So, for example, when Davi Kopenawa 
addressed the UN General Assembly at the launch of the International Year of Indigenous 
Peoples on Human Rights Day in 1992, the affect of his speech relied less on the referential 
content of Yanomami cosmology and more on the symbolic capital of indigenous 
ontological alterity, by aligning notions of nature and knowledge with shamans to convey a 
critique of industrial development couched in apocalyptic anxiety. Davi Kopenawa told the 
General Assembly he brought to the UN a message from Omam,  
the creator of the Yanomami and the creator of the shaboris, who are our shamans. The 
shaboris have all the knowledge, and they have sent us to deliver their message to the 
United Nations: stop the destruction, stop taking minerals from under the ground, and 
stop building roads through forests. Our word is to protect nature, the wind, the 
mountains, the forest, the animals, and this is what we want to teach you. The leaders of 
the rich, industrialized world think that they are the owners of the world. But the 
shaboris are the ones that have true knowledge. They are the real First World. And if 
their knowledge is destroyed, then the white people too will die. It will be the end of the 
world. This is what we want to avoid. (Yanomami 1994:110-1; cf. Ewen 1994; 
Multinational Monitor 1992; Turner and Yanomami 1991)  
The notion that indigenous peoples possess arcane knowledge that holds the key to 
ecological conservation and sustainable development has hardly been without controversy or 
criticism. Several scholars have argued that the notion of ‘indigenous knowledge’ as distinct 
from and independent of Western science or modern epistemology does not stand up to 
scrutiny (for example Dove 2006; Escobar 1998; Nygren 1999; Sillitoe 2006, 1998; Sillitoe 
et al. 2002). Furthermore, the notion of a profound distinction between ‘local science and 
global science’ is hardly neutral and ‘may privilege political, bureaucratic authorities with a 
vested interest in the distinction (whether its maintenance or collapse)’ (Dove 2006:196; 
although see De la Cadena 2010; and Povinelli 2001). Moreover, recalling the saliency of 
notions of the ‘noble savage’ in American history (Harkin and Lewis 2007; R. Jacobs 1980; 
Krech 1999; Vecsey 1980), several observers have argued that celebrations of indigenous 
peoples and indigenous knowledge as a solution to the environmental challenges facing the 
world updates the romantic trope of the noble savage with that of the ecological Indian. 
Distinguished from modern man by a laudably primitive but harmonious relation with the 
environment—‘more of nature than in it’ (Nadasdy 2005:292)—the ecological Indian has 
been hugely controversial (Hames 2007; Redford 1991; Nadasdy 2005), not least for 
indigenous peoples who have taken aim at many environmentalists’ romantic idealisations 
(for example, Cultural Survival 1991; Harkin and Lewis 2007; cf. Redford 1991; Redford 
and Stearman 1993). However, the controversy is complicated by indigenists’ advocacy of 
environmental stewardship which relies on similarly essentialist notions that indigenous 
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peoples are best suited to managing environmental resources because, being indigenous, they 
have a close bond with the natural environment (for examples, see Akwesasne Notes 1991; 
Eaglewoman 2009; Martinez 1998), despite the fact that essentialising strategies risk 
undermining indigenous claims for a greater share of natural resources and development 
assistance (Walker 2001; cf. Niezen 2003:242n21). In fact, the symbolic politics of the 
indigenist-environmentalist alliance imputed a range of ecocentric ideas to indigenous 
religiosity, indigenous cosmovisions, and indigenous ritual specialists and instrumentalised 
these to distinguish indigenous peoples as exemplars of an ecocentric orientation towards the 
world we all inhabit. In this way the noble savage was modified and revived as the 
ecological Indian, weighted with the moral authority and political capital of indigenism, and 
amplified by alarm at ecological destruction on a planetary scale. Now rendered as the 
ecological Indian, representations of indigeniety in an ecological imaginary arguably 
instrumentalise primitivism in an ecological register to lament what has been lost in the 
course of becoming modern. The Gaia Foundation’s report on Sacred Sites discussed earlier 
is a good example.  Chris Tennent (1994:7) has noted the double role of this figure, 
‘representing not only what has been left behind in the progress of modernity, but also 
providing a site for millenarian aspirations for a transformation and redemption of 
modernity, through a “return to the primitive”’. 
As such, the indigenist-environmentalist alliance forms part of a much longer tradition 
of critiquing anthropocentrism with representations of indigenous cultures and cosmologies. 
Traces of this critique can be discerned in the European romantic tradition, notably in the 
work of Edmund Burke and Jean Jacque Rousseau, and nineteenth-century American 
transcendentalists such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. The latter, 
along with John Burroughs, an exemplar of ‘the Arcadian impulse in American culture’ (B. 
Taylor 2009:59), and American wilderness preservationist John Muir, are often regarded as 
among the most influential antecedents of the twentieth-century green movement (Albanese 
2007, 1990; B. Taylor 2009; although also see Grove 1995 and Guha 2000). Within the 
green movement, the critique of anthropocentrism has been most closely associated with 
Norwegian ecologist Arne Næss’s advocacy of deep ecology, a term he first proposed in 
1973 (Næss 1973), and James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis, an idea he first conceived in the 
early 1960s and later popularised in an accessible non-specialist book Gaia, a New Look at 
Life on Earth (Lovelock 1979; cf. Lovelock 1969, 1965). From early on, the critique of 
anthropocentrism operated spiritual, mystical and transcendent tropes, and although not all 
contemporary deep ecologists conceive of nature in transcendent terms, a significant 
proportion do conceive of nature as numinous in one way or another (B. Taylor 2009; see 
Chapter Six).  
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The problematic I want to draw out of this analysis is how the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance generated a symbolic economy for indigenous authenticity and 
politics of representation that linked a range of ideas about indigenous identity and 
religiosity with nature and ecology. As Indians and environmentalists learned ‘how to speak’ 
and ‘play the game’ of the new transnational environmental advocacy, tactical choices about 
contextual specificity were combined with reified notions of ‘indigenous knowledge’, 
‘biodiversity conservation’, and ‘sustainable development’ in a generic discourse about 
indigenous peoples’ closeness to nature. These kinds of representations and references were 
mobilised by indigenists and environmentalists alike to signify a subject position that, in 
relation to the current ecological challenges facing the modern world, indicated a site from 
which economic development could be critiqued, modernity lamented, and indigeneity 
lauded in a millenarian anticipation about indigenous peoples’ importance in saving the 
world from itself.15  
At the same time that these reified and abstract elements construed a useful distinction 
between modern and indigenous ontology represented as difference between anthropocentric 
and ecocentric epistemologies, the free-flowing recombinations of these elements and their 
intense mediation among transnational audiences16 eroded contextual contingency within the 
realm of indigeneity and opened the way to hyperreality. Differentiation between specific 
communities of indigenes, their distinct histories, cultures and traditions gave way to 
simulations of indigenous identity, in which shamans, their cosmologies, ritual practices, and 
indigenous (‘shamanic’) knowledge featured prominently. Among the consequences of the 
indigenist-environmentalist alliance was that it distilled an increasingly generic image of 
shamans as keepers of valuable local knowledge, and placed indigenous healing techniques 
at the centre of shamanic practice and expertise. Significantly however, this image also de-
emphasised older representations of shamans as implicated with conflict, killing and death, 
and was supplemented by the notion that shamans, among all indigenous peoples, are the 
most knowledgeable about how human beings can live sustainably as part of, rather than 
masters over, the natural world. Rendered in these generic terms, the term ‘shaman’ became 
even more easily translatable and local names for traditional healers around the world 
became (and continue to be) translated as so many local equivalents of a transnational 
generic ‘shaman’ category. The discussion in Chapter Two on shamanism’s ‘emigration’ to 
North America illustrated early examples of this kind of assimilation by translation. A 
                                                       
15 Typical of this genre is David Maybury-Lewis’s Millenium: Tribal Wisdom and the Modern World, based on a 
1992 television series of the same name (Maybury-Lewis 1992). 
16 Documentary film and television, print and broadcast media, public awareness and fundraising campaigns, 
lobbying efforts, and the like have all been prominent strategies of the alliance since the late 1990s. 
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similar discussion in Chapter Five will illustrate how this process is also assimilating local 
southern African indigenous religiosities to a generic shamanic idiom. 
But if this generic image distilled by a gradual loosening of referents resembled a 
hyperreal simulation, it still retained, and even increased, its currency in a widening 
economy for shamanic authenticity. This is one of the areas where my analysis departs from 
Baudrillard’s.17 Contra Baudrillard’s contention that in postmodernity symbolic value has 
supplanted exchange value (Baudrillard 1981), I argue that symbolic value (capital in the 
Bourdieusian sense) is still traded and exchanged in the general economy staked out by the 
range of interests structuring the indigenist-environmentalist alliance. With this qualification 
in mind, I think Baudrillard’s conceptualisation of hyperreality is helpful with regard to the 
erosion of indigenous difference and the opening of this field to simulations of 
‘indigenousness’. The loosening correspondence between sign and referent helps to account 
for the increasing ease with which the effusion of indigeneity as ecocentric disposition 
escapes the logic of practice specific to the indigenist-environmentalist alignment of interests 
and spills over into other domains. As ‘an image without a resemblance’ (Delueze 
2004:295), simulacra of ecocentric indigeneity can go travelling unencumbered by a 
specificity that would otherwise impede their range of application. But precisely this lack of 
impediment increases the symbolic capital of indigeneity as ecocentric disposition, which is 
now more readily appropriated and adapted to a discourse about shamans and accommodated 
to the logic of shamanism’s modalities and regularities.  
Rendering shamans as exemplars of indigenous ontology framed in terms of an 
ecocentric disposition retains the notion of shamans as mediator between worlds. However, 
the distinction between worlds is now represented as between an ordinary world oriented by 
anthropocentric mastery of nature, and an ordinarily hidden world in which humans are only 
one part of an ecological system that ultimately comprises all natural things. This distinction, 
in which the latter enables a critical perspective of the former, is mirrored in a distinction 
between ‘Western’ ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘indigenous knowledge’. The shaman is 
valued for their possession of indigenous knowledge that they draw on in their role as healer, 
which is now represented as their primary social function. Practising shamanic techniques 
                                                       
17  Although I think Baudrillard’s notions of simulacrum and hyperreality are important and analytically usefully 
for understanding cultural circulation in a globalised world shrunk by and saturated with digital mediations, I 
use his theory with reservation and qualification. I am unconvinced by Baudrillard’s argument that symbolic 
exchange has superseded economic exchange (Baudrillard 1981) or that the structuralist model described by 
de Saussure and developed by the ‘poststructuralists’ is outdated by hyperreality’s implosions and 
dedifferentiations (Baudrillard 1993, 1983). In general, I don’t accept Baudrillard’s notion that the logic of 
simulation distinguishes postmodern from modern societies as the logic of production and utility supposedly 
distinguishes modern capitalist from pre-modern pre-capitalist societies. For overview discussions of 
Baudrillard’s theories and significance, see Hegarty (2004) and Kellner (1989). Kellner, for example, has 
suggested that ‘Baudrillard exaggerates the break between the modern and the postmodern, takes future 
possibilities as existing realities, and provides a futuristic perspective on the present’ (Kellner 2003:329). For 
a strident critique of Baudrillard’s thought, see Christopher Norris (1992, 1990).  
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accesses this non-ordinary world, and if performed correctly, the hidden world reveals itself 
to the shaman possessed of the right knowledge and technique. Through a combination of 
bodily and spiritual techniques, the shaman intervenes in this ordinarily hidden world to 
affect the desired healing outcome. Noteworthy is the occlusion of negative images of 
shamans. By singling out benevolent indigenous knowledge and healing as the core of 
shamanic practice and expertise, the indigenist-environmentalist contributed towards 
distilling a generic image of shamanic religiosity that downplayed older images of shamans 
as implicated in conflict, killing, and death. This generic image has increasingly become the 
global template of the traditional-healer-as-shaman tapped by spiritual entrepreneurs and 
increasingly subject to state regulation, both topics I address in Chapter Five.  
In the last discussion of this chapter, I want to look at this shaman more closely. On 
the one hand, this shaman appears to have shrugged off resemblances to specificity and 
contingency to the extent that all that remains are simulations of shamans as the image of 
ontological alterity, a last resemblance on the threshold of hyperreality. On the other hand, 
however, the simulacrum of universal shamanic religiosity relies on symbolic capital cached 
in indigenous identity to vouchsafe its universal claims. To demonstrate this point, I want to 
consider how Michael Harner’s theory of ‘core shamanism’ has adapted its representation of 
shamans in the wake of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance. By tracking this adaptation, 
I will return the discussion to the operations of modernity’s double-hinge and the perpetual 
motion between ontological and epistemological labours.  
 
Modern Shamanism  
Michael Harner is a former professor and chairman of the Graduate Faculty Department of 
Anthropology at the New School of Social Research, and taught at the University of 
California at Berkeley, Columbia University, and Yale. In the course of his academic career 
he published two anthropological books (Harner 1972, 1973) and several journal articles 
based on his fieldwork among indigenous communities in Amazonia during the 1950s and 
1960s (Grimaldi 1997). This fieldwork stimulated Harner’s interest in what he would later 
term the ‘shamanic state of consciousness’ and is a frequent reference in his theory of core 
shamanism.  
 
Core Shamanism 
Harner defines core shamanism as ‘the universal, near-universal, or common principles and 
practices of shamanism not bound to any specific cultural group or perspective…’ (FSS 
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2012d), as outlined in his book The Way of the Shaman.18 For Harner, a shaman is ‘a man or 
woman who enters an altered state of consciousness—at will—to contact and utilise an 
ordinarily hidden reality in order to acquire knowledge, power, and to help other persons. 
The shaman has at least one, and usually more, “spirits” in his personal service’ (pp.25-6). 
‘Shamans are especially healers’, and move between ordinary and ‘ordinarily hidden’ 
realities to perform their healing work (p.55). In Harner’s view, ordinary and ordinarily 
hidden realities are both equally real. Harner rejects as unproven, ‘even in the sciences of 
ordinary reality’, the contention that there is only one state of consciousness that is valid for 
firsthand observations on which basis is determined the empirical definition of reality 
(p.xvii). Therefore, Harner proposes another duality, the shamanic state of consciousness in 
contrast to the ordinary state of consciousness: ‘The SSC is the cognitive condition in which 
one perceives the “nonordinary reality” of Carlos Castaneda and the “extraordinary 
manifestations of reality” of Robert Lowie’ (p.26). As an intermediary between ordinary and 
nonordinary realities, the shaman is ‘a magical athlete of states of consciousness’ (p.56). 
However, the shamanic state of consciousness is not a place of play; ‘The shaman is a person 
with work to do in the SSC and he must know the basic methods for accomplishing that 
work’ (p.27). These methods entail knowledge, of the ‘cosmic geography of nonordinary 
reality’, of speaking with non-human beings, including animals, trees and spirits, and of 
working with guardians and spirit helpers (pp.26,74-5,81-3). This knowledge can be 
acquired in many ways, including apprenticeships and textual sources such as his book.19 
However, mainly shamanic knowledge is acquired through experience: ‘The shaman is an 
empiricist… And indeed the shaman depends primarily on firsthand experience of the 
senses, to acquire knowledge’ (p.58). According to Harner (pp.52-3), ‘the remarkable 
worldwide consistency in basic shamanic knowledge’ is a hallmark of shamanic practice and 
is widely reported by scholars (his examples are Eliade and anthropologist and folklorist 
Johannes Wilbert). Indeed, this consistency Harner suggests is because ‘the ancient methods 
of shamanism are already time-tested’ (p.xiv). ‘Shamanic methods’ are very ancient, 
according to Harner, ‘at least twenty or thirty thousand years old’ and possibly ‘two or three 
millions years’ when ‘primates that could be called human’ populated the planet (Harner 
1980:51). Like knowledge produced by scientific experimentation, knowledge produced by 
shamanic methods has distilled and separated what works from what does not. Shamanic 
knowledge is therefore not only consistent, but reliable too.  
                                                       
18 Although Harner did not coin the term ‘core shamanism’ until later, The Way of the Shaman is Harner’s key 
text and is promoted as a kind of textbook of core shamanism by his Foundation. Unless otherwise indicated, 
subsequent page citations reference Harner (1980). 
19 On whether shamanic knowledge can be learned from a book, Harner states, ‘You must learn the methods in 
order to utilize them…In Western culture, most people will never know a shaman, let alone train with one. 
Yet, since ours is a literate culture, you do not have to be in an apprenticeship situation to learn; a written 
guide can provide the essential methodological information’ (Harner 1980:xv). 
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Shamanism for Harner is the method of applying shamanic knowledge; it is ‘the most 
widespread and ancient methodological system of mind-body healing known to humanity’ 
(p.51). Although ‘the achievements of Western scientific and technological medicine’ are 
‘miraculous in their own right’ (p.176), shamanism is not taken seriously in the modern 
world because ‘our Western culture’ is ‘cognicentric’, by which Harner means ‘prejudiced 
against a concept of nonordinary reality’; cognicentrism is ‘the analogue in consciousness of 
ethnocentrism’ (p.xvii). In contrast to Western cognicentrism, ‘primitive peoples’ already 
understand ‘the two-tiered nature of their experiences’ and don’t distinguish between 
ordinary and non-ordinary reality. Yet, ‘[b]ecause our Western culture is not shamanic’ and 
‘is simply unsophisticated from a shamanic point of view’, it is necessary when teaching 
shamanism to make these distinctions clear. If you become a shaman, however, ‘you will 
find it no more necessary than a Jívaro or an Australian aborigine to specify the state of 
consciousness you were in when you had a particular experience. Your audience, if 
composed of persons of knowledge, will know’ (pp.60-2). Western cognicentrism 
notwithstanding, Harner claims students attending his training workshops ‘have 
demonstrated again and again that most Westerners can easily become initiated into the 
fundamentals of shamanic practice.’ Indeed, ‘[t]he ancient way is so powerful, and taps so 
deeply into the human mind, that one's usual cultural belief systems and assumptions about 
reality are essentially irrelevant’ (pp.xiv-xv). Harner terms these ‘fundamentals of shamanic 
practice’ along with the body of knowledge on which it relies ‘core shamanism’. At the 
centre of core shamanism is the shaman’s experience, beginning with his or her transition 
into shamanic state of consciousness and followed by journeys in nonordinary reality. 
Harner describes the shaman’s experience as follows: 
In the SSC, the shaman typically experiences an ineffable joy in what he sees, an awe of 
the beautiful and mysterious worlds that open before him. His experiences are like 
dreams, but waking ones that feel real and in which he can control his actions and direct 
his adventures. While in the SSC, he is often amazed by the reality of that which is 
presented. He gains access to a whole new, and yet familiarly ancient universe that 
provides him with profound information about the meaning of his own life and death 
and his place within the totality of all existence. During his great adventures in the SSC, 
he maintains conscious control over the direction of his travels, but does not know what 
he will discover. He is a self-reliant explorer of the endless mansions of a magnificent 
hidden universe. Finally, he brings back his discoveries to build his knowledge and to 
help others (p.27). 
The purpose of Harner’s core shamanism training is to recommend specific techniques by 
which one may journey into the shamanic state of consciousness and nonordinary reality and 
there partake of one’s own ineffable experience (pp.38-40). First, the journeyer must be calm 
and relaxed. They should avoid psychedelic or alcoholic stimulants for at least twenty-four 
hours ‘so that your centeredness and power of concentration will be good, and your mind 
clear of confusing imagery’. Similarly, Harner recommends fasting or eating only lightly. 
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When they are ready, they should lie comfortably on the floor in a dark and quiet room 
wearing light clothing without shoes or pillow. They should take a few minutes to relax arms 
and legs, and take a few deep breathes while contemplating the journey they are about to 
begin. Finally, they should close their eyes and cover them with a hand or forearm to keep 
out any light. They are now ready to begin. First, they should ‘visualize an opening into the 
earth that you remember from some time in your life’. Any kind of opening will do—a 
burrow, cave, tree hollow, spring, or ‘man-made opening’. After visualising the opening for 
a few minutes, they should instruct a companion to begin beating a drum ‘in a strong, 
monotonous, unvarying, and rapid beat’ of between 205-220 beats per minute. The journey 
through the tunnel takes several minutes, during which time ‘[t]he steady, monotonous beat 
of the drum acts like a carrier wave, first to help the shaman enter the SSC, and then to 
sustain him on his journey’ (p.65): 
When the drumming begins, visualize your familiar opening into the earth, enter it, and 
begin the journey. Go down through the opening and enter the Tunnel. At first the 
Tunnel may be dark and dim. It usually goes underground at a slight angle, but 
occasionally it descends steeply. The Tunnel sometimes appears ribbed, and often it 
bends. Occasionally one passes through the Tunnel so fast it is not even seen. In 
following the Tunnel you may run up against a natural wall of stone or some other 
obstacle. When this happens, just go around it or through a crack in it. If this fails, 
simply come back to try again. In any case, do not exert yourself too hard in making the 
journey. If you do this work correctly, it will be relatively effortless. Success in 
journeying and seeing depends on an attitude that lies between trying too hard and not 
trying hard enough. (p.40) 
If the journey is successful, the shaman emerges onto a landscape. Harner recommends the 
journeyer ‘examine the landscape in detail, travel through it, and remember its features’. 
When signaled to return by the drumming companion, the shaman should return to the 
ordinary state of consciousness by way of the same tunnel. Finally, Harner recommends the 
shaman describes their experience to their companion to assist them retain the knowledge 
learnt. Harner also recommends writing down these recollections or dictating them into a 
voice recorder. ‘The act of remembering these experiential details is the beginning of your 
accumulation of SSC knowledge.’  
This account of the shaman’s journey into shamanic state of consciousness and 
nonordinary reality is the basic pattern of core shamanism. It is the template from which 
other kinds of shamanic journeys, take their variation, including journeys to recover a power 
animal, spirit canoe journeys, and journeys to remove intrusions or to restore a soul. It is the 
origin of shamanic knowledge and healing practice. On this point, Harner insists that ‘truly 
significant shamanic knowledge is experienced, and cannot be obtained from me or any 
other shaman. Shamanism is, after all, basically a strategy for personal learning and acting 
on that learning’ (p.xxii). 
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The Foundation for Shamanic Studies 
The Foundation for Shamanic Studies (hereafter FSS or Foundation) is a nonprofit, public 
charitable organisation ‘Dedicated to the preservation, study and teaching of shamanic 
knowledge for the welfare of the Planet and its inhabitants’ (FSS 2012a). Currently based in 
Mill Valley north of San Francisco, Harner established the Centre for Shamanic Studies in 
1979, and transformed it into the FSS in 1987 to promote core shamanism. 
The FSS’ dedication to preserving, studying and teaching shamanism is envisaged as 
‘a three-part mission’. Historically, teaching shamanism has been the most important part of 
the Foundation’s work and has been organised around a menu of courses offered through the 
Foundation and taught by Harner and an ever-growing college of FSS faculty members, all 
of whom are themselves graduates of the Foundation’s advanced level courses. The 
introductory level Basic Workshop in Core Shamanism is modeled on The Way of the 
Shaman and is a prerequisite for proceeding to more advanced level courses. Since the basic 
course was developed in the 1980s, a wide range of advanced level offerings have been 
developed by Harner and the Foundation’s alums. These range from weekend workshops, to 
two-week intensive courses, such as the Shamanic Healing Intensive, and a Three Year 
Program of Advanced Initiations in Shamanism and Shamanic Healing. The typical offering 
of advanced-level weekend workshops include Shamanic Extraction Healing Training; 
Shamanism, Dying, and Beyond; Shamanic Divination Training; Shamanism and the Spirits 
of Nature; Shamanic Dreamwork; Shamanic Training in Creativity; and Shamanism 
Practicum (FSS 2012k). Most courses are taught in North America, and as more graduates 
have moved on to advanced levels and become faculty members, so the number, diversity 
and availability of courses has increased. Scheduled offerings published in the Foundation’s 
monthly newsletter indicate that for the six-month period January-June 2011, 46 Basic 
Workshops and 29 advanced level courses were offered across North America. Almost the 
same numbers are repeated for the same period in 2012.20 The Foundation’s success over a 
sustained period has also led to a network of international Faculty who teach the 
Foundation’s courses beyond North America through local affiliates. The largest of these is 
FSS Europa based in Vienna. Among the most active European affiliates are Centro Studi 
Sciamanici (Italy), Chamanisme (Switzerland), Chamanisme-FSS (France), FSS Europe 
Portugal (Portugal), Formación en Chamanismo Transcultural (Spain), and The Sacred Trust 
                                                       
20 The numbers are slightly different for the period September 2010 to March 2011 (30 basic and 40 advanced) 
and October 2011 to April 2012 (46 basic and 45 advanced).  
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(United Kingdom).21 Each offer a regular schedule of basic and advanced courses. Although 
less frequent, FSS courses are also taught by FSS faculty in Argentina, Australia, Japan, and 
Taiwan. 
The various courses offered around the world by FSS faculty members along with 
prerequisite conditions for enrolment, graduation through higher levels of advancement, and 
certification upon completion suggest some of the ways the FSS produces disciplinary 
knowledge about shamanism (‘shamanic knowledge’) along with mechanisms for 
authorising and regulating standards. For example, White, Bronze, and Silver certifications 
are issued with respect to completing combinations of advanced level courses of two weeks 
or longer, while Gold certification is issued upon completion of ‘all standard advanced 
Foundation trainings in Core Shamanism’ (FSS 2012b). The certification ‘Harner Method 
Shamanic Counselor’, the most esteemed of the FSS’s certifications, is instructive (FSS 
2012j). Among other requirements, candidates must: complete the FSS Basic Workshop; 
complete the 5-day shamanic counseling training course; submit a 5000-word essay on the 
topic, ‘What should the standards be for the shamanic counselor, and how do I meet these 
standards?’; attend at least twenty meetings of a ‘core shamanic drumming circle’; complete 
125 hours of ‘core shamanic training’ in advanced level FSS courses; submit audio 
recordings and written reports of shamanic counseling sessions; and complete a 5 day 
‘Teaching Examination in Shamanic Counseling’ and oral examination. Although the FSS 
stopped issuing Harner Certified Shamanic Counseling certifications in 2008, the 
certification remains valid for those who had already received it, including nearly 100 
Harner Method Certified Shamanic Counselors listed on the Foundation’s website (FSS 
2012c). 
Besides teaching, in recent years the FSS has begun placing more emphasis on 
research. In 2006 the Foundation established the Shamanic Knowledge Conservatory. 
According to the FSS, the conservatory holds ‘over 65,000 indexed pages related to 
shamanism and shamanic practices…culled from 396 cultures’, as well as books, 
manuscripts, artifacts, drums, and audio-visual media. Mostly preserved digitally and stored 
in multiple locations to ensure survival in case of ‘a future calamity’, the material is 
organised into five categories: shamanic healing, about shamans, cosmology, eschatology, 
and divination (FSS 2012g). A second research project is concerned with ‘mapping 
nonordinary reality’. This project has amassed ‘Over 70,000 pages of researched data on 
cross-cultural shamanism and shamanic healing, and over 6,000 books and journals 
regarding the same’, as well as 35,000 pages of first-hand descriptions of shamanic journeys 
                                                       
21 The websites of these organisations are respectively, http://www.studisciamanici.it; 
http://www.chamanisme.ch; http://www.chamanisme-fss.org; http://www.xamanismo.net; 
http://www.estudioschamanicos.com; and http://www.sacredtrust.org <Accessed: 29 March 2012>. 
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‘and other visionary experiences of contemporary Westerners’, including, according to the 
FSS, ‘the very first shamanic journeys contemporary Westerners have experienced’ (FSS 
2012g). Finally, the FSS also runs a Shamanism and Health programme that researches the 
efficacy of shamanic healing methods. Envisaged as ‘a progressing effort to find how 
shamanic practices complement mainstream medicine’, the Foundation invites ‘shamanic 
healing practitioners’ to complete a questionnaire, although no time frame is given for when 
findings will be published (FSS 2012h). Between these transcultural research and 
transnational teaching labours, the FSS strongly resembles a conventional academic 
institution, as indeed is the Foundation’s intention. As Harner has said, ‘Our Foundation for 
Shamanic Studies is a kind of university of shamanism’ (Harner 2005:170).  
The third part of the Foundation’s mission is given as ‘preservation and revival of 
indigenous shamanism’. The Foundation has two programmes for accomplishing these goals. 
The Living Treasure of Shamanism award ‘provides an annual lifetime stipend to 
exceptionally distinguished indigenous shamans in less-developed countries where their age-
old knowledge of shamanism and shamanic healing is in danger of extinction’. The purpose 
is to provide the financial support that will ‘allow these Living Treasures to pass on their 
knowledge to their people’. Among the twelve award recipients listed on the Foundation’s 
website are a Daur shaman in Inner Mongolia, Tibetan shamans in Tibet and Nepal, four 
shamans of three different ‘small peoples’ of Siberia and central Asia, and several shamans 
in Amazonia (FSS 2012f). The second programme, titled ‘Preservation, Revival, and Urgent 
Indigenous Assistance’, is more interventionist: ‘When invited by indigenous peoples who 
have largely lost their shamanic knowledge, the Foundation may send a team to help them 
establish firsthand shamanic contact with their own spirits and learn from them.’ (FSS 
2012a) As of March 2012, the Foundation had sent ‘basic training teams’ to the Republic of 
Tuva, China, Siberia, Samiland (Scandinavia), Australia, Canada, the northeastern United 
States and Alaska. The Foundation states it is also ‘actively engaged in preservation work in 
Nepal, Siberia, China, Central Asia, the Amazon, and elsewhere’ (FSS 2012f). Certainly this 
kind of direct intervention could be viewed askance as a form of proselytizing, which is 
probably why the FSS stresses this ‘assistance’ is by invitation only and is provided by FSS 
‘Field Associates’, of which the Foundation lists thirty spread around the world. The 
Foundation’s 1993 ‘expedition’ to ‘Tuva, Land of Eagles’, mentioned in Chapter One, 
pioneered this form of ‘indigenous assistance’.  
A more recent example is a project to support ‘shamanic revival’ among the Baniwa 
people of northwest Amazonia. The focal point of the Foundation’s effort is Manuel da 
Silva, a local Baniwa chief (mandu) and reportedly the last snuff-jaguar shaman. 
Anthropologist Robin Wright has undertaken field research among Baniwa communities and 
other Awarak language groups on the Brazilian side of the border with Colombia since the 
 169 
1970s and Da Silva has been one of his key informants. Wright has also been a close 
observer of the alignment of indigenism with sustainable development in Amazonia since the 
1980s (Wright 2009, 2007), and the cover of his monograph Cosmos, Self, and History in 
Baniwa Religion is illustrated with a 1977 photograph of Da Silva in shamanic trance 
(Wright 1998; cf. Wright 2011). Some time around 2009 Wright persuaded FSS to support a 
project to promote ‘shamanic revitalization’ about the Baniwa. Wright became an FSS Field 
Associate and Mandu Da Silva became a Living Treasures of Shamanism award recipient. 
Whether the Foundation was aware of, or indeed interested in, how their support might fit 
within the larger political context of Amazonian cultural politics or transnational indigenism 
is not clear, although there is nothing in the Foundation’s account of ‘the shamanic 
revitalisation of the Baniwa people’ that acknowledges this history.  
The project’s first major objective was to establish a ‘cultural centre’ in a purpose-
built ‘traditional longhouse’. The centre would house a ‘library of books, tapes, and other 
audio-visual material that will serve the needs of the schools of the region of the Aiary 
River’. More than an archive of Baniwa culture, the centre was to be a focus of Baniwa 
shamanic revival. With FSS funding, the longhouse was built in 2009. Titled ‘the Shaman’s 
School of Knowledge’ (Malikai Dapana), the FSS was pleased to report that 15 young 
Baniwa men had subsequently apprenticed to Da Silva. The FSS was particularly pleased 
that all 15 were schoolteachers because this fact was regarded as advancing one of the 
project’s goals, to ensure that ‘the knowledge of the shamans will be a regular part of the 
educational curriculum in Baniwa schools’. Towards this end, the FSS explained that the 
next phase of the project would produce a series of illustrated booklets about the shaman’s 
work to be used in classrooms. At the same time, conservation work would continue by 
recording shamanic knowledge on film and with audio and photographic equipment to be 
lodged in the Cultural Centre. In this way, the Shaman’s School of Knowledge would 
become a living library of Baniwa culture (FSS 2012i). This support for Manuel da Silva and 
his community is one of several projects to provide ‘indigenous assistance’, although since 
2009 the Baniwa project has been the most prominently advertised on the Foundation’s 
website and in its newsletters. Subscribers and website visitors are reminded that ‘ongoing 
assistance is needed to continue the revitalization’ and are encouraged to donate to the 
Foundation’s Fund to Save Shamanic Knowledge (FSS 2010b). The Fund is one of three to 
which donors can make earmarked contributions (the others are the Fund to Study Shamanic 
Knowledge and the Fund to Teach Shamanic Knowledge), and donors have the further 
option to contribute a once-off donation, join the Guardians Circle by donating monthly, or 
the Partners Circle by donating $5000 or more annually for three years (FSS 2012e).  
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Core shamanism and indigenous symbolic capital 
Placing side-by-side Harner’s theory of core shamanism and the work of his Foundation for 
Shamanic Studies raises interesting questions about the character of this relationship. At one 
level, the FSS is an institutional means of propagating and disseminating the theory. Yet 
there is also a sense in which the FSS’s labours are indispensible to the internal structure of 
the theory itself. On the one hand, the image of shamanic experience promoted by core 
shamanism is a representation of shamanic practice so thoroughly stripped of its resemblance 
that it verges on hyperrealism. On the other hand, it is an image so thin and fragile that it 
requires the edifice of the FSS and its labours to support and sustain it. For what would core 
shamanism be without progressive advancement through more advanced levels of study; 
without the roughly 150,000 ‘indexed pages’ of data ‘culled’ from 396 cultures, academic 
sources, and first-hand descriptions; without ‘living treasures’ and ‘basic training teams’ 
dispatched around the world to teach core shamanism to indigenous communities whose own 
shamanic traditions have dissipated amid modern encroachments on their lands, territories 
and resources? It seems to me that if core shamanism’s representation of shamanic practice 
is a hyperreal simulation of shamanic authenticity, it is nonetheless sustained by forms of 
symbolic capital that are indispensible to core shamanism’s discursive affects. This was as 
true in 1980, when The Way of the Shaman was first published, as it was after the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance generated a symbolic economy of indigenous authenticity that 
represented indigenous ontological alterity as ecocentric disposition. Although the 
requirement for indigenous symbolic capital is consistent over this period, the indigenist-
environmentalist alliance revalued this capital and transformed its representation. Harner and 
his Foundation adapted their discursive practice accordingly, and the prominent role given to 
indigenous peoples and indigenous alterity in the Foundation’s work is the result.  
This idea can be seen by contrasting the operations of symbolic capital in Harner’s 
earlier discourse with his and his Foundation’s later statements. Central to core shamanism is 
a critique of Euro-American modernity. The theme of loss of shamanic knowledge in 
modern culture is an organising trope of Harner’s theory, along with the auxiliary claim that 
among indigenous peoples ‘shamanism and shamanic knowledge is in danger of extinction’ 
(FSS 2012f).22 In The Way of the Shaman, however, Harner does not mention ‘indigenous’ 
peoples, although he frequently refers to ‘primitive’ societies and ‘tribal’ cultures. For 
example, he claims that ‘Today shamanic knowledge survives primarily among people who, 
until recently, had primitive cultures’, and argues that ‘shamanic knowledge [is] basically 
consistent in different parts of the primitive world’ (Harner 1980:51,53). Harner affirms the 
                                                       
22 We see in this formulation—Western peoples ‘lose’ shamanic traditions; among indigenous peoples it becomes 
‘extinct’—traces of the noble savage/ecological Indian who is more of nature than in it and for whom the 
natural history category of ‘extinction’ is a problem.  
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identical idea in a 1997 article in Natural History Magazine, but substitutes ‘primitive’ and 
‘tribal’ with ‘indigenous’: ‘the fundamental principles of shamanic practice’ are ‘basically 
the same among indigenous peoples’ (Harner 1997:51). This is more than a gesture towards 
political correctness. Although all three terms—‘primitive’, ‘tribal’, and ‘indigenous 
peoples’—are used to reference non-modern ontological alterity and carry the same 
indexical value in core shamanism’s discourse, this lexical shift foreshadows the FSS’s 
better positioning itself to appropriate and instrumentalise indigeneity as symbolic capital in 
ways that had long ceased to be advantageous with reference to the older terms. 
Another example: in April 2010, the FSS announced Harner would be running a new 
weekend course titled ‘Shamanic Dreamwork’ in September (FSS 2010a). In a subsequent 
article titled ‘A Core Shamanic Theory of Dreams’ and published in the FSS’s journal, 
Harner elaborated the ‘ten core principles’ of his theory (Harner 2010). For present purposes, 
the principles are less important than Harner’s references to indigenous shamans and 
indigenous knowledge.23 Harner repeatedly emphasises that his theory derives from his 
‘years of cross-cultural study of indigenous shamanism’ and reflects ‘indigenous shamanic 
concepts and practices’. He concludes his introductory remarks with the hope that 
‘indigenous shamans’ will regard his exposition as ‘an example of a long overdue Western 
recognition of the validity of what they and their ancestors have known since ancient times’. 
Similarly, he concludes his article with the hope that ‘this brief article may encourage more 
research on the wealth of indigenous knowledge, published and unpublished, that is awaiting 
respectful study’, and in a footnote recommends the Shamanic Knowledge Conservatory for 
this purpose (Harner 2010:2,4). 
The extent to which Harner became sensitive to the new language of indigenism 
during the 1980s is evident in his Preface to the tenth anniversary edition of The Way of the 
Shaman (Harner 1990). Harner notes that before the first edition was published in 1980, 
missionaries, colonists, governments and commercial interests were overwhelming ‘tribal 
peoples and their ancient cultures’, and ‘shamanism was rapidly disappearing from the 
Planet’. Since then, however, there has been a remarkable ‘shamanic renaissance’, which he 
attributes to three developments. Firstly, ‘thinking people’ have lost trust in ‘ecclesiastical 
dogma and authority’. They have ‘left the Age of Faith behind them’ in favour of the ‘higher 
standards of evidence’ provided by direct, unmediated experiences of ‘realms of the spirit’. 
                                                       
23 The ten principles are: 1) Spirits are real. 2) Spirits produce dreams. 3) These spirits have…different kinds and 
degrees of power, and differing preoccupations. 4) Spirits producing dreams can be: personal souls; helping 
spirits…; or they can be non-helping ones, such as suffering beings or other intrusive spirits. 5) ‘Bad’ dreams 
or nightmares can be beneficial warnings… 6) Persons of substantial spiritual power tend to be resistant to 
receiving unsought dreams from non-helping spirits. 7) Major helping spirits can manifest as Big Dreams and 
convey important spiritual power and information. 8) The above principles apply to all kinds of dreams, 
including sleeping, waking and day dreams, and visions. 9) …people can merge with a helping spirit to call 
back dreams for study, or they can take shamanic journeys to their most important divinatory spirit helpers … 
10) These journeys should include the extensive study of metaphors… (Harner 2010:3) 
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Secondly, ‘holistic health approaches’ discovered ‘techniques long used in shamanism’ and 
incorporated these into contemporary holistic healing practices. Thirdly, ‘In this time of 
worldwide environmental crisis, shamanism provides something largely lacking in the 
anthropocentric “great” religions: reverence for, and spiritual communion with, the other 
beings of the Earth and with the Planet itself’. More than merely nature worship, shamanism 
connects us with ‘the awesome spiritual power and beauty of our garden Earth’. 
‘[Shamanism] is spiritual ecology’; from the shaman’s viewpoint, ‘our surroundings are not 
“environment,” but family’ with whom ‘we need to communicate intimately and 
lovingly…not just with the human peoples, but also with the animal people, the plant people, 
and all the elements of the environment, including the soil, the rocks, and the water’ (Harner 
1990:xi-xiii).  
As ecocentric disposition became the measure of ontological alterity and increased the 
symbolic value of specifically ‘indigenous’ identity, Harner and his Foundation adjusted 
their representations of ontological alterity in core shamanism. The Foundation represents its 
programme of ‘indigenous assistance’ as helping indigenous communities such as the 
Baniwa recover their shamanic knowledge, revive their ecocentric disposition, and promote 
both cultural and environmental conservation. These kinds of intrumentalisations of 
indigenous symbolic capital operate in ways basically similar to the symbolic politics of the 
indigenist-environmentalist alliance: partnerships with local indigenous communities are 
cited as evidence of the organisation’s good work, to testify to the legitimacy of this work, 
and to underwrite the organisation’s authority as world leader in a field reconfigured by new 
indigenous participants for whom shamanism was an important representational strategy in a 
new transnational eco-politics.  
At any rate, the Foundation’s instumentalisations of indigenous symbolic capital 
suggest a locus of particularity and contingency that undermines representations of core 
shamanism as ahistorical universalism. For as Bourdieu argues, a form of capital becomes 
symbolic power when the particular interests conveyed in its ‘truth’ are misrecognised as 
legitimate knowledge (Bourdieu 1990:112; cf. Swartz 1996). The historicising lens of the 
indigenist-environmentalist alliance questions the core shamanic elements represented by 
Harner as ‘natural’, ‘given’ or ‘beyond question’. At the same time, however, the 
Foundation’s appropriations and intrumentalisations of indigenous symbolic capital are only 
one part, albeit a crucial part, of a larger labour comprising epistemological and ontological 
arms. By way of concluding this chapter, I want to demonstrate this idea by reviewing this 
analysis from the perspective of modernity’s double-hinge.  
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Shamanism’s Labours 
Noteworthy in Harner’s account of core shamanism is the contrast between his relatively 
detailed description of a journey into shamanic state of consciousness—an opening in the 
ground; a tunnel; features of the tunnel; possible obstacles and circumventing them; rate and 
inclination of descent—and his abstention from describing a nonordinary landscape seen 
upon exiting this tunnel. Harner’s stated reason is that he is reluctant to provide (or impose 
on) his readers details of an experience that is valued for its uniqueness (Harner 1980:xx-
xxi). Recall that Harner’s recommendations—really instructions: abstinences that help clear 
the mind of confusing imagery; preparation of a comfortable, dark room; drumming at a 
specified range of beats per minute; recommended visualisations; and the guided journey 
itself—are promoted as techniques for accessing an other-than-ordinary state of 
consciousness that also suspends a cognicentric prejudice against the reality of the 
experiences had within that other-than-ordinary state of consciousness. Harner identifies 
these experiences as essentially shamanic (core shamanism), and this other-than-ordinary 
state of consciousness as the shamanic state of consciousness.  
Harner’s reluctance to describe nonordinary reality beyond the tunnel into the 
shamanic state of consciousness stems from his commitment to eidetic reduction. Indeed, he 
regards his exposition in The Way of the Shaman to be ‘essentially a phenomenological 
presentation’ (Harner 1980:xx). He insists every shaman’s experience is different and 
unique, but is nonetheless a variant of a single phenomenon, the essence of which is 
shamanic knowledge. To know this essence requires comparison of variations of the 
perceptual object, hence Harner’s emphasis on lifelong learning: ‘In its essence, shamanic 
initiation is experiential and often gradual…shamanic initiation is a never-ending process of 
struggle and joy…’ (Harner 1980:56-7). But to help his readers along, he offers them 
personal accounts of his shamanic experiences, particularly during time spent with Jívaro 
(Shuar) and Conibo shamans in Ecuador and Peru, as well as lengthy first-hand accounts of 
shamanic experiences provided by his students. By inviting his readers to compare these 
experiences with their own (Harner 1980:40), Harner is inviting his audience to engage in an 
eidetic reduction of essential shamanism. His advice recalls Husserl’s celebration of ‘this 
wonderful correlation between the phenomenon of knowledge and the object of 
knowledge…The task is this: to track down, within the framework of pure evidence or self-
givenness, all correlations and forms of givenness, and to elucidate them through analysis.’ 
(Husserl 1999:68). Thus Harner advises, ‘A true master shaman does not challenge the 
validity of anybody else's experiences…The master shaman will try to integrate even the 
most unusual experiences into his total cosmology, a cosmology based primarily on his own 
journeys’ (Harner 1980:57).  
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At the same time, this emphasis on the ontology of a unique experience is supported 
and sustained by an extensive labour to collect and collate a comprehensive account of 
shamanism’s universal epistemology. Hence the Shamanic Knowledge Conservatory’s 
65,000 indexed pages related to shamans, shamanic healing, cosmology, eschatology, and 
divination; 70,000 pages of cross-cultural analysis; 35,000 pages of first-hand descriptions of 
shamanic journeys, and so on. The emphasis here surely is on quantity rather than content, as 
if the sheer volume of materials would overwhelm any suggestion against the veracity or 
coherence of their testimony. Underpinned by discursive and embodied accumulations and 
expenditures of indigenous symbolic capital, this comprehensive account of universal 
shamanism is a living resource and its epistemological labours are a living practice, hence 
the importance of Living Treasures and Indigenous Assistance in preserving and reviving 
core shamanism. From this perspective, ontological labour that cultivates shamanic 
knowledge via experiences in shamanic states of consciousness places a formidable 
responsibility on the aspiring shaman. For if Harner is correct that the master shaman will 
integrate even the most unusual accounts into their total cosmology, then the master shaman 
has their epistemological labour cut out for them. The FSS’ representation of shamanism 
encapsulates precisely modernity’s double-hinge: just as ontological labour is endless 
because every journey into shamanic consciousness is a new limit experience and therewith 
a new surface of appearance of a knowing self, so too is this epistemological labour endless 
as every added page establishes a new limit that knowledge must (once again) renounce 
exceeding.  
So where does environmentalism figure in this analysis? I have deliberately stayed 
close to the historical specificity of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance rather than the 
wider range of inquiries pertaining to environmentalism as historical concern about the earth 
biosphere and human habitat. The indigenist-environmentalist alliance adumbrated one 
domain in which emerged these wider concerns about human development within carrying 
capacities of natural environments. This domain’s economy of practice revised indigenous 
identity, so that proximity to nature became an essential element of indigenous ontology, and 
indigenous knowledge pertaining to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development 
became an essential element of indigenous epistemology. Indigenists and environmentalists 
alike embraced indigenous cosmovisions and worldviews to represent these ontological and 
epistemological dimensions of essential indigenous identity, with a concomitant elevation of 
the figure of the shaman as exemplar of indigenous ecocentric disposition.  
Recalling the importance in shamanism discourse of the shaman’s ontological alterity, 
this elevation had significant implications for shamanism. As ecocentric disposition became 
the contemporary mode of representing ontological alterity, so did representations of 
shamans adjust to comport with the new symbolic economy of indigenous authenticity. 
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While this adjustment enabled contemporary shamanists like Harner and the FSS to remain 
relevant and competitive in the shamanism field, it also offered a timely opportunity to 
invigorate a discourse that had lost some of its lustre since its counter-culture heyday. With 
this in mind, revivals of indigenous shamanism might be better regarded as reviving 
universal shamanism, by stimulating universalism with new particularities and 
contingencies, and indicating new limit horizons towards which shamanism can point its 
labours.  
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Chapter Five: Neoliberalism 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis presented in Chapter Four showed how the emergence in history of an alliance 
between indigenists and environmentalists generated a symbolic economy of indigenous 
authenticity that represented indigenous ontological alterity as ecocentric disposition. This 
economy endures today, and ecocentric disposition as the measure of indigenous ontological 
alterity remains a compelling image, as the Ramunangi and FSS examples illustrate. 
Typically this disposition is identified with an indigenous worldview or cosmovision in 
which indigenous peoples’ ecological and spiritual proximity to nature is both a kind of 
identity and a site of difference, a laudable fact and an aspirational desire, and a means to an 
end. However, if ecocentric disposition signifies a kind of difference with reference to 
anthropocentrism, fundamentally this difference pertains to a relation between a human body 
and nature, where the difference pertains specifically to a relaxing of distinctions and 
enhancing of mediations between an embodied self and natural world so that they may form 
an identity. As we saw with the Awas Tingni case discussed in Chapter Three, shamanism’s 
discursive language is amenable to representing these mediations by emphasising shamans’ 
relations with spirits, including spirits associated with specific plants, animals, topographical 
features of landscapes, and ancestors residing there. In the present chapter I want to consider 
the reverse perspective by paying attention to shamans’ relations with their body. If in the 
wake of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance shamanism signifies a difference between 
worlds oriented by anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, then the shamans’ body has become a 
figure of this mediation. However, read in tandem with the neoliberal critique of labour, 
shamans’ ability to engage with spirits can be recast as a form of embodied capital that can 
be invested to generate an income stream over time. Indeed, the various discussions 
presented in this chapter argue that this is precisely what is happening.  
Neoliberalism is shorthand for far-reaching structural transformations in the global 
economy in recent decades. Usually associated with the policy and legislative agendas of 
Thatcherism and Reaganism during the last decade of the Cold War, neoliberalism is 
conventionally summarised as an approach to economic policy that promotes deregulation of 
state-centric control of markets, liberalisation of financial products and services, and the 
almost wholesale transfer of custodianship of the economy from public to private sectors 
(Birch and Mykhnenko 2010; Harvey 2005; Larner 2000). The term ‘neoliberalism’ is much 
older, however, dating to the 1930s when some economists and intellectuals became 
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concerned about central planning of national economies in politically liberal states, the 
British Keynesian state and the New Deal in the USA being obvious examples, to which we 
could add ordoliberalism in West Germany following World War Two. Advocating that 
economic theory should be reoriented away from concern with the structure of the economy 
and towards the individual as economic agent, they coined the term ‘neoliberalism’ to 
distinguish their theories from the prevailing economic orthodoxy of their time. Foucault’s 
analysis of neoliberalism showed that although the reorientation advocated by scholars such 
as Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, George Stigler, and Ludwig von Mises (and later 
Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker) sought to recover some elements of classical liberal 
theory, notably the primacy of individual choice, it also radically revised classical 
economics, most notably the classical theory of labour, which in the neoliberals’ analysis 
was insufficiently theorised compared to capital. The emergence of a specifically neoliberal 
homo economicus is only half the story. The emergence of this economic subject was the 
correlation of a much larger transformation, from the exercise of power by a sovereign in 
relation to that which they owned, to a form of power that exercised multiform tactics, 
targeted the population, and had as its objective optimising the distribution of things towards 
desired ends. Henceforth the art of government would entail an economising rationality to 
coordinate an optimal allocation of scarce means to desired ends, a new kind of practice that 
instilled the principle of economy as a form of reason intrinsic to the state. Foucault’s insight 
was to recognise that neoliberal homo economicus embodied this economic principle and 
practiced the art of government in relation to their self. 
This chapter considers shamanism in relation to Foucault’s analysis of homo 
economicus and governmentality. I follow a summary discussion of Foucault’s critique of 
governmentality and neoliberalism with the chapter’s two main discussions. In the first 
discussion, I argue that the neoliberal critique of labour enabled the notion of engaging with 
spirits to be recast as a form of human capital that could be developed, trained, and invested 
to generate an income stream over time. I illustrate this argument by considering 
professional shamans, the strategies they use to develop their profession, and the techniques 
they employ to invest in and capitalise their embodied human capital. As another vehicle 
conveying shamanism discourse at a transnational level, however, neoliberalism has also 
contributed to the kinds of proliferations and intensifications I have considered in relation to 
indigenism and environmentalism. I illustrate these movements with reference to 
transatlantic circuits of bodies and ideas linking southern African sangomas with North 
American shamans. I have chosen examples from these regions for several reasons. With 
regards to North America, Harnerian core-shamanism has been a key factor propelling 
neoliberal shamanic practice, and emerging professional networks of shamans suggests the 
extent to which markets for shamanic goods and services have grown in North America 
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since the 1990s. With regards to transatlantic exchanges, I want to demonstrate shamanism’s 
discursive power and the way it assimilates heterogeneity to its regularities and order, as I 
show with reference to southern African sangomas. A different range of reasons becomes 
clearer in the second half of this chapter where I discuss neoliberal governmentality. Since 
the late 1990s, successive South Africa’s governments have engaged in an ambitious project 
to restructure the state, initially to dismantle apartheid, but increasingly to orient South 
Africa towards what the governing party considers will be the opportunities and challenges 
of the twenty-first century. South Africa has hardly been alone in these efforts during this 
period. However, South Africa is a compelling example of economy as the principle of state 
reason (raison d’état) in relation to indigenous ritual specialists and traditional healing 
practices. A raft of policies, supported by new legislation and an array of regulatory 
authorities amount to an ensemble of tactics designed to bring sangomas and other 
categories of ‘African traditional healers’ into the ambit of things coordinated by 
government as it seeks to optimise an arrangement disposed towards desired ends. This 
coordinated exercise of biopower raises dilemmas, however, because by inculcating the 
principle of economy in citizens, the art of government also promotes formation of a 
specifically neoliberal subjectivity in relation to a domain increasingly beyond sovereign 
reach. I take up this problem in the chapter’s concluding discussion where I consider the 
dialectic between homo legalis and homo economicus as another example of modernity’s 
double-hinge operating in shamanism discourse.  
 
Foucault’s Critique of Neoliberal Economy 
Foucault’s account of neoliberalism fits into his larger analysis of the emergence of 
governmentality and biopolitics, the subjects of his 1978 and 1979 lectures at the Collège de 
France. One could argue that the 1978 course, which took the historical emergence of 
governmentality as its primary subject, set up the argument Foucault developed in his 1979 
lectures on biopolitics in which he showed that the neoliberal critique of classical economics 
was another mode of articulating the historical emergence of governmentality’s rationality 
and inculcating that rationality in the biological person as a proclivity towards economic 
conduct. Read together, the lectures give a history of governmentality in the twin registers of 
sovereign state and individual autonomy. Indeed, one of Foucault’s most important insights 
was showing how these two domains co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke 
2001:191). The first part of this discussion focuses on governmentality and the emergence of 
an economising rationality as the principle of state reason (raison d’état). The second part 
focuses on the 1979 lectures on biopolitics and the neoliberal critique of classical economics.  
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Governmentality 
The key issue for Foucault’s account of governmentality is the ways in which the conduct of 
individuals, both in the sense in which they conduct themselves and in which they are 
influenced or impressed upon to conduct themselves, how this question of individual 
conduct became an increasingly important part of the exercise of sovereign power. Foucault 
argues that during the seventeenth century a discourse on the art of government emerged as 
part of a critique of sovereign power as that which is exercised by the sovereign to reinforce, 
strengthen, and protect what he owns (i.e. his territory and subjects), for which Machiavelli’s 
Prince and Hobbes’s Leviathan remained the basic model (Foucault 2009:91-2). This new 
kind of practice modified sovereign power in several ways. Notably, it was immanent to the 
state (as opposed to above or external to it), it existed in a plurality of forms,1 and perhaps 
most significantly, it was essentially continuous in all its forms. This principle of continuity 
was its ‘economy’, and the task of establishing this continuity and ensuring its endurance 
was the proper art of government. Henceforth, ‘the essential issue of government will be the 
introduction of economy into political practice’, which is to say (quoting Guillaume La 
Perriére), achieving ‘the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end’ 
(Foucault 2009:96). Elaborating on the political economy of optimising an arrangement of 
things, Foucault noted that the art of government takes as its object, not territory and its 
inhabitants, but rather ‘men in their relationships’, with their means of livelihood, the 
resources at their disposal, their social and cultural context, and especially the variability and 
changing character of these relations over time (Foucault 2009:96).  
Emerging here is an important transformation, not simply of sovereign power, but of a 
particular kind of reason intrinsic to the state and separate from, and not reliant on (or at least 
decreasingly reliant on), natural or divine laws or traditional virtues of wisdom and 
prudence. Up to the early eighteenth century this kind of reason formulated as the art of 
government was still constrained by prevailing theories of sovereign power. The art of 
government could not fully articulate the specifically economic principles of its rationality so 
long as sovereign power meant exercising power in relation to territory and its inhabitants 
through political institutions armed with laws and decrees. The breakthrough event, if one 
can call it that, that enabled the art of government to assert economy as the principle of 
raison d’état was the emergence of the problem of population out of a series of mutually 
reinforcing transformations related with population growth, increasing availability of money, 
and expansions of agricultural production (Foucault 2009:103-4, cf. pp.277-8). The 
perception of specific problems to do with population enabled ‘the isolation of a level of 
                                                       
1 Foucault’s examples are monarch, emperor, king, prince, lord, magistrate, prelate, judge, etcetera; to which he 
adds ‘governing’ a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, and a family (Foucault 
2009:131). 
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reality that we call economy’ and therewith it became possible ‘to think, reflect, and 
calculate the problem of government’ outside of the juridical framework of sovereign power 
(Foucault 2009:104). Thus, statistics gradually revealed that the population possesses it own 
regularities in rates, incidences, distributions, and aggregates, and is therefore amenable to 
quantitative analyses. Population appeared, for government, as both its end and its 
instrument; as subject of needs and aspirations, and as object of government manipulation; 
aware of its wants and unaware of what was being done to it (Foucault 2009:105).  
These kinds of practices of power instantiated in tactics targeting the population 
Foucault called biopower, and the specific kind of economising rationality coordinating the 
art of governance Foucault called governmentality. However, an analysis of biopower that 
attributes its effects to the emergence of an economising rationality applied to the population 
is incomplete without a complimentary analysis that accounts for inculcations and 
incorporations of the principle of economy into the individual self, who will then carry it, by 
practising it, to domains that are not immediately and directly economic. In other words, 
Foucault’s analysis of governmentality implies an analysis of subjectivity that correlates 
with the principle of economy underpinning the new art of government.  
Foucault’s earlier studies of subject formation in relation to madness, the clinic, and 
prisons tended to overemphasise techniques of domination; his lectures at Dartmouth in 
November 1980 acknowledged as much (Foucault 1993:204). Foucault’s subsequent 
development of a genealogical method during the 1970s led him to recommend that an 
analysis of the genealogy of the subject in Western civilisation must take into account both 
techniques of domination and techniques of the self, or better still, take into account their co-
determination. This is precisely where governmentality enters Foucault’s analysis. 
Government is the ‘contact point’, and governmentality is the interactive zone where these 
two types of techniques constantly adjust to one another in a struggle for equilibrium 
between techniques that assure coercion and processes through which a self constructs and 
modifies their self (Foucault 1993:203).  
Foucault takes up the question of subjectivity in relation with governmentality in his 
1979 lectures on the birth of biopolitics. A key issue in the lectures is the transformation of 
homo economicus, a person who in the eighteenth century is the subject of laissez-faire 
liberalism and who government ought to leave alone, but who by the twentieth century 
accepts their environment as given reality and responds systematically to its modification by 
sovereign power. As Foucault observes, homo economicus is someone who is eminently 
governable: ‘From being the intangible partner of laissez-faire, homo economicus now 
becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and 
systematically modify its variables’ (Foucault 2008:270-1). 
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Biopolitics 
Foucault did not precisely distinguish biopower and biopolitics. However, following 
Rabinow and Rose (2006:196-7), we could say that biopower references practices that 
intervene in the biological dimensions of human existence, while biopolitics references the 
range of practices related to determining the intervention, its instruments, the goals and 
objectives it will pursue, the coordination of its efforts, and the production of consent that 
confers legitimacy on state-sanctioned exercises of biopower. Recalling Foucault’s previous 
rendering of governmentality as ‘conducting conduct’,2 we could say that biopolitics is the 
conduct of biopower. The 1979 lecture series on the birth of biopolitics was concerned with 
demonstrating the emergence of economy as the principle of governmentality in relation to 
the exercise of biopower.3  
The lynchpin of Foucault’s analysis is the transformation of the field of economic 
analysis, the constitution of its objects, and the domain of its reference. Foucault suggests 
this transformation did not really come into its own until the twentieth century and the 
articulation of a critique of liberalism by a generation of economists who wished to defend 
liberal economic principles against various forms of central planning that had gradually 
come to dominate economic thought during the 1930s (cf. R. Turner 2007). These critics 
identified their concern as neoliberalism to distinguish it from classical economics. Whereas 
classical economics since Adam Smith broadly understood its object of analysis to be the 
mechanisms of exchange of utility between producers and consumers of goods and services, 
for which Smith’s image of the market’s ‘invisible hand’ is an enduring metaphor, neoliberal 
analyses conceived their object as the calculus of substitutable choices that allocates scarce 
means towards achieving competing ends. Neoliberals thought the starting point of economic 
analysis should not be the structure of economy, but the individual as economic agent. 
Economic analysis should be concerned with the ways in which individuals allocate their 
scarce means to alternative ends (Foucault 2008:222).  
This concern with personal choice and the (economic) calculation that connects 
allocation with desirable ends necessitated a fundamental reconceptualisation of the classical 
theory of labour. Foucault contends that classical political economy never really analysed 
labour itself, as distinct from land and capital (together, the three primary factors of 
production). Instead, classical economics reduced labour to a quantitative variable. From 
David Ricardo through to John Maynard Keynes, labour was analysed simply in terms of 
expenditures of time, so that increasing productivity meant simply adding more labour hours. 
                                                       
2 See particularly the lecture of 8 March 1978. 
3 Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics have been both criticised and elaborated, notably by Giorgio 
Agamben and Antonio Negri. For discussions and critiques, see Coleman and Grove (2009), Esposito (2008), 
Genel (2006), Rabinow and Rose (2006), and more generally, the journal Foucault Studies.  
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Likewise in Marx’s theory of capitalism, labour is abstracted from the real conditions of 
workers’ lives. But whereas Marx attributed this abstraction to the alienating effects of 
capitalist production, neoliberal theorists attributed it to the omission from classical 
economic theory of a serious analysis of labour ‘in its concrete specificity and qualitative 
modulations’. In other words, whether purchased on the market or calculated as a production 
input, labour was never regarded by classical economists as a subjective choice among other 
activities (Dilts 2011:135; Foucault 2008:220-1). 
Neoliberal economists conceived labour as essentially ‘economic conduct practiced, 
implemented, rationalised, and calculated by the person who works’ (Foucault 2008:223). 
Work was no longer regarded in the quantitative sense of time expenditure but in the 
qualitative sense of investment, with attendant consideration to strategic discrimination 
between alternative kinds and means of investment, as well as risks and dividends. In this 
process, the worker is transformed from an object in an economic analysis into an active 
economic subject. Neoliberal economists began by breaking down labour into capital and 
income, where the latter is the wage earned from work and, as an income, is the product of a 
capital, which is the worker’s abilities and skills. In other words, in this neoliberal analysis 
the worker is her or his capital and this capital—their capital—is inseparable from their 
person. Developing the classical idea that capital investment increases income, neoliberal 
economists suggested a worker can increase their income by investing in their corporeal 
being, by improving their skills, capabilities, capacities, and so on.  
In this way, neoliberal theory revised the classical idea of homo economicus. Classical 
homo economicus engaged in economic activity on the basis of an analysis of wants and 
needs that allowed them to describe or define a utility and thereby enter into exchange 
transactions. Neoliberal homo economicus is not a partner in exchange in any sense; s/he is 
an entrepreneur of her/himself, ‘being for himself the source of (his) earnings’ (Foucault 
2008:225-6). Rather than obtaining a wage in exchange for one’s labour, now it is one’s 
embodied capital that generates income. Since income is increased by investing in capital, 
one can increase one’s income by investing in oneself, say by enrolling in further education 
and training, obtaining more experience, building networks, and so on, prompting a range of 
choices about allocating scarce means to alternative ends. If one’s self-investments are 
prudent and wise, then one’s income will increase commensurately. Thus neoliberalism 
posits a theory of homo economicus as an entrepreneur of the self. No longer a producer and 
consumer via a mechanism of market exchange, neoliberal homo economicus is a self-
entrepreneur of their embodied capital and a producer of their own satisfaction in which 
consumption is an enterprise activity.  
Neoliberal economists called this store of embodied capital ‘human capital’ (for 
example, Becker 1964; Schultz 1970, 1961). Much human capital is acquired though 
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strategies and techniques devised for ‘self-development’ and ‘self-improvement’, and an 
important implication of the neoliberal analysis is that acquisition of forms of human capital 
(or failure to acquire and develop human capital) is the responsibility of the individual as 
self-entrepreneur. Equally important are the innate elements of human capital, hereditary 
elements acquired from one’s parents and incorporated into the body during fetal 
development. These comprise the entire range of one’s biological distinction from other 
humans, and draws attention to political dimensions of neoliberal economics. For example, 
genetic information about the offspring of a union raises ethical questions, about whether, 
how, or how much a genetic profile can be manipulated to improve the resulting child’s 
human capital, or indeed, whether to continue or abort a pregnancy. Since these kinds of 
decisions involve costs and perceived benefits, they become economic calculations about 
optimising correlations of scarce means to alternative ends. But they also prompt political 
interventions to regulate the permitted range of choices under stipulated conditions and 
channel conduct towards desirable ends (for example education campaigns, resource 
allocations, tax regimes, benefits entitlements, and so on).  
For an economic program that advocates less government involvement in the formal 
economy and simultaneously advocates expanding the economic enterprise form into all 
parts of the social realm, the notion of neoliberal governmentality may seem like an 
oxymoron. The distinction between government and governance is important here; 
neoliberalism advocates less of the former, but requires more of the latter (Larner 2000:12-
3). Specifically, it requires strategies of rule that will constrain, condition and channel 
conduct of individuals, institutions and corporations, and the population as a whole towards 
producing and guaranteeing conditions conducive to constituting and consolidating a 
specifically neoliberal subjectivity, which is to say, neoliberal homo economicus (see also 
Lemke 2001:201-3; Hamann 2009:42). Neoliberal subjects are eminently governable 
because they embody the principle of economy in their conduct and therefore more readily 
conduct themselves towards optimal arrangements disposed towards desired ends. Yet this 
fostering of an eminently governable neoliberal subject also creates a dilemma for sovereign 
power because, as Foucault succinctly puts it, ‘there is no sovereign in economics’ (Foucault 
2008:283). The delimited and circumscribed space of sovereign power, its jurisdiction so to 
speak, is increasingly inhabited by economic subjects who, by their very ontology, 
increasingly resist circumscription. This dialectic between homo economicus and homo 
legalis illustrates the double-hinge articulating the two halves of the analysis presented 
below.  
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Professionalising Shamanism 
Shamanic practitioners 
The Society for Shamanic Practitioners (hereafter SSP or Society) describes itself as a public 
benefit corporation ‘whose goal is to support the re-emergence of shamanism into modern, 
western culture’. While other shamanic organisations tend to ‘document and learn from what 
has been done in the past’, the SSP’s focus is documenting in the present ‘how shamanism 
is…being used as it interfaces with the twenty-first century world’ (SSP 2012a). Most of the 
Society’s founding members have been shamanic practitioners since the 1980s, have 
completed the FSS’s advanced level courses, and are established professionals working at 
the intersection of psychotherapy, counseling, holistic health and integrative medicine. 
Some, like Sandra Ingerman and Tom Cowan, are longtime FSS associates and core 
shamanism practitioners who have developed their own shamanic specialisations, in soul 
retrieval and Celtic ‘visionary and healing techniques’ respectively.  
According to the Society’s website (SSP 2012a, 2012c), the SSP was established as a 
non-profit corporation in California in 2004. In that year a Board of Directors was appointed 
and membership recruitment begun. In 2005 $10,000 was raised towards establishing a 
professional journal, the inaugural annual meeting drew 100 delegates to Monterey in 
California, and membership reached 500 quickly thereafter. In the years that followed, the 
SSP began publishing The Journal of Shamanic Practitioners at a rate of two issues per year, 
a book project modelled on the international medical humanitarian organisation Médecins 
Sans Frontières / Doctors without Borders, which resulted in a monograph Shamanism 
without Borders, ‘a guide to shamanic tending for trauma and disasters’ (Albee et al. 2011). 
By late 2009 membership reached around 850 members in sixteen countries. Frequent 
regional meetings in California, Michigan, New Mexico, New York and Ontario in Canada 
have helped establish networks of professional shamanic practitioners across North America. 
The Society has also branched into the United Kingdom, where annual meetings held in 
Dorset since 2007 have consistently drawing around 100 delegates. The bulk of the Society’s 
website is designed to develop these regional, national and transnational networks by listing 
advertisements in different thematic areas, including ‘shamanic services’, organisations, 
radio programmes, retreat centres, training, travel, art, books and tapes, drums and rattles, 
and jewelry. Shamanic services, training, and organisations are the most populated of these 
lists. In May 2012, shamanic services were advertised in 34 US states, as well as Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The SSP website 
advertises 43 shamanic trainers offering courses and qualifications in a variety of shamanic 
techniques, along with 17 professional associations and organisations of shamanic 
practitioners.  
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Tom Cowan explains the importance of developing networks of shaman practitioners 
in a short video introducing the SSP (Rachelatssp 2011). Cowan notes that many shaman 
practitioners feel alienated and ‘outside the mainstream of our culture’ because ‘the 
community we live in isn’t shamanic’. Whereas ‘shamans always have worked in a 
community, in a tribe, village, clan’, many modern shamanic practitioners ‘discovered 
shamanism without a community’. The SSP brings together practitioners ‘to have that sense 
of community and to work together and to learn from each other’. Cowan is echoed by 
fellow board members Martha Lucier and Sandra Ingerman. Ingerman thinks it is important 
‘to connect shamanic practitioners, who are doctors, who are lawyers, who are school 
teachers, who work in their communities…to make [shamanism] more accessible to a 
modern day culture’. Lucier, who also founded the Canadian Centre for Shamanic Studies, 
explains that at this historical moment ‘we’re being asked to come into unity, to come into 
unity with all our relations and with our peers’.  
The SSP is a good example of how in recent years shamanism discourse has adopted 
the language of professionalism and entrepreneurialism. Increasingly, shamans are 
professional practitioners. They offer services, have peers, and form professional societies 
and associations. They contribute to industry publications rather than scholarly journals, and 
the most successful shamanic practitioners have significant online presence, with their web 
address usually comprising either their company or organisation name, or just as frequently 
their personal name. While social media websites like Facebook and Twitter have been an 
important part of growing markets for shamanic goods and services, professional networking 
websites like Linked-In have been equally important in establishing shamanic practice as a 
profession. Linked-In’s Shamanism group, established in December 2008, had 31 members 
on 5 July 2010. One year later membership had grown to 167, and by the first week of July 
2012 had reached 687—a four-fold increase just in one year (Linked-In 2012).  
The temptation should be resisted to regard these developments as relevant only to 
shamanic practitioners in the global north who tend towards New Age spiritualities, 
alternative medicine, or holistic health approaches. The distinctions on which these 
categories rely obscure the extent of similarity, overlap and convergence between so-called 
neo- and traditional shamanic religiosities. Instead, I think emerging in contemporary 
shamanism discourse is a neoliberal entrepreneur of the self, and this emergence is as 
evident in the global north as it is in the global south. If there is a division that broadly 
correlates with a north-south distinction, it is that the important implications of this 
emergence with respect to sovereign power are more readily apparent in the south, or rather, 
in postcolonial contexts, because it is here where the dialectic is most clearly evident 
between a neoliberal homo economicus who inhabits an economic domain beyond the reach 
of a sovereign power and a homo legalis who inhabits a realm circumscribed by that same 
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power. The second half of this chapter considers this dilemma with reference to South Africa 
and the chapter’s concluding discussion relates it to the modern limit attitude and the double-
hinge animating modernity. In the following discussion I want to stay with the question of 
neoliberal homo economicus in relation to shamanic practitioners.  
 
American sangomas  
In several southern African cultural traditions, a sangoma is a spirit medium who becomes 
temporarily ‘possessed’ or ‘inhabited’ by ancestors in the course of ritual divination of 
affliction and prescription of cures. Originally a Zulu term, ‘sangomas’ are differently 
named in other local languages (Thornton 2009; cf. Wim van Binsbergen 2005:321), 
although arguably these are being displaced in a process similar to the emigration of 
‘shaman’ to North America described in Chapter Two. Indeed, ‘sangoma’ is emigrating to 
North America too. Consider, for example, shamanic practitioner Gretchen Crilly McKay. A 
former teacher with 26 years experience in elementary schools in California, in the mid-
1990s McKay began enrolling in FSS workshops and over several years completed courses 
with Michael Harner, Tom Cowan, and eventually Sandra Ingerman’s two-year shamanic 
teacher training course. In June 1999, McKay met Petros Hezekial Mtshali, a sangoma from 
Swaziland who was visiting the United States as a guest of Susan Schuster Campbell. 
Campbell had written about Mtshali in her book Called to Heal: African Shamanic Healers 
(S. Campbell 2000) and invited Mtshali to attend the annual Comprehensive Cancer Care 
Conference in Washington (D.C.). McKay later wrote that meeting ‘the Zulu sangoma 
(shaman) changed my life’. According to McKay, Mtshali advised her that she was a 
traditional healer, that her ancestors called her to this role, and that if she accepted the call, 
the ancestors would guide her ‘on an accelerated path’. In July 2000, McKay travelled to 
Swaziland where she spent two weeks training with Mtshali at his Luvengwa Traditional 
Clinic at Siteki, near the border with Mozambique. Following a further ‘two rigorous months 
of sacred work’ in Swaziland, McKay completed her training in 2001 (cf. Mtshali 2004:60-
64). Back in her Los Angeles home, McKay left teaching and focussed fulltime on growing 
her shamanic practice around her specialisation in sangoma divination techniques and 
communing with ancestors. (McKay 2009; Mtshali 2004:60; Stolfo 2009) 
On her Linked-In profile, McKay (2012b) identifies herself as ‘a shamanic 
practitioner and teacher for more than 15 years, studying with master shaman in the U.S. and 
Africa’. She states that she ‘graduated in a traditional ceremony as a sangoma under the 
mentorship of Zulu shaman P.H. Mtshali in Swaziland, Africa’, and diagnoses ‘physical, 
emotional, and spiritual issues’ by using ‘the African divination system called “throwing the 
bones”’. In McKay’s repertoire of shamanic healing, African divination complements 
 187 
‘spiritual extraction, soul retrieval and healing with spiritual light’, and the blend represents 
McKay’s synthesis of African shamanic practice. In her essay Journey of an American 
Sangoma, McKay is clear that there is little difference between sangomas and shamans. 
Noting that ‘The training I received in Africa has merged with my shamanic training in the 
United States’, McKay claims that sangomas, ‘like shamans throughout the world, believe 
that they are here for only one purpose, to heal through love and compassion, and take an 
oath to cause no harm’ (McKay 2009:8,2). This view is the premise of McKay’s ‘shamanic 
services’ detailed on her website Ancestral Wisdom. These include ‘African Bone Readings 
and Connecting with the Ancestors, Soul Retrieval and Soul Remembering, Spiritual 
Extraction, Psychopomp, Blessings/Clearings and Sacred Ceremonies, Herbalist and 
Aromatherapist, Shamanic Teacher and Spiritual Life Coach’, for which she charges on a 
sliding scale from $90 per hour to $640 per day (McKay 2012a, 2012d).  
McKay is little different from countless other shamanic practitioners operating private 
practices in the burgeoning self-improvement industry. Reliable data is difficult to come by, 
but an ongoing study of the US market by Florida-based market research company 
Marketdata Enterprises, Inc. concludes that the US market was worth $11 billion at the end 
of 2012 and still has plenty of growth opportunities. Marketdata Enterprises’ forecast until 
2014 predicts the biggest growth segments after motivational speakers (forecast 6.8 percent) 
will be personal coaching and holistic institutes, each forecast to grow at 6.2 percent 
annually. For speakers and coaches, an important vehicle for their self-entrepreneurialism is 
authoring books. According to Marketdata Enterprises, self-improvement book sales, worth 
$406-million in 2009, will double to $854-million in 2014. Audiobooks are also predicted to 
grow faster than conventional books. From $406-million in 2009 or 17 percent of the total 
US audiobooks market, audiobook sales until 2014 are forecast to grow by 6 percent 
annually, compared with 3.4 percent annual growth in the conventional books market. In 
2011, more than 24 million Americans were listening to audiobooks (Marketdata Enterprises 
2012, 2010a, 2010b).  
This all bodes well for self-employed shamanic entrepreneurs like McKay, Cowan, 
Ingerman, and their professional peers registered with the SSP. By professionalising their 
shamanic practice, they and countless other shamanic practitioners are creating new 
opportunities in an expanding marketplace for shamanic goods and services. Advertisements 
of their services and websites are listed in countless industry magazines and online forums, 
from publications like The Journal for Shamanic Practice and Sacred Hoop magazine, to the 
websites of the FSS, SSP, the Shamanic Teacher’s and Shamanic Practitioners websites 
(published in German, Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, and Romanian), and 
Indie-Shaman, a UK-based organisation ‘for independent spirits’ that offers ‘support, 
training and information on Shamanism and on living a Shamanic lifestyle’ (Indie Shaman 
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2012). The proliferation of interest groups through new social media from websites like 
Facebook, Linked-In, and Twitter to podcast subscriptions and audio books, has also 
increased interest in shamanic practice and grown the market for shamanic goods and 
services. As with any entrepreneurial venture, success requires differentiating one’s product 
from competitors. Marketdata Enterprises announced its 2012 survey results by proclaiming 
‘self- improvement market has unfilled niches for entrepreneurs’ (Marketdata Enterprises 
2012). For several shamanic practitioners, one of these unfilled niches is southern African 
spirit mediumship.  
McKay’s journey from North America to southern Africa to train as a sangoma is a 
well trodden path. Before McKay, Chicagoan James Hall was initiated as a sangoma and 
published his account in Sangoma: My Odyssey into the Spirit World of Africa (Hall 1994). 
Nicky Arden has similarly written of her ‘mystical journey into the African spirit world’ 
(Arden 1999, 1996). In 2005 shamanic counselor and healer Shilo Satran spent a month with 
McKay’s mentor Mtshali who taught her ‘the age old arts of throwing the bones…and 
working with herbs’ (Satran 2012). Probably the most well-known sangoma practising in 
America and also a student of Mtshali is surgeon and urologist David Cumes. A South 
African expatriate who settled in the US in 1975, Cumes opened his private practice in Santa 
Barbara in 1981. In the early 1990s, he visited South Africa and spent a month in the 
Kalahari ‘with the San (Bushmen), the last hunter-gatherers of Africa’ (Cumes 2004:vii).4 
During subsequent visits Cumes met independently with several sangomas who ‘threw 
bones’ for him. A traditional divination practice well-known in southern Africa known, 
‘throwing the bones’ consists in casting specially selected bones (and sometimes dominos 
and dice) and then interpreting the fall of the bones as conveying messages from ancestors. 
On each occasion their message was unequivocal: Cumes was ignoring his destiny; he 
should train to become a sangoma (Cumes 2004:vii). In 1999 Cumes began training with 
Mtshali.  
Cumes’ ‘odyssey into the spirit world of African healing’, as he subtitled his 
subsequent book, continued a journey he began in 1990. While performing a shamanic ritual 
in Peru, Cumes had a vision of the South African bushveld and a dilapidated house without a 
roof. The dream was the first of three over several years that would eventually lead Cumes to 
Tshisimane, a farm in South Africa’s Soutpansberg mountains, that he purchased around 
2002 to establish Tshisimane Healing Centre. The healing centre in the mountains is 
premised on the idea that, as Cumes puts it (2004:112), ‘Nature is a magnificent 
                                                       
4 Commenting on the appropriateness of the designations ‘San’ and ‘Bushmen’, South African archaeologist and 
rock art specialist David Lewis-Williams has noted that the term ‘bushman’ is often seen as a pejorative term 
for the indigenous inhabitants of the Kalahari region and that the term ‘San’ is generally preferred. However, 
he notes too that ‘San’, a Nama word, means something similar to vagabond or vagrant and is also pejorative. 
Unfortunately there is no suitable name for these indigenes, although many of them chose either or both these 
terms to identify themselves (see Lewis-Williams 1995: 82n1). 
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microcosmic representation of the Divine. The wilderness is God’s showpiece. She is the 
ultimate healer and can provide the strongest medicine. Indigenous healers know this truth, 
and their “natural” medicine will never be outdated.’ Cumes first tested this idea in 1995 
when he founded Inward Bound, ‘an organisation dedicated to the idea that nature provides 
the best healing available’. Inward Bound promoted ‘restoration and self-transformation’ by 
offering experiential tours into remote wilderness areas so that participants could benefit 
from an ‘inner journey into the wild outdoors’: ‘the purer one’s exposure to remote 
wilderness, the more powerful is the effect of what I call wilderness rapture’ (Cumes 
2004:vii,63). Cumes’s first book Inner Passages, Outer Journeys (Cumes 1998) took Inward 
Bound and wilderness rapture as its principle subject.  
Cumes’ second book, The Spirit of Healing (Cumes 1999), takes readers on a journey 
with Cumes ‘to distant lands where healing is practiced in a different way’. Via visits to the 
‘primitive cultures’ inhabiting the Kalahari desert, Tibet’s mountains, and Amazonia’s 
jungles, Cumes leads his readers ‘towards the ultimate discovery—that we cannot separate 
modern medical practice from inner healing without a negative impact on our health’. For a 
surgeon like Cumes, this discovery fundamentally challenges professional practices of 
patient treatment and care. Cumes’ training with the Swazi sangoma Mtshali was as much a 
response to the calling of his ancestors as it was his attempt to engage the challenge posed to 
his allopathic training: 
The healing that the sangoma does, like the San healing, is the first medicine; it has not 
changed and will not change. This therapy arises from nature, and like us it will return 
to nature. The principles are always true and always pure since they come from the 
Divine and thence from the ancestors. It is in those areas closest to wilderness, where 
the bush is most pristine, that the best muti [medicine] is available and where the 
healing is the most uncontaminated. (Cumes 2004:64) 
Beginning in 1999, Cumes’ training took two years. During this time he took periodic breaks 
from his Santa Barbara practice to train with Mtshali in Swaziland. Back in Santa Barbara he 
built his own ndumba or special home for the ancestors, although Cumes modeled his on the 
Asian yurt and made it of canvas rather than the round mud and thatch hut found in southern 
Africa. In his third book, Africa in My Bones, wherein he recounts his experience training to 
become a sangoma, Cumes admits he worried that his ‘patient base’ would dwindle. 
‘Paradoxically’, he reports. ‘my Western practice has increased since I began throwing bones 
and dispensing muti out of my ndumba’. Although his surgical practice is standard and 
conventional, ‘figuratively’ he carries his sangoma medicine bag wherever he goes; ‘this 
practice has added to my Western skills’ (Cumes 2004:114-5). 
Cumes’ diverse skill set is indicated by the different photographs of Cumes displayed 
on the covers of The Spirit of Healing and Africa in my Bones. Spirit displays Cumes in the 
pose of a male medical professional. Photographed from the waist up with arms folded 
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across his chest, he wears blue surgical scrubs and has a stethoscope draped around his neck. 
His image is cut out of its original setting and displayed against a plain white background, as 
if to underline that professional medical practice is not context-bound and easily 
transposable. Slightly graying, clean-shaven and smiling broadly, Cumes is somewhat 
reminiscent of a cardboard cutout of George Clooney’s character in the television series ER. 
The cover of Bones displays Cumes very differently. Rather than standing arms folded 
facing the viewer, Cumes is seated cross-legged with unfolded arms resting on his thighs. 
Rather than a cutout against a white background, he is seated on a reed mat inside his 
ndumba surrounded by woven and beaded baskets, with his bones set scattered before him. 
In place of his stethoscope, in his hand he holds a pointing stick and crisscrossing his chest 
are two beaded strings, signifying his sangoma status. Cumes’ ‘odyssey into the spirit world 
of African healing’ conveyed by the accoutrements of the sangoma’s practice is emphasised 
by the compositional perspective; rather than confronted by Cumes’ assertive authority as he 
stands before the viewer, now our perspective is slightly declined as we view Cumes seated 
on the ground, as if approaching a humble and patient healer. Finally, that it is a surgeon 
who has undertaken this odyssey is indicated by the only similarity with Spirit’s photograph 
of Cumes: he still wears surgical scrubs and the same engaging smile accompanies his gaze 
directly at the camera.  
A few months before publication of Bones, in late 2003 Cumes launched his website 
at www.davidcumes.com under the banner ‘holistic urology & surgery psycho-spiritual 
healing’. The website explained the principles of ‘African healing rituals and divination’; 
advised how visitors may engage Cumes as a keynote speaker or workshop facilitator 
(suggested topics included ‘South African shamanism’ and wilderness- and nature-related 
themes); listed two dozen ‘sponsoring organsations’, including The American College of 
Surgeons, the Institute of Noetic Sciences, and the American Holistic Nurses Association; as 
well as advertised his books, Inward Bound, the healing centre at Thisimane, and somewhat 
incongruously, the Cumevac, ‘the original single fill bladder evacuator’ (IA 2012). Cumes 
has periodically updated his website, adding video from his travels in South Africa, a 
documentary film about his ancestors’ calling, a podcast link, and a link to his webpage at 
the independent online music store CDBaby where visitors can purchase any of the seven 
albums Cumes has released since 2008. With titles like ‘Sacredness’, ‘Indigenous Voices’, 
‘The Ancestors’, and ‘Spirit Healing Songs’, they can be found in CDBaby’s ‘shamanic’, 
‘new age’, and ‘world traditions’ genres (Cumes 2012).  
Like McKay, Cowan, Ingerman, Shilo Satran and most professional shamanic 
practitioners for whom practising without a presence in cyberspace would be a formidable 
handicap, Cumes’ personal website is a homology of his professional presence in the world. 
The implication that Cumes’ medical rooms in Santa Barbara have been displaced recalls an 
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important element of Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism. There is a resemblance between 
Cumes’ journey (from physician to surgeon to sangoma to shamanic practitioner and 
entrepreneur), and the transformation from classical into neoliberal homo economicus. Recall 
Foucault’s argument that in place of entering into exchange transactions on the basis of 
wants, needs, and a utility that may be defined and satisfied, neoliberal homo economicus is 
an entrepreneur of her or his self, increases income by investing in her or his own embodied 
human capital, and produces satisfaction by reconceiving consumption as an enterprise 
activity. In a neoliberal context, there is no distinction between personal and professional 
identity because neoliberal homo economicus is identified less by profession than by 
entrepreneurial pursuits that have their locus and unity in the ontology of homo economicus. 
Cumes carries his sangoma bag with him everywhere he goes, and while he describes this as 
figurative luggage, to the extent that it symbolises his human capital, it is less figurative than 
embodied. Indeed, if ‘David Cumes’ is the product of his own satisfaction, then the 
eponymously named Cumevac, patented in 1989, may be regarded as an early experiment in 
Cumes’ neoliberal entrepreneurialism, for which Cumes’ eponymously named website is the 
maturation. As Cumes’ undifferentiated personal-professional presence in cyberspace, 
davidcumes.com is homologous to Cumes’ embodied neoliberal entrepreneurial self.  
Like American sangomas, African sangomas have also been investing their human 
capital. However, whereas identifying their human capital with sangoma traditions is 
valuable for North American practitioners, African sangomas have found value in 
identifying their human capital with shamanism. 
 
African shamans 
Although sangomas and other kinds of traditional healers and ritual specialists across Africa 
have been represented as ‘shamans’ for at least a century,5 assimilations of African 
indigenous religiosities to a transnational popular shamanic idiom accelerated sharply during 
the 1990s. There are likely several contributing factors explaining these developments, 
including the global revolution in digital technologies and relative political stability that 
followed the end of apartheid in South Africa. However, I think an important but neglected 
facilitating factor has been neoliberal entrepreneurialism, in the Atlantic world generally, 
                                                       
5 As early as 1868, an anonymous review of T.P. Lesley’s Man's Origin and Destiny suggested that ‘African 
fetichism is, in reality, the same superstition as the Shamanism, or so-called devil worship of Asia’ (Anon. 
1868:365; also see Lang 1891; Lewis 1981, 1971; Nadel 1946; Ngubane 1977). For a while scholars debated 
whether spirit-medium traditions in parts of Africa and Asia could be grouped with the heroic representations 
of shamans as journeyers into spirit realms (Cox 2008; Reinhard 1976). This dispute—representative 
examples are Eliade and I.M. Lewis—prompted deeper questioning, particularly of gender issues (Anagnost 
1987; Atkinson 1992:317-9; Kendall 1985). Spirit-mediumship and possession has since become a highly 
productive research field, whether in relation to shamanism or not (for example Dawson 2011; Johnson and 
Keller 2006).  
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and in southern Africa particularly. While Americans have been journeying to southern 
Africa to be initiated in the ways of indigenous African healing, African shamans have been 
heading to North America, apparently doing as Mtshali charged Cumes, ‘to tell the white 
people that they have lost the way’ and need to ‘get back to what we in Africa know’ 
(Mtshali quoted in Cumes 2004:ix). 
Mandaza Augustine Kandemwa is a ‘Svikiro’ or ‘carrier of many earth and water 
spirits’ and a ‘Mhondoro’ or ‘one who is in constant prayer on behalf of others’. According 
to his website at www.mandaza.org, Kandemwa is ‘a vessel of spirits’ who ‘receives visions 
and dreams, makes offerings, performs healing rituals, and serves as a messenger for the 
Ancient Ones’. Kandemwa’s priority is ‘to pass on to…all citizens of Planet Earth, business 
people, politicians, presidents, prime ministers, kings and queens—the powerful messages I 
receive in my dreams and visions’, and to ‘share the deeper meanings of Love, Truth, Justice 
and Peace as given to us by Our Creator, Ancestors, and Spirits’ (Kandemwa 2012g). Since 
the early 2000s, Kandemwa has steadily increased his penetration of a growing network of 
enthusiasts in North America for southern African indigenous religiosities. Kandemwa’s first 
contact into this network was Michael Ortiz Hill and Deena Metzger. Hill’s background is 
nursing and his interest in healing and compassionate care is the subject of several books and 
essays; Metzger is a feminist writer and storyteller who has published widely in both 
academic and non-academic forums (for examples, see Hill 2012; Metzger 2012). Together, 
Hill and Metzger are credited with introducing the Shona concept of daré or community 
council to North America. They can also be credited with introducing North American 
enthusiasts for African religiosities to Mandaza Kandemwa.  
Following the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Hill became interested in African-Americans’ 
dreams about white people. ‘To do justice to the dream life of African Americans’, Hill 
proposed studying ‘the African (predominantly Bantu) world that gave birth to black 
American culture’. He headed for Africa where, in 1996 , he met ‘the Bantu healer Mandaza 
Kandemwa’ in Zimbabwe who initiated Hill ‘into the ritual tradition anthropologists 
recognize as the headwaters of what was to become African American culture’. It also led to 
a series of books co-authored with Kandemwa. The Village of the Water Spirits is the result 
of Hill’s racial dreaming project; Kandemwa’s interpretations of ‘the racial dreams of black 
Americans’ outline ‘a compelling picture of the African shape of the African American soul’ 
(Hill 2010). The other two books revolve around Hill and Kandemwa’s relationship, 
introduced in Gathering in the Names: A Journey into the Land of African Gods in terms of 
their kinship bond as healing practitioners, and culminating in Twin from Another Tribe: The 
Story of Two Shamanic Healers from Africa and North America (Hill and Kandemwa 2007, 
2006, 2002).  
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Kandemwa built his North American network through collaborations with Hill and 
Metzger. Metzger was particularly taken with the Shona concept of daré (Beath 2005:138-
140). In Shona, daré generally refers to a community court or council with executive 
authority. However, as the concept has been developed by Metzger and a growing 
community of daré enthusiasts in North America, it refers to ‘a sacred community gathering’ 
constituted for the purpose of dialogue, with participants as much as with spirits and 
ancestors. Rituals are important. Meetings open with invocations of spirits, and drumming 
and dancing are regarded as essential as the community ‘aligns itself with timeless ways of 
knowing, placing healing, peace building and the restoration of our world at the center of our 
community, consciousness and actions’ (Bay Area Dare´ 2012b; cf. 2012a). Kandemwa 
describes daré as ‘a gathering together of community to give and receive healing to one 
another and the community at large—to share ideas, stories, dreams and gifts; to create and 
to celebrate; to honor Spirit—and between us, to find the wisdom to proceed on a path of 
peacemaking’ (Kandemwa 2012a). Among the most active daré communities in North 
America are Cape Cod Daré in Massachusetts, Bay Area Daré in California, and Topanga 
Blue Flag Daré at Hill’s and Metzger’s home northwest of Los Angeles.  
These and other locations are important destinations on Kandemwa’s annual visits to 
North America. From 2004 to 2008, Kandemwa visited annually with the daré community at 
Cape Cod where his presence was a celebrated focus (Cape Cod Daré 2012b). In 2009 he 
attended the SSP’s annual conference in New York’s Catskill Mountains where he gave two 
keynote addresses, on ‘Becoming a Temple of Spirit’ and ‘Holding Dreams in Reverence’, 
and in the evening performed a ‘sacred dream ceremony’. Kandemwa’s keynote was 
probably facilitated by Metzger, who serves on the SSP’s Advisory Board (SSP 2012b). 
Since 2009, Kandemwa has been a featured speaker at the Society for the Study of 
Shamanism, Healing and Transformation’s annual conference in San Rafael, California 
(SSSHT 2012). Coincidently, the 2010 conference, themed ‘Wisdom of Our Ancestors-
Bridge to The Future’, also featured American sangoma David Cumes (SSSHT 2010). No 
doubt Kandemwa was fêted at similar conferences and sacred communities around the US 
and Canada, although the inherent transience of webpages, most of the time the only readily 
available sources for this kind of discovery, makes tracing Kandemwa’s movements and 
activities challenging. However, Kandemwa’s 2010 calendar suggests something of the scale 
and scope of his itineraries in previous years. Somewhat reminiscent of a touring rock band, 
Kandemwa’s 2010 ‘international tour dates’ comprised 14 cities in 15 weeks, beginning in 
Germany, then Canada, followed by events from Boston and Cape Cod to Los Angeles and 
the San Francisco bay area, before ending in Hawaii in late September (Kandemwa 2010). 
The following year was still more ambitious. Kandemwa was on the road for more than five 
months travelling to 29 different locations, including 12 in Canada (Kandemwa 2012f).  
 194 
It is worth recalling that for more than a decade, the economy of Kandemwa’s native 
Zimbabwe has all but collapsed. Kandemwa can probably do more to support himself and 
his family by his entrepreneurial endeavours in North American than he can with the limited 
opportunities in southern Africa. At any rate, giving economic assistance to Kandemwa’s 
family in Zimbabwe is advertised as a rationale for seeking out Kandemwa’s ‘Teachings, 
individual sessions and water and fire ceremonies’ during this ‘critical time period as Mother 
Earth heals and re-balances’ (SME 2009).6 There is no doubting that Zimbabwe’s shambolic 
economy has brought great suffering to Zimbabweans and I make no judgments about the 
interests, concerns or motivations of either Kandemwa or his supporters. The significant 
point, however, is that support for Kandemwa and his family in Zimbabwe entails more than 
simply purchasing divination readings, spiritual retreats, or attending speaking engagements. 
Kandemwa’s North American supporters have gone to some length to facilitate an 
entrepreneurial project built around ‘Mandaza Kandemwa, African shaman, healer and 
peacemaker’, including establishing and managing his presence online, as well as 
fundraising and sponsorships. For example, the American sangoma Gretchen McKay 
designed Kandemwa’s website and links to it from her own (Kandemwa 2012c; McKay 
2012c), and his contact details direct inquirers to a member of Cape Cod Daré. Indeed, there 
is a strong sense that Kandemwa is not the author of his online presence; his website and 
webpages on the social networking platforms Facebook, Ning, and Peace Villages are 
written in the third person (Kandemwa 2012d, 2012b, 2012e). 
Yet as a mode of support, neoliberal entrepreneurialism involves some risks. 
Kandemwa’s friends founded a non-profit organisation to channel financial support to 
Kandemwa and his dependents in Zimbabwe. According to Cape Cod Daré (2012a),  
Tatenda is a non-profit organization that has been set up to support and sustain 
traditional healers and their communities in Africa as well as helping to preserve these 
living cultures so critically endangered by poverty, inter-racial and ethnic conflicts and 
the demands and circumstances of modern life. In addition, Tatenda seeks to create 
dialogue and collaboration between practitioners of western medicine and the healing 
arts internationally for their mutual benefit and enlightenment. 
Like many small non-profit projects in the US, Tatenda used a ‘fiscal sponsor’, which is to 
say, an organisation already registered with American tax authorities as a tax-exempt, non-
profit organisation. For a fee, fiscal sponsors manage project accounts, make payments, and 
ensure compliance with relevant laws (Fiscal Sponsor Directory 2012). Tatenda’s fiscal 
sponsor was International Humanities Center, a California-based organisation founded in 
2003 that at its peak managed over 300 non-profit projects. In late 2011 International 
                                                       
6 One poster advertising a ‘retreat/intensive with African Healer, Mandaza Kandemwa’ in Ontario, Canada, in 
July 2009 advertised: ‘All money collected for Mandaza will be his only source of funds to support his large 
extended family and community for basic needs such as food, water, gas, clothes and education fees for many 
children. Your support is received with tremendous gratitude.’ (SME 2009) 
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Humanities Center collapsed amid allegations of misappropriation and fraud; losses are 
estimated at over $1-million, including $60,000 for Tatenda, and $20,000 for Metzger’s 
Mandlovu (Cohen 2012). Although it will be some time before Kandemwa or Tatenda will 
recover, fundraising began with renewed impetuous in 2012 (Anon. 2012; Fell 2012).  
Mandaza Kandemwa is a relative newcomer to the field of African shamanic 
entrepreneurialism. The pioneer of this field is surely Malidoma Patrice Somé, a self-
professed Africa shaman and envoy to the West of the Dagara people of West Africa. Somé 
explains in his autobiography Of Water and the Spirit: Ritual, Magic, and Initiation in the 
Life of an African Shaman (Somé 1995) that as a child he was kidnapped from his rural 
village in Burkina Faso by Jesuit missionaries who forcibly converted him to Christianity. At 
age 20 he escaped, but discovered rejoining his community was near to impossible; he had 
lost his indigenous language and culture. The village decided Somé needed to be initiated 
back into the tribe, and a month-long ritual followed. At the end of it, Somé was restored to 
the community. But because he retained his ‘Western education’, he felt like ‘a man of two 
worlds—trying to be at home in both of them’ (Somé 1995:3). As a man of two worlds, 
Somé is in a better position than most to recognise that, 
…at this time in history, Western civilization is suffering from a great sickness of the 
soul. The West’s progressive turning away from functioning spiritual values; its total 
disregard for the environment and the protection of natural resources; the violence of 
inner cities with their problems of poverty, drugs, and crime; spiraling unemployment 
and economic disarray; and growing intolerance toward people of color and the values 
of other cultures—all of these trends, if unchecked, will eventually bring about a 
terrible self-destruction. In the face of all this global chaos, the only possible hope is 
self-transformation. (Somé 1995:1).  
At his elders’ behest, Somé returned to ‘the white man’s world…to share what I had learned 
about my own spiritual tradition through my initiation’ (Somé 1995:3): ‘My elders are 
convinced that the West is as endangered as the indigenous cultures it has decimated in the 
name of colonialism.’ In terms somewhat reminiscent of FSS expeditions to Siberia to assist 
indigenous communities recover the traditions they have lost, Somé’s task was to be a 
Dagara envoy to the West, to teach the West about the spiritual values it has lost, to restore 
regard for environment and nature, and to replace violence with tolerance and understanding. 
Somé’s first assignment was to obtain a university education, and in his first book he claims 
to hold three masters degrees and two doctorates, one each from the Sorbonne and Brandeis 
University.  
Following a brief stint teaching at the University of Michigan, Somé left academia in 
the early 1990s to become a fulltime public speaker. He gained some prominence in the 
‘men’s movement’ by offering an African indigenous perspective on such issues as home 
and community, sexual intimacy, and initiation, the latter in collaboration with mythologist 
and poet Michael Mead and James Hillman (b.1926 d.2011), director of studies at the 
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Jungian Institute following Jung’s death and an important figure in the Jungian orientation of 
the men’s movement during the 1980s and 1990s (Somé 1993; Somé and Somé 1994; 
Hillman, Meade and Somé 1992; cf. Kimmel 1995). Somé was the subject of a documentary 
film and was interviewed for Mother Jones (Bloch 1994; D.P. Miller 1995). Over the next 
few years, Somé published the three books that extended his influence beyond the men’s 
movement and established him as a fixture in the alternative spiritualities circuit. The first 
was Of Water and the Spirit, his autobiographical account of ‘life as an African shaman’ 
(Somé 1995), followed by Ritual: Power, Healing and Community (Somé 1997), and finally 
The Healing Wisdom of Africa (Somé 1999). The first and last are still in print, have been 
recorded as audiobooks, and translated into German (Somé 2004, 2001). Somé also founded 
a charitable organisation, but whereas Kandemwa opted for the fiscal sponsor option, Somé 
registered his as a non-profit organisation and assumed responsiblity for managing its 
finances. In Of Water and the Spirit, Somé wrote of his role ‘as both a bridge and a conduit’ 
between two worlds (Somé 1995:4). Echoes of the Ancestors, Inc. was conceived as the 
vehicle with which to traverse the distance. Through Echoes of the Ancestors, Somé offered 
over twenty courses and workshops on divination, healing with ancestors, and African 
shamanism, including courses on ‘African Shamanism in the Business World’ and a ‘three 
year intensive’ titled ‘into the Heart of African Shamanism’ (Somé 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
While African shamanism travelled west, Somé advertised development projects in Burkina 
Faso he hoped would draw funding eastward. Details, applications, payment, and donations 
were all handled through Somé’s website at www.malidoma.org.  
By 2010 Somé had transferred his website to a .com domain (www.malidoma.com) 
and revamped its design. He scaled back his services to telephone consultations and personal 
divinations and reduced his intensive African shamanism course to two years. Retitled 
‘Indigenous African Spirit Technologies: An Introduction Into a Dagara-Inspired Way Of 
Walking on the Earth’, the course is designed ‘to lay the groundwork, deeply and personally, 
for a leap into the magical and spiritual technological legacies of our ancestors’. It includes 
‘radical exploration of the elements of cosmology, Fire, Water, Earth, Nature, and Mineral’, 
‘ancestralisation’ rituals, ‘cowry shell divination’, and ‘the art and science of talisman 
making’ (Somé 2012b, 2012c). Somé also replaced Echoes of the Ancestors with a new non-
profit organisation called Aviela, Inc. Aviela’s two purposes are, firstly to acknowledge and 
thank ‘the elders and diviners, the healers and shamans of West Africa’ for giving of ‘their 
time, knowledge, and dedication to the ancestors…often without compensation or 
acknowledgement’; secondly, Aviela ‘provides a vehicle’ to realise Malidoma’s vision of ‘a 
training/healing/retreat center, a home for the ancestors, here in the west’:  
This place would be dedicated to the ongoing offering of ritual training, teaching and 
intense experiential healing that comes from the work Malidoma facilitates. It will be a 
 197 
space, in the west, that holds the collective energies of all those who come to deepen 
their relationship with the other worlds, via the teachings of indigenous Africa.’ (Somé 
2012a) 
‘AVIELA provides a container for saying “thank you”, in a monetary way’, and anyone may 
donate with Paypal via Somé’s website. 
 
Neoliberal spiritual entrepreneurs 
One may wonder what exactly is so neoliberal about spiritual entrepreneurs like African 
shamans Kandemwa and Somé, American sangomas McKay and Cumes, and innumerable 
examples like theirs. Recalling Foucault, the key issue is how neoliberalism reconceives 
labour. The classical theory of labour as sold at the market price for a given skill or 
competency level is challenged by the observation that the worker’s skill is embodied and 
inseparable from the worker, and therefore cannot be sold from time to time on the market. 
Instead, labour can be separated into components of capital and income, where the latter is 
the wage earned from work and, as an income, is the product of a (human) capital, which is 
the worker’s abilities and skills. As against the Marxist account of the worker as an alienated 
machine, Foucault understands this machine in the positive sense as one constituted by a 
worker and their ability bound together and remunerated over time by a series of wages that 
will produce an income stream. Foucault’s account of a ‘machine-stream ensemble’ is very 
different from the conception of labour power sold at the prevailing market price; the 
ensemble presents ‘a conception of capital-ability…so that the worker himself appears as a 
sort of enterprise of himself’. (Foucault 2008:224-5) 
This kind of enterprise of the self distinguishes neoliberal from classical homo 
economicus. It is also particularly well suited to shamanic practitioners, whose ability to 
enter a shamanic state of consciousness and commune with ancestral and other spirits is both 
paradigmatic of their practice and quintessentially inalienable from their corporeal being. If 
this analysis is correct, however, then what do neoliberal spiritual entrepreneurs impart that 
in imparting is nonetheless not alienated from them? I suggest it is an experience in the 
person with whom they are transacting, catalysed by the entrepreneur’s representation (via 
autobiography) of their experience (engaging with spirits) which also testifies to their skills 
and abilities (as shamanic practitioners): Cumes’ ‘pure experience’ of ‘wilderness rapture’, 
the centrality of ‘ancestral wisdom’ in McKay’s and Somé’s respective projects, 
Kandemwa’s darés that ‘honor spirit’, indeed Harner’s account of core-shamanism as 
cultivating shamanic knowledge via shamanic experiences, or as one participant enthused on 
Mandaza’s Facebook webpage in August 2011 about a joint workshop with Somé and 
Kandema, ‘such an incredible experience witnessing Mandaza and Malidoma meeting in 
person’. Experience has been one of shamanism’s discursive regularities since at least the 
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nineteenth century. In the neoliberal era, however, the entrepreneur’s representation of their 
experience increasingly emphasises technique. Unlike entrepreneurs of Harner’s and 
Castaneda’s generation for whom technique meant a means of accessing shamanic 
consciousness and non-ordinary reality, for today’s spiritual entrepreneurs technique 
increasingly means recovering an alternative epistemology as a move towards founding a 
new ontology that will reverse the deleterious effects of anthropocentric mastery. Consider 
for example Somé’s two-year course on ‘Indigenous African Spirit Technologies’:  
The time for a vigorous act of devotion to, and embracing of the wisdom of indigenous 
Africa has come.…the continent is…the repository of profound unseen powers and 
technologies on standby to contribute to a radical healing change much needed in the 
world today. This calls for…those in whose heart ancient Africa speaks, to check in for 
this exciting and compelling journey home where they can expect to find how much of 
the old in them has been waiting to burst in service of the world’s need to heal and to 
transform. This training is offered in response to that call. (Somé 2012b) 
Certainly this training is also an object of commercial transaction and resembles a product of 
labour exchanged for a monetary value at the market price, in accord with classical 
economics. Yet, this understanding misrecognises the nature of the object and the larger 
process of which it is a part. Rather than a product of labour, the training (and its experiential 
content) is a product of human capital, which is Somé’s embodied and inalienable abilities 
and skills as a shamanic practitioner. With his capital he generates an income, which is his 
wage for his labour. Secondly, by emphasising the transaction, the classical understanding 
fails to convey the sense in which it is one transaction in a complicated web linking it with 
other transacted products (books, talks, workshops, retreats, etc.) and in its temporal 
dimension is akin to an income-stream that returns to Somé the dividends of his investments 
in his embodied human capital.  
Shamanism’s neoliberal moment emerged because the new premium neoliberal theory 
placed on embodiment meant that engaging with spirits could be recast as a form of human 
capital. Shamanic practice, like other professional practices, could be trained and improved, 
and as an investment in human capital, would generate an income stream over time. Today 
shamanic practice is regarded by aspiring shamanic practitioners as a viable career option. 
Consider the professional biography of shamanic practitioner Lenore Norrgard (2012a, 
2012b). Drawn to shamanism in the late 1980s, Norrgard enrolled in FSS courses and 
graduated in 1993 as a Harner Method Shamanic Counsellor. From the mid-1990s she began 
designing and offering professional shamanic counseling services and courses from offices 
in downtown Seattle, including a Shamanic Healing Apprenticeship Programme (Norrgard 
2012c). By the end of the decade she was consulting with health insurance giant Kaiser 
Permanente in preparing a grant application to the National Institutes of Health to research 
the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of shamanic healing (Norrgard 2012a; cf Rauber 2012). 
Norrgard participated in the subsequent study (see Vuckovic et al. 2007; Norrgard 2012b). 
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Or Christina Pratt, a former student of both Harner and Somé and author of An Encyclopedia 
of Shamanism (Pratt 2007). Since January 2009 Pratt has hosted a weekly podcast titled 
‘Why Shamanism Now’. The podcast is available online and via Apple’s ITunes service, and 
over the years has featured interviews with Cowan, Ingerman, Lucier, McKay, and Norrgard, 
among many others (Pratt 2012). In the new millennium, Pratt, like Norrgard and a growing 
number of practitioners registered with the Society for Shamanic Practitioners and other 
associations, are among a new generation of shamans working hard to develop shamanic 
practice as a profession. 
This kind of professionalisation is not without controversy, not least because capital, 
whether embodied or otherwise, is always acquired one way or another. Since much 
professional shamanic practice in North America is based on Harner’s core-shamanism and 
stripped of reference to specific contexts and cultures, it is less vulnerable to charges of 
unethical appropriation of indigenous cultures and traditions. However, modes of acquisition 
become highly contested in cases of indigenous culture and knowledge that are identifiable 
with specific local cultures and contexts. Accusations of appropriation, commodification and 
exploitation of indigenous traditions and native authenticity have long been topical issues in 
this regard,7 and controversies over intellectual property rights are among the most salient 
examples of intersections between indigenism, environmentalism and neoliberalism. These 
controversies intensified during the 1990s, partly because transnational indigenism increased 
sensitivity to exploitation of indigenous cultures, but particularly because surging interest 
from pharmaceutical companies in indigenous peoples’ knowledge of healing properties of 
plants prompted accusations of neocolonialism and ‘green colonialism’, from Yanomami 
shaman Davi Kopenawa among many others (Jowitt 2007).  
The Swazi sangoma Mtshali recounts that in 1985 his senior ancestor King Luvenga 
told his family a new independence struggle was needed in Africa: ‘…nations of Africa have 
struggled and fought for independence from the bondage of colonialism and imperialism. 
Now that political freedom has been gained it is time for the next step—to gain professional 
independence for traditional healers.’ Mtshali reported that all the ancestors agreed with 
King Luvenga and charged the president of Swaziland’s Traditional Healers Organisation ‘to 
be their mouthpiece’. In this new independence struggle, sangomas need help, and not only 
from their ancestors. Mtshali continued:  
                                                       
7 These issues became topical in New Age contexts in the 1980s (Churchill 2003; P. Deloria 1994; Raibmon 
2005; Kehoe 1990; P. Jenkins 2004; Wernitznig 2003; Welch 2002). An analogous controversy has emerged 
in southern Africa where sangoma traditionalists have argue that white people shouldn’t be initiated as 
sangomas because they don’t have African ancestors (Gophe 2000). John Lockley, a white sangoma and self-
proclaimed African shaman who was featured on Pratt’s radio show (Pratt 2010), counters that since Africa is 
the birthplace of humanity, ‘we all have ancient African ancestors’ (Lockley 2010; cf. IOL 2007). Academic 
researcher and white sangoma Jo Wreford has written on these issues (see Wreford 2008, 2007, 2006; cf. 
Hiney 2005). 
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I believe that each country should collect and preserve traditional healing skills which 
are rapidly disappearing. The traditional medical knowledge of herbs…should be for the 
benefit of all people, not just make a few drug companies rich. These companies steal 
our knowledge and then make the drugs so expensive that the people who collected the 
knowledge in the first place cannot afford to use and benefit from them. Is this fair? I 
say no, and the way around the problem is to have governments collect the knowledge 
worldwide for the benefit of everyone. (Mtshali 2004:117) 
In the second part of this chapter I shift perspective from neoliberal homo economicus who 
is an entrepreneur of her or his self towards neoliberal governmentality and the art of 
maintaining things in their right disposition so that the principle of economy extends 
capillary-like to the farthest limbs of the social order. There are many examples of 
intersections between neoliberal governmentality, entrepreneurialism, and indigenous 
identity and culture that illustrate the issues I discuss below. For example, in North America, 
Alaska’s Native Claims Settlement Act provided a uniquely neoliberal solution to 
indigenous claims to sovereignty over their lands, territories, and resources. The Act 
transformed all twelve of Alaska’s regional native associations into over 200 ‘Native Village 
Corporations’, such as the Chenega Corporation of Prince William Sound 
(www.chenega.com) and the Afognak Native Corporation of Kodiak Island 
(www.afognak.com). With offices across the union, including Anchorage, Honolulu, Dallas, 
Denver, San Diego and Washington, the Afognak pursue their goal ‘to optimize financial 
benefits, land use and preserve our culture for the well-being of our shareholders’ (Afognak 
Native Corporation 2012). Another series of examples can be found in Central and North 
Asia, where shamanic revivals in autonomous federal republics of Altai, Sakha (Yakutia), 
Tuva, and Buryatia (and among ethnic Buryats in Mongolia) have vitalised post-soviet 
ethnic nationalisms (for example, Balzer 2008, 1999, 1996; Buyandelgeriyn 2007; 
Humphrey 1999, 1994; Laruelle 2007; Lindquist 2005; Pika and Grant 1999; Siikala 2000). 
Integrations of ethnic nationalisms into global circuits of shamanism discourse have brought 
Siberia to the wider world, but it has also brought the shifting discursive regularities of 
transnational shamanism to Siberia. Vitebsky’s comparison of the Sora and Sakha discussed 
in Chapter One illustrated how coupling environmental concern with privileged indigenous 
knowledge that began in Brazil has been instrumentalised in Sakha Republic. In the idiom of 
environmentalism, indigenous claims cached with histories of dispossession and subjugation 
become future-oriented and hence all the more powerful in legitimating ethnic claims in the 
political vacuum that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Vitebsky 1995:180-2). 
To these examples we could add South Africa, where an ensemble of tactics targeting 
sangomas provides another exemplary illustration of neoliberal governmentality implicating 
shamanism.  
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Neoliberal Governmentality 
Bio-economy 
In 1997 the South African government’s Department of Health adopted a National Drug 
Policy (DOH 1996). Comprising health, economic, and ‘national development’ objectives, 
the policy committed the government to investigating the effective and safe use of ‘African 
traditional medicines’ in primary healthcare. The policy aimed to encourage ‘traditional 
healers’ to work more closely with ‘the formal health care sector’, and committed the 
government to investigating the efficacy, safety and quality of traditional medicines. A 
‘national reference centre for traditional medicines’ would be established, and ‘[m]arketed 
traditional medicines will be registered and controlled’ (DOH 1996:26). The following year, 
the Medical Research Council of South Africa established a Traditional Medicines Research 
Unit and a National Reference Centre for African Traditional Medicine. An expert 
committee on African traditional medicines was also established to advise the Medicines 
Control Council on regulating, registering, and controlling traditional medicines (DOH et al. 
n.d.; MRC 2012). From a healthcare perspective, these efforts were important, particularly 
given that seventy to eighty percent of South Africa’s population relied on traditional 
medicine for their primary healthcare needs and South Africa’s disease burden included 
epidemics of HIV and tuberculosis. Beyond healthcare, however, these efforts to regulate 
and control African traditional medicine also signaled an extension of neoliberal 
governmentality into social domains in which economy as the principle of raison d’état had 
not previously been present, or at least less intensely. Indeed, from the late 1990s successive 
governments’ strategies to modernise and develop the post-apartheid state extended and 
consolidated the principle of economy across all sectors of society, in accord with former 
president Thabo Mbeki’s version of a developmental state. It was a cornerstone of his vision 
of an African Renaissance and the motivating factor in prioritising ‘Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems’ (hereafter IKS) in the government’s economic development strategy (Odora 
Hoppers 2002).  
The government’s Indigenous Knowledge Systems Policy, designed by the national 
Department of Science and Technology (hereafter DST) and adopted by cabinet in 2004, is 
structured by four ‘IKS Policy drivers’: ‘affirmation of African cultural values in the face of 
globalisation’; ‘development of services provided by traditional healers’; contribution of 
indigenous knowledge to employment and wealth creation, and interfaces with other 
knowledge systems (DST 2004:9,12-15). The policy established a National Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems Office within the DST and charged it with responsibility for 
coordinating IKS-related matters between twelve relevant ministries, in multilateral and 
bilateral relations with other states, and with the private sector (Green 2008a, 2007; Soudien 
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2008). The policy also made clear that the state too intends prospecting indigenous 
knowledge. Indeed, the government’s Ten-Year Innovation Plan for South Africa published 
in 2008 intends transforming South Africa into a ‘knowledge-based economy’ by 2018 (DST 
2008; cf. PMG 2011). The four pillars of this vision are given as innovation, education, 
information infrastructure, and ‘the economic and institutional regime’. ‘[H]uman capital 
development’ is prioritized, and the Plan explains that ‘the government needs to set the 
focus, establish the scale, and give appropriate signals to ensure that enabling conditions are 
in place’ (DST 2008:31). The Plan is premised on an analysis that the world is entering a 
new phase of technological innovation it calls ‘bio-economy’ and compares this economy’s 
stage of development in 2007 with the steam age around the 1840s and the information age 
around the 1970s (DST 2008:3). Faced with this bio-economic future, the Plan identifies 
several ‘grand challenge areas’, including ‘[t]he “Farmer to Pharma” value chain to 
strengthen the bio-economy’. The Plan insists that by 2018 ‘South Africa must become a 
world leader in biotechnology and the pharmaceuticals [sic], based on the nation’s 
indigenous resources and expanding knowledge base’ (DST 2008:viii). Far from guarding 
healing practices from commercial exploitation, the healing practices of sangomas like 
Mtshali are a key part of the government’s strategic goal: ‘an economy in which new 
knowledge-based industries, and knowledge workers and systems, fuel stronger economic 
growth’ (DST 2008:31). 
One can appreciate why South Africa’s government thinks the future of technological 
innovation is bio-economy. The World Health Organisation estimates that 80 percent of 
earth’s population use herbal medicine for some aspect of primary healthcare (WHO 2008). 
Although proportions of population who use herbal medicines are highest in developing 
countries, in economic terms, the most valuable markets for phytomedicines are in western 
Europe, North America, and China. In 1993 the phytomedicines market in Europe, Asia and 
North America combined was worth $8.4 billion (Laird and Wynberg 1996). Only four years 
later, in Western Europe alone it was valued at $7 billion (Okigbo and Mmeka 2006:88). In 
1993, American consumers spent almost $1.5 billion on ‘herbal remedies’. The US market 
grew from $3.2 billion in 1996 to $5 billion by 1999 (Neddermeyer 2009; Okigbo and 
Mmeka 2006:88). Market size in developing countries is more difficult to measure, although 
Grunwald (cited in Okigbo and Mmeka 2006:88) reported that in 1993, over $2.4 billion 
worth of traditional Chinese medicines was sold in China and another $400 million worth 
was exported. The World Health Organisation estimates that sales of herbal products in 
China totaled $14 billion in 2005 and in Brazil were worth $160 million in 2007 (WHO 
2008). Figures published in 2006 showed that South Africa’s market for African traditional 
medicine contributed an estimated R2.9 billion annually to South Africa’s economy and 
employed at least 133,000 people (mostly rural women) (Rautenbach 2011:39). In 2006, the 
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annual global market value for phytomedicines was roughly $43 billion (Okigbo and Mmeka 
2006:88). Although the notion of using natural materials, whether plant, animal, or mineral, 
to treat ailments is probably as old as humanity (Pandey et al. 2011:27), the expansion of 
market economics into this domain on the scale seen over the past quarter-century is 
unprecedented in human history. Some countries, notably those with high measures of 
biodiversity, think they have a competitive advantage. South Africa’s 24,000 indigenous 
plants represent approximately ten percent of all vascular plants on earth, according to 
government literature (DOH et al. n.d.:5; cf. PMG 2011), and entirely includes one of earth’s 
six floristic kingdoms.8 Many of these plants can be purchased in local markets in towns and 
cities across South Africa and online through companies like African Shaman (African 
Shaman 2012), although consumption rates of 200,000 tons of plant material per year alarm 
conservationists and sangomas alike (Mhlabane 2002; Rautenbach 2011:39). 
 
Knowledge into property 
If growing global demand for phytomedicines indicates that the future bio-economy is 
already upon us, one can appreciate the South African government’s sense of urgency, 
especially given South Africa’s unique supply of plant resources. Indeed, like many 
governments around the world, South Africa is trying to catch-up with transnational 
corporations that have been prospecting indigenous knowledge for the therapeutic properties 
of plants since the early 1990s. That decade saw an explosion of private sector interest in 
plant materials, spurred on by advances in genetic science that allowed researchers to screen 
biological material for health properties far faster than trial and error methods. However, 
given that earth has hundreds of thousands of plant species, researchers reasoned that 
traditional healers are a good source of research leads and would add another level of 
screening. One South African researcher estimated screening efficiency increased by more 
than 400 percent when researchers took their leads from sangomas and traditional healers 
(Koch 1995). At least one company, California-based Shaman Pharmaceuticals, made data 
collection from indigenous communities and traditional healers a cornerstone of their 
research strategy. During a 1995 visit to South Africa, Shaman Pharmaceuticals’ chief 
medical anthropologist reportedly held extensive discussions with a local healers 
organisation and talked about funding the organisation through South Africa’s statutory 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Koch 1995). Although Shaman 
Pharmaceuticals ultimately failed as a company and declared bankruptcy in 2001, their 
                                                       
8 In botanical taxonomy, Earth’s flora consists of six kingdoms, 35 floristic regions, and 152 floristic provinces. 
The South African Kingdom is the smallest and is entirely contained within South Africa’s south-west region.  
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failure has not deterred other companies who have drawn lessons and are staking their claims 
in the new world of bioprospecting (Clapp and Crook 2002). 
Foremost among the ethical issues raised by bioprospecting is fair compensation 
agreements or ‘benefit-sharing’ with communities whose knowledge corporations convert 
into intellectual property and patents. When benefits are not shared equitably with 
communities, bioprospecting becomes biopiracy. The Rural Advancement Foundation 
International or RAFI, renamed in 2001 to Action Group on Erosion, Technology and 
Concentration or ETC Group, coined the term ‘biopiracy’ in the early 1990s to refer to ‘the 
appropriation of the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous 
communities by individuals or institutions seeking exclusive monopoly control (usually 
patents or plant breeders’ rights) over these resources and knowledge’ (Robinson 
2010:14,18). Although a formal definition of biopiracy has not been adopted by transnational 
regulators like the World International Property Organization, and ethical issues, legal 
complexities, and controversies abound (Dutfield 2003; Farhat 2008; McGown 2006; 
Robinson 2010), RAFI’s definition remains an influential benchmark and was used, for 
example, by the report of the UK government’s Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(CIPR 2002). 
If bioprospecting frames the future bio-economy in terms of opportunities, biopiracy 
frames it in terms of dangers. In recent years, these dangers have been brought into focus by 
several controversial patenting decisions. For example, India’s government became 
embroiled in complicated legal wrangling to reverse decisions by US and European patent 
authorities to grant patents on turmeric, neem tree extracts, and basmati rice (ICTSD 2002; 
Marden 1999), and Bikram Choudhury’s franchising of 26 yoga postures precipitated ‘yoga 
wars’ in the multi-billion dollar yoga industry, in the US alone valued at $6 billion and up to 
$30 billion when accessories, equipment, instructional books and DVDs are included 
(Sharma 2007; Wax 2010). Governments have recognised that a proactive approach requires 
measures along the lines advocated by Mtshali. India’s government responded to the Bikram 
Yoga franchise by dedicating a 200-strong team of yogis and scholars to documenting and 
archiving 900 postures scanned from the Mahabharata and Yoga Sutras, among other 
sources. This labour was part of a larger project to ‘safeguard the sovereignty of [India’s] 
traditional knowledge’ under the auspices of the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library 
(TKDL 2012), a government-sponsored project to archive traditional knowledge found 
within India’s sovereign territory in a searchable digital archive catalogued according to the 
specifications of international patent classification systems. Agreements with patents offices 
of Japan, the European Union, United Kingdom, United States, and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization grant confidential access so that patent applications in these 
jurisdictions can be checked against India’s catalogue. The project includes an ongoing 
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effort to translate the archive into English, French, German, Japanese and Spanish (TKDL 
2011a, 2011b, 2010, 2009).  
The Indian example illustrates three important issues for the problematic of neoliberal 
governmentality and indigenous knowledge. Firstly, safeguarding indigenous knowledge 
from biopiracy requires assimilating it to neoliberalism’s economic principle by converting 
indigenous knowledge into intellectual property. That conversion is achieved by describing 
the unique properties of an object in such a way that the description conforms to the 
systematicities and regularities of transnational intellectual property management regimes. 
Secondly, when Mtshali recommends that governments should collect traditional healing 
practices to safeguard them against appropriation by transnational pharmaceutical 
companies, the implication is that governments should collect this knowledge from people 
who already possess it, yogis in the Indian example just mentioned and sangomas in the 
South African example cited earlier. A similar logic played out in Brazil. Among the 
changes wrought by the new Amazonian ecopolitics discussed in Chapter Four, Brazilian 
nationalists reversed the earlier exclusion of indigenous tribes from Brazilian national 
imaginaries and began portraying shamans as a bulwark against biopiracy by foreign 
corporate interests. The xenophobic element is important. Whereas previously Brazil’s 
nationalists viewed Amazonia’s indigenous populations as suspicious outsiders, in the new 
conjuncture they were increasingly included in the Brazilian ‘nation’ and identified as 
strategic partners in efforts to regulate bioprospecting in the national interest (Conklin 1997; 
cf. Erickson-Davis 2010). From this perspective—this is the third point—‘bioprospecting’ 
and ‘biopiracy’ appear in a new light in which the prefix ‘bio-’ refers less to the properties of 
naturally occurring materials and more to the biological being of people in whom this 
knowledge is embodied. Bioprospecting and biopiracy in this sense have less to do with 
genetic plant materials and more to do with biopower: bodies are now targeted for 
government interventions in the name of defending the state by asserting the sovereignty of 
its indigenous knowledge.  
This perspective casts South Africa’s 10-year innovation plan in a new light. ‘Bio-
economy’ now appears less as an epoch of technological innovation akin to last century’s 
information age or the steam age the century before that. Instead, bio-economy is the 
principle informing the raison d’état of the South African republic. The Plan’s emphasis, 
that ‘the government needs to set the focus, establish the scale, and give appropriate signals 
to ensure that enabling conditions are in place’ (DST 2008:31), recalls Foucault’s definition 
of the art of government as the conduct of people in their multiform relationships toward an 
arrangement suitable to desired ends (Foucault 2009:96, 1993:203). This entails extending 
the principle of economy into new domains as well as deepening its penetration in those 
domains in which its organising rationality is already felt. Ultimately, however, the condition 
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most enabling of neoliberal governmentality is neoliberal subjectivity. Neoliberal subjects 
are eminently governable because their self-conduct is informed by the same principle of 
economy that informs the conduct of people towards an optimal arrangement. The continuity 
of sovereign power across the plurality of its forms is sustained and enhanced when 
individuals’ self-conduct is a correlate of raison d’état. Seen from this perspective, the 
ensemble tactics targeting the population are geared towards producing and guaranteeing 
conditions conducive to forming neoliberal subjectivity as much as towards the specificities 
of policy objectives. This ensemble, which includes policy, legislation, and institutional 
authorities, operates a microphysics of power at the extremities of embodied subjectivities, 
‘where power reaches into the very grain of individuals’ (Foucault 1980a:39; on capillary 
power, see Foucault 1977a:26-7, 1980b:96; cf. 1980a; Miller and Rose 1990). This kind of 
shaping and moulding a desirable subjectivity is akin to supplying sensation to a nerve, in 
which case South Africa’s ten-year innovation plan is more aptly characterised as an 
innervation plan. 
An important issue stemming from Foucault’s analysis of governmentality is what 
becomes of law when sovereign power is no longer constituted by obedience to the 
sovereign’s laws but instead becomes the art of government. In Foucault’s analysis, the 
notion of the sovereign’s divine right to command obedience recedes (Foucault 
2009:99,106). In its place legislation becomes one aspect of an ensemble of tactics 
combining policy objectives, institutional requirements, regulatory oversight, and 
inducements in the form of advantages and benefits obtained through compliance with 
legislation. Examples from South Africa have already been mentioned. The drugs policy and 
later the IKS policy facilitated a National Reference Centre for African Traditional 
Medicine, an expert committee to advise the Medicines Control Council, a National 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems Office to coordinate IKS-related matters between relevant 
ministries, in foreign relations, and with the private sector, and a rationale for prospecting 
indigenous knowledge in terms of the government’s strategic vision of a knowledge-
economy. However, within this ensemble, legislation retains an important role. Legislation 
makes a practical task of citizenship by compelling compliance with the calculus of an 
economising rationality, and elaborates continuity between neoliberal subjectivity and raison 
d’état. Legislation coordinates the tactical operations of the micro-physics of sovereign 
power and, by ensuring the principle of economy pervades all forms of sovereign power, 
gives governmentality its art. I want to illustrate legislation’s role by considering the South 
African government’s efforts to incorporate sangomas into the ambit of governmentality and 
put individual sangomas within reach of sovereign power.  
 
 207 
Healers into practitioners 
The Traditional Health Practitioners Act (hereafter THPA or the Act) was signed into law in 
2007. Introduced to Parliament in 2001 as the Traditional Healers Bill, the stated purpose of 
the THPA is to provide ‘a regulatory framework to ensure the efficacy, safety and quality of 
traditional health care services’, and ‘to provide for the management and control over the 
registration, training and conduct of practitioners, students and specified categories in the 
traditional health practitioners profession’. From the perspective of neoliberal 
governmentality and shamanism discourse, two aspects of the THPA are particularly 
noteworthy. The first is the effort in the name of the state to fix in law coherent, stable and 
universally applicable definitions of several key terms of local discourses about sangomas 
and African traditional healing practices more generally. The second is the effort in the name 
of the state to found institutions and regulatory mechanisms that will govern traditional 
healers in their profession as traditional health practitioners.  
Regarding definitions, Article 1 defines ‘traditional health practice’ as ‘the 
performance of a function, activity, process or service based on a traditional philosophy that 
includes the utilisation of traditional medicine or traditional practice…’. ‘Traditional 
philosophy’ is defined as: ‘indigenous African techniques, principles, theories, ideologies, 
beliefs, opinions and customs and uses of traditional medicines communicated from 
ancestors to descendants or from generations to generations, with or without written 
documentation, whether supported by science or not, and which are generally used in 
traditional health practice’. This broad and inclusive definition of ‘traditional health practice’ 
with reference to ‘indigenous African techniques’ is supplemented by differentiation from 
and specific exclusions of ‘professional activities of a person practising any of the 
professions contemplated in the Pharmacy Act,…the Health Professions Act,…the Nursing 
Act,…the Allied Health Professions Act,…or the Dental Technicians Act,…and any other 
activity not based on traditional philosophy’.  
Having staked out a domain of application in these terms, the centerpiece of the Act is 
the Traditional Health Practitioners Council. The Council is responsible for, inter alia, 
facilitating contact between different ‘fields of training…within the Republic and to set 
standards for such training’; maintaining ‘ethical and professional standards’; and, ensuring 
traditional health practice ‘complies with universally accepted health care norms and values’. 
Article 6 requires the Council to maintain registers of traditional health practitioners, to 
‘control and exercise authority in respect of all matters concerning the training of persons in 
traditional health practice and the conduct of its members’, and, in consultation with the 
Minister of Health, to ‘determine policy, and…make decisions regarding…educational 
framework, fees, funding, registration procedure, code for professional conduct and ethics, 
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disciplinary procedure and scope of traditional health practice’. The Act, which gives the 
Council statutory equivalence to the professional councils that respectively regulate 
pharmaceutical, allopathic, nursing, complimentary, and dental health practitioners, requires 
traditional healers to register with the Council in at least one of four practitioner categories 
identified as ‘diviner’, ‘herbalist’, ‘traditional birth attendant’, and ‘traditional surgeon’. 
Definition of these categories is deferred to the Council. The Act prohibits anyone from 
practising as a traditional healer who is not registered with the Council, establishes the office 
of a Registrar responsible for maintaining a register of traditional health practitioners, as well 
as providing for disciplinary procedures to secure the integrity of the profession. Stipulations 
about accreditation, examination, qualification and certification are also specified, although 
the details are again deferred to the Council to determine. Altogether, the Act intends 
professionalising traditional healthcare by extending government regulation of public 
healthcare providers to traditional healers.  
Certainly there are good reasons for this intervention. An estimated 27 million South 
Africans rely on traditional medicine that they obtain through the services of an estimated 
200,000 traditional healers (Gqaleni et al. 2007:178; Moagi 2009:119; cf. Raats 2005). With 
more than 50 percent of the population—and up to 70 percent or even 80 percent by some 
estimates (Moagi 2009; WHO 2008; although see Jones 2006:179-80)—receiving healthcare 
from providers whose qualifications, prescriptions and therapeutic techniques are beyond 
state surveillance, in a population with amongst the highest tuberculosis and HIV infection 
rates in the world, one might expect state intervention. Yet although the interventions 
provided for in the THPA models the same basic regulatory infrastructure governing other 
healthcare providers, traditional healers are also unique among health practitioners because 
their practice extensively involves working with spirits.  
This is where the THPA extends the economic principle of raison d’état into domains 
previously relatively insulated from it, notwithstanding criticism such as Moagi’s (2009:116) 
that ‘the Act sets out a number of objectives for government, [but] talks little about the 
practical regulation of spiritual healing’. Indeed, the THPA does not mention religion, 
initiation, spirits, mediumship, or trance states, all of which are important and well-known 
aspects of traditional healing in South Africa (Thornton 2009:21). Arguably, the Act 
downplays aspects of African traditional medicine because they might be viewed askance by 
other kinds of health professionals, although that seems unlikely because the facts of African 
traditional healing are so well known it is hardly credible that they can be suppressed. It is 
more plausible that the ‘spiritual’ or ‘religious’ aspects of traditional healing are not 
specifically mentioned simply because it is not necessary. The all-encompassing definition 
of ‘traditional philosophy’ and the legislated practitioner categories, particularly ‘diviner’, 
are sufficient for the Act’s purpose. Far more significant than the Act’s perceived omissions 
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or obfuscations is the fact that the government seeks to intervene in spiritual healing in the 
first instance. Accession of the THPA was after all perhaps the first time in modern history 
that a liberal democratic state recognised the occult category of ‘ancestors’ as a source rather 
than an object of knowledge (Thornton 2009:22-3). Indeed, viewed from the perspective of 
governmentality, the THPA’s perceived shortcomings are less omissions than deferrals to 
other apparatuses and technologies that as an ensemble exercise a form of power that targets 
the population. These include institutional bodies and regulatory authorities established by 
the THPA and tasked with translating varieties of local folk traditions into a profession, with 
its range of regularities, consistencies, standards of behaviour, ethical conduct, and common 
language and terminology conventions; related legislation, for example the Intellectual 
Property Laws Amendment Bill that incorporates ‘indigenous cultural expressions or 
knowledge’ into the existing regime of regulations governing copyright, patents, trademarks, 
and designs; state agencies and institutions such as the Medicines Control Council and 
National Reference Centre for African Traditional Medicine, but also fiscal authorities like 
the South African Revenue Service; public sector service providers including hospitals and 
clinics, but also schools and state employers who must decide whether diagnoses from 
traditional health practitioners are acceptable for school absences and processing employees’ 
annual sick leave; private sector partners such as pharmaceutical companies, whom we have 
seen were ahead of the government in targeting traditional healers, but also mining 
companies who were among the first private sector institutions in South Africa to recognise 
and incorporate traditional healers into their workers’ medical insurance schemes (Hiney 
2005); regional and national healers’ associations, many of whom have enthusiastically 
supported the state’s intervention from the Act’s first draft and have vocally advocated 
implementation of its provisions (THO 2011, 2004);9 and the overall coordination of this 
effort across these domains by the calculations and objectives of government’s policy 
framework.  
 
The Culture of Neoliberalism 
A frequent criticism of the THPA is that it represents traditional health practice and 
traditional philosophy as an unchanging system of knowledge passed down from ancestors 
or through generations from a precolonial past (Thornton 2009; Rautenbach 2011). This 
representation is a pronounced problem in the South African government’s ‘indigenous 
                                                       
9 The most vocal association is the Traditional Healers Organisation which claims 29,000 members, maintains a 
website and Facebook webpage, and appears to be influential with government departments (THO 2012). 
Other traditional healers organisations in South Africa are Tshwane Healers Forum, Dingaka Healers 
Association, Nyangazezizwe Traditional Healers Organisation, and African Traditional Health Practitioners’ 
Union.  
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knowledge systems’ policy and is evident too in other applications of neoliberal 
governmentality to forms of indigeneity in South Africa, most obviously incorporations of 
‘indigenous cultural expressions or knowledge’ into intellectual property rights regulations. 
For example, the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill amends several laws governing 
patents, copyright, trademarks, and designs (hereafter PCTD) to ‘[recognise and protect] 
certain manifestations of indigenous knowledge as a species of intellectual property’. To this 
end, when enacted the Bill will establish: a National Database of forms of indigenous 
knowledge that is integrated with national registers of PCTD; a National Trust for 
Indigenous Knowledge to administer and redistribute royalties; and a National Council for 
Indigenous Knowledge to advise the Minister of Trade and Industry and respective PCTD 
registrars. As of September 2012, the Parliamentary process is complete and the Bill awaits 
Presidential assent (see Dean 2011; Ensor 2011; Karrim 2009; PMG 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; 
and more generally Brush 1996; Coombe 1995; Farhat 2008; Greene 2004). Some observers 
prefer to emphasise that knowledge is situated and practical. For example, Green (2008:149-
50) proposes ‘knowledge practices’, ‘knowledge traditions’, or ‘knowledge diversity’ to 
designate what governments from South Africa to India to Brazil call ‘indigenous 
knowledge’. Making the same point, Thornton criticises approaches to ‘traditional healing’ 
that fail to recognise that tradition is ‘a category of critical and dynamic knowledge that is as 
much part of modernity as any other field of knowledge’:  
The sangoma tradition has multiple roots that extend across time, cultures and 
languages, and derives partly from pre-colonial African systems of belief. While its 
appeal is broadening, it is also changing as sangomas are exposed to a wide range of 
other healing traditions and religious views. Today many of their practices scarcely 
resemble the older traditions reported in the early ethnographies, though some, like 
divination, remain…Sangomas offer a wide range of counselling, divination/diagnostic, 
medical and other services. The sangoma’s art is rarely directed simply at organic 
causes of physical disease. They prepare muti (‘medicine’) to protect clients from motor 
accidents, theft, witchcraft, infection, unemployment and loss of love, lovers or spouses. 
They relieve anxiety and depression, assist clients to make decisions and help to find 
lost or stolen objects. The sangoma is not a poor man’s doctor; they generally charge as 
much as a registered medical practitioner would. (Thornton 2009:23) 
In Thornton’s view, sangomas do not need interventions like the THPA to establish their 
status as professionals; they already consider themselves members of a profession with a 
distinct intellectual tradition that is constantly made and remade in dynamic processes of 
circulation, critical reflection and change (see also Van Binsbergen 2005). Not only does this 
account of the epistemological labours of sangomas’ practices contradict the concept of 
indigenous knowledge operated by the multiform tactics of raison d’état, it also suggests that 
the principle of economy is well established in the domain of African traditional medicine 
prior to the state’s exercise of biopower targeting traditional healers. Does this contradict the 
foregoing analysis that the ensemble of apparatuses and technologies of biopower, including 
the THPA and its regulatory mechanisms, extend economy as the principle of state reason 
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into domains where previously this principle was less established? I do not think so, because 
the point of the foregoing analysis is to demonstrate that it is the state, actually a ruling 
government exercising a sovereign power that is constitutive of the state, which monopolises 
these apparatuses and applies these technologies to the population.  
But this critique of the THPA and more generally of the ensemble of tactics of which 
it is a part draws attention to an important implication of the principle of economy for raison 
d’état: the art of government cannot bound or define the limits of the economic domain or 
circumscribe portions of it, whether as ‘African traditional medicine’, ‘indigenous 
knowledge systems’, or any other delimiter. The reason is simply that there is no bird’s-eye 
view, no Archimedean vantage, from which sovereign power can grasp the totality of the 
economic domain and rearrange its elements to optimise the disposition of things towards 
desired ends. The invisible hand of the market is invisible to the sovereign too. As Foucault 
observed, ‘Economics steals away from the juridical form of the sovereign exercising 
sovereignty within a state precisely that which is emerging as the essential element of a 
society’s life, namely economic processes’ (Foucault 2008:282). 
Since the 1990s, the prominence of ethnic bodies, occult economies, defined as ‘The 
deployment of magical means for material ends’ (J. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999:297n31), 
and ‘the kingdom of culture’ in South African political economy has stimulated a number of 
researchers (for example, Ashforth 2005, 2000; Chidester 2012, 2006; J. Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2005, 2004, 2000, 1999; J.L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Kohnert (2003); Leatt 
2009; Mitchell and Mullen 2002; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; Robins 2005, 2003, 2001; Settler 
2013, 2010; and more generally Chabal and Daloz 1999; J. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 
2001; Engelbert 2002; Mbembe 2002, 2001). The work of Jean and John Comaroff in 
particular is distinguished by their sensitivity to how neoliberalism challenges not only 
conceptions of sovereign power in South Africa, but also commodification and the 
commodity form. Not long ago commodification was considered the worst kind of 
appropriation. Lacking even the merit of good intention, commodification was the vanguard 
of modernity’s ‘incursions’ into indigenous societies (Olupona 2004:13-14). Whereas 
appropriation signified a loss of auratic authenticity, commodification was regarded as 
outright corruption that defiled the imputed purity of social relations unsoiled by the 
predations of commercial interest and financial transaction. Ertman and Williams (2005:4) 
observe that the term ‘commodification’ is reserved for certain kinds of sales: it is seldom 
raised with regard to milk delivery or garbage collection, for example. They suggest 
commodification is invoked when boundaries between market and non-market are contested 
and poses questions about whether something should be in or out of the marketplace and 
which social relations should be managed by market forces.  
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The Comaroffs give a different account of commodification. They see in South Africa 
profusions and intensifications of ‘ethno-preneurialism’ dialectically positioned between a 
tendency towards social disorder and violence on the one hand, and towards recourse to law 
as first recourse on the other.10 They argue this dialectic between law and disorder 
increasingly characterises contemporary societies in general but is most pronounced in 
postcolonies, for which South Africa is their primary example. Both tendencies they attribute 
to intensifications of neoliberalism, evident in the art of government as well as the economic 
conduct of individuals, which they suggest is displacing older mechanisms of state authority 
and monopolies on violence (J. Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; J.L. Comaroff and Comaroff 
2009). Significantly, as against an older, negative account of commodification, they suggest 
that the reduction of culture to commodity, commerce, and cash does not necessarily denude 
culture of all auratic, affective, or social worth. Commerce has become a mode of cultivating 
deep and powerful attachments to chosen lifestyles and the values underpinning and framing 
them. What’s more, commerce is a means of accomplishing them, of exercising agency and 
making selfhood. The point is that commodification is not a one-way street and as culture is 
commodified, so is the commodity rendered explicitly cultural, and thus is increasingly 
apprehended as ‘the generic source of sociality’ (J.L. Comaroff and Comaroff 2009:28; cf. 
Muir 2007). The culture of neoliberalism is, in this sense, the world seen from the 
perspective of commodity as generic source of sociality in which culture is commodity, 
knowledge is property, tradition is patent, identity is asset, and indigenous religiosity is 
human capital. 
From the perspective of sovereign power, however, this circumstance is deeply 
problematic. Not only is the sovereign’s political-juridical world which he grasps in its 
totality incompatible with the economic world which he does not, so are homo legalis and 
homo economicus absolutely heterogenous and not superposable. Foucault states the issue 
bluntly: ‘There is no sovereign in economics. There is no economic sovereign.’ (Foucault 
2008:283). The absorption of sociality into the economic domain, or rather, incorporation of 
the principle of economy into the cultural and social relations binding society, transforms 
everyday life into economic process and thereby steals away evermore of ‘the essential 
element of a society’s life’ from the sovereign’s realm, so to speak. Foucault (2008:294) 
sums up the problem as follows: ‘the art of government must be exercised in a space of 
sovereignty—and it is the law of the state which says this—but the trouble, misfortune, or 
problem is that this space turns out to be inhabited by economic subjects.’ 
                                                       
10 Their analysis combines Benjamin’s observations that transgressing law founds another law and gives violence 
law-making power, with Derrida’s observations that this terrifying moment, ‘in which the foundation of law 
remains suspended…by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone’, ‘…is also 
the whole history of law. This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence’ (Derrida 
2002b:169-70; cf. Benjamin 1986a:283,295). 
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From a Foucauldian perspective, we could interpret the dialectic between law and 
disorder analysed by the Comaroffs in terms of the government’s efforts to found 
sovereignty (not assert, but endlessly reestablish sovereignty) by exercising its monopoly on 
violence through lawmaking, by mobilising the violence inherent in the law to found the 
state. On the one hand, law circumscribes, delimits and bounds a realm of application of the 
sovereign’s power; on the other hand, these boundaries are also the limitations of its effort 
and mark the beginning of a domain of disorder, which is to say, a domain that cannot be 
totalised and is not ordered by sovereign power. Both the sovereign’s realm and the 
economic domain are structured by the principle of economy, but whereas neoliberal 
governance seeks to harness this principle to optimise its exercise of sovereign power, the 
disordered economic domain is populated by sovereign individuals who, as neoliberal homo 
economicus, each embody the principle of economy, and as economic actors each invest in 
their human capital as they make entrepreneurial enterprise with their ontological being. The 
art of government—‘the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end’—
is a practice undertaken by sovereign governments as much as sovereign individuals. 
Neoliberal governance desires neoliberal subjects whose self-conduct is a correlate of raison 
d’état and are therefore eminently governable. The problem for sovereignty is that this art of 
optimising preferred arrangements (including conditions conducive to forming and 
sustaining neoliberal subjectivity) also transforms subjects of right into autonomous 
economic actors in relation to a domain increasingly beyond sovereign reach. Sometimes an 
arrangement of things within an economic domain will approximate sovereign governments’ 
preferred arrangements, for example when autonomous individuals freely form themselves 
into professional associations of traditional healers or shamanic practitioners. This ought not 
to surprise us since it is the invisible hand of the economic principle embodied in neoliberal 
homo economicus that gives rise to these initiatives. The important point, however, is that 
these and similar initiatives are not at the sovereign’s behest. The sovereign is always in the 
position of catching up, of trying to gain mastery over a field that it does not control 
(‘African traditional medicine’; ‘indigenous knowledge systems’), often with only a 
rudimentary map compiled from accounts of travelers who have gone before. This is also 
why sovereign power places a premium value on knowledge of the population, because it 
enables government to optimise its targeting of biopower, but also fills out the map with a 
bird’s-eye view of obstacles, opportunities and above all, scale and boundaries. But the 
security obtained by representing the population in this way—by totalising the sum of 
individuals in the detail of their healing modalities, techniques and specialisations, 
prescriptions, their training, its content, location, duration and supervision, and any number 
of regularities and generalities generated by analyses of these details—this security is as 
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fleeting as the correspondence between an object and its representation. The map, afterall, 
only ever sustains an incomplete correspondence with territory.  
Regarded from this perspective, neoliberal shamanism appears as another instance of 
modernity’s double-hinged dialectic. On one side, the sovereign’s epistemological labours 
seeks to: delimit a domain of application in the qualities and properties, patterns and 
regularities, uses and potentials of traditional healing, including as these pertain to people for 
whom these qualities hold relevance or consequences (shamanic or traditional health 
practitioners, their clients, employers, other health professionals, etcetera); gain mastery over 
this domain by a variety of tactics that divide, define, target and circumscribe this knowledge 
of people and things; and optimise the arrangements of this knowledge along with the tactics 
by which it is mastered so that sovereign power may be distributed continuously through its 
many forms, down to the grain of individuals. Transforming things into commodities and 
abilities into human capital is a particularly powerful form of epistemological practice. On 
the other side of the hinge, the ontological labours of neoliberal homo economicus tends to 
deconstruct the sovereign’s epistemological practice into embodied contingencies. 
Professional shamans and traditional health practitioners invest her or his embodied human 
capital and make an entrepreneur of the self. But although these practices partake of the 
same principle of economy, are a correlate of raison d’état, and may be amenable to 
epistemological mastery, to the extent that investing one’s human capital references the 
range of practices related to working with spirits (examples include reading bones; divining 
causes of ailments and afflictions; shamanic techniques of soul retrieval; conveying advice 
and instructions from ancestors; or in the stripped-down Harnerian version, entering a 
shamanic state of consciousness to cultivate shamanic knowledge), these practices exceed 
epistemological circumscription and totalising representations. More than that, they erode 
the imputed stability of shamanic practice as a knowledge domain. This is not to say that 
shamanic practice lacks an epistemological foundation or that neoliberal homo economicus 
escapes sovereign power. Rather, it suggests that no sooner is homo economicus 
circumscribed by homo legalis (voluntarily or by legal compulsion makes little difference) 
than a new contingency exceeds that circumscription and homo economicus is her or his own 
sovereign once again, relatively free to invest her or his human capital and transform an 
ontological being into entrepreneurial enterprise. This constant oscillation between a subject 
of right and economic agent indicates the dialectic, the perpetual motion dynamo, that 
animates and innervervates contemporary neoliberal society as much as it does neoliberal 
shamanism.  
This discussion of shamanism and neoliberalism concludes the four core discussions 
organising this study. In the following chapter, I recapitulate the main argument 
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development in the preceding chapters, consider opportunities for further research, and end 
with a concluding statement. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
I began this study of shamanism with three principle questions. First, how did a kind of ritual 
specialist first reported in Siberia during the seventeenth century become an eponymous 
category of a universal religiosity? Second, for whom is shamanism discourse important, 
how is it effective, and how have these effects enabled further proliferations of shamanism in 
new contexts and practical domains? Third, what is the relationship between shamanism and 
modernity? Successive chapters developed answers to each of these questions, as I 
summarise here.  
The first chapter introduced the central theoretical reference of this study as the 
modern limit attitude and the alternation of ontological and epistemological labours this 
attitude occasions. Epistemological labour references procedures for submitting data to 
methodical analysis and thereby expanding the limits of knowledge in a reach for 
universalisable structures. Ontological labour consists in identifying the contingent in 
everything given as universal, beginning with particularities of bodies and differences 
between particular bodies, and thereby multiplying the surfaces of appearance of a knowing 
self. The simultaneity of epistemological practice that tends to produce universal structures 
and ontological practice that tends to deconstruct universals into embodied contingencies 
establishes a self-perpetuating dynamic that animates and innervates modern history. Thus 
the main argumentative procedure of the thesis was to examine this double-hinged 
articulation of epistemological and ontological labours through successive discussions of 
shamanism, indigenism, environmentalism, and neoliberalism.  
 Chapter Two introduced the reader to the historical specificities of shamanism 
discourse through a genealogical account of the emergence of a discourse about shamanism 
in imperial Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the transfer of this 
discourse to North America around the turn of the twentieth century. A second function of 
Chapter Two was methodological, made explicit in the chapter’s concluding discussion that 
responded to the Derridean critique that genealogy is a form of logos too, that the 
constitution of this logos relies on the same structures of knowledge it seeks to critique, and 
that genealogy therefore is to some extent complicit with perpetuating the same discursive 
formations it claims to disrupt. Drawing on chronophotography as a metaphor, the discussion 
situated this criticism with reference to modernity’s double-hinged articulation of 
epistemological and ontological labours by demonstrating that genealogy participates in the 
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same perpetual oscillations between circumscribed unity and erosive contingency. I argued 
that genealogy acquires its critical potential when the limit attitude within genealogy itself is 
acknowledged, and the contingencies of divisions, sequencing and choices structuring the 
internal coherence of a genealogical account are recognised. I suggested that genealogy’s 
critical potential is realised when it gives itself over to critique such that the double-hinge 
operating within genealogy is perceived by a recognising subject and becomes their 
perception. This relationship of perception is a form of practice and embodies the modern 
limit attitude and labour dialectic this limit attitude occasions. The chapter concluded by 
inviting the reader to engage in this perceptual practice in their reading of remaining 
chapters.  
Chapter Three introduced the question of indigeneity to the analysis of shamanism via 
a close, situated reading of the historical emergence of an indigenist critique of human rights 
law. The key question for indigenists was how to secure indigenous peoples’ collective right 
to self-determination in the face of opposition from nation-states who currently exercise 
sovereignty over indigenous lands, territories and resources. The relevance of this question 
for shamanism discourse became clearer as greater autonomy for indigenous peoples at a 
substate level emerged as a viable solution to indigenist claims because indigenist’ elevation 
of cosmology and religiosity as a fundamental dimension of indigenous practices of 
territoriality required a transnational discursive structure through which indigenists, state 
agents, jurists and other interested parties could achieve mutual intelligibility within the 
epistemological requirements of law and legal precedent. As a universal category, ‘shaman’ 
became an instrumental part of indigenism’s double-hinged interpolation of ontological 
being and legal epistemology, evident for example in the trial testimony of the Awas Tingni 
case and subsequent cases citing the precedent this case established. At the same time, the 
authority of judicial judgments and legal precedent added law’s emphasis on consistency, 
rationality and citation to shamanism’s discursive regularities.  
Chapter Three’s discussion of the emergence in history of a remarkably consistent and 
coherent transnational indigenous identity enabled discussions of shamanism’s imbrications 
with environmentalism and neoliberalism in chapters Four and Five respectively. Chapter 
Three demonstrated how articulations of indigenous identity in terms of cosmologically-
oriented and spiritually-mediated relations between indigenous peoples and their lands 
became a vitalising element of transnational indigenism. Amid growing concern during the 
1980s about the unsustainability of human development policies and strategies, this quality 
identified indigenous peoples as valuable partners for development agencies, 
conservationists, and ecologists. Chapter Four built on this preceding analysis to show how 
the historical emergence of an indigenist-environmentalist alliance generated a symbolic 
economy of indigenous authenticity that supplied indigenous symbolic capital to an 
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ecocentric critique of anthropocentric mastery of nature. These developments inflected 
shamanism discourse in at least two important ways. Firstly, representing indigenous 
ecocentric disposition in terms of indigenous cosmovisions and shamanic religiosities 
validated and reinvigorated an aesthetic critique of modernity in which shamans have 
historically featured prominently but that had begun to appear hackneyed and stale amid the 
eclecticism of New Age syncretism and bricolage. Secondly, as ecocentrism cached an 
aesthetic critique of modernity with indigenous symbolic capital, so did styles of 
representing shamans adjust, along with shamanism discourse. Symbolic capital invested in 
indigenous identity ensured indigenous shamans became desirable partners in the labours of 
representing and promoting universal shamanism, seen for example in the Foundation for 
Shamanic Studies’ various projects to ‘preserve and revive indigenous shamanism’, the Gaia 
Foundation’s Sacred Sites Network, and local partnerships in Colombia, South Africa, and 
Tuva, as well as Bradford Keeney’s Ringing Rocks Foundation and Zulu shaman Credo 
Mutwa’s relatively sudden elevation to international prominence, both examples mentioned 
in Chapter One. 
This symbolic economy for indigenous authenticity also demonstrated that although 
ontological contingencies erode the imputed stability of epistemological circumscription, this 
circumscription still requires an ontological quality, or risk crossing the threshold into 
hyperreal simulation. The symbolic economy of indigenous authenticity generated 
increasingly abstract representations of indigeneity on the threshold of hyperreality: the 
purported identities between indigenous peoples and nature, indigenous knowledge and 
ecological knowledge, cultural diversity conservation and biodiversity conservation, 
indigenous development and sustainable development, and of course the universality of an 
indigenous cosmovision and religiosity itself. To guard against dissolutions of indigenous 
ontology into simulacra of indigenous religiosity, universal representations required distinct, 
diverse and historically specific indigenous peoples to attest to the veracity and validity of 
universal representations, as we saw with The Gaia Foundation’s work across three 
continents. As a structural requirement of the economy itself, this indigenous testimony is 
required not just once, but repeatedly, because the modern limit attitude labours only at the 
limits and does not (because it cannot) retread old ground.  
The desirability of indigeneity discussed in Chapter Four was explored in greater 
detail in Chapter Five, by considering transatlantic exchanges between southern Africa and 
North America. However, whereas Chapter Four’s analysis was anchored by Bourdieu’s 
sociological theory of practice, Chapter Five was anchored by Foucault’s critique of 
neoliberalism in relation to practices of the self. The discussion demonstrated how the 
neoliberal critique of labour enabled the notion of engaging with spirits to be recast as a form 
of human capital that could be developed, trained, and invested to generate an income stream 
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over time, and illustrated this argument with examples of professional shamanic practitioners 
and the growth of shamanic practice as a profession. As spiritual entrepreneurs of the self, 
professional shamans exemplify neoliberal homo economicus whose investment in their 
embodied human capital transforms their shamanic practice into a form of economic self-
conduct. However, because the economising rationality that informs this self-conduct is the 
same as that informing raison d’état, neoliberal subjects, including professional shamans, are 
increasingly targeted by sovereign power better to optimise and coordinate scarce means 
towards desired ends. In this way, a neoliberal art of government connects and extends the 
principle of economy throughout the sovereign’s domain, reducing friction and optimising 
continuities between self-conduct and the conduct of government, and innervating the body 
politic with an increasingly sensitive apparatus of coordination and self-regulation. Amid 
transformations of culture into commodity, knowledge into property, tradition into patent, 
identity into asset, and shamanic practice into human capital, shamanic religiosities are 
increasingly drawn into the ambit of things arranged by governments as much as by 
professional shamans to optimise desirable ends. But herein lies the problem: the delimited 
and circumscribed space of sovereign power—its jurisdiction so to speak—is increasingly 
inhabited by economic subjects who, by their very ontology, increasingly resist 
circumscription. By embodying a specifically neoliberal homo economicus, professional 
shamans are eminently governable, but for the same reason are not reducible to homo legalis 
and therefore resist circumscription by sovereign power. Thus we see in neoliberal 
shamanism the double-hinge operating in the  oscillation between an economic agent and a 
subject of right.  
Throughout this study I have tried to represent the problems and issues considered 
here in terms of processes. Rather than dependent and independent variables, we are dealing 
with interrelated events: things happen because other things have happened, are happening, 
or are anticipated to happen. An indigenist agenda became established at international 
forums like the UN because the promise of a moral transcendence of politics produced 
political contexts more receptive to indigenist claims. In Bourdieusian terms, one could say 
the ascendency of individual human rights discourse altered the stakes structuring the field 
of indigenous struggles at an international level and therewith the position of indigenists 
relative to other players, mainly states, competing for those stakes. These developments also 
increased the worth of symbolic capital cached in transnational indigenous identity and 
transformed indigeneity into an important mediator in respect of anxiety regarding the 
sustainability of contemporary human development policies and strategies. The growing 
prominence of transnational indigenous identity has been imbricated with other global 
processes too. Elaborations and consolidations of a specifically neo-liberal homo-
economicus have incorporated signifiers of indigenous ontological alterity (for example, the 
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unique cosmological bond between indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands; ecocentric 
disposition; indigenous knowledge; shamanic religiosity) into its techniques of the self. But 
because this kind of self-conduct correlates with the principle of economy in the neoliberal 
art of government, these same signifiers are increasingly prominent in the constant 
adjustments between techniques that coerce the population and processes through which a 
self constructs and modifies its self. These imbricated processes have broadened circulations 
of signs and bodies (Johnson 2002; cf. Chidester 2006), broadened their range, intensified 
their local penetration, and brought about all kinds of new relations and exchanges. They 
have, as Appadurai has said, brought us into altogether new conditions of neighbourliness, 
and therewith precipitated new kinds of problems and challenges (Appadurai 1996:29).  
But what does all of this say about shamanism? What does shamanism mean in a 
world increasingly sensitive to indigenous peoples’ practices of territoriality, increasingly 
concerned about humans’ relationship with natural environments we all share, increasingly 
encouraged and coerced to adjust self-conduct to comport with and augment government 
conduct? Indeed, what does shamanism mean in a world increasingly integrated by digital 
communication technologies that not only extend the self in all kinds of novel ways, but also 
amplify polyvocality and intensify dialogism? What conclusions can we draw from this 
research and what are some of the most significant implications?  
With this research I have tried to show how shamanism—the regularities, unities, 
modalities, and strategies that link statements about shamans and shamanic religiosities into 
a knowledge structure—supplies discursive language with which to articulate and represent a 
range of new and emerging concerns at a transnational level, along with debates and 
conflicts these concerns inevitably occasion. The examples presented in the preceding 
chapters suggest shamanism supplies a discursive frame and thus language to an increasingly 
diverse array of interested parties. Indigenists, conservationists, jurists, bioprospectors, 
entrepreneurs, legislators, activists of various stripes, lawyers of various specialisations, state 
representatives and agencies, institutional agents, and innumerable related social actors, 
including academicians, all rely—in different ways—on shamanism’s discursive language to 
articulate their concerns and interests and interpret the claims of others. For these agents, 
contemporary shamanism discourse variously articulates critiques of prevailing notions of 
universal human rights, anthropocentric mastery of nature, sovereignty and self-
determination, and physiological, spiritual, personal, and communal aspects of human 
health. This is as true for advocates of these critiques as for agents who are engaged by them, 
even if they disagree with their merits. These articulations and representations in terms of a 
discourse about shamans and shamanic religiosities have stimulated shamanism with more 
diverse applications and wider circulations, promoting its proliferation and dispersal to 
practical contexts in which historically people called ‘shamans’ and practices that may be 
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described as ‘shamanic’ have been less prominent if not absent. In turn, the modalities, 
regularities, and unities of discursive practices in these imbricated domains are conveyed 
back into shamanism’s discursive language to inflect and modify representations of shamans 
and shamanic religiosities with the tropes, styles and themes of these practical domains.  
I have also tried to show with this research how shamanism is both a product and is 
productive of the modern limit attitude. Wherever shamanism’s discursive language is 
instrumentalised to represent practical interests and concerns, perpetual oscillations between 
circumscription and contingency proliferate and disperse as well as intensify and condense a 
discourse about shamans and shamanic religiosities. These labours simultaneously expand 
the limits of knowledge about shamanic religiosity and multiply the surfaces of appearance 
of a knowing, desiring self, as well as inflect knowledge about shamans with new concerns, 
generate more discursive iterations, and adjust shamanism’s discursive regularities, 
modalities, and unities. These two ideas—that shamanism is a product of the modern limit 
attitude, and supplies discursive language to related practical domains—are represented 
schematically in figure two.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: thesis structure 
 
This schematic representation encapsulates the thesis of this study and summarises its 
basic argument as it has been pursued in the course of the preceding chapters: the emergence 
of modern subjectivity as a practical limit attitude inaugurated a discourse about shamans 
that has been elaborated over the course of three centuries via perpetual oscillations between 
epistemological labour’s tendency towards universalism and ontological labour’s tendency 
toward contingency. In recent decades this discourse has supplied a discursive structuration 
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for a diverse array of new interests and concerns, facilitating in turn proliferations and 
intensifications of shamanism discourse in new practical domains and at increasing scales of 
complexity and transnational distribution, and giving new prominence and visibility to 
people called ‘shamans’ and practices that may be described as ‘shamanic’.  
The two parts of this argument are perhaps most succinctly captured in the double 
meaning of articulate. Various social actors use shamanism’s discursive language to 
coherently express their concerns and cogently convey their interests. However, shamanism 
is itself an articulation, which is to say, it designates a hinged joint and thus a range of 
possible movements. Regarded from this latter perspective, shamanism as a discursive 
practice is an occasion for thinking about the operations of the modern limit attitude and the 
double-hinged articulation of ontological contingency with epistemological circumscription. 
The various examples considered in preceding chapters have signalled the basic problematic 
of this research: contingencies of ontological labour always exceed epistemological 
circumscription and totalising representations. This is not to say that ontological 
contingencies cannot be circumscribed or represented, but it is to say that this excess will 
always erode totalising circumscriptions and challenge the coherence and stability of 
universal representations. Epistemological circumscription therefore constantly adjusts to 
accommodate this endless surplus, while the bounded limits of what knowledge must 
renounce exceeding are constantly renewed so that the edifice of the universal, or at least the 
possibility of universality, is sustained.1 In this sense, this study has been less concerned 
with a Derridean critique of the metaphysics of presence inhabiting language and more 
concerned with discursive practice and practical effects arising from perpetual oscillations 
between epistemological and ontological labours that animates and innervates modern 
history, like a dynamo produces energy and nerves supply sensation to a body.2 Whether 
articulating indigenist claims to greater autonomy in relation to lands, territories, and 
resources, or the anxieties of a transnational ecological imaginary that increasingly takes 
humans’ destructive relationship with the planetary biosphere as its object of concern, or 
challenges posed to transnational intellectual property regimes by the increasing 
commodification of identity and culture, or indeed opportunities afforded professional 
                                                       
1 This problematic recalls Foucault’s essay on Kant, wherein he turns the Kantian question back on itself by 
characterising the modern philosophical ethos as limit-attitude: ‘If the Kantian question was that of knowing 
what limits knowledge must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned 
back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by 
whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?’ (Foucault 2003:53) 
2 To some extent erosions of epistemological certainty by ontological contingency recalls Derrida’s critique of 
the metaphysics of presence that halts the multiplying riot of différance with logocentrism (Derrida 1976). 
However, in this study I have sought to foreground labours that instantiate logos (beginning with my own, as I 
demonstrated in the concluding discussion of Chapter Two), along with these labours’ effects. Stated in this 
way, I am reminded of Foucault’s observation: ‘People know what they do; they frequently know why they do 
what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does’ (quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 
1983:187). 
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shamanic practitioners, these historical developments have drawn on shamanism to articulate 
their key concerns.  
The various discussions in preceding chapters tend to confirm Adlam and Holyoak’s 
analysis that future research will need to engage implications for shamanic religiosities of 
consumerism, commodification, and late capitalism, along with impacts of new technologies, 
particularly as these stimulate new modes of cultural production and consumption, new 
patterns of circulation, and alter cultural profiles (Adlam and Holyoak 2005:535). Although 
these problems are not exclusively relevant to shamanism research, and neither are they 
entirely new, they are increasingly salient under the new conditions of neighbourliness 
emerging in recent years. From this perspective, shamanism increasingly adumbrates new 
kinds of problems in a growing number of practical domains with which shamanic 
religiosities are increasingly imbricated. By way of concluding this study, I want to end with 
some thoughts on opportunities for further research.  
 
Further Research Opportunities 
Shamanism and Ecocriticism 
One possibility for further research is indicated by the frequency with which shamanism’s 
discursive language is mobilised to articulate a variety of concerns related to degradations of 
ecological environments and humans’ relations with nature. The analysis presented in 
previous chapters situated these instrumentalisations in relation to specific interests 
structuring fields and how these changed over a relatively short period of time, generating a 
symbolic economy for indigenous authenticity and related practical consequences discussed 
at length in Chapter Four. However, notwithstanding these historical questions, for growing 
numbers of people around the planet shamanism is an important intellectual and cultural 
resource for thinking about humans’ relationship with natural environments. Bron Taylor’s 
research into the spiritual and religious dimensions of the environmental movement led him 
to coin the term ‘dark green religion’ to describe a range of religious or spiritual perspectives 
or dispositions mediating anxieties about humans’ impacts on natural environments and the 
earth biosphere more generally (B. Taylor 2009, 2001a, 2001b, 1997, 1995; Taylor and Van 
Horn 2006). Dark green religion refers to a range of beliefs and practices ‘flowing from a 
strong sense of belonging to and interconnectedness in nature, while perceiving the earth and 
its living systems to be sacred and interconnected’, and emerges from what Taylor calls the 
environmentalist milieu: ‘contexts in which environmentally concerned officials, scientists, 
activists, and other citizens connect with and reciprocally influence each other’ (B. Taylor 
2009:13-4). In this sense, Taylor’s typology of dark green religion maps the spiritual and 
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religious tendencies of the ‘green’ milieu. Although Taylor is not the first to distinguish 
varieties of concern about natural environment in terms of shades of green (see Harries-
Jones 1993:46-9), his account is almost certainly the most thoroughly researched and 
historically situated. Taylor proposes a four-way typology of dark green religion (Figure 3). 
 
 Animism Gaian Earth Religion 
Supernaturalism Spiritual Animism Gaian Spirituality 
Naturalism Naturalistic Animism Gaian Naturalism 
 
Figure 3: dark green religion 
 
The rows and columns of this table indicate tendencies and the types themselves are 
highly permeable, indicated by the dotted lines distinguishing them. The tendency towards 
animism, in Taylor’s analysis ‘a shared perception that beings or entities in nature have their 
own integrity, ways of being, personhood, and even intelligence’, leads to forms of ritualised 
action through which people develop relationships with these non-human beings, entities, or 
spirits. On the other hand, the tendency towards Gaian earth religion is informed by an 
organicist tradition that takes the whole, usually understood scientifically, as a model. The 
diverging tendencies between supernaturalism and naturalism in Taylor’s analysis turns on 
differing attitudes towards non-human beings and entities, with the former tending to 
emphasise the factuality of spirits and agency of non-human beings, while the latter tends 
towards a more metaphorical and conceptual reference to non-human beings within an 
ecocentric view of the environment and people’s place in it.  
If one were to locate shamanic religiosities in relation to Taylor’s typology, tendencies 
in much shamanism discourse towards what Taylor characterises as animism and 
supernaturalism suggests shamanic religiosities best correspond with Taylor’s Spiritual 
Animist type. However, if that was true in the past, it could be argued based on successive 
discussions in preceding chapters that shamanism’s proliferations and dispersals into new 
practical domains have inflected shamanist discursive practice with tendencies towards 
Gaian Earth Religion and to a lesser extent Naturalism. Harnerian core shamanism 
undoubtedly corresponds closest to Spiritual Animism as perhaps do indigenist 
representations of their cosmovisions in relation to indigenous self-determination. But the 
case is less clear when one considers indigenists’ representations of their cosmovisions in the 
context of the indigenist-environmentalist alliance, or Gaia’s Sacred Sites Network and 
Cormac Cullinan’s Wild Law (for examples of the latter see contributions to Burdon 2011). 
It seems unlikely Gaian Naturalists would have much use for shamanism and at present 
would likely have serious misgivings about the centrality of spirits and similar agentive 
forces in representing natural processes of the Earth biosphere. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that shamanism has become an important means of articulating a critique of humans’ 
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relationship with natural environments, and ultimately with the earth biosphere we all share, 
it could be argued that enthusiasm for shamanic religiosities and hence for shamanism’s 
discursive language in recent years is a creative response to the challenging difficulties of 
comprehending and responding to the increasing sense of precariousness and vulnerability 
many people feel about the future of human life on planet earth. An essay by historian 
Dipesh Chakrabarty illustrates the issue.  
Chakrabarty grapples with the profound and transformative implications that 
anthropogenic theories of climate change pose for thinking about human history. 
Referencing Alan Weisman’s book The World Without Us in which Weisman invites his 
readers to imagine a world left behind by humans who have become extinct (Weisman 
2007), Chakrabarty suggests going along with Weisman’s thought experiment is profoundly 
difficult because it requires we insert ourselves into a future ‘without us’ in order to visualise 
it. Climate change disrupts the assumption underpinning the discipline of history—that our 
future, present, and past are connected by a continuity of human experience—by putting the 
future ‘beyond the grasp of historical sensibility’ and disconnecting future and past 
(Chakrabarty 2009:197). Reflecting on this problem, Chakrabarty outlines four theses. 
Firstly, anthropogenic climate change collapses the time-honoured distinction between 
natural and human history. Whereas historians concern themselves with human affairs and 
perceive humans as agents of passing events, ‘the events of nature are mere events’. Nature 
has no ‘inside’; it is process without agency. Environmental historians made some headway 
breaching this artificial distinction, but they too speak of humans as biological agents and 
operate within a disciplinary knowledge framework that prioritises the agency of humans 
above other kinds of agentive forces. This is precisely where the anthropogenic theory of 
climate change disturbs the historical sensibility:3 it challenges this artificial distinction 
between natural and human histories by positing humans not as individual biological agents, 
but as a collective geological force. 
In geological periodisation, the last ice age or Pleistocene was followed by the warmer 
Holocene, our present period during which warmer conditions enabled biological life to 
flourish. The notion that humans have become a geological agent on the planet has led some 
scientists to propose a new geological age, the Anthropocene. The key idea of this proposal, 
which is currently under consideration by the Geological Society of London, while the 
Geological Society of America titled its 2011 Annual Meeting ‘Archean to Anthropocene: 
The Past is the Key to the Future’ (see Chakrabarty 2009:209-10) is that humans exist as a 
geological force. This kind of agency challenges the account of human agency familiar to 
                                                       
3 Chakrabarty acknowledges that theories of anthropogenic climate change are controversial but explains that he 
accepts the scientific consensus and bases his discussion on the assumption that these theories are correct (see 
Chakrabarty 2009:200-1).  
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professional historians like Chakrabarty, for whom the key concern for human histories since 
the eighteenth century to the present era of globalisation has been freedom.4 Certainly ideas 
about what constitutes freedom vary considerably with human cultural and historical 
diversity, but this malleability only underlines this word’s rhetorical power. Indeed, the 
discussion of modernity’s double-hinged subjectivity in Chapter One showed how an 
impetus towards critique is a consequence of the modern limit attitude: by interrogating its 
own contingencies, this form of subjectivity acts on these contingencies as the limits the 
crossing of which will (temporarily) satisfy desire and therewith the will to freedom. 
Chakrabarty notes that in none of these humanist accounts of freedom has there been 
recognition that human beings have been acquiring geological agency ‘at the same time as 
and through processes closely linked with their acquisition of freedom’ (Chakrabarty 
2009:208). There are of course compelling (human) historical reasons why geological time 
and the chronology of human histories have been kept separate. Still, the anthropogenic 
theory of climate change is rapidly closing this distance, prompting Chakrabarty’s second 
thesis: the Anthropocene severely qualifies humanist histories of modernity and 
globalisation. These qualifications create confusion. Is the period since the Enlightenment 
better conceived as one of freedom or the Anthropocene? Is the Anthropocene a critique of 
the narratives of freedom or is geological agency the price we pay for pursuing freedom? 
The problem is that, as Chakrabarty puts it, ‘the geologic now of the Anthropocene has 
become entangled with the now of human history’: although human’s acquisition of 
geological agency is deeply entangled with histories of capital, a critique of capital is 
insufficient for questioning that acquisition or its implications in the present time of rapid 
climate change (Chakrabarty 2009:212). 
The necessity of a different kind of historical perspective brings Chakrabarty to his 
third thesis: the hypothesis regarding human’s geological agency requires that global 
histories of capital be put in conversation with the species history of humans. These two 
kinds of histories begin differently. Geologists and climate scientists can give a historical 
account of why current trends in climate change are anthropogenic in nature. However, since 
it is not the geological planet that is threatened but rather the geological and biological 
conditions that have sustained human life during the Holocene, a particular kind of historical 
self-awareness is required to comprehend that climate change is a crisis for humans at a 
                                                       
4 ‘Freedom, one could say, is a blanket category for diverse imaginations of human autonomy and sovereignty. 
Looking at the works of Kant, Hegel, or Marx; nineteenth-century ideas of progress and class struggle; the 
struggle against slavery; the Russian and Chinese revolutions; the resistance to Nazism and Fascism; the 
decolonization movements of the 1950s and 1960s and the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam; the evolution 
and explosion of the rights discourse; the fight for civil rights for African Americans, indigenous peoples, 
Indian Dalits, and other minorities; down to the kind of arguments that, say, Amartya Sen put forward in his 
book Development as Freedom, one could say that freedom has been the most important motif of written 
accounts of human history of these two hundred and fifty years.’ (Chakrabarty 2009:208) 
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species level rather than for the planet as such. ‘Species’, a word Chakrabarty notes 
designates humans as a form of life among others, is used by biologists and geologists 
working in ‘deep history’ hundreds of thousands of years beyond the horizon of the last few 
thousand years of ‘recorded history’; it is never used in standard historical or political-
economic critiques of globalisation by scholars on the Left. Some of the difficulties of 
bridging this distance and placing historically the crisis of climate change are suggested by 
the discomfort of bringing together the planetary and the global, deep and recorded histories, 
and species thinking and critiques of capital. It is uncomfortable because it entails unfamiliar 
arrangements, conjunctions, proximities, and modes of thought, as if one were wearing 
clothes tailored for a body of different dimensions.  
Chakrabarty’s fourth thesis develops this idea: ‘the cross-hatching of species history 
and the history of capital is a process of probing the limits of historical understanding’ 
(Chakrabarty 2009:220). This probing at the limits can be highly productive, but it is also 
profoundly challenging. Humanist histories produce meaning by appealing to our capacity to 
reconstruct events by drawing on our past experience. This capacity is not available to 
species histories because we humans never experience ourselves as a species: ‘[I]n species 
history, humans are only an instance of the concept species as indeed would be any other life 
form. But one never experiences being a concept’ (Chakrabarty 2009:220). We humans are 
challenged with a dilemma: we have developed sophisticated critiques with which we can 
understand ourselves as humans and locate ourselves in relation to the present crisis, but 
these are insufficient at the level of species history because we experience ourselves as so 
many instances of a human species rather than as the species itself. Summing up his essay, 
Chakrabarty concludes:  
Species may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emergent, new universal 
history of humans that flashes up in the moment of the danger that is climate change. 
But we can never understand this universal. …climate change poses for us a question of 
a human collectivity, an us, pointing to a figure of the universal that escapes our 
capacity to experience the world. (Chakrabarty 2009:221-2).  
Chakrabarty’s essay is not without problems, but that’s the point too. His essay is 
perhaps better conceived as a prolegomenon, a sketch of a problematic that invites 
engagement and elaboration (see for example, Baucom 2012; Dibley 2012; Žižek 2010:330-
6). However, from the perspective of shamanism studies, Chakrabarty’s essay casts a 
different light on the analysis of shamanism presented in preceding chapters. I have argued 
that proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse in recent decades can be 
attributed at least in part to a conjuncture of historical processes that from around the 1970s 
onwards increasingly drew on shamanism’s discursive language to articulate the concerns 
and interests of agents contesting stakes constituting corresponding practical fields. Could it 
be that proliferations and intensifications of shamanism discourse also have to do with this 
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dilemma of bridging the distance between human and natural histories compelled to merge 
in the Anthropocene? Could it be that the various examples of discursive and embodied 
practice in relation to shamanism discussed in preceding chapters are also examples of 
experiments in bridging this distance? Is it plausible that at least some of the proliferations 
and intensifications of shamanism discourse in recent years are a consequence of attempts to 
fill this emerging lacuna in contemporary history? Can a case be made that shamanism 
discourse is better situated within and interpreted as part of a larger discussion about 
bridging this distance, or at least mediating it, by ‘cross-hatching’ diverse but interrelated 
perspectives in an interdisciplinary project that brings together radical ecology, economics, 
ethics, indigenous feminisms, history, philosophy, and theology among other disciplinary 
perspectives, including shamanism studies? Are proliferations of shamanism discourse a 
correlate in non-academic contexts of emerging ‘non-anthropocentric human sciences’ 
(Domanska 2010:118)?  
I think there is something worthwhile in the suggestion that at least some of 
shamanism’s discursive concerns have to do with creatively experimenting with ways of 
articulating an emergent, new universal history of humans, even if Chakrabarty is correct 
that we can never understand this universal. The central motif of much shamanism discourse 
since the eighteenth century, that the shaman is a mediator between worlds, offers a 
suggestive metaphor for reorienting embodied dispositions from anthropocentric to 
ecocontric ones, no less than bridging the distance between species history and human 
history. In Chapter Four I outlined a distinction between anthropocentric and ecocentric 
ways of perceiving the world, where the former refers to humans’ mastery of nature, and the 
latter provides a critique disavowing a distinction between natural life and human life, along 
with a range of ethical implications and responsibilities this disavowal entails. Some of the 
examples discussed in Chapter Four, such as Cormac Cullinan’s notion of ‘wild law’ or The 
Gaia Foundation’s Sacred Sites Network, suggest something of the enthusiasm for resorting 
to a shamanic idiom in experimental modes of thinking about humans as a species among 
others and therewith our (human) species’ relation to the natural world. Whether these 
experiments offer a route towards non-anthropocentric perspectives on humans’ species 
history and geological agency, or how successful these experiments will be remains to be 
seen. However, growing interest in varieties of ecocriticism suggests there is room, 
enthusiasm, and urgency for innovative research addressing these questions (Coupe 2000; 
Peterson and Peterson 1996; Zimmerman and Callicott 1998). A burgeoning field of research 
and practice in recent decade, ecocriticism has stimulated a range of more focused 
interdisciplinary studies, including literary ecocriticism (for example Buell 2005; Garrard 
2011; Goodbody and Rigby 2011; Glotfelty and Fromm 1996), ecofeminism (for example 
Kronlid 2003; Ruether 2005; Sturgeon 1997; Warren 1997), ecotheology (for example 
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Ashford 2012; Berry 2009, 2006; Hallman 1994; McFague 2008; Neu 2002) and 
environmental ethics (M. Smith 2001).  
 
Religion, neo-liberalism, and post-secularism 
A second range of inquiries that have attracted growing interest in recent years concerns 
commodifications of religiosity. This is hardly a new topic, least of all in relation to 
prosperity gospels (Coleman 2000), so-called ‘eastern’ religions (Carrette and King 2005; 
Kitiarsa 2007), or indeed indigenous religiosities (Jocks 1996; Ramos 2000). However, these 
studies are often located in relation to transnational circulations of commoditised culture and 
processes of globalisation, and less so in relation to local economies and circulations. Some 
attention has been given to occult economies in postcolonial contexts, particularly where 
these economies are illicit (for example J. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; Whitehead and 
Wright 2004). However, I think there is opportunity for further research into 
commoditisations of religiosity in relation to practices of the self. Consider a recent blog 
post by Jonathan Bender, an ‘Authenticity Coach and Intuitive Business Strategist’ based in 
Oakland, California (Bender 2011). Titled ‘Conscious Entrepreneurs: Come Out of the 
Spiritual Closet!’, Bender suggests ‘many coaches, entrepreneurs, holistic practitioners, and 
more are just done with the old paradigm to simply make money’. According to Bender, they 
want to transform the world by adhering to their life purpose: 
For many of us spiritually-based (at least in our personal lives) entrepreneurs, Divine 
Presence is the real reason behind our passions and work in the world. We weren’t 
given a choice—we must do what we are doing, and must continue to follow our inner 
guidance. There’s no shortage of us—and our numbers are radically growing. Yes, 2012 
is here.  
Bender’s article is posted in the Professional Development section of the website 
Biznik.com. Described as ‘an online networking community for independent business people 
to come together, share resources, referrals, and support’, the website’s tagline is ‘Going it 
alone, Together’ (Biznik 2012). What does it mean to ‘come out of the spiritual closet’ as a 
‘conscious entrepreneur’ and ‘go it alone, together’? What kind of ‘reason’ is this sense of 
Divine Presence that compels a passion for transforming the world? What kind of 
transformation does it aspire towards and what kind of self-transformation does it suggest 
has already occurred? What is the relationship between spiritually-based entrepreneurialism 
and the commodity form? If the Comaroffs are correct and the commodity form is 
increasingly a generic source of sociality, is there anything that distinguishes commoditised 
religiosity from Durkheim’s moral community (Durkheim 1995)? Alternatively, if religiosity 
in the form of commodity is shaped by market sentiment, what distinguishes this kind of 
sentiment from the ‘religious sentiment’ described by William James (1916:27) as ‘a 
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collective name for the many sentiments which religious objects may arouse in alternation’? 
According to Martin Marty, not much:  ‘Religion is now a consumer item for a nation of 
spiritual window shoppers’ (quoted in Moltmann 1998:152). Marty’s remark portrays 
religion as something exterior to the self that becomes interior through consumption. What 
of the production side of this equation, however? What kinds of practices of the self 
transform cultures into commodities? If commoditisation of religiosity refers to practices 
through which selfhood is made, is religious practice today becoming a kind of neoliberal 
entrepreneurialism? How does this kind of religious practice square with neoliberals’ 
revisionist theories of land, labour, and capital? If the commodity form is increasingly a 
generic source of sociality, how does commoditisation of cultural objects (whether or not 
they are vested with religious significance) qualify Marx’s account of commodity fetishism 
(cf. Marx 1906:81-7)? Can it be shown that the commodity form, while obscuring some 
kinds of social relations, also makes other kinds more apparent and even strengthens them?  
When restated as hypotheses, these abstract and theoretical problems raise 
methodological questions about the merits of different approaches, and whether 
anthropological fieldwork, an empirically-grounded sociological methodology, or a social 
constructivist approach that emphasises the importance of language and representation, as I 
have done in this study, is better suited to the task. Whether this problematic indicates a 
useful and worthwhile research project is an important consideration. Expansions of 
professional shamanic services and growing demand for self-improvement techniques and 
resources reported by research consultancies like Marketdata Enterprises suggests this 
research certainly would be relevant for further understanding the significance of religion in 
relation to neoliberal spiritual entrepreneurialism (cf. Lindner 2009).  
Adding more variables further draws out implications and suggests wider applications. 
Commoditisation raises problems of ownership, and therewith questions about who benefits 
and benefit sharing. As we saw in Chapter Five, this is a challenging problem in the context 
of reforming intellectual property law, both to guard against piracy and theft as well as to 
ensure communities are able to advance their socio-economic development by economic use 
of their culture, identity, and local knowledge. However, intellectual property law is part of a 
larger concern about ensuring local social and economic developments are part of 
investment-planning and are measurable outcomes of business practices, particularly at a 
transnational level. For example, the Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework of 
the International Finance Corporation (hereafter IFC), a development finance institution and 
member of the World Bank Group, requires that clients establish ongoing relationships with 
communities affected by business investment and actively seek broader development 
opportunities, particularly where affected communities are indigenous. The IFC gives as 
examples: supporting indigenous peoples’ development priorities; addressing gender and 
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generational issues; documenting indigenous peoples’ culture and society (including 
‘culture, demographic structure, gender and intergenerational relations and social 
organization, institutions, production systems, religious beliefs, and resource use patterns’); 
strengthening indigenous peoples’ capacity to implement and monitor development 
programmes; protecting indigenous knowledge and safeguarding intellectual property rights; 
and, facilitating indigenous peoples’ partnerships with public, private and NGO sectors (IFC 
2012a). As we saw in Chapter Three, international human rights law and jurisprudence is 
increasingly sensitive to these issues. Following the Awas Tingni precedent and the general 
trend in statutory requirements, as well as new ‘best practice’ models such as promoted by 
the IFC (IFC 2012b), in future we should expect debates about indigenous development to 
be increasingly inflected by religious and cosmological aspects of indigenous peoples’ 
development priorities, particularly concerning private sector investments in their lands and 
territories as well as with regards partnerships with public, private and NGO sectors.  
These issues are not only relevant for indigenous communities and private sector 
corporations. Governments are embroiled in these issues too and compelled to mediate 
between the interests of national economies and local communities. The twin discussions in 
Chapter Five demonstrated that while government is ordinarily thought of as an objective 
structure of authority, it is perhaps better conceived of as forms of practice that optimise a 
relation between scarce means and desired ends, and manages resources accordingly. The art 
of government refers to the conduct of governments as much as it does self-conduct, so that 
(neoliberal) governmentality extends sovereign power capillary-like into the bodies of 
sovereign subjects, connecting them into a kind of nervous system in which the whole is 
sensitive to self-conduct in the furthest parts. However, reading the discussion of 
governmentality in Chapter Five with the indigenist critique of self-determination in Chapter 
Three, an important question arises. If government is better conceived as a form of reason 
that constitutes a sovereign power and a sovereign state (raison d’état), and secondly, if the 
principle of economy coordinating this practical reason is increasingly sensitive to religious 
cosmovisions, rituals, symbols, spiritual techniques and the like (whether entrepreneurial or 
territorial), then what does this intersection offer by way of a critical vantage on the 
changing relationship between religion and the state? Debates around post-secularism, public 
religions, and public theologies have become increasingly topical and productive areas of 
research and scholarship in recent years. Much of this scholarship is stimulated by debates in 
Europe about the proper relationship between religion and the public sphere, and more 
generally the relationship between secularism and modernity, both in European and post-
colonial contexts (for example An-Na'im 2008; Asad 2003; Casanova 1994; Davis et al. 
2005; De Vries and Sullivan 2006; Göle 2010, 2002; Habermas 2010; Kaviraj 1995; Kalyvas 
1996; McLennan 2010; Smith and Whistler 2010; Spivak 2007; C. Taylor 2007; Warner et 
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al. 2010). However, the kind of state one has in mind makes a difference. In postcolonial 
societies like South Africa, indigenous religiosity is understood in terms of secular 
customary law and kingship, a legacy of indirect rule written into the post-apartheid 
constitution. Jason Myers (2008) has argued that indirect rule in South Africa was not, as 
Mamdani (1996) has argued, primarily or even merely concerned either with co-option of 
local elites or decentralised despotism. Rather, Myers argues, indirect rule operated as an 
ideological structure that legitimised racial segregation. Leatt’s contention that colonialism 
in Africa was, among other things, a process of secularisation that segregated political and 
religious elements in order to rule more effectively extends Myers’ argument. Where secular 
custom and tradition ends and religion begins is one aspect of a larger problematic that turns 
on theorising the location of religion in relation to the modern state, whether in the model of 
postcolony or European nation-state. As Leatt has noted, ‘the problem is that what is politics 
is shifting and what is religion is shifting. And we can no longer assume the naturalised 
distinctions between them’ (Leatt 2009:2; cf. Myers 1999). I would add that that if this 
segregation between secular and religious domains is coming undone, it is not only because 
postcolonies like South Africa are grappling with the ambivalences and contradictions of 
their colonial legacies. They are grappling with them at the same time that a neoliberal art of 
government is innervating the body politic with an economising rationality for which 
segregations between secular and religious domains are increasingly more of a hindrance 
than an advantage to practising sovereign power and raison d’état.  
 
Conclusion 
In light of the analyses pursued in preceding chapters and the possibilities for further 
discussions described above, we may well wonder who is this figure of an eponymous 
discourse that combines so many apparently disparate interests and concerns? I have tried to 
show throughout this study that the figure of the shaman with which the thesis opened is in 
fact a figuration, a combination of an individual figure with the discourse that proceeds from, 
is imposed on, and then circles back to that figure, along the way acquiring new valuations 
that both expand and intensify this figure in relation to practical domains.  As a figure in 
history, the shaman is a figuration of time, and we may recall the structural optics composing 
a chronophotograph to illustrate the point: the divisions of an object of perception into still 
smaller components; the framing of those divisions by the photographer’s will; the relation 
in time this composition of time establishes with a viewer; and above all, the invitation this 
composition extends to a viewer to insert their self into this composition by (re)cognising the 
structural optics on which their perception and the coherence of the image relies. In this 
sense, the figure of the shaman is also a figuration of the practical limit attitude and 
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therewith the double-hinged articulation of epistemological and ontological labour that 
constitutes modern subjectivity. Like a chronophotograph, the modern limit attitude has an 
internal logic that animates and innervates it, and holds out the possibility of critique. By 
directing us to query ‘whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints’ within what is given as universal, this practical limit attitude separates out from 
the contingencies that have made us the possibilities for saying, thinking, and doing 
differently, and therewith gives impetus, ‘as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work 
of freedom’ (Foucault 2003:53-4). However, no sooner has this will to freedom multiplied 
the surfaces of appearance of a desiring self than the transiency of desire’s fulfillment 
inscribes new limits. Hence we have an enormous proliferation and intensification of a 
discourse about shamans as the limits of knowledge are pushed outwards and the limits of 
the desiring self are elaborated with ever-growing complexity and refinement. As a metonym 
for modernity’s double-hinge, the figure(ation) of the shaman is an occasion for thinking 
about this endless alternation between a will to freedom and the temporalities and 
contingencies that constrain it, not only in relation to specific shamans (who they are, what 
they do, how and why they do it), but in relation to the diverse practical domains 
increasingly imbricated by a discourse about shamans.  
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